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Abstract 
Warning Fatigue or Cry-Wolf effect is a taken-for-granted phenomenon that can result from 
being ‘over-warned’. The terms are used to describe situations where individuals who are 
exposed to recurring warning messages about a disaster which then does not eventuate 
become cynical, apathetic and ‘tired’ of hearing warnings. They may become desensitised to 
the risk thereby endangering themselves even more. The assumption by practitioners 
(emergency managers and governmental policy-makers for example) that warning fatigue is 
a problem presents emergency agencies with a conundrum: they want to avoid the 
accusation of panicking the public but worry they may run the risk of under-preparing them 
at the same time. As a result, they may be tempted to err on the side of caution, delay 
issuing a warning and downplay the possible severity of a potential disaster. 
 
Examination of the literature, and an analysis of presentations and news stories have shown 
that policy-makers, emergency managers, academics and the public use the term ‘cry wolf’ 
or ‘warning fatigue’ in everyday life. They regard it as conventional wisdom and believe it 
can influence risk perception and warning response. Nonetheless it has been presumptively 
assigned by some disaster theorists to the category of a myth. A limited warning fatigue 
literature has examined the phenomenon in the context of rapid-onset disasters and has 
concluded that risk perception is not affected by warning fatigue. However, it also suggests 
there is a direct relationship between warning time, preparedness and response. This allows 
for the possibility that warning fatigue may not be a myth, but a function of the type of 
disaster, the frequency of warnings and warning lead-time. This thesis makes a distinction 
between rapid-onset and prolonged lead-time disasters and hypothesises that prolonged 
lead-time disasters are responded to in very differently ways than rapid-onset ones. 
Australian bushfires provide the context in which this research was conducted because 
bushfires are repeatedly warned about yet rarely (once every ten or twenty years) result in 
a major disaster.  
 
Using social constructionist and social representation theoretical frameworks, and 
integrating psychosocial and sociological perspectives, this thesis examines the role that 
warning fatigue plays in the risk perceptions, warning responses and decision-making 
processes of people living in bushfire-prone areas of Australia. Utilisation of a mixed 
methods design, a substantive literature review and two rounds of semi-structured 
interviews resulted in a conceptualisation of a bushfire warning fatigue measure (BWFM). 
Application of the measure among at-risk Australian communities validated the measure. 
Through empirical statistical analysis, this standardised instrument was revised (BWFM-R) 
and used to measure the change in warning fatigue levels over a fire season (November 
2011-April 2012). Analysis showed that warning fatigue appears to be multi-faceted 
comprising five aspects: Trust and credibility, over-warning, false alarms, scepticism and 
helplessness. It was also found that warning fatigue responses are contextual and 
interconnected with ‘unofficial’ warnings (such as media stories). The direction of the 
change and analysis of the qualitative component of the survey implied that unofficial 
bushfire rhetoric from the media during the winter months may produce a warning fatigue 
effect, so that when the official warnings were issued at the beginning of the bushfire 
season, the public were already ‘tired’ of the message.  
 
Trust and credibility, over-warning, false alarms, scepticism and helplessness are not new 
factors in public warning response to disaster communication, but this research 
demonstrates that they can combine in a unique way to produce ‘warning fatigue’. It 
proposes that if emergency and disaster agencies differentiate between rapid-onset and 
prolonged lead-time disasters, understand the complexities of warning fatigue and design 
their warnings accordingly, then disaster risk communication will become more effective, 
increasing public engagement and improving disaster response.  
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Glossary of Terms 
 
The terms used below provide the basis of understanding of these terms in this thesis. 
However, it is important to note that these definitions should not be regarded as 
deterministic or self-evident; rather this thesis is an exploration of peoples 
understanding of these terms. The approach of this thesis that underpins the 
understanding of these terms is that people socially-construct and interpret them as 
they experience them in their everyday lives. 
 
Warning: information that warns people who are at risk from an impending disaster and 
enables those people to make decisions and take action. 
 
Disaster: Whilst a disaster can equally be a social construction as well as a physical phenomenon 
(Quarentelli 1995), a disaster can be defined as a sudden accident or a natural catastrophe that 
causes great damage or loss of life. 
 
Natural Hazards: Natural hazards are severe and extreme weather and climate events that 
occur naturally in all parts of the world, often as a result of severe weather events.  
 
Natural Disasters: Natural hazards become natural disasters when people’s lives and 
livelihoods are destroyed. Dennis Mileti argues that 'nature creates the hazards but man creates 
the disaster".1 
 
Disaster Warning: a warning about a disaster which can (but not always) be issued in advance 
of a potential event. Warnings of this nature tend to be about large-scale potentially 
catastrophic events.  
 
Emergency Warning: a warning about a potential disaster that is imminent and can be about 
events which are either small or larger in scale.  These warnings tend to be very specific and 
localised. 
 
Risk Communication: a social process ‘by which people become informed about hazards, are 
influenced towards behavioural change and can participate in decision-making about risk issues 
in an informed manner’(Rohrmann 2008:1). It is characterised by risk information which is given 
prior to a possible event. 
 
Crisis Communication: emergency information communicated immediately prior to or 
immediately after a major disaster event. 
 
Bushfire: Bushfire, wildfire, wild-land fire, grass fire, forest fire or scrub fire are all terms used to 
describe any uncontrolled, non-structural fire burning in a grass, scrub, bush or forested area. 
 
Rapid-onset disaster: a potential disaster event that is easily detected, has a high degree of 
certainty in terms of magnitude, severity of impact, time and location and usually happens as 
predicted within a short time period. 
 
Prolonged lead-time disaster: a potential disaster event that has a high degree of uncertainty 
in terms of impact, magnitude, severity, location and is often warned about months or years 
before the possible event.   
                                                                 
1  “What keeps me up at night: lessons (Not) learned” 37th  Natural Hazards Workshop.  
http://www.colorado.edu/hazards/workshop/2012/Sessions/ws201239.html     
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 “Coming events cast their shadows before them” 
Lochiel’s Warning, Thomas Campbell2 
 
Warning Fatigue and the ‘Cry Wolf’ Syndrome 
Cry-wolf’ syndrome and ‘warning fatigue effect’ are generally recognised terms for 
cynicism or apathy that can result from being ‘over-warned’; individuals who are 
exposed to recurring warning messages about an event which does not eventuate, 
become ‘tired’ of hearing warnings. They then turn off and may become desensitised to 
the threatened danger, thereby endangering themselves even more.  
 
There are two popular interpretations of the ‘Cry Wolf’ fable,3 and over time, with the 
telling and retelling, it is impossible to know whether it was based on an event or simply 
a story or as most fables are, a combination of the two. In the first interpretation of the 
original fable the boy saw the wolf creeping near to the sheep and cried out to the 
villagers to come and help, but the noise the villagers made scared the wolf away. 
Because the villagers didn’t see the wolf they thought he didn’t exist so after several 
incidents where the wolf appeared, the boy warned, the villagers came to help and the 
wolf ran away, the villagers did not respond to the boy’s cries, allowing the wolf to 
eventually make off with the sheep. The boy did his job by warning the villagers but 
because the villagers failed to see the wolf (not once, but several times) they thought 
the warnings were bogus. Therefore the danger was real, the consequences equally real 
but the perception or evaluation of the threat was flawed. In the second interpretation, 
the boy was a mischievous trickster who enjoyed seeing the villagers rush out of their 
houses when he pretended that a wolf was endangering the sheep. The villagers 
eventually realised the boy was playing games and when a wolf finally did appear, they 
ignored the boy’s genuine cries for help. Over the years the term ‘cry wolf’  has 
morphed into a myth about being warned about a danger that does not exist. Whereas 
the moral of the older ‘cry wolf’ fable was ‘even if you do not listen to the boy, sooner 
or later he will be right’, the 21st century’s interpretation of the term ‘cry wolf’ is that the 
boy is a liar.  
 
                                                                 
2
 1802, Thomas Campbell, 18th century Scottish poet (1777-1844) 
3
 'The Boy Who Cried Wolf', one of more than 655 fables, supposedly written between 620 and  560 BC by a 
Greek slave and story-teller called Aesop 
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As the following literature chapters will show, ‘Cry wolf syndrome’ or ‘cry wolf effect’ is 
operationalised in the disaster and public safety literatures as being the same as 
warning fatigue; there is no distinction made between the two. This thesis is written 
with the assumption that ‘cry wolf’ is what the public perceive the authorities are doing 
(when threats that are repeatedly warned about don’t eventuate) and that ‘warning 
fatigue’ is the resultant cumulative effect.  
Warning Fatigue in Everyday Life 
The use of the term warning fatigue in relation to warning scenarios is pervasive in 
everyday discourse. For example, a February 2013 agenda for the Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) advisory committee stated: ‘the Committee will discuss general 
factors in risk communication about FDA regulated products, including approaches to 
avoid message fatigue and related communication barriers such as prevention or 
warning fatigue or inaccurate risk perception’.4 A study by the Social Issues Research 
Centre (SIRC) in Oxford UK titled ‘Health scares can cause psychological side effects’ 
suggested that health promotion campaigns which use shock tactics to discourage 
people from harmful behaviour could have the opposite effect.5 The researchers 
identified three types of unwanted effects, the first of which was warning fatigue. They 
suggested that this effect resulted in people becoming desensitised to health messages 
and paying no attention whatsoever concluding: ‘That is the danger of crying wolf. When 
there really is a wolf, you come up against warning fatigue: your audience has simply 
switched off.’6 
 
The existence of warning fatigue is considered conventional wisdom, that is, everyone 
knows about it (or at least what it is) and it has become a ‘taken-for-granted’ 
phenomenon. There is an assumption by end-users (emergency managers, 
governmental policy makers and civil defence authorities for example) that warning 
fatigue not only exists but is a problem. The acceptance of the effects of warning 
fatigue are widespread and are talked about by disaster and emergency managers, 
academics and the public alike. For example, in a paper presented at the AFAC 7 
conference in Darwin in late 2010, principal research scientist for CSIRO8 Dr Garry Cook 
                                                                 
4
 http://www.fda.gov/AdvisoryCommittees/Calendar/ucm335076.htm  
5
 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/health/352150.stm 
6
 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/health/352150.stm 
7
 The Australasian Fire and Emergency Service Authorities Council  
8
 The Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation is Australia's national science agency 
and one of the largest and most diverse research agencies in the world. 
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concluded that in order to reduce residual risk from bushfires in the Australian context 
the ‘cry wolf effect’ needed to be managed (Cook, Bradstock and Williams 2010).  At the 
same conference a year later and when explaining how bushfire fighters make decisions 
in worst-case scenarios, Johnson (2011) identified warning fatigue as the third of seven 
factors that act as barriers to effective management.9  
 
Sandman (2008) identified the dilemma of emergency officials who find it hard to know 
just how aggressive to be when ‘sounding the alarm’ as they have a two-fold problem; 
avoiding the accusation of panicking the public but also running the risk of under-
preparing them at the same time (1). Ensuring that people remain vigilant in a 
prolonged threat scenario is challenging, as Matthew Cochrane, communications and 
advocacy manager for the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent 
Societies (IFRC) acknowledged: ‘officials risk creating undue panic or becoming ‘the boy 
who cried wolf’ [and] it’s a fine line between keeping people aware ..but not 
underwhelmed or overwhelmed’.10 In June 2007, The Asian Disaster Preparedness 
Centre issued number 18 of their ‘Safer Cities’ case studies on mitigating disasters in 
Asia and the Pacific. This community initiative to provide early warnings was entitled 
‘The Boy Who Cried “Wolf” or Why a Community-based Alert System is a good idea’. 
The case study about community responses to tsunami warnings was framed using the 
cry wolf story and asked ‘what is the village, who is the wolf, and who is the boy’? (Safer 
Cities 2007). 
 
Examples of references to warning fatigue are often found in weather warnings 
contexts. Weather forecasters are particularly wary of the way they issue weather 
warnings, because even though technology has developed to the point where extreme 
weather events can be warned about days or weeks in advance, it is still far from an 
exact science. An article in the Newark Star-Ledger by Stirling (2011) quoted 
meteorologist Greg Heavener from the Mount Holly National Weather Service: ‘You’re 
dealing with dangerous situations and people’s lives could be in danger. But if you over-
warn, you can become like the boy who cried wolf, people stop paying attention’.  
Sharma and Patt (2012) point out that natural hazards are inherently uncertain and ‘it is 
                                                                 
9
 Seven factors that act as barriers to effective management : 1) Inexperience, 2) Tunnel Vision, 3) 
Underestimation of Risk, 4) Suboptimal attitudes, 5) Situation characteristics, 6) interpersonal issues, 7) 
standard procedures 
10
 ‘Global: The risk of warning fatigue in disaster preparedness” , 
http://www.irinnews.org/report/94109/global-the-risk-of-warning-fatigue-in-disaster-preparedness 
13 
 
impossible to make perfect predictions of hazards occurrence and its characteristics’ 
(421). Many of the public understand this, yet when weather forecasters fail to warn of 
catastrophic events, they are criticised. The recent trial and conviction in an Italian court 
of six scientists who were accused of failing to give adequate warning of an earthquake 
in the city of L’Aquila in 2009, illustrate this (MailOnline 2013).  The impact on public 
perception of tsunami warnings was uppermost in the mind of Jim Tetlow of the 
eastern Bay of Plenty CDEM11 after a tsunami siren in the coastal town of Whakatane, 
New Zealand, sounded following a 4.2 magnitude earthquake. However this was a false 
alarm as there was no actual tsunami warning issued. Tetlow regretted the incident 
saying that he was ‘wary of the Boy Who Cried Wolf factor that false alarms could bring’ 
(Stuff 2013). Similarly, Joseph Miketta, the warning coordination meteorologist at the 
US Mount Holly National Weather forecast office was concerned about the high false 
alarm rate associated with tornado warnings and said: ‘one of the problems with 
tornado warnings we see is warning fatigue [which] can have serious consequences’ 
(Stirling 2011). 
 
In March 1993 in the southern Appalachian region of the eastern United States, an 
extreme weather event occurred, later named the ‘Superstorm of ‘93’.12 Rhatigan, 
Barnes and Gruntfest (2004) surveyed emergency managers who dealt with this event 
and found that some thought that the public’s confidence could be lessened by a false 
alarm, and that ‘those issuing warnings may be more reluctant to issue warnings for the 
fear of issuing a false alarm’ (Gruntfest and Carswell 2000; Weaver, Gruntfest and Levy 
2000 cited in Barnes, Gruntfest and Hayden et al. 2007:1143). Perhaps the United States 
National Weather Service13 was concerned about public warning fatigue when it issued 
a strongly worded warning to residents directly in the path of Hurricane Sandy. 14 There 
were five main statements in the warning, and the last one read: 
IF YOU THINK THE STORM IS OVER-HYPED AND EXAGGERATED, PLEASE 
ERR ON THE SIDE OF CAUTION.15 
Prior to the same storm, a US news organisation – CNBC – ran a story about the 
impending disaster entitled 'Frankenstorm: Threat Launches Mass Evacuations’. In the 
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 Civil Defence Emergency Management, New Zealand.  
12
 Also known as the Great Blizzard of 1993, it impacted the East Coast of North America on March 12–13, 
1993. It was unusually large in size and intensity and killed 310 people.  
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 Mount Holly, New Jersey 
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article a comment by a resident of a town in the path of the hurricane shows why 
emergency authorities are wary of false alarms and warning fatigue:  
.But you know how many times they tell you, ‘This is it, it’s really coming 
and it’s really the big one’ and it turns out not to be? I’m afraid people will 
tune out because of all the false alarms before, and the time you need to 
take it seriously, you won’t (US News: ‘Frankenstorm Threat’, 2012) . 
These examples are far from exhaustive, but serve to demonstrate that the use of the 
terms cry wolf or warning fatigue is a commonplace occurrence. Understanding how 
these terms have come to have  meanings and impacts ascribed to them is fundamental 
to the exegesis of warning fatigue in this thesis, because as this chapter will show, it is a 
much contested term.  
Warning Fatigue and False Alarms 
The idea that false alarms could be used deliberately for a particular psychological 
effect has been documented as early as 331BC as a deliberate battle strategy: ‘Repeated 
noisy marches and counter-marches of the cavalry of Alexander the Great kept Porus on 
tenterhooks, and then, through repetition, dulled his reaction to it’ (Hart 1962 cited in 
Breznitz 1984:xiii). When a warning is given or an alarm sounded, the belief that the 
threat is real and the warning should be heeded is ‘a function of the ratio of recent true 
alarms to recent false alarms’ (ibid.: 12). Because of the assumption that over-warning is 
problematic and that false alarms reduce confidence in future warnings, in an attempt 
to mitigate the cry wolf effect emergency managers have been known to change the 
way they issue warnings. For example, in 2010 the U.S National Weather Service stated 
that it was actively seeking to reduce the problematic false alarm rate (FAR) related to 
weather warnings, because of anticipated community complacency (Barnes et al. 2007).  
 
Emergency managers are aware that false alarms can undermine credibility, and want 
to reduce them. For example, Savage, Baker and Golden et al. (1984) report that having 
previously ordered evacuation orders that proved unnecessary, government officials 
during a subsequent hurricane 16 opted not to recommend evacuation because they 
were worried they would be accused of ‘being wrong again’ (cited in Mileti and 
Sorenson 1990:76). In tsunami warning scenarios, false alarms are problematic as they 
are often triggered automatically by emergency systems rather than manually by 
emergency authorities. Most often earthquakes do not generate tsunamis big enough 
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 Hurricane Alicia, struck Galveston and Houston, Texas in August 1983, causing US$2.6 billion dollars and 
killing 21 people.   
15 
 
to justify evacuation. A paper by Simmons and Sutter (2009) that explored the false  
alarm effect by plotting the relationship between tornado false alarms and death and 
injury rate from tornados for the same period, 17 found that there was a statistically 
significant false alarm effect in areas with a higher false alarm ratio (FAR). The study 
concluded that public perception of the FAR may be different to the actual effects; this 
observation illustrates that often public perception of risk is at odds with the official or 
experts evaluation of the same event. The public may not be able to distinguish 
between a false alarm and a near miss, or credit a near miss as a false alarm and vice-
versa. This problem is not confined to the general public. In much of the literature 
reviewed for this chapter the language used in warning scenarios was often 
contradictory, vague and confusing; terminologies were used interchangeably with little 
distinction made between ‘warnings’ or ‘predictions’, ‘false alarms’ or ‘near misses’.  
 
‘Disaster’ is a highly contested term, and can be equally a social construct as well as an 
actual physical event. As Quarantelli (1975) points out, conceptualising ‘disaster’ is 
important, albeit difficult, because a broad consensus about what a disaster is needed if 
peoples working in different disciplines are to understand each other. At a minimum, it 
is important to have some agreement about ‘characteristics of the phenomena, the 
conditions that lead to them and the consequences that result’ (ibid:225). As stated in 
the glossary on page 10, a disaster is operationalised in this thesis as a natural catastrophe 
that causes great damage or loss of life. 
 
The majority of contemporary disaster warnings are not typically followed by impact 
(Reser 1996). Therefore if ‘high alarm’ messages do not eventuate in an event of 
corresponding magnitude (despite the very real nature of the threat), it is possible that 
the public may become desensitised to subsequent warnings, be less concerned about 
the hazard and fail to take it as seriously as the emergency agencies recommend. 
Twerski, Donaher, and Piehler et al. (1976) suggest that over-warning or the frequency 
of warnings (in the environment) ‘may contribute to a perception that certain types of 
warnings should be ignored’ (cited in Stewart and Martin 1994:7). The very idea of a 
false alarm is problematic as it implies that any response to the warning was a waste of 
time, maybe a bit foolish, certainly unnecessary. After responding to a false alarm 
people can feel that they have lost face and were foolish for believing the prediction, 
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and presume that preparatory and avoidant action were wasted (Breznitz 1984).  
Another study (Atwood and Major 1998) suggested that some people who had been 
involved in a false alarm event may feel that the event was ‘a bad joke in which they 
been had played for a fool’ (296). The problem is that people are ‘exposed to repeated 
warning messages in the absence of an actual impact’ (Reser 1996:204) and recent 
research into public reactions to the global avian flu pandemic supports this. 18 When the 
H5N1 influenza was first warned about in 2002, New Zealanders who had taken the 
threat seriously were subsequently ridiculed by others people in their social networks 
when the H5N1 threat turned out not to be as serious as first predicted (Mackie 2009). 
It is the repeated nature of false alarms that this thesis suggests is problematic; on the 
basis of cumulative experience of false alarms, subsequent warnings are ‘reinterpreted 
at some point as benign’ (Brezntiz 1984:15).  
 
Barnes et al. (2007) conceptualised a ‘general depiction of warnings for possible events’ 
(1143) where instead of a ‘yes/no’ schema where events were classified as either an 
accurate warning or a false alarm, a spectrum of events could be mapped to reflect a 
range of warning scenarios. 
         Figure 1: Conceptual Model of Warning Accuracy (Barnes et al. 2007:1144) 
The model by Barnes et al. (2007) of warning accuracy reflects a range of official 
warnings, but makes no assumptions about how each warning scenario could impact 
upon public response. An adapted model is discussed in chapter 3. 19 There is an obvious  
negative effect on subsequent public response if false alarms occur, however, this can 
be mitigated if the reasons for the mistake are clearly communicated to the public 
(Mileti and Peek 2000:191). In this way false alarms may serve to improve public hazard 
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awareness and risk appraisal, and could be ‘an opportunity to convey information’  
(Mileti and Sorenson 1990:33). Dow and Cutter (1998, 2000) offer that there is a 
difference between public response to a single false alarm compared with repeated 
false alarms and suggest that if the public understands why a false alarm has happened, 
their subsequent response (to another alarm) will not decrease. Sandman (2012) argues 
that the public are wise to lose faith in false alarms because he maintains that ‘properly 
constructed warnings aren’t falsified when the risk doesn’t materialise ... any more than 
the failure of a house to catch fire negates the purchase of fire insurance’ (6).  
 
The Australian public is warned throughout the year about the dangers of bushfires  and 
two discourses are common: if the winter has been wet it has produced abundant fuel 
for the summer bushfire season. However if the winter months have been dry, then the 
coming fire season is predicted to be dire. Immediately prior to the fire season, there 
are numerous official bushfire warnings, 20 and this cycle of bushfire rhetoric continues 
year after year. However, a bushfire event sufficiently destructive to be called a disaster 
rarely happens. For example, the 2009 Victorian Black Saturday bushfires (resulting in 
173 deaths) occurred some 26 years after the previous comparable bushfire disaster 
event: the Ash Wednesday bushfires in which 47 Victorians perished.21 Nonetheless, 
major bushfires occur often enough that most people know what a dangerous and 
unpredictable threat they can be. In Australia, fire danger warnings are issued by the 
Bureau of Meteorology when the fire forecast is deemed to be Extreme/Catastrophic. 
During the 2002-2003 fire season (November to April) there were 1,234 fire-weather 
warnings, of which just over half provided an advanced warning and 40 percent were 
false alarms (BoM 2003). There is little research about the impact of false alarms in the 
Australian bushfire context. More research is needed to understand whether false 
alarms are detrimental to public response to bushfire warnings; additionally, what 
measures could be adopted to lower the false alarm rate. This discussion is outside the 
scope of this thesis. 
The ‘Myth’ of Warning Fatigue 
Much of the existing disaster literature talks about the ‘myth’ of the cry wolf syndrome 
or effect, implying that it doesn’t exist. However, much of the same literature raises 
questions about the public’s response and puzzlement as to their non-response. Reser 
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(1996) says there is little evidence to support warning fatigue but in the same paper he 
states ‘repeated natural disaster warnings, as for example in the case of cyclones, can 
lead to inattention, complacency and desensitisation’ (204). Sorenson (1993) calls ‘cry 
wolf’ a myth, yet when he explains what he means, he says that warnings are not 
always diminished by cry wolf syndrome implying therefore that sometimes they are. As 
Nigg (1995) points out, a myth does not necessarily mean that a social phenomenon 
should be regarded as fiction, but rather ‘as a cultural explanation for events and 
phenomena that impact peoples lives’ (374). Moreover, these myths are more likely to 
be associated with natural disasters22 than man-made technological ones.23 (Fischer and  
Bischoff 1987 cited in Nigg 1995). A 2002 workshop on effective hazards warnings24 
repeated the dictum that the cry wolf effect is a myth, yet it also qualified this 
statement by saying that [only] rare events produce this effect. Moreover, it is 
important to try and not interrupt peoples’ lives with warnings [and] to limit the 
number of interruptions to those situations that are directly hazardous to them’ 
(‘Developing a Unified All-Hazards Public Warning System’ 2002). Perhaps the 
prolonged disaster scenarios as outlined later in this chapter typify these ‘rare events’.   
Literature to date 
Much of the literature that explores the cry wolf phenomenon was published over 30 
years ago and only two empirical studies of warning fatigue have been done to date. In 
an early study Breznitz (1984) hypothesised that warning fatigue (or the False Alarm 
Effect – FAE) was a result of anticipatory stress from repeated threats of future harm 
that did not eventuate. His premise was that people cannot sustain vigilance about 
personal risk and through various coping mechanisms (of which warning fatigue is one) 
strive to palliate or mitigate the anticipated stress. Breznitz (1984) operationalised 
anticipatory stress as fear and hypothesised that any change in the amount of fear a 
person may experience as a result of a threat, could be a function of time. He also 
explored whether the way that a threat was communicated affected the fear response. 
He tested his theory of warning fatigue with participants in a laboratory setting, 
threatening them with a stimulus and measuring the strength of their fear reaction 
when the stimulus was not administered. The stimulus was the threat of an unavoidable 
intense electric shock,25 the imminence of which was known to the participant and 
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 Radioactive leaks, health scares, dam collapses, for example. 
24 ‘Workshop on Effective Hazards Warnings’ held in Emmetsburg Maryland, November 25, 2002   
25
 This methodology would never have been approved by a 21st century ethics committee! 
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anticipated by watching a clock. The participant did not experience the shock prior to 
the experiment and knew when the shock was supposed to occur thus eliminating 
temporal uncertainty - where the participants do not know the exact time of danger. 
The fear or FAE indexes were heart rate (beats per minute) and skin conductivity. Some 
of his findings included: 
 Threats increase a fear reaction and the cancellation of threats decreases it.  
 The probability of a threat is positively related to the intensity of a fear reaction and 
a high probability threat leads to a stronger FAE.  
 The greater the similarity between the new threat and the cancelled one, the 
greater the FAE.  
 New information about why the threat was cancelled (not available during the 
issuing of the original threat) did not restore credibility.  
 
The overall conclusion of the research was that a false alarm experience reduces the 
fear reaction of the receiver. Breznitz (1984) also hypothesised that personality 
characteristics and social norms influenced the extent to which individuals were 
susceptible to the FAE. His research was laboratory-based with a contrived threat 
stimulus and was not generalised to a real-world application of natural hazards. This 
was because Breznitz deemed warning fatigue ‘too complicated a phenomenon to be 
studied in its natural environment’ (23).  
 
Turner (1983) explored six hypotheses26 related to an extended period of waiting for a 
disaster, using as a case study a series of ‘earthquake-near’ predictions in 1976 of a 
‘great and destructive’ earthquake in Los Angeles County. His second hypothesis was 
that a cry wolf effect could result from people concluding that ‘the entire alarm was 
unjustified in the first place’ and that the forecasters or scientists ‘did not know what 
they were doing’ (308). Turner found that people became less sceptical and 
disillusioned and so rejected his hypothesis. However, Turner’s definition of ‘cry wolf’ is 
problematic because a fundamental premise of this thesis is that the cry wolf effect is 
the end result of a series of warnings not a faulty assumption at the beginning of the 
process. In dismissing warning fatigue as a possibility but then linking his conclusion 
with source credibility (scientists and forecasters) Turner ignored the vast body of risk 
communication literature that shows there is a strong correlation between trust and 
credibility of officials on one hand, and the public’s uptake and belief of risk messages 
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fatigue may develop; 3) anxiety accumulates resulting in denial; 4) accumulated anxiety results in suspicion, 
scapegoating and resentment; 5) people seek clarification, hear repeated reminders and seek more 
information; and 6) led to rehearsals and selection of more effective responses.  
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on the other (for example Covello & Sandman 2001; Eagly et al. 1978; Flynn et al. 1992; Giddens 
and Pierson 2009; Gutteling and Weigman 1996; Hovland and Weiss 1952; Johnson and Sandman 
1992; McGuire 1969; Pidgeon et al. 2003; Renn and Levine 1991; Sandman 1993, 2004, 2008).  
Turners study also interchanged the terms ‘prediction’ and ‘warning’. Turner also linked 
his participants remembering earthquake ‘announcements’ with how likely they 
thought the earthquake may happen. This demonstrates only that a level of  attention 
was paid to the announcements and more research into the specific components of the 
message would have added clarity to his findings. The sense of urgency about the 
earthquake threat and perception of its imminence did decline over time which Turner 
suggested should be interpreted as increasing realism. Turner also found that despite 
repeated ‘reminders’ the participants’ uncertainty about the impending disaster 
increased, which other studies suggest would decrease credibility and increase warning 
fatigue. These observations imply a cumulative effect of warning fatigue which needs to 
be examined over a longer period than Turner used for his study.  
 
Atwood and Major (1998) tested the cry wolf hypothesis based on an earthquake 
prediction by a New Mexico business consultant and self-taught climatologist, Iben 
Browning. His prediction had been widely reported in the media since late 1989, but it 
was not until October 1990 that the Ad Hoc Working Group from the National 
Earthquake Prediction Evaluation Council (NEPEC) announced that the ‘prediction had 
no scientific value’ (280). Atwood and Major (ibid.) observed that up to half of the 
public had recalled that a prediction had been made but the study did not explore the 
reasons for the recall.  The results concluded that a false alarm effect was evident 
because after Browning’s prediction was cancelled, people spent less time thinking 
about and preparing for the threat. They also assessed the earthquake as less of a 
threat than before the cancellation. Atwood and Major’s study had some 
methodological limitations and was similar to Turners study in that the terminologies 
are used interchangeably: ‘cry wolf’ and ‘false alarm effect’ and ‘warning fatigue’ are 
described as the same phenomenon. Browning’s predictions were made known 
through the media, but the effects on the public from the media reporting were not 
considered.27  
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Most of the literature to date has used weather warnings as their case studies. An 
example is a study by Dow and Cutter (1998) that explores the cry wolf effect in the 
context of people’s responses to two hurricanes (Bertha and Fran), which made landfall 
in North Carolina in 1996. The underlying premise of the study was that ‘repeated false 
alarms reduce the credibility of warning information’ (2). It explored the cry wolf effect 
through examining the evacuation compliance of residents in the path of the predicted 
hurricanes. Dow hypothesised that information credibility was a factor in residents’ 
evaluation of risk from the hurricanes and concluded that cry wolf was not a factor 
because there was no drop in information credibility after the first hurricane. However, 
there was no ‘base-line’ measurement established pre-hurricane which makes it difficult 
to conclusively surmise the drop (or otherwise) of the rate of information reliability.  
Dow and Cutter (ibid.) assumed a decrease in evacuations for the second hurricane 
would demonstrate a cry wolf effect; as this did not happen they concluded that the cry 
wolf effect was minimal, whilst noting that there seems to be a growing ‘evacuation-
resistant’ population. Although in their study Dow and Cutter (1998) did not find 
evidence of the cry-wolf effect, they commented that the cry-wolf effect is often ‘a 
widespread source of speculation and concern within the warning community’ (1142). A 
strength of Dow and Cutters approach was that their study included cultural and social  
contexts, and included several different information sources.28 
 
In a study that examined the inconsistent literature about the effect of experience upon 
warning response, Sharma and Patt (2012) suggest that the definition of experience 
may be problematic. They highlight that some literature defines experience as simply 
witnessing an event whereas other literature characterises experience as substantial 
loss. Many studies (but not all) negatively correlate experience (of either type) with 
disaster response. Sharma and Patt (ibid.) support the concept of a continuum to 
demonstrate a range of warning accuracy (Barnes et al. 2007) and their study concluded 
that ‘the greater the experience of false alarms, the lesser the tendency to respond to 
warnings’ (Sharma and Patt 2012:421). This finding has important implications for the 
exploration of false alarms as a factor in generating warning fatigue. In a different vein, 
but perhaps no less relevant, Roulston and Smith (2004) propose a cost-benefit (or 
cost-loss) matrix for the cry wolf fable scenario which factored in the rationality of the 
villagers in making the decision not to come to the aid of the shepherd boy. They 
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supposed that if the villagers had done a cost-benefit analysis, where the flock of sheep 
was one of the villages’ most important assets, then they should have tolerated a quite 
high false alarm rate. Roulston and Smith (ibid.) calculated the false alarm rate was 
about 67 percent, which unfortunately for both the boy and the villagers, produced a 
low rate of compliance (answering the boys’ cries for help). Through mathematical 
modelling Ralston and Smith (ibid.) show however that compliance is a combination of 
the frequency of the forecasted probabilities, cost-loss ratio and the intolerance of the 
users to false alarms. When seeking explanations for the phenomena of warning 
fatigue, these are ideas which merit consideration. 
 
Sandman (2008) maintains that apathy is a more pressing problem than warning fatigue 
and that people ‘intuitively understand that a false alarm is a much smaller problem 
than a disaster they weren’t warned about’(3). Furthermore he argued that people stop 
taking warnings seriously if previous warnings do not eventuate and too many warnings 
about risk that do not materialize may result in people who shrug off future warnings 
(Sandman 2011). Sandman highlights the issue of contradictory warning language and 
ponders whether the warnings that are most susceptible to warning fatigue are not in 
fact warnings, but predictions. He suggests that warning fatigue, should it prove to be 
an issue in the bushfire context, may be a temporary effect and part of what he calls an 
adjustment reaction (ibid.: 2005a).29 This is where, after a rare and catastrophic event, it  
is common for people to think there will be more similar events. However, when this 
doesn’t happen the disaster is contextualised and preparations relaxed.  
 
Warning fatigue could be beneficial because it may serve to correct an over-prepared 
organisational and personal disaster response that could ‘waste resources year after 
year whilst waiting for a rare event to finally materialise’  (Sandman 2012). Continuing 
this idea, Sandman (ibid.) did a ‘cost-benefit’ analysis, assuming that a bushfire similar 
to Black Saturday occurred once every twenty years (with comparable householder 
fatality rates), which equated to nine lives lost per year. He posed the question: ‘how 
much distortion in people’s lives is appropriate to save something less than ten lives per 
year’? This idea challenges the emphasis put on warning about bushfires by fire 
agencies and suggests a different way of thinking about bushfire risk communication.  
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Over-reassurance by authorities is criticised by Sandman as ‘warning fatigues’ evil twin’ 
(2008). He asserts that whilst exaggerated warnings about realistic potential hazards 
perform a service because they get people’s attention and motivate precautions, ‘by 
contrast, exaggerated reassurances about realistic potential hazards are mostly a 
disservice, lulling people into apathy about genuine problems’ (Sandman 2013).  
Sandman maintains that warning fatigue operates much more in the sphere of risk 
probability than of risk consequence and that credibility is more likely to be damaged 
when warnings overstate how probable or imminent a potential catastrophe may be; it 
is far less damaged when warnings dramatize or even exaggerate how bad it might get 
if it happens (P. Sandman, personal communication used with permission: 20 September 
2013). Implications of this approach are that warning fatigue is hypothesised to be less 
of an issue when warnings overstate the probability of the threat but have a greater 
effect when warnings overstate how bad things may get. This hypothesis is discussed in 
chapter 10. Sandman (2013) explains that ‘I certainly don’t think warning fatigue is a 
myth. But I do think its risks are themselves often overstated’ (ibid.).  
Discussion 
It is the premise of this thesis that warning fatigue, as a warning response has been 
presumptively and wrongly assigned by disaster literature to the category of a myth. 30 
Examination of the literature, and an analysis of commentaries, presentations, news 
stories and articles have shown that policy makers, emergency managers, academics 
and the public use the term cry wolf or warning fatigue in everyday life and, as 
conventional wisdom, believe that it is an influence on risk perception and warning 
response. The literature to date has examined the phenomenon both in a laboratory 
setting and in the field and has done so in the context of rapid onset disasters. 
However, the studies on false alarms suggest there is a direct relationship between 
warning time, preparedness and response. This allows for the possibility that warning 
fatigue may be a function of risk perception, frequency of warning messages, types of 
disaster and warning lead-time. This chapter has also highlighted the confusing and 
contradictory nature of the language that is often used in the disaster literature and by 
those issuing warning messages.  
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Australian bushfires are an infrequent disaster-level event, occurring once every 20-30 
years in the magnitude that destroys vast swathes of land and causes many property 
losses and civilian deaths. However, it is also a threat which has an annual ‘season’ and 
is the reason for a myriad of official bushfire warnings. These are many and various, 
communicated primarily by fire agencies via a variety of methods.31 Research on the 
Australian public’s response to bushfire warnings has been limited, and has mostly 
focused on disaster behaviour, compliance with the ‘Stay or Go’ policy,32 effectiveness 
of evacuation options and the benefits of preparedness on survivability. This thesis 
asserts that, in the context of a prolonged disaster threat which generates repeated 
warnings in the absence of an actual event, there is a need to understand how people 
assess their actual bushfire risk. Additionally, more research is needed to understand 
those things which influence attention to warnings and response. This chapter has 
considered the ‘case for warning fatigue’ and the following chapters explore the 
experiences, opinions and viewpoints of people living in bushfire-prone areas of 
Australia to see if warning fatigue is an influence upon risk perception and warning 
response. Rather than ‘make an argument’ for warning fatigue at the outset, this thesis 
makes no assumptions about the existence of the phenomenon.  
 
The principle aim of the research reported in this thesis is to explore the phenomenon 
of warning fatigue and establish whether there was a way to operationalise it in such a 
way that it could be measured. Through the evaluation of relevant literature, use of 
pertinent theoretical epistemologies and analysis of in-depth interviews this thesis 
seeks to explore risk perception and warning response in the Australian bushfire 
context. The framework of this thesis is risk communication and risk perception and an 
argument will be made for examining these subjects drawing upon knowledges from 
both psychosocial and sociological disciplines. The media is implicit in communication 
and it is important to understand how the media can influence public perception of 
salient issues; indeed how some issues can be made salient by the media. Risk 
communication should not imply crisis communication although in many instances they 
are confounded.33 In this thesis it is the communication that happens before an event 
(sometimes many years before) that is the framework within which warning fatigue is 
explored.   
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Thesis Overview 
Chapter 2: The Australian bushfires in Context 
This chapter situates the thesis in the Australian bushfire context. It details the unique 
vegetation of Australia and explains the role it has in Australia’s ‘bushfire story’. It 
examines the differing bushfire discourses and shows how the utilisation of ‘collective 
remembering’ and repeated memorial events can serve to keep the risk of bushfires 
salient for the public.   
 
Chapter 3: Disasters, Media and Warnings 
This chapter examines the role of the media in communicating risk and narrows the 
focus to the ways disasters are reported. Disaster myths are addressed with particular 
attention paid to Australian bushfire myths. Using relevant risk, media and disaster 
theories, the ways that the media report risk (and disasters in particular) and ‘mediate’ 
disaster risk for the public is discussed. A disaster typology is proposed that shows how 
the notions of certainty and uncertainty can influence how disaster risk is regarded.  
 
Chapter 4: Subjectivity in the Social Domain 
A psychosocial approach to understanding risk and the role that fear response plays in 
risk perception comprises much of this chapter. Arguments for the merit of including a 
cognitive approach in a sociological thesis are made. Approaches for understanding 
perception of risk include cognitive adaptations, coping strategies, biases and 
maladaptations. There is a focus on the cognitive affects that may contribute to 
warning fatigue. 
 
Chapter 5: Risk 
Risk perception and communication is examined from the perspective of ‘the social’ in 
this chapter. Pertinent risk communication theories as well as risk heuristics and biases 
are discussed. The latter part of this chapter details the official bushfire risk 
communication of the Country Fire Authority in Victoria, Australia.  
 
Chapter 6: Methodology 
This chapter outlines the epistemological frameworks and the theoretical and analytic 
methodologies used to examine the phenomenon of warning fatigue. In particular this 
chapter explains how the integrative and interdisciplinary philosophy, fundamental to 
this thesis, directed the methodological design. Practical considerations of participant 
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recruitment, interviewing and data issues as well as ethical and methodological 
limitations are elaborated upon.  
 
Chapter 7: Study One 
This first analysis chapter reports findings from semi-structured interviews with people 
living in bushfire-prone areas of Victoria and Tasmania who regularly attend community 
bushfire preparation meetings. The investigation of bushfire issues for this round of 
interviews was broad in approach, and covered a wide range of topics. Additionally it 
provided a framework to continue to conceptualise warning fatigue in the bushfire 
context.  
 
Chapter 8: Study Two 
The second analysis chapter extended the exploration of peoples’ ‘lived experiences’ of 
bushfire risk. It reports findings from semi-structured interviews with people living in 
bushfire-prone areas of Victoria who, unlike the cohort in Chapter 7, were not involved 
in any community bushfire preparation activities. The interview protocol was more 
structured and focused on risk perception, warnings and warning responses.  
 
Chapter 9: Study Three 
The last analysis chapter reports results from a survey of a third sample of residents 
living in bushfire-prone areas of Victoria, Queensland and New South Wales. The survey 
was designed to test a purposively-designed self-report bushfire warning fatigue 
measure. The measure comprised items derived from both the disaster literature and 
the findings from the first two studies. Using both qualitative and quantitative 
methodologies, the measure was refined and used to determine levels of warning 
fatigue over a six month period.  
 
Chapter 10 : Discussion and Implications 
This last chapter presents the main findings of the thesis and how the research 
responds to gaps in knowledge previously identified in disaster literatures. It discusses 
the social construction of warning fatigue in the Australian bushfire context and 
describes the advantages of understanding warning fatigue in a broader disaster 
context.   
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2: AUSTRALIAN BUSHFIRES 
Introduction 
This chapter situates the thesis within the physical, cultural and social environments of 
Australian bushfires. Understanding the cultural and social meanings of bushfires is 
important because people rely on this knowledge when making decisions that can 
affect their survival during bushfires (Schauble 2008). The notion of bushfire risk is a 
social construction, 34 because as people gain knowledge about bushfires, meanings are 
created, organised and ‘made concrete’. Cultural representations of fire include the 
place of fire in Australian culture, its landscape and its depiction as a disaster; they 
‘reflect the knowledges that Australians have developed about bushfires, their 
characteristics, behaviour and place in the landscape’ (Schauble 2008:12). Bushfire is 
embedded in a larger nature discourse, which includes notions of ‘the bush’ and ‘the 
bushranger’; these ideas are not ‘neutral’ and over the years have been imbued with 
meanings, symbolism and myth. Bushfires are talked about using competing narratives: 
they are natural or unnatural, good or bad, controllable or uncontrollable. Fires can be 
thought of as necessary for plant regeneration, a destroying force, the result of 
European ignorance or indigenous hunting practices.  
 
Perceptions (and misperceptions) of bushfire are linked to narratives about the bush 
and narratives are produced by culture because they ‘generate meanings’ (Turner 
1986:25). Moreover, as Schauble (2008) argues culture is just as ‘equally influenced by 
the landscape and events within it’ (13) because the land is not only constructed from 
meaning and language but also is transformed ‘itself by words, phrases and ways of 
telling’ (Bonyhady and Griffiths 2002 in Schauble 2007:18). This chapter discusses two of 
the worst bushfires in Australia’s recent history – Ash Wednesday and Black Saturday – 
and show how different discourses can be drawn upon to understand the bushfire 
‘problem’. It also outlines the characteristics of Australia’s landscape and bush that 
make it so susceptible to bushfire year after year. It situates the ideas about bushfire in 
Australia’s recent history and explores the role of culture, context and collective 
remembering in the social construction of bushfire. 
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 Social constructionism is a foundational theory for this thesis and is discussed in Chapter 6, page 128.  
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The Landscape and the Eucalypt 
 
We have had disastrous bushfires in the past, and we must expect them in the 
future with about the same frequency. Australia will burn time and time again 
(Packham 1992:12). 
 
The geographic peculiarities of Australia contribute greatly to its bushfire vulnerability  
and every year eighty percent of Australia does not have any significant rainfall (Clode 
2010). Australia is one of the most bushfire-prone countries in the world, with the worst 
bushfires most often occurring in the states of Victoria and South Australia. After 
heatwaves, tropical cyclones and floods, bushfires have been the fourth most 
hazardous Australian natural disaster in the last century (Coates 1999). This is because 
of several climactic and geographical factors; both states lie on the edge of the Great 
Victoria Desert.35 The propensity for drought, seasonal growth associated with cyclic 
weather patterns (very wet months followed by drought) and the location of heavily 
populated areas make these states especially vulnerable to large-scale bushfires (Luke 
and McArthur 1978). The topography of the mountains, steep slopes, ridges and valleys 
channel the hot air that originates from the inland deserts which are amongst the 
hottest areas on earth. When very dry hot air is transported from central Australia over 
to the south east corner of the continent it does not pick up any additional moisture; 
intense heat builds and can be accompanied by very strong, gale force northwest winds 
(BoM 2013) 
 
Bushfires and climate are intrinsically linked; for example prior to the Ash Wednesday 
bushfires of 1983 and as a result of the El Niño climatic cycle, over large areas of eastern 
Australia there had been the most severe drought since records began in the 1870’s 
(Bureau of Meteorology 1982). Atmospheric conditions are one of several 
environmental factors for bushfires36 and when the years are hotter and drier, fires start 
more easily and the fire season is often prolonged (Liu, Goodrick and Heilman 2013). 
Modelling of climate change due to the greenhouse effect suggest an increase in 
temperature worldwide which increases the likelihood of bushfires, even in regions not 
normally prone (IPCC, 2007). Climate change projections indicate that Victoria and NSW 
are likely to become hotter and drier in future while Tasmania is predicted to become 
                                                                 
35
 The Great Victoria Desert stretches from Western Australia to South Australia; it is over 800 kilometres 
wide and covers an area of 424,000 square kilometres. 
36
 The other factors include fuels, topography and management and the human factor of urbanisation.  
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warmer and wetter (Hennessy, Lucas and Nicholls et al. 2005:6). Therefore the inclusion 
of possible climate change impacts in future bushfires management practices is an 
important consideration. 
 
The most common tree in the Australian landscape is the eucalypt. The Eucalyptus tree 
dominates the Australian landscape and has given Australia a special character; called 
‘The Universal Australian’ it is ‘less of a genus than an alliance with over 700 different 
species’ (Pyne 1998). Commonly known as the ‘gum tree’ because many species bleed 
sap from any break in the bark, the Eucalypt is uniquely adapted for the Australian 
climate. Not only does it have a large root system capable of capturing and retaining 
water, but once water is absorbed the tree is able to store more nutrients than it 
immediately needs, using lignotubers or enlarged storage organs in its roots. It can 
produce seedlings, not only from these lignotubers, but from any broken branch, where 
it uses nutrients cached between the inner heartwood and the outer bark to facilitate 
rapid growth (Lyne 1996). The bark of a Eucalypt is thick, and as such is able to protect 
the epicormic buds beneath it during a fire, allowing the buds after a fire to almost 
immediately push through the burnt bark and begin sprouting. But whilst these many 
characteristics demonstrate its ability to survive bushfires, it is the sclerophyllous leaves 
that explain why the Eucalypt is no friend of the fire-fighter (Hillis 1967). As in other 
members of the myrtle family, Eucalyptus leaves are covered with oil glands, and 
produce the Eucalyptus oil which is uniquely scented. Australia’s only medicinal export, 
it is often used in decongestants and has antiseptic and insect repellent properties. On 
very warm days or when exposed to the heat of a bushfire, the oil evaporates and rises 
above the tree, giving off a blue haze and creating a combustible gas. In the inferno 
which is a firestorm, trees have been known to literally explode, and the bushfire which 
begins on the ground is then transported to the tops of the trees, accelerated from 
canopy to canopy by the inflammable gases (Blakely 1965). In the 2009 Black Saturday 
bushfires for example, this process allowed the fire to travel at phenomenal speeds. 
Bushfire 
Bushfire, wildfire, wild-land fire, grass fire, forest fire or scrub fire are all terms used to 
describe any uncontrolled, non-structural fire burning in a grass, scrub, bush or forested 
area. In countries where fires are a regular occurrence, California (in the United States) 
and Greece for example, the different terms relate closely to the type of vegetation 
that is burned, and is often just referred to as ‘wildfire’. ‘Bushfire’ is the commonly used, 
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‘unique Australian blend of terms’ (Schauble 2008:18) to describe any type of fire which 
burns vegetation. Even in the far north of Australia, the Northern Territory or ‘Top End’ 
(as it is colloquially known) where the geography is typically flat with vast areas of 
grassland, reporting tends to use the term bushfire rather than scrub or grassland fire. 
The bushfires that occur in Australia can be divided into two kinds and relate to the 
geography as much as the vegetation that inhabits it: (i) grassland fires that occur on 
the flat terrain and (ii) bushfires that burn through mountainous regions. All things 
being equal (ground moisture, humidity, wind speed, and temperature) a fire that 
begins and burns in the mountains and hills is a much more dangerous proposition. In 
the simplest of terms, when a fire burns up a slope, it burns faster and more intensely 
than when on the ground because when the heat is directed towards the ground, it 
ignites the fuel on it, accelerating and intensifying the fire; the steeper the slope, the 
greater the wind, the hotter the fire and the more rapidly the fire will burn  (Campbell 
2003., Hennessy et al. 2005). 
Ash Wednesday  
The Ash Wednesday bushfire - 16 February 1983 – was one of more than 180 fires 
burning throughout Victoria on that day. It was one of the worst fire weather days in 
south-east Australia since the disastrous Black Friday bushfires in 1939 37 and was the 
deadliest on record until the Black Saturday bushfires of February 2009. The summer of 
1983 was one of the hottest and driest on record. After more than ten months of 
drought, a scorching heat wave primed South Australia and Victoria's west coast for fire 
(ABC 2012). During February 1983, and in the afternoon of Wednesday 16 th February, a 
severe weather system pushed a super-heated airflow ahead of the fire-front which 
continued to strengthen. It produced gale force winds, high temperatures, low 
humidity and extensive areas of raised dust. The fire was preceded by a massive dust 
storm over 300 metres high and 500 kilometres long which cut visibility in Melbourne to 
100 metres, creating near darkness for almost an hour (BoM 1983).  A series of fires 
ignited across the country from the Adelaide Hills to east of Melbourne; evacuation 
became extremely dangerous with hundreds seeking shelter on the beaches. When the 
fire was over, some 2400 homes and 3700 buildings were destroyed with more than 
520,000 hectares of land decimated. Livestock losses were very high, with over 340,000 
sheep, 18,000 cattle and numerous native animals either dead or later destroyed  
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 The Black Friday fires of 13 January 1939, in Victoria, Australia, burned 20,000 km² of land, killed 71 people, 
destroyed several towns including over 1,300 homes, 69 sawmills; a total of 3,700 buildings.  
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(Emergency Management Australia 2006). In total 75 people lost their lives (28 in South 
Australia and 47 in Victoria) - including 13 fire-fighters. In Victoria, up to 8,000 people 
were evacuated and a state of disaster was declared for the first time in South 
Australia's history (Collins 2006). 
Black Saturday  
In terms of lives and livestock lost, the Black Saturday bushfire was the largest, 
deadliest, and most intense firestorm ever experienced in Australia's post-European 
history. The death toll was almost double that of Ash Wednesday. A week before the 
fires, an exceptional heat wave affected the whole of south-eastern Australia, with 
Melbourne sweltering through three days of record breaking temperatures above 43°C; 
the temperature peaked at 45.1°C on 30 January, the third hottest day in the city's 
history (BoM 2009). On Friday 6 February 2009 - the day before the fires started - the 
Premier of Victoria John Brumby issued a warning about the extreme weather 
conditions expected on 7 February:  
‘It's just as bad a day as you can imagine and on top of that the state is 
just tinder-dry. People need to exercise real common sense tomorrow’ 
(Fairfax Media 2009).  
 
On the Saturday, temperatures reached 46.4°C (the highest temperatures since records 
began in 1859), humidity levels dropped to as low as six percent and north-westerly 
winds were over 100 km/h. In the early evening there was a wind change which proved 
to be the defining moment in the fires’ progress: it caused the long eastern flanks of the 
fires to become massive fire fronts that burned with incredible speed and ferocity 
towards towns that had earlier escaped the flames. 
 
As many as 400 individual fires were recorded on 7 February and the major fires claimed 
173 lives; 120 people were killed by a single fire in the Kinglake area alone. The worst 
bushfires in the nation’s history injured 5,000 people, destroyed 2,029 homes, killed 
countless animals and burnt through over 4,500² hectares of land (Building Commission 
Victoria 2010). The fires affected 78 townships and displaced an estimated 7,562 people. 
The Insurance Council of Australia reported insurance claims of $1.2 billion and the fires 
were investigated by a Royal Commission which included a re-examination of existing 
recommendations and policies.38  
                                                                 
38
 http://www.royalcommission.vic.gov.au/ 
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Cultural Interpretations of the ‘The Bush’ 
How Australians have responded to bushfire is an intensely practical matter 
but it is also a metaphor for how they relate to their environment, which is to 
say, a metaphor for who they are (Pyne 1995:43)  
 
‘The Bush’ has an iconic status in Australian life and romanticising the bush was part of 
the way Australians constructed their identity. Many Australian myths and legends, 
intrinsic to understanding Australian culture, have emanated from the bush.  For 
example, prior to World War I characteristics of bush life and the land - sleeping in the 
open air, learning to ride and shoot, fighting bushfires – were credited with preparing 
the Australian soldiers for battle (The Australian Government, ‘The Australian Bush’).  
Flannery (1994) asserts that any ideas of Australian nationhood must come from ‘an 
intimate understanding of Australian ecosystems’ (24). The bush or land has been 
depicted in song, or art or literature as the only thing that Australians share in common; 
‘it is at once our inheritance, our sustenance, and the only force ubiquitous and 
powerful enough to craft a truly Australian people’ (Flannery 2002). Representations of 
the bush provide strong cultural orientations, for example stories of the Outback, with 
its bushrangers and swagmen, are central to the Australian psyche. ‘Waltzing Matilda’,  
Australia’s unofficial national anthem, encapsulates these themes.39  
 
Australian identity created bushrangers as bush legends who were able to live within, 
control and overcome ‘the bush’. The Australian cultural representation of the Bushmen 
as strong resilient men paints a picture of mate-ship, resilience and tremendous 
resourcefulness. The notion of ‘mate-ship’, comradeship and endurance has been 
pivotal in defining the Australian man. Pioneers had to rely upon each other because if 
they did not, they would surely perish; ‘therefore mate-ship was esteemed above all 
other value [and is] considered a central tenet of Australian culture’ (Flannery 
1994:390). The quintessential Australian man is renewed in more recent bush legends 
such as ‘Crocodile Dundee’40 or ‘Steve Irwin’41 who, like the bush in which they lived, 
were savvy, tough and uncompromising. They were also imagined to be resourceful, 
tenacious and could be utterly relied upon in a crisis. This romanticised version endures 
despite its weak relationship to the truth of most Australians experiences, even by the 
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 Waltzing Matilda lyrics – Appendix 8. 
40
 "Crocodile" Dundee is a 1986 Australian comedy film set in the Australian Outback about an eccentric 
crocodile hunter 
41
 Stephen Robert "Steve" Irwin (22 February 1962 – 4 September 2006) was nicknamed "The Crocodile 
Hunter", was an Australian television personality, wildlife expert, and conservationist. 
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19th century a ‘real bushman’ was a thing of the past (Carroll 1992). However, these 
legends leave cultural legacies that influence present day perceptions of belonging and 
identity.  
 
For the 18th century European navigators, arriving for the first time on the shores of a 
new continent, ‘numerous smokes arising from native fires announced a country well 
inhabited’.42  For the new settler’s, fire was a signifier of occupancy but not of 
ownership; this came only after ‘ploughing, tilling, grazing, sowing and harvesting’ 
(Clode 2010:23). However, for indigenous Australians (the Aborigines) fire and smoke 
was tangible evidence of their relationship and stewardship of the land. As the 
following Aboriginal saying shows, this conservancy of the land is more than a belief; it 
is intrinsically linked to their spirituality:  
We don't own the land, the land owns us. The land is my mother, my 
mother is the land. Land is the starting point to where it all began. It's like 
picking up a piece of dirt and saying this is where I started and this is where 
I'll go. The land is our food, our culture, our spirit and identity .43 
 
Different discourses about bushfire arise out of different conceptualisations of the land. 
Commentaries on the fire practices of the Aborigines show that there are a wide range 
of opinions on the impact that these practices have had on the Australian bush. Some 
literature espouses that Aboriginal burning over thousands of years enabled hunting, 
promoted an under-story of native grasses and kept the bush relatively free of scrub, 
creating the bush that is familiar today (Jones 1969). The discourses about the 
Aboriginal use of fire and their relationship with the land are conflicting and at times 
deviate into folklore. One discourse is that Aborigines managed the land, a perspective 
that aligns ‘more comfortably with Western concepts of property ownership’ (Clode 
2010:26). Ethnographic evidence for Aboriginal burning practices can be found in many 
of the First Fleet journals: 
The weather being very dry, the natives were employed in burning grass on 
the north shore opposite Sydney, in order to catch rats and other 
animals...this is their constant practice in dry weather.44 
 
The farming tool of the Aborigine was the ‘fire-stick’ and it was how they cultivated the 
land. Historical records show that three quarters of deliberately lit fires occurred in the 
‘four hottest months of the year [where the] conditions were typically hot and windy’  
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 Description of the Hastings river valley, north of Sydney by John Oxley (in) Ryan and Starr (1995)  
43
 http://www.brigidine.qld.edu.au/library/pathfinders/re11_AboriginalSpirituality.htm  
44
 Governor Arthur Philip, September, 1790  
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(Clode 2010:38). Whilst surveying the western coast of Australia in 1837, sailors on the 
HMS Beagle (whose second trip to South America had included Charles Darwin) noted 
that whilst flushing out game, Aborigines used large green boughs to beat out the 
flames of a fire which had taken off in the wrong direction.45 The burning practices of 
‘the natives’ were not always seen in such a positive light, especially when they were 
used against the colonising pioneers. Examples of the Aborigines using fire as a weapon 
are many. However, it must be noted that in their efforts to dominate the land and its 
inhabitants, the Europeans were not averse to also using this tactic (ibid.). 
 
Another discourse is that the Aborigines, by their recklessly indiscriminate burning have 
irrevocably changed the Australian flora and fauna. However, in terms of impact on the 
landscape, the ramifications of European fire regimes have been equally significant; 
land clearing and decreased fire frequency due to suppression are two examples. 
Russell-Smith, Whitehead and Cook et al. (2003) state that ‘the removal of Indigenous 
people from their country as a result of European settlement [and the] breakdown of 
traditional burning practices in northern Australia has led to a far higher incidence of 
large-scale, wildfires late in the season’ (cited in Whelan, Roberts and England et al.  
2006:3). Referring to the Ash Wednesday fires that roared through Victoria and South 
Australian in February 1984, Bill Neidjie, the most senior tribal elder of the Gagadju 
people46 said what happened was ‘a shame [and that] people would not have been 
killed if the country had been kept clean’ (italics added; Lewis 1989:14). He explained 
that it was just as much a crime that the country had been allowed to get so dirty, 
something that would never had happened in areas for which his tribe had 
responsibility  
 
European colonisation, with the deforestation of the gold rushes and grand-scale 
grazing, has been blamed for turning what would have been moderate bushfires, into 
the disasters that are now part of Australia’s bushfire history. T im Flannery in his book 
The Future Eaters underscores this idea: ‘when control [of fire] was wrested from the 
Aborigines and placed in the hands of Europeans, disaster resulted’ (1994:194). Lewis 
(1989) asserts that Aboriginal burning practices are ‘clearly a form of resource and 
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 “Fire: The Australian Experience”. Publication was originally produced by the Country Fire Authority, 
Victoria as “Fire in the Australian Environment”. 
46
 The Gagudju language is an indigenous language from northern Kakadu, after which the World Heritage-
listed Kakadu National Park is named. The Gagadju speaking Aborigines were believed to be the region's 
original inhabitants, and evidence of Aboriginal residence in the Park dates back more than 50,000 years. 
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environmental management based on traditional ecological knowledge ’ and that they 
implicitly know that fire has a direct impact on ‘the distribution and relative abundance 
of plant and animal resources’ (946). However, this is a somewhat idealised view and 
the reality most likely lies somewhere in between the two perspectives. Perhaps the 
environmental impact of indigenous fire practices was more localised and less chaotic 
than first imagined, being just one factor of multiple processes including naturally 
occurring lightning fires and the extreme effects of climate. The competing narratives 
illustrate the diverse ways that bushfires and ‘the bush’ are regarded by the Australian 
people; there is no one way to understand this complex relationship.  
Social Construction and Collective Remembering 
‘Major bushfires are embedded in the Australian collective memory’ (Ellis, Kanowski and 
Whelan 2004 cited in Schauble 2006:105) and when the Australian public think about 
bushfires they draw upon their cultural resources to make sense of their perceptions. A 
powerful cultural resource is collective remembering. This is when ‘what is recalled and 
commemorated extends beyond the sum of the participants individual perspectives’ 
(Middleton and Edwards 1990:7). If a cultural object is linked to a salient event 
institutionalized on the cultural calendar then it will be available and more easily 
remembered over time (Schudson 1989:162); ‘9/11’ is perhaps the most salient and 
recognisable disaster event of the 21st century in the western world (thus far) but each 
generation has events that have been given their own special meaning.47 Individuals 
need to draw upon contexts in order to remember or recreate a past event, ‘as it is in 
society that they acquire, recall, recognise and localize their memories’ (Olick 2007:38). 
In this way therefore, history can be understood as not just a series of objective stages 
or events (one thing after another) but an active process of meaning-making through 
time; ‘the ongoing work of reconstructive imagination’ (Assman 1997:9). This meaning-
making is exemplified in anniversaries of disasters, where the past event is 
reconstructed, re-imagined, re-emphasized and re-narrated by the media. The event is 
both publically remembered and privately experienced.  
 
Collective remembering of disasters encompasses celebration (of personal survival and 
community resilience) and affirmation of triumph over adversity. There is the sharing of 
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 The day that the man walked on the moon, (July 1969), the day that John Kennedy was shot (November 
1963), and the death of Princess Diana (August 1997)are but three events that for their generation, are 
often prefaced with “I remember exactly where I was when ..”. Also, in non-western worlds, there are 
disasters which are equally memorable:  the 2004 Indonesian Tsunami (killing approx. 259,000 people, or 
the 2010 Haiti earthquake, affecting over 3 million people and killing over 200,000   
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photographs and mementos, a mourning for lives and communities lost and an 
honouring of heroes and ordinary peoples alike. Disaster memorialisations often 
provide closure and resolution as people relive frightening events, in an environment 
where support is evident. When individuals have not directly experienced an event, 
then knowledge or connection with the event can be developed through accurate 
reconstructions of the past event; marking the anniversary of a disaster can provide a 
‘yardstick for gauging the magnitude and effect of current events’ (Lang and Lang 
1989:133). It is in these memorialisations that echoes of past disasters are heard and 
constructions of future ones are imagined.  
 
An anniversary, as a collective remembrance, is a ritualised disaster symbol, a moment 
in time where the disaster is relived and retold. In 2008, a fire-fighter who attended the 
Ash Wednesday commemoration service at Prospect Hill, Adelaide commented that ‘it 
doesn’t seem like 25 years ago, the memories have just come flooding back’. At the 
same service, a permanent Ash Wednesday exhibition was opened at the museum to 
‘remember the day, not only for its devastating consequences, but also that it bought 
forth many heroes’.48 When bushfires are of a magnitude that results in the loss of 
whole communities, these events become more than anniversaries or memories. They 
become an ‘easily retrieved symbol’ or signifier, with power to affect judgement of 
future events. The aphorisms ‘it felt like that happened yesterday’ or ‘it was like time 
stood still’ demonstrates this. This is not true for everyone as disasters are not 
perceived by everyone in the same way, so the importance of this event as a symbol can 
only be a generalisation at best.  
Human Responses to Fire in the Australian Context 
Community bushfire safety literature provides an important context for exploring 
warning fatigue in the Australian bushfire context. Much of the literature does so from 
the perspective of preparedness and community safety and has found that landowners 
relationship to the land and their attitudes towards bushfire and natural resource 
management can predict how the land--owners prepare for bushfire (Eriksen and Gill 
2010). Everyday attitudes towards bushfire is interwoven with the ‘social fabric’ that 
surrounds peoples living in bushfire-prone areas  - local environmental knowledge, 
social processes, ecological events – and ‘in this sense bushfire is embodied in everyday 
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 Part of the opening speech at the Prospect Hill museum, by Federal MP and former foreign affairs 
minister Alexander Downer. http://www.adelaidenow.com.au/tragedy-stings-25-years-on/story-fna7dq6e-
1111115568480 
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life….and becomes a significant factor in how landowners relate to and exist within 
bushfire-prone landscapes’. (ibid.:816).  The relationship with, or perceived knowledge 
of the local environment may have contributed towards the high number of fatalities on 
Black Saturday 2009. Haynes et al (2010) found that late evacuation was the most 
common form of death where people were caught sheltering in their homes or 
succumbed to the fire whilst fleeing in their vehicles perhaps suggesting a familiarity 
with their surroundings accompanied with an assumption of control. Regardless, those 
who died underestimated their ability to survive a bushfire in surrounding they were 
familiar with. Related to preparedness and survivability is the interpretation and 
response to the recommended ‘Prepare, stay and defend or leave early’ policy of the 
Australian fire services. Rhodes (2005) found that, in a bushfire event, most people 
opted to ‘wait and see’ which could be assumed to be a confidence and familiarity in 
peoples local environment, and in their ability to conduct themselves within it, fire or no 
fire. Whilst Tibbits and Whittaker (2007) found considerable confusion over the 
meaning of the term ‘leave early; people also relied heavily on unofficial warnings from 
family and friends as well as interpreting environmental cues such as seeing flames or 
smelling smoke (Whittaker et al. 2013). These literatures demonstrate that peoples 
relationship to and understanding of their environment are internalised to a large 
extent, and play a greater role than first thought in perception of bushfire risk and 
response to bushfire events. In her book Ignition Stories: Indigenous Fire Ecology in the 
Indo-Australian Monsoon Zone, Fowler (2013) encapsulates one of the main ideas of this 
chapter: 
People’s relationships to fire, and the relationships people have with one 
another—with things in their environments and with landscapes— ...can 
involve very personal, very emotional, and very intimate kinds of things (2). 
Discussion 
Bushfires are an ‘integral part of the cycle of life and death in the Australian bush’  
(Clode 2010:22) and mankind has always lived with the spectre of uncontrolled fires. 
However, as the suburbs of Australian cities expand further and further into peri-rural 
and rural areas, the risk of bushfire impacting upon people intensifies in proportion to 
the development. ‘Fires are an almost unremarkable part of the Australian landscape, 
and every day, somewhere in Australia, there is a fire. Our risk lies not so much in the 
nature of our landscape but in how we chose to live in it’ (ibid.: 81). The reality that 
cannot be ignored is that without the people who have built permanent houses in the 
38 
 
bush, in most cases bushfires of catastrophic proportions would not have resulted in 
the disasters of recent years.  
 
This chapter situates bushfire, not only as a physical entity in a landscape but also as a 
social and cultural construction of Australian identity. This understanding is central to 
any analysis of people’s perceptions of bushfire risk and responses to bushfire 
warnings. The way that ‘an ideal Australian man’ has been depicted in Australian culture 
may have relevance for how the public respond to bushfire warnings – for example the 
recommendations to abandon property and homes on extreme fire danger days imply 
inhabitants’ helplessness and lack of mastery over the environment; concepts that 
could be argued are in direct contrast to the ‘real Aussie Bloke’. The narratives that 
people draw upon to make sense of bushfires influence how their preparations, their 
perceptions of their ability to cope in a potential bushfire, and their attitudes to their 
environment. If for example, people draw upon discourses that construct fire as a 
natural event, largely inhibited or encouraged by organic events such as rainfall or 
lightning (and once passed, bestow great benefit back to the environment), it could be 
imagined that they will think about and respond to a bushfire warning in a particular 
way. Others who draw upon alternative frames of understanding about fire, regarding 
it as fearsome and unnatural, always destructive and wholly uncontrollable could have 
an alternative reaction to bushfire warnings and a different perception of their risk.  
 
The following chapter widens the discussion about bushfire disasters to an examination 
of the way the media report catastrophic disasters and the possible influences media 
has upon public understanding of such events. Myths about disasters exist for many 
reasons, and can be powerful determinants of public attitude and reactions to disaster 
warnings; well-known disaster myths as well as those in the Australian bushfire context 
will be explored. Lastly disaster warnings and warning heuristics will be detailed and a 
typology of disasters proposed.  
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3. DISASTERS; MEDIA, WARNINGS AND BUSHFIRES 
Introduction 
Personal knowledge about disasters comes from many places, and the public 
knowledge about disaster events comes primarily through the media including 
newspapers, television and social media. In order to theorise the communication of 
disaster risk, this chapter details the ways that the media can impact upon the public’s 
thinking about disasters. Media encompasses many types of mass communication, and 
in the context of this thesis, refers to newspapers, television, digital media and official 
disaster and emergency communications. Media studies is a wide-ranging discipline, 
with applications in a myriad of related disciplines from psychology to politics. There is a 
large body of literature that addresses the theories and influence of the media but as no 
media texts comprise any analysis data in this thesis, there is no attempt to explore 
these in any depth. Disaster reporting by the media is examined in this chapter as well 
as the media propensity to privilege some aspects of a story over others which can 
reinforce stereotypes in a post-disaster scenario. The heuristics of warnings and the 
language often used in warning messages are considered along with a typology of 
disasters proposed; a differentiation is suggested between rapid-onset disasters and 
those which require a prolonged warning period. Relevant exemplars in the Australian 
context are used to discuss these topics. Just as there is a great variation in types of 
disasters and communication sources, the way that people attend to what they read 
and interpret what they hear is also diverse and by no means predictable. There can be 
no assumptions made about the uniformity of audience response; therefore theorising 
the factors that contribute to a mediated public evaluation of risk is an important part 
of understanding warning response and risk perception.  
This chapter examines the way that the media interacts with its audience, and focuses 
on reporting conventions for rare and substantial events, which most disasters are. It 
discusses the ways in which the media contributes to the reproduction of common 
disaster myths and bushfire myths. An important part of this chapter is an exegesis of 
warnings in the disaster context, particularly the way that different types of warnings 
may influence attention to a threat for differing disasters. The mass communication 
theories and concepts that are most relevant to the interpretation of risk messages and 
warnings in the Australian context will be examined here. 
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Media 
The media makes sense of and interprets the world for the mass public, ‘emphasizing 
collective values that bind people closer together’ (Curran 2002:77). A dominant idea in 
mass media studies is that mass media mirrors society, reflecting back to it ideas, norms 
and values, thus validating and maintaining what is already present. Traditionally, the 
media were thought to be powerful enough to be able to change people’s views.  
However, opinions and perceptions are complex. Clearly the media has a powerful role 
in constructing people’s knowledge beyond their personal experience, but people also 
construct their own relationship to that knowledge and use it as a personal resource. A 
more accepted view is that whilst the media may not have the power to tell people 
what to think, they are ‘stunningly successful in telling them what to think about’ 
(Cohen 1963:6).  
The study of mass communication and media effects began as early as 1920 with the 
idea that people’s opinions and attitudes could be influenced by what they read. 
Lippmann (1922) proposed that because the media is the means by which most people 
learn about the wider world it ‘determines our cognitive maps of that world’ (cited in  
McCombs and Reynolds 2002:3). An early focus was on the effectiveness of war 
propaganda as a tool for mass manipulation and social control, where the audience was 
considered to be passively receptive. Research then began to explore the possibilities 
of attitude change and ‘limited effects’, concluding that these were diminished by social 
connections and effective only if similar attitudes already existed. It was also shown 
that self-selection confounded accurate measurements of actual effects where people 
interpreted media content according to their own beliefs (Perse 2001). In the 1970s, 
mass communication research explored the cognitive and behavioural effects of mass 
media and since the mid-1980s, the focus has turned to understanding the influence and 
constraints of the social, political and cultural contexts.  
The cumulative media effects model positions the public as reacting in predictable 
ways. When evaluating or deciding upon an issue, the public are thought to use 
information that they have recently read or seen, as it is easier to retrieve this data from 
their long-term memory (Iyengar 1991). In other words, what they have read or watched 
most of, and most recently, will be most easily remembered. Another name for this is the 
‘accessibility bias’ which has been characterised ‘as an almost mindless, mechanical 
response’ (Takeshita 1993:276). When an issue endures in the media for some time, the 
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effect is that the issue becomes more salient, with the result that the public come to 
view as important the same issues which the media have highlighted. This is known as 
agenda-setting and is particularly important because of its assumed influence upon 
decision-making; many studies have explored this media effect in the context of 
political opinions. But it is equally relevant when people are making decisions about 
disasters. If the Australian media consistently emphasise one particular bushfire 
prevention activity over another (investing in sprinkler systems rather than clearing 
vegetation for example) agenda-setting effect could markedly change survival 
outcomes if clearing vegetation was a better bushfire mitigation tool. The theory has 
some constraints, and one of them is that for agenda-setting theory to be applied, the 
media content need to be consistent and the political system ‘reasonably open’ – that is 
to say democratic and free from censorship.49 Lastly, it should be noted that agenda-
setting effects are most influential for ‘issues that lie outside the individual’s personal 
experience because then the media becomes the public’s only frame of reference ’ 
(Singer and Endreny 1993:4). Participants living in bushfire-prone areas of Australia 
often have personal experience of bushfires. However, for those who do not have 
personal experience, the agenda-setting effect of the media could influence how those 
people assess their bushfire risk.  
The way risk communication is perceived via the media can be attributed in many cases 
to the devices the media use when reporting stories about risk. The framing of news 
stories is linked to ideas of news production, information control and notions of ‘gate -
keeping’, 50 and it ‘situates the analysis of news in the context of discursive formation of 
issues, policies, opinions and engagement’ (Pan 2008:3). Framing is a schema of 
interpretation and when journalists change the wording or focus on some aspects of a 
bushfire and not others, they define and interpret the issue for the public, powerfully 
influencing decision outcomes for those who engage in an issue through the media 
(Goffman 1974). As an extension of agenda-setting (or a ‘second-level’ agenda-setting 
effect) framing is both an active process and an outcome; an organizing idea that 
through selection, exclusion, elaboration and emphasis, can ‘turn an occurrence into a 
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 Critics of the media, for example Noam Chomsky, would argue that even in the most seemingly 
democratic countries, media censorship is pervasive and endemic. 
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 Occurring at all levels of media structure, ‘gate-keeping’ is the process through which ideas and 
information are filtered for publication. As a theory used in the disciplines of journalism and mass 
communication, it was first proposed by social psychologist Kurt Lewin in 1947.  
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newsworthy event, and a newsworthy event into a story’ (Marks, Kalaitzandonakes and 
Wilkins et al. 2007:184).  
 
One way to illustrate a consequence of media framing is the effect of ‘attribute agenda-
setting’. The fundamental assumption of this media effect is that people attribute 
responsibility differently depending on the way a story was framed: being more likely to 
hold individuals responsible if the story was framed in one way but more likely to hold 
government and society responsible if the story was framed in another. ‘Risk and 
responsibility are intrinsically connected’ (Beck 1999:6) and attributions of responsibility 
have elements of moral reasoning. Studies into framing effects of television news on 
political issues have shown that stories can be analysed in terms of episodic or thematic 
frames; an episodic news frame focuses on particular cases or specific events whereas a 
thematic news frame situates events and issues within a generalised context. Other 
studies (Dudo, Dahlstrom and Brossard 2007; Mackie 2009) describe episodic framing as 
typically containing sensational reporting (emotive language), non-contextual 
statements and little or no self-protection or self-efficacy information. Conversely, 
thematic reporting is factual, contextual and situational, and gives self-protection 
and/or self-efficacy information, often including scientific and medical facts. Iyengar 
found that when people read reports that were predominantly episodic, they were less 
likely to think that society was responsible for the event. Conversely, reports that were 
written with a thematic framing were less likely to attribute responsibility to individuals.  
Following this argument, this effect could be clearly demonstrated in media reporting 
about bushfires events: for example if bushfires are predominantly reported 
episodically (focussing on specific events), people would be more likely to blame 
individuals for their apathy or poor preparation. However, if bushfires were reported 
using a thematic frame, people would be more likely to attribute the causes and 
solutions to governmental policies (e.g. lack of regulation of land development, or 
resources for fuel reduction) and other factors beyond their control. 
Media Scripts and News Values 
The disaster scripts that ‘tell a disaster story’ are a combination of past disaster events, 
information from disaster and emergency authorities, previous media stories and 
socially constructed knowledges about known hazards. Scripts are stereotypical ways 
of constructing a disaster story, and comprise templates which organise ideas; defining 
how an event is talked about, influencing how people think about a new story and 
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predisposing them to ‘come to conclusions with the minimum of analysis’ (Nuestadt 
and May 1988:33). Templates in this context are not rigid journalistic practices, but 
organising strategies for reporting a disaster event. For example when the media use 
phases like ‘another 9/11’ or a ‘potentially catastrophic bushfire’, images are quickly 
formed and can short-cut the definition process. They work in much the same way as 
worldviews, mental models, cognitive schemas and heuristic biases 51 and ‘not only make 
sense of current events, but are a point of comparison and proof of an on-going 
problem, highlighting patterns and minimizing dissenting or forgotten facts’ (Kitzinger 
2000:76). Whilst many scripts are culturally bound, some transcend cultural boundaries, 
so can be said to be multi-layered; different media audiences will understand them in 
different ways. It could be argued that through ‘collective memories’ or ‘collective 
remembering’ (Middleton and Edwards 1990) a bushfire script is constructed where 
past bushfire events are retold, reconstructed and remembered beyond the sum of the 
participants individual perspectives. It then becomes part of shared knowledges about 
bushfire and is more easily recalled over time. Therefore, arising from memorable 
events, scripts work as a ‘social reference point’ creating a narrative, script or ‘rhetorical 
shorthand’ (ibid.: 61) which are then used by journalists and audiences alike to make 
meaning of any new event.  
As a device to depict an event Bennett and Lawrence (1995) present the idea of ‘icons’ 
or ‘nuggets of condensed drama that can stand alone as an emblematic moment 
evoked with a simple phrase or visual reference’ (20). This idea of the visual expands 
the template analogy where recognisable images can represent events, acting as a 
potent visual symbol. The 2011 CFA bushfire awareness campaign 52 made the most of 
this device, where a family is heard trying in vain to protect themselves from a bushfire. 
Whilst there is a minimalist narrative, it is the images of smoke and then ultimately of a 
house razed to the ground that is both instantly recognisable and powerfully 
descriptive. The adage ‘a picture paints a thousand words’ concisely explains the 
concept of a visual template here.  
Newsworthiness or news values are the criteria by which journalists and editors decide 
what news events or how much prominence a news story should be given. Galtung and 
                                                                 
51
 Worldviews, mental models, cognitive schemas, risk heuristic biases are discussed in Chapter 5. 
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 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kusjRALY8aM 
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Ruge (1965) were the first to identify twelve news values53 and suggested that ‘the 
more an event embodied these values, the more likely it was considered to be 
newsworthy’ (Hughes and White 2005:9). Their theory suggests the media ‘filter’ 
potential news stories using these criteria and many are particularly relevant to bushfire 
stories and reporting. The news value of unambiguity for example makes use of familiar 
past events to make sense of the present one for the public, which simplifies the event 
even though the issues surrounding it may be complex. Comparing a new bushfire 
event with Black Saturday for example ‘short cuts’ much of the background 
explanations about intensity, magnitude and impact. More recently, the criterion of 
news values has been expanded to include emotion, negativity, conflict, ‘visual-ness’, 
and celebrity (Fiske 1987; McGregor 2002). The emotional association of the Black 
Saturday fires and the personalisation of the stories which include pictures of 
devastated communities is also a ‘hook’ by which the media engage the public. Hughes 
and White (2005) comment that it is only by understanding these journalistic practices 
that effective and practical ways of working with the media during extreme bushfire 
events can be achieved.  
Media Reception  
Media reception research focuses on the relationship between the individual and the 
media in order to understand effect, agency and causality. It has shown that audiences 
respond to mass communication based on factors such as the way an article is framed, 
or if they personalise what they read. Stuart Hall, a critical cultural theorist, proposed 
that people react to messages in one of three ways; 1) they respond and interpret the 
text as the creators of the text intended; 2) they ‘negotiate’ problems in the text in 
order to find their own interpretation or 3) they reject the intended meaning and 
choose to put the message into ‘some alternative framework of reference’ (Staiger 
2005:80). A criticism of Hall’s approach is that audiences are positioned as having 
multiple identities, and therefore cannot be regarded as a homogenous group. For the 
purposes of this thesis however, this idea is not problematic and as demonstrated in the  
previous chapter, the public is conceptualised as being made up of individuals who 
interpret risk within the Australian social, political and cultural contexts.  
Reception theory focuses on the meanings within texts, how those meanings are 
constructed, the ways in which the meanings change over time and the effects of media 
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 Frequency; Negativity; Unexpectedness; Unambiguity; Personalization; Meaningfulness: Reference to 
elite nations; Reference to elite persons; Conflict; Consonance; Continuity; Composition; Competition. 
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texts on the audience. This theory is predicated on the idea that, although it is accepted 
that the media does not just inculcate the public, it does play a significant role ‘in the 
shaping of public attitudes and beliefs about the social world’ (Devereux 2007:217). The 
dominant, oppositional and negotiated readings of texts are at the heart of media 
reception theory, which focuses on the interpretation of media texts. This thesis is 
particularly interested in how people construct bushfire risk in the context of the media 
texts that have been available to Australian residents of bushfire vulnerable 
communities.54 Media reception theory embraces the qualitative approach as a way to 
uncover the ‘dynamic and often complicated nature of the relationship between media 
audiences and media texts’ (ibid.: 237).  
Issue-Attention and Adjustment-Reaction 
Ideas about why people get ‘tired’ of issues, especially as they are reported and re -
reported in the media are relevant to explore in the context of warning fatigue. Despite 
some issues having continued and real consequences, the public attention to issues do 
not seem to last very long. Downs (1972) claimed that the public demonstrate a 
‘systematic cycle of heightened public interest and then increasing boredom’ (1). The 
premise of the issue attention cycle model is that there is a causal link between the 
content and frequency of issues reported in the media and the level of the public’s 
attention to and concern about them. The issue attention cycle model is hypothesized 
by Downs as having five stages which begins with an event being highlighted in the 
media and culminates with it being replaced with another. Downs conceptualised his 
model in the context of public attention to ecological concerns, and others (Peters and 
Hogwood 1985; Hall 2002) have applied it to government security and tourism policies. 
It is a useful model to examine the influence of public attention to policy and practices, 
and can equally be applied to disasters and the Australian bushfires.  
 
 In the first stage of the cycle a problem or crisis is bought to the attention of the media 
and is followed by ‘alarmed discovery and euphoric enthusiasm’ (Downs 1972:3). This is 
where the public, primed by similar past events (mass-fatality bushfires for example) re-
interpret the issue in terms of larger problems – environmental concerns or 
governmental shortcomings. During the third stage, there is a gradual realisation that 
the cost of solving the problem could be very high indeed. Frequently, these problems 
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 Media texts include official CFA public education material such as newspaper and letter-box pamphlets 
and local and national newspaper stories about bushfires and bushfire prevention.  These are detailed in 
Chapter 5, page 119. 
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associated with solving the issue seem overwhelming, and in the fourth stage, there is a 
gradual decline in public interest and discouragement and boredom can set in. 
Moreover, if a new issue has subsequently emerged, the public ‘will’ to continue to 
engage with the original problem wanes. The post-problem phase is the last stage, 
where the issue has been firmly replaced with a new one, although positive outcomes in 
the form of policies and campaigns may result. Sandman (2005) conceptualises the 
cycle as a long-term ‘two-steps-forward-one-step-back’ process, and if the issue were to 
emerge again, would ‘receive a higher level of attention’ (Downs 1972:4). The issue-
attention model describes the trajectory of a story through public space, how it is 
framed and the ways news values and templates determine the way it can develop. 
However, this is not to assume that individual audiences (bushfire-prone residents for 
example), respond in equally predictable ways.  
 
This theory of public reaction to risk events as mediated by the media, has some 
similarities to Peter Sandman’s adjustment-reaction model which proposes that a past 
risk event serves as a rehearsal or ‘prime’ for a new event, evoking a reaction or cycle 
that can be predicted. According to Sandman (2005) responses to a threat are 
automatic and often seen by others as an over-reaction, but he asserts this as a normal 
and positive way for the public to learn about risks and risk response. He also points out 
that the primary reaction reduces the probability of a later over-reaction, serving as a 
‘dummy-run’ resulting in people feeling and being better prepared. Both the issue-
attention and adjustment-reaction models argue that the last stage results in a public 
with a heightened awareness of the risk event.  
Issue-Attention Fatigue 
When topics come to the attention of the public, whether by way of the media or 
bushfire public education campaigns for example, people pay attention to them for a 
certain length of time. This length of attention is determined by many factors, and 
literature suggests the importance of these topics to people can be heightened or 
diminished depending on competing concerns. Attention can be involuntary (which 
happens when something is exciting or novel) and voluntary (or directed) and requires 
effort on the part of the individual. It is the latter that is suggested to be susceptible to 
fatigue (Kaplan 1995). In terms of environmental concerns, of which bushfires are one 
of many, experience with a hazard such as bushfire could result in the public becoming 
‘tired’ of the issue, paying less attention to it and becoming desensitised to warnings 
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about it. Studies have found that experience with a hazard resulted in people paying 
attention in the short term, but as time wore on, attention diminished (Weinstein, 1989; 
Burton, Kates and White 1993; Sims and Baumann 1983). It is these prolonged hazard 
events which are proposed in this thesis to influence risk perception and possibly 
increase the likelihood of a community becoming ‘warning fatigued’. 
Availability Heuristic 
There is undoubtedly a ‘collective response’ to events in the social world –‘crowd 
contagion’ or ‘moral panics’ are collective behaviours which typify this phenomenon. 
However, given the complexities of public response, it is important to consider the 
individual response within ‘the social’, and psychologists have much to contribute to 
this understanding. 55 Often decisions in time of threat are made quickly, and it is those  
ideas that are most accessible and most salient that are considered the most important 
and acted upon first. Cognitive psychologists Kahneman and Tversky (1979) labelled this 
quick judgement the ‘availability heuristic’ and demonstrated that as well as being an 
unconscious process, it was an inaccurate perception bias. Other studies (Folkes 1988; 
Sjøberg and Engelberg 2010) have shown that people evaluate a threat to be more risky 
if it is brought to mind more easily than other risks; moreover, this judgement was not 
dependent on how often the event occurred. The predilections of news media to 
newsworthy and sensational stories mean that unusual events, disasters for example, 
are reported more often than common ones, leading people to magnify some risks out 
of all proportion to the actual risk. These risks become more salient, more memorable 
and therefore, are thought of as more of a threat. Priming56 is a similar and related 
effect, which explains how an issue or event previously highlighted in the media can 
subsequently lead people to make quick and easy associations to related issues or 
events. For example, if fire safety campaigns have always included fire engines and fire 
personnel in their prevention literature and communications, people may come to 
expect that, in the event of a fire, fire services will be always available to them. 57 
Priming can also reinforce pre-existing stereotypes (Pechmann 2001), defining what an 
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 A more detailed examination of the contributions that psychology brings to understanding individual risk 
perception is detailed in Chapter 4: ‘Subjectivity in the Social Domain’.  
56
 Originating in cognitive psychology, the theory of media priming is that one idea is related to other ideas 
by semantic pathways, a concept based on the associative network model of human memory.  
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 Recent bushfires in Victoria have shown that there is no guarantee of fire services for at-risk residents 
and the Victorian Fire services have begun to advise the public not to rely on being personally rescued by 
fire crews. 
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event or situation ‘should look like’ and producing a ‘desirable’ citizen; for example,  
families who pack up and evacuate every time there is a ‘Code Red’ day.58 
Media Reporting of Disasters 
The media and disaster warnings are intrinsically linked; few warnings are 
communicated without the media, and most disaster and emergency organisations 
have a working relationship with the media. For example the Country Fire Authority 
(CFA), which is a volunteer and community-based fire and emergency service 
organisation in Victoria, Australia, has multiple media ‘presences’. As well as the more 
traditional - newspaper/press releases and website59 - they have a Facebook page60 and 
Twitter account61 (with the hashtag #bushfires). They also have mobile phone 62 and 
smart phone applications, 63 (for up-to-the-minute fire and incident information) and a 
YouTube64  link for information and safety videos. The following sections situates 
warnings, warning terminologies and typologies within the context of disasters, 
discusses the ramifications of false alarms upon warning response and challenges some 
assumptions about the ways in which disasters are conceptualised.65 
 
For most people, perceptions of risk and information about disasters are mediated by 
one of three sources: personal experience, direct contact with other people and 
indirect contact, by way of the mass media (Singer and Endreny 1993:2). Dynes (1970) 
goes further and says that the media play a leading role, not only in ‘describing and 
interpreting the disaster event [but also] in maintaining public morale’ (12). By their very 
nature, disasters are newsworthy stories providing the media with a guaranteed 
audience who are often fascinated and horrified in equal measure. About two percent 
of news stories deal with large scale accidents or disasters (Larson 1980 cited in Drabek  
1986) and contrary to media reporting of war, crime or poli tics, media coverage of 
natural disasters is largely accepted to be an accurate reflection of what really 
happened (Cockburn 2011).  However, analysis of media reporting of disasters has 
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 ‘Code Red’ (Victoria and New South Wales) or ‘Catastrophic’ (Tasmania) is a Fire Danger Rating that 
recommends immediate evacuation because of conditions deemed to be potentially devastating. 
http://www.cfa.vic.gov.au/mobile/fdr/actions/codered.htm 
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 http://www.youtube.com/cfatv 
65 The psychological and social responses to warnings are explored in Chapters 4 and 5  
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shown that, regardless of the country, scale or type of disaster, the media by using well-
worn scripts and news values, follow predictable norms and conventions (Turner, Nigg 
and Paz 1986., Fischer 2008). 
 
When reporting disasters, the devices of symbols and imagery are important. Hoffman 
(2002) asserts that these devices influence behaviour and provide a ‘compass of 
orientation on how to cope with and survive.. [a disaster]… giving it context, content, 
emotion and meaning’ (114). By only using official sources and governmental 
perspectives (who can have a vested interest in the way disasters are reported), the 
media present a one-sided account, and in this process the voices of disasters victims 
can be marginalised. Differing interpretations of the event have an impact on post-
disaster recovery as blame and compensation are ‘attributed differently depending on 
whose voices are heard’ (Button 2002:144). The depiction of a shocked immobilized and 
uncomprehending victim constitutes one of the most graphic and potent disaster 
images, leading to the misconception that disaster recovery must be initiated by 
outsiders and that ‘the locals’ are inadequate to deal with the crisis.  In fact, by the time 
emergency organisations arrive at a disaster scene, the locals have most often begun to 
recover bodies, rescue the injured, assess damage and attend to the most vulnerable. 
Often the dazed and paralysed victims are simply exhausted survivors who, by the time 
the media arrive, are taking a well-deserved break (Fischer 2008). Additionally, local 
communities can become disenfranchised and resentment can result when outside 
agencies subsequently get ‘all the credit’ for disaster recovery; this can lead to disaster 
relief funds being channelled to these agencies instead of to the communities who need 
it most. These stereotypical media depictions of disasters can have negative 
consequences, not the least of which is public perception of hype and sensationalism. 
When the media is a major conduit through which critical risk communication is 
disseminated, it is important that, for the most part the media are regarded as credible.  
Alarm and Reassurance 
A pattern of media reporting prior to a disaster – the warning phase – has been 
identified by Turner, Nigg and Paz (1986). In the context of predicted earthquakes in 
California, they argue that the media uses an alarm-and-reassurance schema where the 
media report some worst-case scenarios, often over-stating the threat and ‘blurring the 
distinction between possible and probable events’ (418). At the same time, media 
reports often advise calm yet offer no information about protective actions that could 
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be taken; the implication being that something awful will happen eventually, but there 
is no pressing need to do anything about it. Turner, Nigg and Paz (1986) argue that this 
sets up an expectation from the public that they will be adequately warned should the 
disaster be imminent. Moreover, they observe that, in a prolonged lead-time disaster 
scenario it is simply not possible to ‘sustain disruption of normal routines for extended 
periods of time’ (377). Following the alarming story and possibly worried about 
panicking the public, the media often publish ‘reassuring or nullifying reports’ (ibid.: 
418) where contradictory opinions are offered. There is no clear distinction between 
possibilities and probabilities and the public are given no help to clarify the 
contradictions. The reassurances include stories about building or environmental codes, 
the vigilance of scientists and the preparedness of government agencies. Turner et al.  
(1986) suggest that alarm and reassurance patterns of reporting confuse people, 
‘fostering an unjustified sense of certainty and imminence [about the threat], 
reinforcing fatalistic attitudes and encouraging complacency’ (41). These observations 
about media reporting of disasters are important because, by bringing the media into 
the warning response frame, it makes possible a way to understand response and risk 
perception in the Australian bushfire context.  
Disaster Myths 
Disaster symbolism and imagery provide a way to think about and ways to cope with 
unexpected and cataclysmic events. Disaster myths are a cultural rationalisation for 
events and phenomena that impact people’s lives and are a product of individuals’ need 
to understand their world. Myths are shaped by the particular social and cultural 
context in which the individuals live and are ‘systems of belief [which are] reshaped and 
internalised, constructing a world-view and influencing subsequent interpretation of 
natural phenomena’ (Dake 1992). Often uncontested, and similar in many ways to ‘well-
worn’ media scripts, these stories are society’s way of explaining and working through 
events that have impacted upon it. Moreover, myths are more likely to be associated 
with natural disasters - extreme weather, earthquakes, and bushfires - than man-made 
technological ones: radioactive leaks or health scares (Fischer and Bischoff 1987 cited in 
Nigg 1995).  
 
Disaster discourse (and media disaster discourse in particular) often includes the 
following two erroneous ideas: the first is that disasters are indiscriminate ‘equal 
opportunity events’ (Schoch-Spana 2005:2), and secondly that people are affected 
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uniformly regardless of gender, social class, or ethnicity. In numerous disasters, this has 
shown not to be the case as it is the elderly, those living in poverty in unsafe, shoddily-
built housing and those who have few physical or social resources that are most 
affected. Statistics comparing first and third world damage and recovery rates after 
major earthquakes starkly demonstrate this phenomenon where corrupt governments 
and an inability to access insurance add to recovery challenges (Wisher 2004). Included 
in this discourse is the idea that disasters, such as bushfires, earthquakes, floods and 
hurricanes are natural ‘acts of God’, before which people are powerless. There is much 
that can be done to prepare for a disaster, especially when modern technologies enable 
scientists to learn in advance about the nature and behaviour of potential disasters. 
Warning systems are being constantly updated and weather forecasting has become 
increasingly accurate; millions of dollars are spent every year on disaster preparation 
and prediction in countries vulnerable to floods, earthquakes, tsunamis and bushfires. 
 
Disaster myths are pervasive and are perpetrated by popular culture (for example 
doomsday apocalyptic movies). Despite a wealth of research (Drabek 1986; Dynes 1970; 
Mileti 1999; Quarantelli 1990; Scanlon and Alldred 1982) showing that after a disaster 
the public and victims often adapt and respond well, myths about public responses to 
disasters are widely accepted by emergency officials and the media alike. Results from a 
survey 0f Sydney residents conducted by Blong (1984) for example, mirrored those 
found in a similar Delaware survey which found that not only was media the 
predominant source of disaster information, but that ‘a significant proportion of the 
population ... believe myths concerning human response to natural disasters’ (260). 
These myths can be seen as media disaster schemas or templates, within which each 
disaster is placed; in this way the media frame and ‘re-frame’ disasters for the public. 
The news media regard extreme events first and foremost as a generic disaster story 
rather than part of complex scientific, political and social processes. Media content 
tends to overemphasize the chaotic, irrational, and deviant aspects of the event and 
journalists are primed to look for heroes and villains, rescues and fatalities, sensational 
imagery and blame. Scalon and Alldred (1982) call it ‘the same old story’ (363). 
 
A common ‘taken for granted’ disaster myth is that after a disaster social 
disorganisation will ensue and in their efforts to escape people will panic, ‘running in 
any direction without thought’ (Fischer 2008:50). Panic is rare; in fact the problem is not 
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that people panic, it is getting them to move (Wenger, Sykes, Sebok et al. 1975). The 
media find it particularly difficult to relinquish the idea of mass panic, so that in some 
instances, the absence of this myth is reported as ‘there was no panic in this instance’ 
(Turner et. al. 1979:132). In the Hobart, Tasmania fires of 1967 there was ‘little evidence 
of panic’ (Wettenhall 1975:320) nor verified instances of looting. Looting (and the fear 
of looting) is a prevailing myth and once again, when looting does not result, the media 
often comment how fortunate it was that this did not happen. Looting typically occurs 
during riots and emergencies such as power blackouts leading the public to generalise 
this exemplar to other emergencies (Fischer 2008). The belief that looting has occurred 
and the reality are somewhat different as a survey by Chamberlain, Doube, Milne et al. 
(1981) showed after the 1974 Cyclone Tracey, in Darwin Northern Territory. Seventy 
eight percent of the people surveyed believed that looting had taken place despite 
most of the reports coming from people who had evacuated after the cyclone and not 
returned. The ‘crime wave’ that is predicted to result from such social disintegration 
also does not happen, and most often reported crime actually declines in the aftermath 
of a disaster. Similarly, retailers who supposedly capitalise on disasters by price gouging 
are also a myth. By emphasising civil unrest and lawlessness, the media creates a 
military invention (martial law) discourse and ‘reinforces a social control ideology’ 
(Teirney, Bevc and Kuligowski 2006:57). Incorrect assumptions about the potential for 
civil unrest can have serious and negative consequences for emergency response. They 
can lead to inefficient allocation of much needed resources and lead officials ‘to keep 
risk-related information from the public’ and avoid issuing timely warnings (Fischer 
2008:52).  
 
A prevailing disaster myth is that of evacuation behaviour and need for temporary 
accommodation. Without consulting local communities about their actual 
requirements, government agencies often make assumptions about community needs, 
hastily providing designated public shelters; often at great expense. In the Brisbane, 
Queensland flood of 1974 Short (1979) claimed that less than seven percent of 
occupants who evacuated used the emergency accommodation provided for them by 
emergency agencies. As previously noted, when assessing risk people often do not act 
in predictable ways and evacuation decision-making is no different; those expected to 
evacuate often do not, and those who should not evacuate often do (Dash and Gladwin 
2007). In the immediate aftermath of the 2010 Christchurch earthquake, where an 
estimated 2000 people were made homeless, a decision was made by the local city 
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council to make 350 motor homes available for temporary accommodation. This was at 
an estimated cost of many thousands of dollars per day. In the three months that 
followed, just one family made use of this facility as people stayed where they were, 
were accommodated by friends and relatives or simply left the area.66  
 
In a content analysis of 40 years of disaster reporting in Time Magazine, Fischer and 
Bischoff (1987) found that whilst ‘we no longer read of looters allegedly cutting off the 
fingers of the deceased to steal rings’ (Quarantelli quoted in Fischer 2008:79), the 
portrayal of disaster myths had increased. Fischer (2008) found that the most telling 
statistics were for natural disasters where 77 percent of all disaster stories contained 
disaster myths. Additionally, in the post-disaster context, 88 percent of the reports 
contained at least one myth, with some containing up to twelve. Scalon and Alldred 
(1982) suggest that one of the reasons for this type of reporting is that few newspapers 
and television organisations can afford to have specialist reporters who are expert in 
weather and geological knowledge, with a good grasp of technical and scientific facts. 
They are ‘generalists’ who, within the constraints of news values and production 
deadlines, rely on others for their information. There are other challenges journalists 
face when reporting on an event of great magnitude. The death and misery of hundreds 
is much more difficult to report in a meaningful way than a more personal human 
interest story. Cockburn (2011) argues that when a journalist reports on disasters they 
must ‘pretend to an emotional response on behalf of their audience  which often comes 
across as contrived and formulaic’ (4).  
 
Despite the observed tendency for media to revert to predictable ways of reporting, 
researchers (Singer and Green 1972; Scanlon and Alldred 1982) conclude that the media 
are an asset in a disaster and a key source of information. They can be a valuable 
support, and can speed up disaster response by highlighting acute problems, pointing 
to areas not yet reached and warning of further issues. During major bushfire events, 
Schauble (2009) sees the media ‘as a resource to be exploited by the fires service , [as 
they are] a critical conduit for information to the general public’ (367). The media can 
also enable people to contact loved ones and provide reassurance; this is especially true 
of social media which has been shown to be extremely effective in communicating crisis 
information, centralising and focusing recovery efforts (Sutton, Palen and Shklovski 
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2008; Palen 2008; Gao, Barbier, Goolsvy et al. 2011). After the immediate disaster has 
passed, the media often play a role in social justice, highlighting community needs 
previously ignored and giving voice to ‘ordinary people’. For example, frustrated by the 
progress by official agencies to give immediate help to people severely affected by the 
Christchurch earthquake in February 2010, a Canterbury university student67 used the 
social networking website ‘Facebook’ to quickly mobilise over 13,000 students. Called 
the ‘Student Volunteer Army’, the students manned call centres, cleared away 
liquefaction, and distributed food, water, pamphlets and chemical toilets. Contrary to 
the myths, typical post-disaster behaviour is proactive, prosocial and altruistic. Survivors 
share resources and help one another, clean-up activities begin at once, police uphold 
public safety, looting and price gouging rarely happens and martial law is almost never 
declared. Damage, injury and death estimates, whilst initially exaggerated, are normally 
revised downwards (Fischer 2008:222). 
 
As the literature shows, there are well-established ways of reporting disasters and yet, 
those scripts, schemas and myths are often not an accurate portrayal of the actual ways 
that people react to a disaster event. These repeated scripts are among people's 
resources to make sense of living in the bush, and are likely to have a complex 
relationship with other forms of knowledge people have. How these all come together 
in the judgements people make about risk, in situations where the risk is a long drawn 
out one and the scripts and myths build up over time, is the subject of this thesis. As the 
empirical chapters will go on to show, media messages form a backdrop to specific, 
context-dependent and individualised responses to those risks. 
The Australian Bushfire Context 
'I’ve often felt … that reporters don’t dig beyond the common clichés 
associated with forest fires – scorched earth, epic events, devastation and 
destruction, etc. – and the result is a one-sided, one-dimensional view of fire' 
(Smith 1992: 6) 
 
The discourse around bushfire is saturated with superlatives. For example, words such 
as ‘exceptional’, ‘unprecedented’ and ‘extraordinary’ (Campbell 2003:246) are 
commonplace in bushfire media reporting. After the Black Saturday bushfires the word 
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‘catastrophic’ was added to this list. This hyperbole contributes to the myth of 
helplessness,68 where the fire is depicted as so severe, (a fire-storm or fire-ball) as to be 
unsurvivable. An analysis of newspaper reporting of the 1983 Ash Wednesday fires in 
South-eastern Australia concluded that media reports ‘focused on descriptions of the 
victims as helpless during and after the event’ (McKay 1983:89). Furthermore, there was 
very little self-efficacy information which would have helped people to ‘help 
themselves’. Certainly not confined to the Australian landscape, but pervasive 
nonetheless, is the myth of the discarded bottle as an accidental cause of bushfire. 
Schauble (2008) once again calls this a fallacy and using statistics from a 2006 National 
Litter Index,69 shows that despite glass rubbish accounting for many thousands of cubic 
metres of discarded roadside rubbish, for the preceding 6 year period, only 6 fires could 
possibly be attributed to discarded glass (22).70 The myth or perception that a bushfire 
is able to be out-run (either on foot or by car) is a pervasive yet dangerous one, as the 
2009 Victorian Black Saturday bushfires showed: some people perished as they 
evacuated late and underestimated the speed and ferocity of the fire and their ability to 
escape it. Others died whilst sheltering in their homes (Handmer et al.2010., Blanchi et 
al. 2014) but the majority of those who evacuated late (including those who drove 
through the bushfires), survived (Whittaker et al. 2013). It is difficult to conclude the 
specific role on the media in the perpetration of these myths; certainly they are 
circulated ‘in the social’, in everyday life. Suffice to say that, as media are credited with 
reflecting society’s norms and values back to society, myth-making and myth-telling are 
all part of that process.  
 
Bushfire myths are thought to contribute to much erroneous thinking about what to do 
in the face of a potential bushfire; so much so that the New South Wales Rural Fire 
Service included a page on bushfire myths in their ‘Prepare.Act.Survive’ brochure – a 
household information and preparation resource made available to every household in 
New South Wales.71 Some common myths are that during a bushfire (a) sitting in a 
bathtub full of water is a safe place to be; (b) standing on the roof and hosing it down 
will avoid the house being burned; (c) the fire brigades will be available to residents; (d) 
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a house can explode if it catches fire and (e) a good local knowledge of roads will 
enable an escape. Erroneous thinking about bushfire behaviour has led to people 
believing that roads, or rivers or even brick walls will stop a major fire. Whilst 
occasionally this has been the case72 more often than not roads and rivers are little 
protection from a major bushfire. Many people are influenced by visual cues and think 
that as long as they stay ahead of the wall of flames, they will be safe; however, embers 
driven by the wind can ignite a fire kilometres ahead of the fire front. Other more 
general myths about Australian bushfire include the idea that bushfires are a ‘natural 
phenomenon’, and as such, should not be thought of as a hazard. As Mike Klimek, a fire-
fighter with the US Forest Service explains, bushfires are only a concern because of the  
wild-land-urban interface (WUI), and ‘the increasing intrusion of people and buildings 
into fire-prone landscapes’ (Tullis 2013:26). A persistent bushfire myth associated with 
the benign way that ‘nature’ is regarded is that the bush needs the fire to regenerate. 
Research has shown that plants regenerate vigorously after a fire simply because fires 
remove competing plants, open up the canopy to greater sunlight and enrich the soil 
with ash from the previous generation of plants (ibid.). 
 
Research has shown (Wenger et al. 1975; Blong 1985) that the media is the predominant 
way the public get their information about disasters. Studies also show that media 
reporting of bushfire can add to people’s sense of helplessness, increase dependence 
on fire agencies and encourage scapegoating (McKay 1996). Other literature criticise 
the media for engendering panic and increasing stress which, in turn, can discourage 
fire authorities from communicating with the media (Henderson and McKinney 2003). 
For example, during the 2003 Canberra fires, a coronial inquest found that ‘fire fighting 
authorities were wary of providing the media with information that might cause 
widespread alarm’ (ABC News 2004). Media reporting of bushfires has been likened by 
Marshall (1994) as similar to war propaganda where ‘the irrational advance of the 
flames was placed in opposition to the rational organisation of troops and civilians’  
(538). He claims that when reporting about bushfires, television reinforces the link 
between the mythic character of masculinity – ‘the digger myth of manhood’ – and the 
resolution of bushfire crises (ibid.: 542). Similarly, Cohen, Hughes, White et al. (2006) 
argue that ‘bushfire mythology may be built into poplar images of fire fighting itself’  
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(49). Media depictions of bushfire myths can influence people’s beliefs about their own 
agency in a bushfire: 
Once you’ve got people understanding bushfires to be a fire storm why 
would you believe you could defend yourself? Why would you believe you 
could protect your house? If you think houses explode, why would you 
bother starting to prepare yourself? You’ll take your risk on the road 
(Carson 2004:34). 
 
Instead of the overuse of emotive language which often hypes the threat, Campbell 
(2003) suggests that media reporting of bushfires should be more about ‘knowledge 
and fire management’ than ‘warfare, destruction and terror’ (244). The media tend to 
frame bushfires as a ‘disaster’ only when it ‘escapes’ from the rural into urban and peri-
urban areas (Cohen et al. 2006a) which Campbell (2003) contends adds to public 
ignorance and a lack of respect for fire.  
 
The media are important to consider in the context of public understanding of disasters 
because they interpret disaster events for the public by privileging some information 
over others, allowing experts to communicate with the public, and providing a way for 
the public to access knowledge usually only available in specific contexts. In many ways 
the media draw attention to disasters long before the public would normally become 
aware of them. Not only can they frame how the public come to think about disasters 
but they become a major source of ‘unofficial’ risk communication, making it difficult 
for the public to differentiate between ‘everyday news’, and what the disaster 
authorities need the public to pay attention to.  
Warnings 
If people at risk are to take action then warning messages must mean 
something to them (Handmer, O’Neill and Kallalea 2010). 
 
Disaster warnings are devised by emergency authorities to help the public prepare for a 
potential event, and the primary objective is public safety. A warning can be described 
as information that warns people who are at risk from an impending disaster  and 
enables those people to make decisions and take action. Mileti and Sorenson (1990) 
state that public response to warnings is part of an larger warning system where the 
public respond to warnings from a management subsystem ‘on the basis of their own 
interpretations of those warnings’ (38). The effectiveness of the warnings varies and 
the reasons for this have resulted in decades of research and the development of many 
theories, models and hypotheses. Notable are the contributions psychology has made 
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to understanding risk perception from a cognitive and behavioural perspective, and the 
studies done by media researchers on the ability of mass communication to influence 
public opinion. Arguments for improving the efficacy of warnings include increasing the  
accuracy of predictions, making scientific information more accessible, augmenting the 
‘scientific literacy’ of the public, reaching more of the target audience and better 
defining the message (‘Developing a Unified All-Hazards Public Warning System’ 2002). 
A distinction needs to be made in the first instance between those warnings which are 
made immediately before a threatened disaster, and those which are issued weeks, 
most often months before a potential disaster. The former falls within the genre of 
crisis communication73 which is distinct from risk communication.  
 
The phrase ‘timely and effective’ to describe the optimal types of warnings can be 
found in much of emergency management literature. However, what these ‘best-
practice’ warnings look like in terms of the timely part of the equation is seldom, if ever 
quantified. Nonetheless, it is widely agreed that effective risk communication, of which 
warnings constitute a large part, include components of self-efficacy, timeliness, 
credibility and scientific information. Mileti and Sorenson (1990) also emphasise that 
good warnings need to be consistent, accurate, informative and confident. Disaster 
warnings need to include these elements, as well as those of predictability and 
controllability, magnitude, imminence, scope and duration. Ideally, warnings are able to 
give enough forewarning for people to heed the warnings and also give an indication of 
the ramifications if the warnings are ignored. In describing a warning system as one 
which ‘provides the opportunity for coping’, Breznitz (1984:5) could also be describing 
characteristics of an optimal warning. Important and relevant for this thesis, is the 
dimension of frequency. According to Mileti and Sorenson (1990) a warning consists of 
the message and source of the warning, the ‘channels through which it is 
communicated and the frequency with which it is repeated’ (45). They also insist that 
people do not mind receiving too many warnings; a point of view that this thesis 
contests as over-warning is hypothesised to be problematic in prolonged lead-time 
threats. However, they do acknowledge this dilemma and offer that ‘in protracted 
emergencies ... there is a point of limited returns after which constant delivery of [the 
same] information may be counterproductive’ (68).  
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Disaster literature (Janis 1962; Turner 1983; Drabek 1996) has shown that there is a 
relationship between warning time, preparedness and response. Janis (1962) 
demonstrated this premise when he described public response to warnings about the 
great Kansas City flood and subsequent fire of 1951, where homes of 20,000 residents 
were damaged or destroyed. According to researchers from the University of Oklahoma 
Research Institute, a major factor in the non-compliance of people directed to evacuate 
was a series of preliminary communications issued during the time preceding the actual 
crisis. ‘The very fact that it was possible to issue warnings long before the danger was 
immediate made possible a gradual, easy adaption to the approaching danger, but, at 
the same time, rendered the warnings less effective’ (ibid.: 79).  
 
Towards the end of World War II residents of London demonstrated a similar 
indifference to air raid warnings and, after a long period of air raids (which at first 
elicited a high level of response) they ‘gradually became more and more emotionally 
adapted to the recurrent threat’ (Janis 1962:109-116). This reaction (or non-reaction) is 
less to do with actual risk assessment and more to do with the way people who live 
with relatively high risk over a prolonged period of time adapt in order to go about their 
everyday life.74 A health related case-study was published by Leventhal et al.(1960) who 
documented public reaction to the 1957 Asian influenza outbreak in two U.S. cities. 
Even though the prevalence of infection was high with more than forty percent of 
families having at least one person in the family sick with the virus, these cases had 
accumulated slowly over a period of 2 months. This meant that only a small number of 
people were sick at any one time, leading to the perception that the epidemic was not a 
real problem; this also limited the number of people who decided to protect themselves 
by being vaccinated. Bettman, Payne and Staelin (1986) claim long-term (prolonged 
lead-time) hazards are difficult for the public to quantify meaningfully (cited in Stewart 
and Martin 1994:1). 
 
As this thesis argues, warning response depends on many different things including 
context and culture, experience and knowledge, interpretation and belief. Integral to 
warnings being responded to as emergency agencies intend, is that people understand 
the warning, believe what it is saying, personalize the risk and respond appropriately 
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(Mileti and Sorenson 1990). However, some people are ‘better equipped to process and 
respond’ and experience, responsibility (for others), understanding risk and social 
networks all contribute to a better response to warnings (92). An official warning 
implies:  
 ‘Based on what we think, which is based on what we know, a bushfire 
could happen therefore you need to prepare or evacuate’.  
 
However, the public interpretation and response is more complex (and could be): 
‘Based on what I think, which is based on what I know from the media and 
other sources, which is based on whom I trust (family/neighbours/friends), 
which is based on how feasible it is for me to do what you recommend, 
which is based on what happened last time you warned me, I will or will not 
heed your warning’.  
 
Drabek (1999) observes that the default response to a threat is denial. However much 
of the disaster literature suggests that the first response to a warning is belief; it is only 
upon examining the evidence around them (environmental risk assessment) that this 
initial reaction is modified. Moreover, experience has shown in the Australian context 
that ‘often only a small percentage of those at risk will receive or recall receiving official 
warnings’ (Handmer 2000-2:6) and many are warned through informal channels 
(Pareker and handmer 1977). These commentaries demonstrate how confused and 
contradictory the literature is, and how a better understanding of warning responses is 
needed.  
 
Following a warning, people most often revert to their own evaluation of their 
environment; in the scenario of a bushfire warning, checking the temperature, wind 
direction or horizon and looking for clues that either will confirm or invalidate the 
warning. Social networks come into play, where neighbours, or those acquaintances 
nearby (‘over the ridge’, or ‘in the next valley’) are called upon to provide more 
information that is not immediately available. To the observer, it may seem somewhat 
chaotic, but this ‘social disorganisation’, according to Turner (1983) is common, and not 
necessarily unintentional or irrational as it often involves trying to get to a safer 
location, find and reunite families and gather up frightened pets. Nigg (1995) explains 
that after a warning has been issued, life continues to be regarded as normal or not life-
threatening, that is, until social and sensory cues demonstrate anything to the contrary. 
Interpretation of warning messages always occurs within people’s ‘frames of normal 
expectations’ and in order for people to take action, this ‘normalcy bias’ needs to be 
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overcome (374).75 Of course, some people seem to do nothing, but research has shown 
that even when people go about their daily routines, they have paid attention to the 
warning; they’ve just reacted to it in different ways.  
Warning Heuristics 
Overwhelmingly, disaster literature describes warnings in terms of the systems used to 
communicate the warnings: for example sirens, SMS (phone texts) messaging, 
television safety campaigns, household letterbox drops and public education 
programmes. There is much less written in the disaster literature about the heuristics of 
disaster warnings, that is, the meanings that the warnings have for those to whom they 
are directed. Warnings mean different things to different people, and as such are 
always open to interpretation. Whilst acknowledging that, in times of crisis, people 
receive warnings through a myriad of processes, studies have shown that up to fifty 
percent can be from informal sources (Mileti and Sorenson 1990). It is important to 
clarify that the warnings in this chapter are operationalised as those official warnings 
that are issued by emergency and disaster agencies prior to the potential threat.  
 
Uncertainty and certainty play a large part in disaster warnings, with emergency 
agencies erring on the side of caution; for legal reasons as much as for public safety. For 
example, in 1965 there was a tsunami threat in Crescent City California and public 
evacuation was the most desirable public safety option. However, Anderson (1970) 
reports that local officials were worried that if no tsunami eventuated, their call for 
evacuation would result in public condemnation. Mileti and Sorenson (1990) call this 
‘the warn-or-not-to-warn’ dilemma and comment that the final decision often comes 
down to whose vested interests the warning best serves (119). A warning not only alerts 
the public but also functions to legally protect the agency that disseminated it.  
Warnings therefore, can be imbued with notions of motivation and credibility which can 
in turn, moderate public response. A 2006 report by the National Academies into 
hazards and disaster research in the social sciences, titled ‘Facing Hazards and Disasters: 
Understanding Human Dimensions’ states that there has been ‘little systematic 
comparative work on the special characteristics of natural, technological and wilful  
disasters’ (National Research Council 2006). The report highlights the need to 
understand the relationship between warning time, preparedness and response.  
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A disaster warning comprises a combination of four main components: the reality of the 
threat, the likelihood of it happening, the timeliness (when it is going to arrive) and the 
warning time (before impact). Other warning parameters are the extent to which a 
threat has been experienced previously and the level of clarity or ambiguity of the 
warning message (Breznitz 1984:5). A disaster comprises predictability, severity 
(magnitude), direction and impact, therefore a disaster warning can be imagined as a 
combination of all of the components mentioned above. Other components that are 
part of the warning process are the source(s) of information, the warning channels, the 
public and their response. Importantly,  these warning components can be both 
objective and subjective. Current beliefs about the threat and previous experience with 
similar threats (for both experts and ‘lay publics’) can also influence how the warnings 
are received. With so many variables that contribute to a warning, it is understandable 
why agencies have found it hard to definitively predict or understand public response. 
Moreover, Svenson (1985) argues that the public have ‘difficulty integrating multiple 
indices of risk to arrive at a summary judgement of overall risk’ (cited in Stewart and 
Martin, 1994:1). The predictability or likelihood of a disaster happening is equally 
important and the likelihood of occurrence is time-bound and linked to the timeliness 
component; people want to know when the disaster is predicted to arrive, as much as 
whether it will or not. This makes warning about disasters that are known about well in 
advance but have yet to materialise, doubly problematic.  
Conceptualising Disasters and Disaster Warnings 
The threats that have a high predictability and certain timeliness have been 
characterised by Janis (1962) as precipient threats. Possibly a more useful way to think 
about these threats are as rapid-onset or shorter lead-time threats. Janis (ibid.) 
suggests that people are more vigilant about these types of threats and pay more 
attention to the warnings because they generate more reflective fear. 76 With rapid 
onset disasters, the perceived likelihood of the threat is high and so is the perceived 
level of danger; this results in higher vigilance and heeding of warnings. However, if a 
prolonged threat has been ‘anticipated by numerous antecedent warnings’ (Janis 
1962:81) then by the time a final and more urgent warning is given, the potential hazard 
is perceived to be less of a threat.  
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Another way to understand human response to a prolonged lead-time threat is to think 
of the time before the threat as an incubation period during which people become 
more fearful and stressed (Breznitz 1984). Janis (1962) suggests that when there has 
been a ‘sequence of warnings’ there may be a finite amount of attention that people 
can pay to warnings before becoming fatigued and ‘emotionally adapted’ to the threat. 
A corollary to this hypothesis is that if, in the sequence of warnings there is some new 
information given, people’s attention to the threat will be stimulated. However, Janis is 
not explicit about the type of new information. Conversely, if no new information is 
received, or the new information indicates the threat is less dangerous than previously 
described, then it could be hypothesised that the watchfulness of people decreases. 
Drabek’s (1996) research following Hurricanes Bob, Andrew and Iniki77 showed that, 
amongst other factors, two event characteristics constrained the responses of tourists 
and residents alike: the availability of escape routes and warning lead-time. These 
findings give weight to the argument that the length of time before a disaster a 
warning is issued has a ‘considerable influence’ in how messages are received and 
whether protective action is taken (521).  
 
Threats which require a prolonged warning period are often those, as shown in Table 
1,78 where the reality is ambiguous, likelihood is low, the timeliness is uncertain and the 
warning time before predicted impact is prolonged. Mileti and Sorenson (1990) state 
that warnings need to have a ‘when’ component; in prolonged disaster scenarios this is 
very hard to provide. Pandemics, bushfires, earthquakes and volcanic eruptions can be 
characterised as prolonged lead-time disasters and all have a ‘contextual potential’, that 
is, in the context of season, or location or as a result of a past event, there is a likelihood 
of a disaster happening, but as yet, thus far, nothing has. Breznitz (1984) states that a 
threat ‘arises from present cues about future harms’ (3) which is problematic for 
disasters in the prolonged lead-time context. Unlike weather warnings which are often 
accompanied by environmental cues such as strong winds, drop in temperature or 
excessive rain, the environmental cues for most prolonged lead-time threats are not 
visible to the lay public, who have to rely solely on the experts for threat information 
and risk assessment.  
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Mileti and Sorenson (1990) describe a typology of hazard types in a report on 
communicating emergency warnings prepared for the Federal Emergency Management 
Agency. However, bushfires, as a hazard or threat were absent from the typology. 
Nonetheless, it provides a framework to begin to think about how warnings might be 
impacted in different ways by the types of hazards or disasters. Their typology 
described warnings issued by emergency authorities rather than the perception of the 
warnings by the public, but it is logical to assume that the way a warning is devised can 
impact upon understanding and perception of risk. Their typology focused on three 
main hazard characteristics: predictability, impact and detection. It concluded that 
those hazards that were easy to detect, where the impact was foreseen and had a long 
prediction time were the easiest to warn the public about. These hazards were specified 
as riverine floods, a slowly erupting volcano, (those in Iceland or Hawaii for example) 
and an earthquake. However, the latter hazard (earthquake) poses classification 
problems, as Mileti and Sorenson point out: ‘earthquakes can span two categories as 
time passes and its physical characteristics change’ (ibid.: 106). Similarly, Burton et al. 
(1993) define ‘speed of onset’ as the length of time between the first appearance of an 
event and its peak (34); in this way earthquakes are defined as ‘rapid-onset’. Bushfires 
pose the same problem and are equally difficult to define; in one sense they can be 
predicted over a long period, as wet winters produce fuel and dry summers make the 
vegetation conducive to fire. Bushfires always have the potential to be once-in-a-thirty-
year events, yet equally may be (and most often are) mild to moderate events. 
However, once bushfires occur, the warnings are issued in a much shorter time frame; 
the fact remains that the impact is unknown until the fire starts. One of the issues with 
any sort of typology is that in most cases one variable is dependent on another one 
which is in turn dependent on a further variable. For example, impact is dependent on 
prediction time which is dependent on detection. 
 
Warning fatigue literatures support the notion that false alarms impact warning 
response. The conceptual model of Public Perception of Warning Accuracy and Source 
Credibility discussed in Chapter 1 (Barnes et al.2007) showed a range of warnings on a 
continuum where a False Alarm resulted from a warning which was issued but the event 
did not occur. It could equally be imagined that there is a correlated public response for 
each warning scenario. The adapted conceptual model of warning accuracy and 
warning source credibility (Figure 2) assumes that, between an unwarned event and a 
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false alarm, there is a continuum of public perception about warning accuracy and 
warning source credibility. As in the Barnes et al. model (ibid.), the adapted model 
includes warning scenarios of under-warning (event occurred but was more severe than 
warning) and over-warning (event occurred but was less severe than warning). The 
public perception of a false alarm in the adapted model states that ‘Warning was not 
accurate and warning source was not credible’ – this response has much in common 
with the ways that warning fatigue has been conceptualised by emergency managers, 
meteorological officials, academics and the public. 
 
Figure 2: Adapted Conceptual Model of Public Perception of Warning Accuracy and Source Credibility 
 
This thesis argues that hazards are not straightforward to typify and that when the 
public hears a warning, or become aware of a threat, indices of (a) reality (of the 
threat), (b) likelihood (of it happening), (c) timeliness (of predicted impact), (d) impact 
location and (e) warning time needed (before impact) could be a more useful 
differentiation of hazards. The example of a hurricane in the following table, illustrates 
the ways a hazard can be described and shows that once a hurricane is detected by the 
weather bureau on the weather radar its ‘reality’ is unambiguous as it is able to be seen. 
It is highly likely it will eventuate into a hurricane event, and depending on the size of 
what is seen on screen, the magnitude and impact can be predicted. Because of the 
sophisticated nature of weather tracking technology, the time and location of landfall 
can also be accurately predicted. A hurricane can be categorised as a rapid onset 
hazard, because the time from detection to time of landfall is usually around a week or 
so. It could be argued that lead-time for a hurricane could be much longer as a hurricane 
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season can be predicted annually; just as there are tornado and bushfire seasons. 
However, in the typology below in Table 1, warning time indicates the time from when a 
threat is warned about, until it eventuates (or not); this is an important distinction. 
Pandemics, volcanic eruptions, risks from bushfires and earthquakes are sometimes 
warned about many months before an event occurs, and in many cases the predicted 
event never eventuates.  
HAZARD Detection 
Predictability 
/Likelihood 
Timeliness Location 
Warning 
Time  
(Lead-time) 
Hurricane Unambiguous High Certain Certain Shorter 
Tornado Unambiguous High Certain Certain Shorter 
Blizzard Unambiguous High Certain Certain Shorter 
Flood Ambiguous Moderate Certain Certain Shorter 
Tsunami Ambiguous Low Uncertain Certain Shorter 
Pandemic Ambiguous Low Uncertain Uncertain Prolonged 
Volcanic 
Eruption 
Ambiguous Moderate/Low Uncertain Uncertain Prolonged 
Bushfire Ambiguous Uncertain Uncertain Uncertain Prolonged 
Earthquake Ambiguous Low Uncertain Uncertain Prolonged 
Table 1: Typology of Disasters 
Bushfires were operationalised using this typology as ambiguous, as the reality of a 
bushfire can be imagined (because of seasonal and meteorological conditions) yet does 
not exist until one actually begins. Warnings about bushfires (either official or 
unofficial) are in the public sphere almost year round. The likelihood of a bushfire is 
uncertain, yet a warning can be issued because of a combination of ground moisture, 
temperature, wind speed, fuel load and topography. The timeliness aspect of a bushfire 
is also uncertain, as once a fire has started, where it may ‘arrive’ is dependent on the 
environmental factors mentioned above. Warning lead-time for bushfires can be 
prolonged (for bushfire seasons) as well as shorter, as fires actually start.  In both 
bushfire scenarios the detection is straightforward, but only once ignited. So warning 
the public about bushfires, an inherently uncertain threat, is problematic. Mileti and 
Sorenson (1990) concur with this observation and comment that there are some 
warning scenarios which ‘extend beyond the period of time that people would normally 
remain vigilant, concerned or even interested’ (ibid.: 112). These scenarios are ‘massive 
and rare events’ and effective ways to deal with these events are difficult and ‘pose 
unique problems for emergency officials’ (ibid.: 113). It is one of the fundamental aims of 
this thesis to understand warning response in this context.  
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When exploring evacuation issues during the Ash Wednesday fires of 1983, Miller, Carter 
and Stephens (1984) identified timely, adequate and accurate warnings as one of the 
main problems. The challenges that lead-time presents when warning about bushfires 
was underscored in an address to the Institution of Fire Engineers, by John Nicholson, 
(AFSM):79  
Mass evacuation in the event of wildfire is a difficult option, as warnings of 
impending danger become increasingly difficult to issue the shorter the 
lead-time available between the knowledge that a danger threatens and 
when it is anticipated that it will occur. The difficulty is accentuated when 
the exact time and location of impact are uncertain (Nicholson 1994:5).  
 
Findings from a study by John Handmer (1992) about the 1988 Rockhampton 
(Queensland) floods, identified a major challenge of prolonged lead-time warnings: that 
of competing ‘unofficial’ warnings. He argued that warning response is influenced by 
lead-time because, as official warnings are issued well ahead of the predicted event, the 
public have time to confirm or disconfirm the warnings by reading media reports and by 
talking to others. Media commentaries on the coming event also serve as unofficial 
predictions and the hazard discourse is confounded by multiple viewpoints which 
‘modify the context of the message’ (9). This undermines the ‘one source’ official 
message, especially if these unofficial sources conflict with official advice. During the 
1967 Tasmanian fires, known as 'Black Tuesday' Wettenhall (1975) found that people 
under-responded to pre-disaster danger signals because they claimed they had 'heard it 
all before’ ( 71,  104). Handmer’s (1992) study suggests that, response to warning 
messages in prolonged lead-time scenarios may depend not so much on what people 
hear but from whom or where they hear it.  
 
In the wake of the Black Saturday bushfires householder behaviour and decision-making 
under threat in the Australian bushfires context was examined (Whittaker et al. 2009. 
McLennan, Elliott, Omodei et al. 2011, McLennan, Omodei, Elliott et al. 2013), and 
included evidence presented to the Victorian Royal Commission. Failures in warning 
systems and a lack of timely and accurate information regarding the location speed and 
direction of the bushfires was suggested to have jeopardised resident’s safety (2009 
Victorian Bushfires Royal Commission Final Report , 2009). McLennan, Elliott, Omodei et 
al. (2012) notes that prior to the bushfires participants reported few offici al warnings 
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about the imminent bushfire. Their study called for a better understanding of ‘factors 
that drive decisions and subsequent behaviours of householders exposed to a wildfire 
threat’ (916). However, not included in the post-Black Saturday literature was how the 
perception of official warnings influenced risk perception and whether warning lead-
time had an impact upon decision-making. This knowledge gap is addressed in this 
thesis.  
Discussion 
Disaster warnings are interpreted by the media, defined and imbued with meanings. 
The public then re-interprets these messages and warnings in the context of their 
everyday lives, using social, cultural and environmental cues to confirm the warnings, 
evaluate their risk and respond as they see fit. Whilst media  theorists no longer 
subscribe to the maxim that the media can tell people what and how to think, the 
conventions of reporting, templates and news values all combine to be a powerful 
influence upon people’s understandings and perspectives. Nowhere is this more telling 
than when disasters happen; because of deadlines and news values (amongst other 
constraints) tried and true ways of telling a disaster story are employed. These ways 
stereotype both response and responders, often creating a problem where previously 
there was none. Myths are perpetrated in this way and these were detailed in this 
chapter. Absent from the list of myths was that of ‘cry wolf’ or ‘warning fatigue’ as this 
thesis challenges the accepted view that repeated warnings do not result in w arning 
fatigue. This chapter also extends the definition of disasters by proposing a typology 
that included warning lead-time as a differentiating factor. It also suggested that 
disasters with a prolonged warning lead-time present unique warning challenges for 
emergency authorities and influence how the public respond to them.  
 
The following chapter explores perception and appraisal of risk from the psychosocial 
perspective. It draws predominantly upon the discipline of psychology to understand 
stress and anxiety responses and explores the strategies individuals employ to cope 
with and mitigate the feelings arising from hearing a disaster warning. Whilst using 
psychological theories and models may seem incongruous to understanding ‘the social’,  
this thesis argues that to ignore the individual as part of the social is only to tell ‘half the 
story’, and that by bringing more than one perspective to an exploration of risk 
perception and warning response, a complete picture can be drawn.   
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4. SUBJECTIVITY IN THE SOCIAL DOMAIN 
Introduction 
The person, it is argued, is much more than a gateway or site through which 
affecting forces jostle, to be then transmitted on to other human receivers. 
Instead, a rather massive and distinctive re-working of the social is thought to 
occur as it passes thought human subjectivity (Wetherell 2012:128) 
 
Studies into the interaction between the individual and community, or the self and the 
social, have often been reduced to an ‘either/or’; a binary where the self has been seen 
as either preceding the social or resulting from it. Bodies and brains are embedded 
within social contexts; when sociologists talk about the social expression of a 
psychological concept for example, there is an implicit assumption that brain processes 
directly translate into social processes. However, I would suggest that this privileges 
the social contexts of these processes at the expense of acknowledging and 
understanding the psychological affects80  that directly contribute to these social 
expressions. A psychosocial approach views the human subject as a social entity, with 
subjectivity in the social domain. Subjectivity is operationalised as the desires, feelings, 
perspectives, even personalities of ‘the subject’, who, for purposes of this thesis, are 
people who live in bushfire-prone areas of Australia. This complex dynamic between 
thoughts, feelings and actions can be understood as ‘a crucial bridge between the 
individual and the social, and are a quintessentially psychosocial phenomena’ they are 
situated in the body yet manifested in the social (Day Sclater, Yates, Price et al. 2009:1).  
The challenge that this chapter pursues is to ‘move between existing disciplines of pure 
and applied domains’ to ‘rethinking the space between the psychic and the social’  
(Stenner 2007:1,3). 
 
Risk perception, or risk judgment (Dunwoody and Neuwirth 1991) is multidimensional,  
encompassing cognitive, societal and cultural influences and few have ‘distinguished 
between social and personal risk judgments’ (Coleman 1993:613).  A central theoretical 
aim of this thesis is to keep a holistic perspective on risk, acknowledging that risk 
perception can be social and cognitive and to explore the intersection of both. In the 
context of disaster warning and threat appraisal this chapter also explores the intra-
personal component of risk evaluation and the cognitive affects that influence the 
decision-making process. This is not to imply that there is a right or wrong way to 
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 Affect –verb: to act upon or influence. noun: (psychology) an expressed or observed emotional 
response. The ‘affect heuristic’ is discussed on page 103. 
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respond to risk but to emphasise that individuals are not just information processors, 
they are also meaning-makers who evaluate and interpret risk within social, political and 
cultural contexts. Just to what extent these social contexts influence or mediate the 
perception of risk will be addressed in the following chapter. 
 
One of the objectives of this thesis is to understand what impels the inhabitants of fire-
prone areas of Australia to pay attention to bushfire warnings. Furthermore, as they pay 
attention (or not) and interpret them in their own context, to determine what shapes 
their assessment of bushfire warning credibility. As the environment and its dangers 
meet the individual and are mediated by emergency and disaster authorities, it is how 
risk is personalised and then made real (or subjectified) that this chapter explores.  
 
The decision on which literature, theories and models to include was made as a result of 
several years of reading and research in the risk evaluation field, and led to narrowing 
the focus of this thesis to warning fatigue. This thesis takes an integrated and 
interdisciplinary approach to understanding warning fatigue and draws upon literature 
from several disciplines including psychology, sociology, geography, mass 
communication, and disaster and emergency management. However, in this chapter 
there is an emphasis on the psychological explanations for topics which are relevant to 
this thesis – anxiety, coping, risk appraisal, control, self-efficacy and biases; for the 
purposes of exploring these topics this chapter privileges the psychological over the 
social. It builds upon, in part, Irving Janis’ ideas about the psychological effects of 
warnings which are encapsulated in Baker and Chapman’s (1962) book Man and Society 
in Disaster. All the topics covered in this chapter involve the appraisal process of a 
threat and the psychological affects which influence how appraisals are made, rather 
than the behaviour which follows a threat appraisal. For example theories such as 
Azjen’s (2002) Theory of Planned Behaviour concentrate more on beliefs about 
behaviour with the aim of being able to predict behaviour in certain contexts. 
Summarised in this chapter is the psychological literature on emotions such as 
helplessness, fear, and anxiety, as these have been shown to play a part in how the 
public perceive personal risk and decide to respond to warnings. The cognitive 
adaptations and maladaptations as well as appraisal, stress and coping theories are 
outlined; these include personality traits of optimism, unrealistic optimism, theories of 
attribution, normalcy and habituation, and the emotional ‘reactions’ of fatalism and  
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helplessness. Hobfoll’s (1989) Conservation of resources theory is useful to examine 
how, in times of stress, people evaluate their ability to cope by assessing whether they 
have the required resources to deal with the threat. 
 
The exploration of risk perception and cognition has a rich research history in 
psychology, and sociologists can use this knowledge to explore the interplay between 
subjectivity and its expression in the social domain. Until relatively recently, much of the 
psychological literature that has examined threat responses has done so in laboratory-
based situations using a contrived stimulus and, compared to society at large, a 
relatively small number of individuals. For example, Breznitz (1984), in his exegesis on 
the cry wolf syndrome, details the electric shocks he threatened to give his participants 
and evaluated his hypotheses by their psycho-physiological (heart rate and skin 
conductance) indices. The quantitative methodologies that psychology typically 
embrace propose and then seek to prove or disprove hypotheses. However, without a 
qualitative component it is difficult to empirically validate why participants respond in 
such a way - only that they did. The psychosocial approach offers a way to observe the 
connection between thought and action, intention and behaviour, stimulus and 
response, emotions and affect. 
Appraisal, Coping and stress theories 
Within contemporary theories of stress, the ways that people both appraise threats and 
mitigate anticipated impacts is seen as integral to understanding how best to cope with 
life’s challenges. Fleishman (1984) defines these strategies as ‘overt and covert 
behaviours that are taken to reduce or eliminate psychological distress or s tressful 
conditions’ (229); research has traditionally explored responses that both confront and 
avoid. Typologies examined in this literature include the processes of change or control,  
modification or regulation and cognitive and behavioural strategies which focus on 
either the problem or the emotional response. Coping strategies can be initiated at any 
stage of a stressful scenario: before, during or following an event. This discussion of 
stress and coping will do so in the context of pre-disaster scenarios, (warnings and 
preparedness) rather than how people emotionally mitigate the effects of a disaster 
after it has occurred. Therefore, the appraisal and coping strategies people employ 
prior to a disaster or in response to a potential threat are especially pertinent.  
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Appraisal and response is a dynamic contextual and reciprocal process between a 
person and their environment; the response of a person cannot be understood in 
isolation of an equal understanding of the natural setting in which it occurred 
(Schwarzer, 1998). Lazarus (1991) acknowledges the environment also when he 
conceptualises stress reactions as comprising causal antecedents made up of personal 
beliefs on one hand and environmental constraints on the other. A sense of 
environmental mastery as well as self-esteem were found by Pearlin and Schooler 
(1978) to reduce emotional distress in situations which occurred over a relatively long 
period of time. Based on this idea of self and environment, Brandtstädter (1992) devised 
a model of goal-oriented coping in which he theorised that people are either 
‘assimilative’ (they try to modify their environment) or ‘accommodative’, in that they try 
to modify themselves. He further explained that assimilative coping styles are used to 
pursue goals, whereas an accommodative style tends towards adaptation to the 
unexpected. 
 
Most people do not exist in isolation, and peoples’ social networks and relationships are 
often drawn upon in time of distress and crisis; these social resources have been 
hypothesised as mediating life stressors where low levels of social resources can cause 
psychological anxiety (Lin, Simeone, Ensel et al. 1979, Andrews, Tennant, Hewson et al. 
1978). Additionally the quality of support can be a predictor of coping outcomes 
(Henderson 1977). Perceived support, also known as ‘functional support’ (Wills and Filer 
2001) help people believe they can rely on friends and family to talk with, and that their 
social networks will be emotionally and practically supportive.  
Emotion and Affect 
Stress 
Although risk perception was originally viewed as a form of deliberative, 
analytic information processing, over time we have come to recognise just 
how highly dependent it is upon intuitive and experiential thinking, guided 
by emotional and affective practice (Slovic 2000:xxxi) 
 
Aversive experiences such as anxiety, worry, dread and fear can all be understood as 
‘normal’ adaptive response to threats. However, these responses can influence how 
people respond to warnings, interpret potential threats and respond to risk. Stress, 
often experienced as fear or anxiety, is a subjective psychological and physiological 
response which places demands upon the individual. A stress response is initiated by 
the body’s nervous system and  can result in physiological changes; for example in acute 
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stress situations, a stressor may produce increased stress hormones such as cortisol 
and adrenalin, enabling the evolutionary adaptive flight or fight responses. 
Neurotransmitters, such as serotonin, are released to mitigate effects of acute stress 
(Glanz and Schwartz 2008). Early psychological research developed to explore concepts 
of stress most often did so within the framework of abnormal psychology. However, 
more recently, research into stress has focused on chronic or long-term stress, and its 
effects on the body; for example the immune system, metabolism and memory.  
 
A stressor can be any real or perceived physical, social, or psychological event and is 
often perceived by an individual as somewhere between a threat and a challenge 
(McLennan personal communication 25 November 2013). These events can result in 
anxiety and fear which are stress reactions and there are many factors which influence 
this subjective experience of stress. This chapter operationalises the ‘stressor’ as a 
disaster warning and ‘stress’ as the individual’s response to a disaster warning. Using a 
threatened disaster as an example of a stressor, these factors could include the 
characteristics of the disaster – controllability, predictability and frequency – and an 
individual’s previous experience with a similar disaster, coping consequences and 
outcomes. Lazarus (1991) states that ‘the anticipation of a severe threat with its 
inherent uncertainty is often more stressful than the event itself’ (204).) He proposed 
that stress was a transactional phenomenon, largely dependent on the subjective 
meaning the stimulus had for the perceiver (Antonovsky, 1979). For purposes of 
exploring stress responses in the disaster context, this chapter draws upon Lazarus’ 
Transactional Model of Stress (Lazarus 1966). This model describes that in times of 
threat, people quickly situate the threat within their experience, imagine what the 
impact might be and evaluate their ability to deal with it. He suggests a primary and 
secondary appraisal schema where the first appraisal evaluates the personal risk and 
the second considers the available coping options. The secondary appraisal apportions 
responsibility or blame, evaluates their ability to cope with the threat and, if the event 
plays out in accordance with their goals, the probable outcome. Lazarus’ theory has 
subsequently been revised and more recent research suggests the secondary appraisal 
of ‘coping options’ may in fact be utilised first.  Krohne (2002) offers a more appropriate 
nomenclature of ‘demand and resource’ appraisals as he maintains both appraisals 
‘depend on each other and often appear at the same time’ (2).  
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The ways that people respond to challenges from their environment can be seen ‘as a 
function of their personality, constitution, perceptions,  and the context in which the 
threat occurs’ (italics added, Hobfoll 1989:513). Earthquake victims who experience on-
going earthquakes, each of which may herald another large quake or a lesser 
aftershock, experience stress because they are situated between the physical event and 
the subjective experience of the event; they are active in this process and are 
constructing risk as they do so. Healthy citizens of a community which has recently 
experienced a flu-virus outbreak and who are monitoring their own health on a daily 
basis are another example. The idea of acute stress as opposed to chronic stress can be 
demonstrated as the difference between the stress experienced in an imminent pre-
disaster phase (‘there is a hurricane bearing down on your town’) and the prolonged 
experience of living with awareness of a potential risk (‘we know we live on a major, 
active fault-line’).  
 
People who live in bushfire-prone areas experience a fire season annually, where for the 
six or so months over the summer, the risk from bushfires is made known through 
public safety campaigns and targeted television and radio bushfire information. 
Apprehension about potential bushfires is activated with each very hot day, which is 
classified by fire authorities and well-known to communities as a ‘total fire ban’  day.81 
Observations of the vegetation and ground drying out, increasing fuel load and 
particular meteorological conditions (strong winds, high temperatures, low moisture) 
can raise the awareness of bushfire risk. This awareness has the potential to increase 
anxieties about the potential for a fire. These observations are not made just once, but 
are part of on-going risk assessment. However the ability of people to maintain 
vigilance about a threat over a long period of time is limited. 82 Vigilance depends on a  
variety of factors: the magnitude of the threat, the salience of the threat in relation to 
everyday life concerns and the perceived ability of the disaster and emergency agencies 
to keep the threat contained. Therefore, in a longer temporal context (prolonged lead-
time), factors such as vigilance become more of an influence on decision-making and 
need to be considered along with the psychological affects.  
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Anticipatory Anxiety 
Anticipatory anxiety is a specific type of fear that initiates coping mechanisms. During 
the fire season and in addition to everyday cues, the public are exposed many warnings, 
the number and frequency of which can have a sensitising effect, making some threats 
more salient. From the road-side signs indicating the level of fire danger for that day, to 
frequent television bushfire prevention broadcasts, the public are primed to expect that 
a fire is likely should factors beyond their control conspire to produce a bushfire. In the 
absence of an actual fire event and regardless of whether the bushfire eventuates, the 
anxiety precipitated by the warning for some will be real.  
 
Research (Monat, Averill and Lazarus 1972) suggests that temporal uncertainty (not 
knowing when a threatening event will happen) is managed better when the lead-time 
is prolonged as this gives people more time to activate or change their coping 
strategies. The usefulness of event lead-time or prior warning for coping strategies 
needs to be qualified however, as event uncertainty is compounded when the 
probability of the event is also unknown. Unlike severe weather events which are able 
to be predicted more easily as weather modelling and satellite technology develop, 
prolonged lead-time disasters present the public with well-known disaster outcomes 
but with little or no certainty as to when the event will occur. Probabilistic data for 
volcanic eruptions, pandemics, earthquakes and bushfires are the domain of industry 
experts, and the public are entirely dependent on their expertise and ability to convey 
timely and important information. In the case of bushfires, it is possible to evaluate the 
weather - the ground moisture, the wind strength and direction, temperature and 
moisture - so it is reasonable to assume that personal evaluation of environmental cues 
may reassure and moderate anticipatory anxiety to some degree. However, as Slovic, 
Fischoff and Lichentstein (1980) point out, ‘even when statistical data are plentiful, the 
hard facts can only go so far...[and]… at some point human judgement is needed to 
interpret the findings and determine their relevance’ (189).  
Anticipatory Coping 
Peacock and Wong (1996) posit that when people are exposed to conditions where an 
uncertain outcome induces stress, they employ a variety of coping strategies, activating 
one of eight coping schemas.83 Based on accumulated knowledge of the situation at 
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hand (an imminent bushfire for example) and much like mental models, 84 people use 
different coping schemas according to the perceived threat. Additionally, how well 
people cope when faced with a threat depends on how much control they think they 
can have over the situation. The schema most applicable to highly threatening 
situations is the ‘passive-emotional’ schema which involves a disengaging ‘in order to 
control strong emotional reactions’ (Peacock and Wong 1996:206). However, similar to 
Lazarus and Folkman’s (1984) concept of emotion-focused coping, a passive-emotional 
approach is not thought to change a situation; rather it serves to make a person feel 
better whilst experiencing it. Anticipatory coping is posited by Beehr and McGrath 
(1996) as one of five coping behaviours85 whose purpose is to manage the impending 
risk. For example women about to lose their hair from the side effects of chemotherapy 
often choose to shave it off before treatment as it provides a sense of control over an 
unpredictable process (Frith et al. 2007).  
 
Coping with anxiety caused by events in the past, called reactive coping, is 
fundamentally different from anticipatory coping because the crucial threat has yet to 
materialise. The usefulness of anticipatory anxiety is that it motivates people to imagine 
the possible impact of the event and engage in preparation activities. Schwarzer and 
Knoll (2003) assert that anticipatory coping is a ‘management of known risks [and a] 
short-term engagement with high-certainty events’ where people invest their 
resources, enlist help or seek reassurance (5). 
Preventative and Proactive Coping 
Preventative coping are strategies people put into place long before an event occurs 
and includes gathering resources in order to ‘reduce the severity of the consequence of 
stress’ (Greenglass 2002:6). Preventative coping is most often event-specific and people 
usually know about the threat for which they are preparing. For example as the bushfire 
approaches, residents who live in bushfire-prone areas will often go through a well-
rehearsed list of tasks (clearing gutters, checking water supplies) even though there is 
no certainty that their actions will result in protection. As Schwarzer and Knoll (2003) 
point out, preventative coping is not initiated because people are about to experience 
an acute threat, rather it is borne from a generalised concern about ‘the dangers of life’ 
(6). Uncertain events which have yet to materialise and of which people have had no 
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personal experience are harder to prepare for; these are also the disasters that 
emergency authorities know are the hardest to warn about. It is important to note that 
for preventative coping, the anticipated problems are viewed as controllable, and the 
mechanisms put in place to manage the event deemed sufficient. 
 
Preventative and proactive coping are future-orientated, conceptualising a risk or threat 
and imagining ways to combat any negative impacts. Schwarzer (1999) defines reactive 
coping as more of a risk management strategy, whereas proactive coping is ‘coping to 
prevent adversity and promote personal growth’ (Schwarzer and Luszczynska 2008:22). 
Therefore, rather than being something that a person does in a specific instance for a 
specific event, proactive coping is operationalised as a ‘life skill’ . It is something to be 
incorporated into a person’s general attitude where resources are acquired, managed 
and goals achieved. In contrast to preventative coping where worry levels are high, 
proactive coping results in lower levels of anxiety (Scharwzer 2000) and makes people 
feel better whilst imagining the threat.  
Self-Efficacy 
Perceived personal competence or optimistic self-belief was first addressed by Bandura 
(1977) whose concept of ‘self-efficacy’ (a personal belief in one's ability to succeed in 
specific situations) laid the foundation for his social cognitive theory.86 As an internal 
coping resource, Bandura claimed that self-efficacy can be a predictor for ‘whether 
coping behaviour will be initiated and sustained as well as how much coping effort will 
be expended’ (Holahan and Moos 1987:953). The stronger an individual’s sense of 
efficacy, the greater the effort, perseverance, and resilience they exhibit in the face of 
an adverse situation. Self-efficacy is positively correlated to self-control; the more that a 
person believes he or she can alter the outcome of a situation, the more positively a 
threat will be viewed and the more convinced they are that they will be able to 
overcome it. The terms self-efficacy, self-esteem or self-concept are often used 
interchangeably. Self-esteem can be defined as a personal judgement of worthiness, 
involves an attitude of approval or disapproval and ‘indicates the extent to which the 
individual believes himself to be capable, significant, successful, and worthy’ 
(Coopersmith 1967:4,5). Efficacy beliefs have also been shown to influence the amount 
of stress and anxiety individuals experience when facing a potential threat (Pajares and 
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 Originating from Social Learning Theory (Miller and Dollard 1941), Social Cognitive Theory asserts that it is 
only by observing others and copying their behaviour, that people acquire knowledge. That knowledge is 
then modified as a result of reward or punishment. 
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Shunk 2001; Pajares & Miller 1994). Furthermore, Lazarus (1991) conceptualises self-
efficacy as comprising of ‘hardiness, sense of coherence, optimism, consecutive 
thinking, learned resourcefulness and self-control’ (442).  
 
Personal self-efficacy is the belief that an individual can achieve what they set out to 
achieve and outcome efficacy is the belief that there will be a favourable outcome if this 
action is completed. Outcomes which are seen as successful enhance personal self-
efficacy and those which are interpreted as failures, lower it. Self-efficacy mediates 
between a person’s thoughts and emotions and their actions. Research (Bandura 1986;.  
Corbin 1972; Felz and Landers 1983; Kazdin 1978) has shown that individuals with high 
perceived self-efficacy more easily imagine scenarios in which they are successful, which 
in turn (when they are successful), further strengthen efficacy beliefs. Moreover, even 
when things do not go as well as planned, those high in self-efficacy recover more 
quickly, and ‘maintain their commitment to their goals’ (Schwarzer 1998:4). Hearing 
about and responding to disaster warnings is essentially a problem-solving dilemma and 
it is possible that those who can more easily imagine themselves being successful in a 
disaster may have better outcomes than those who cannot. These outcomes can range 
from more thorough preparation to better family and property protection measures. 
Furthermore they not only involve physical processes but also can include role-playing 
and rehearsal (Hepworth, Rooney and Dewberry-Rooney 2010). The majority of disaster 
literature which links self-efficacy to preparedness and effective decision-making under 
stress does so in the context of post-disaster scenarios. Self-efficacy is integral to 
understanding how individuals appraise potential threats. 
 
In terms of decision-making under threat, encouraging proactive coping behaviour is a 
challenge for disaster and emergency management agencies, not the least because 
disasters are extremely negative, requiring reactive processes to alleviate distress. 
However, one of the tenets of proactive coping is that is changes how people think 
about adversity; instead of potential problems, the obstacles are reconceptualised as 
challenges and threats become opportunities. Positive coping strategies include 
imagining the threat and then acquiring personal resources to meet those challenges. 
The rationale is that the better the resources, the more empowered individuals will feel 
about facing adversity (Greenglass 2002). Correspondingly, it is hypothesised that the 
fewer resources a person thinks they have, and with no way to redress that problem, 
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the more stressed they are likely to become. These ideas were encapsulated in Steven 
Hobfolls (1989) ‘Conservation of Resources’ theory where both internal (self-beliefs) 
and external (physical and social) resources are hypothesised to contribute to proactive 
coping. This theory is valuable to explore in the psychosocial context of this chapter as 
it suggests that resources can be both psychological and social. Moreover that people 
who perceive themselves to having adequate amounts of both types of resources 
appear better placed to respond to threats should they occur.  
Conservation of Resources Theory 
Surviving a disaster has been shown to increase self-control and self-esteem which in 
turn, increases optimism (Taylor and Armor 1996).  Within the discipline of positive 
psychology, these positive traits can be understood as ‘positive psychological capital’  
(Luthans and Youssef 2004), a concept which describes the emotional resources that 
enable people to manage anticipated stress. Not unlike social capital, where social 
resources such as family and friendship networks increase social cohesion and personal 
investment (Dickenson 2013), so too emotional resources have been hypothesized to 
protect against the psychological and emotional impacts of threats. As a way of 
explaining why people become stressed at the prospect of losing their resources, 
Hobfoll (1989) proposed a ‘conservation of resources’ theory in which people strive to 
retain, protect and build resources in order to prepare for and mitigate anticipated 
stressful life events. These resources can be physical  objects, social relationships, 
knowledges, personal characteristics or even conditions such as a stable marriage or a 
good reputation. Limitations of this theory are that it is often difficult for people to 
quantify or even recognise their own resources, and therefore find it challenging to add 
to these resources if they are perceived as lacking. Hobfoll’s definition of resources is 
broad, and the weak association between resources and wellbeing problematic; 
‘whereas some people might be able to make a lot out of very little,  others might be 
less skilled in using their resources efficiently’ (Freund and Riediger 2001:373). The 
theory is a generalised framework at best where the resources which would be most 
relevant to any given domain are not specified. However, Hobfoll’s theory goes some 
way to explaining why people become stressed when their perceived resources are 
threatened, or when a situation is approaching where their ability to cope and the 
resources they have available to them are outweighed by the magnitude of the threat.  
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Cognitive Adaptations and Self-serving Biases 
The challenge of a psychosocial approach is to integrate the often contradictory 
traditions of psychology and sociology without privileging one over the other; this 
thesis maintains that both disciplines can contribute to understanding how and why 
people respond in the ways they do. Despite the criticism that psychology tends 
towards a pathologising of behaviour (Haslam 2005), the focus in the following section 
on ‘the self’ is to understand how a cognitive response can be a part of a socially-
contextual process. 
Optimism Bias 
Weinstein (1989) describes optimism bias as the belief individuals have that if 
misfortune occurs, it will always be to other people, not to themselves; ‘people tend to 
think that they are invulnerable’ (806). A New Zealand study by Spittal, McClure, Siegert 
et al. (2005) showed that compared to friends and others who lived in the same city, 
participants thought should an earthquake occur, they were better prepared and less 
likely to be hurt. Survivors of the 2009 Black Saturday bushfires in Victoria reported 
both internally and externally-based optimism beliefs; most felt their fire plans and their 
fire knowledge were sufficient. They also believed their houses were more resilient to 
fire (than they turned out to be) and that emergency authorities would be able to warn 
and protect them (McLennan, Elliott and Omodei 2012). These optimistic beliefs were 
shown to be flawed, and for those who died, are believed to have contributed to their 
deaths (Handmer et al. 2010). The bias of optimism is important to consider in the 
decision-making and response process regardless of whether an optimistic ‘default’ is a 
way of making stressful situations seem more palatable. ‘If people do not perceive 
themselves as vulnerable to a disease or condition [or threat] they are less likely to 
adopt recommended behaviours’ (Avis, Smith and MacKinlay 1989:1608).  
 
Because of its impact on control appraisals, optimism increases problem solving efforts  
(Scheier and Carver 1985); quite simply, optimistic people feel as if they have more 
control over personal situations. For example, if a person expects a positive outcome, 
they are more likely to see the threat as manageable, and envision ways to manage the 
problem. Belief in good luck (externally-based optimism) and perceived self-efficacy, 
that is, internally-based optimism, has also been thought to increase the expectation of 
a positive outcome. Schwarzer (1994) claims some people have a well-being ‘default’ 
and are constantly looking for a positive outcome. Moreover, in times of stress and 
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threat, optimistic people actively seek ways to overcome any perceived negative 
outcome. Studies have shown that optimism increases positive outcomes in many 
different contexts, (Marshall and Lang 1990; Reker and Wong 1984; Sheier and Carver 
1985). However, there are fewer studies that have examined the influence of optimism 
on decision-making before an event. 
 
University students, who had experienced a magnitude 6.7 earthquake in Northridge 
California (a suburb of Los Angeles) in 1994, were asked a series of questions designed 
to test their optimism bias. Conducted over a period of 5 months after the quake, the 
study found that ‘those who had personal experience with injury or monetary loss as a 
result of the earthquake showed less optimism about injury in future earthquakes than 
those with no personal experience of injury or loss’ (Helweg-Larsen 199p:119). Contrary 
to previous research suggesting that, over time, experience of disaster increases 
optimism bias, Helweg-Larsen found that even five months after the earthquake, 
optimism beliefs had not returned. This finding raises questions about whether there 
are other mechanisms that replace illusory beliefs in events where experience with a 
natural disaster has resulted in injury or loss. It also suggests that personal experience 
may moderate the effects of optimism bias. In addition to the personality trait of 
optimism (which can act as a psychological buffer in stressful situations), individuals 
who have been observed to have an ‘easy-going’ disposition anecdotally appear more 
psychologically healthy under stress. This has led researchers to propose that an easy-
going coping style could serve as a personal resource (ibid), and studies have shown 
that people with this trait (and the related trait of self-confidence) tend to use active 
coping strategies and rely less on avoidance coping strategies. Other research however 
has suggested that despite the real nature of the threat, confident, calm easy-going 
people may have a reduced perception of risk and therefore do not feel they need to 
avoid it (Holahan and Moos 1987:947,953). 
Cultural Influences of Optimism Bias 
Optimism bias is thought to be culturally influenced. A study by Fontaine and Smith 
(1995) into attitudes to cancer compared American and British responses finding 
significant differences; American participants had much lower levels of optimism. 
Fontaine and Smith hypothesised that this was due to greater personal responsibility 
for health taken by Americans. Equally, it could be due to the confidence each culture 
places in their respective country’s health system. Whilst not ruling out the limitations 
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of using multi-language versions of the same inventory, Schwarzer, BaBler and Kwiatek 
et al. (1997) compared self-efficacy between three cultures - Chinese, German and Costa 
Rican - and found there were differences between the collectivistic and individualistic 
cultures. Chinese students showed much lower self-efficacy than those students from 
Costa Rica. Heine and Lehman (1995) used the constructs of independence and 
interdependence to compare levels of unrealistic optimism between Canadian and 
Japanese participants, and over two studies found that ‘Canadians showed significantly 
more unrealistic optimism than Japanese, and Canadians' optimism bias was more 
strongly related to perceived threat’ (595). The authors suggested that the reason for 
these findings was that constructs of self and in particular self-serving biases such as 
optimism are, for collectivist or interdependent cultures, valued differently. As this 
thesis argues, the ‘self’ is socially constructed, and therefore it follows that, across 
different cultures the self will be expressed differently. In western individualistic 
cultures, the self is encouraged to be independent, and people ‘strive to assert their 
individuality and uniqueness and stress their separateness from the social world’ yet in 
collectivist cultures ‘it is only within the contextual fabric of individuals' social 
relationships, roles, and duties that the self has meaning’ (Markus and Kitayama 
1991:596).  
Unrealistic Optimism 
Unrealistic optimism, optimistic bias or unique invulnerability are all terms to describe a 
hopeful outlook on life and are known as the ‘better-than-average effect’ (Alicke, Klotz, 
Breitenbecher, et al. 1995). These ways of looking at life seem like a great life strategy 
yet in some instances (decision-making under threat for example) it can be detrimental.  
Optimism, when rooted in knowledge and experience can be a realistic evaluation of 
the circumstances, whereas unrealistic optimism is more of a self-serving bias. ‘The 
illusion of invulnerability is both robust and pervasive’ and understanding why people 
resort to such strategies is far from straight-forward (Taylor and Gollwitzer 1995:214).  
However, some explanations for unrealistic optimism have merit: people are motivated 
to bolster their self-esteem because in stressful times they need to make decisions they 
feel good about. Good decision-making (or feeling good about an average decision) is 
reassuring, which can reduce fear thus making the individual feel as if the situation is 
under control.  
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Unrealistic optimism is also thought to be higher when predicted threats have not been 
previously experienced (Weinstein 1989a). However, the reverse has also been found to 
be true. When a community has survived a flood for example residents are more 
optimistic about their ability to survive a subsequent flood, even though the odds of 
another flood being as bad or worse have not changed (Sattler et al. 2000). This is an 
example of gamblers fallacy87 where people ignore the truism that random events -  
‘one-in-10’ or ‘one-in-100’ year floods - are equally probable, even when the ‘one-in-100’ 
year flood has just happened. When the prior experience of disaster has been a positive 
one, then the expectations that a subsequent disaster will have a similar outcome is 
common (ibid.). This is not to say that experience is detrimental to risk perception and 
preparedness, but it can result in a flawed and biased risk perception. 88 The usefulness 
of examining unrealistic optimism in the bushfire warning fatigue context is that when 
people have experienced a bushfire and survived it, it may be that for some people, a 
sense of invulnerability is generated. This is not to say that the survival may have been 
the result of good preparation and decision-making, but to highlight that no-one can 
truly predict how bad a bushfire may become; therefore unrealistic optimism could be 
an impediment to future risk evaluation.  
 
Of particular interest to this thesis’ exploration of warning fatigue is the point at which, 
after a disaster, unrealistic optimism affects risk perception. Berger and Palmer (1992) 
found in a study they conducted following the 7.1 magnitude Loma Prieta earthquake in 
1989, that immediately after the earthquake, unrealistic optimism was not apparent for 
their participants. However, just three months later, because of the absence of the 
immediate threat and the associated feelings of vulnerability, their results showed their 
participants to be unrealistically optimistic about their perceived risk from all hazards 
(not just earthquakes). Berger and Palmer (ibid.) called this the ‘out of sight, out of 
mind’ effect (43) and even though unrealistic optimism can be seen as a positive trait in 
that it can help reduce anxiety, it can also contribute to people failing to prepare for 
future threats.89  
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 Gamblers Fallacy – The erroneous belief that if an event (slot machine pay-out for example) hasn't 
happened for a while, there is a higher likelihood of it happening as time goes on.  
88
 Experience, as an influence on risk perception, is discussed in Chapter 5, 106.  
89
 This finding of delayed optimism bias needs to be qualified however; Berger and Palmer asked a general 
question about the risk of being hurt in a natural disaster, not earthquakes specifically. Their study was also 
a ‘between-participants’ design, which asked different students over time. 
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Another bias which contributes to people being inadequately prepared for a disaster is 
the single-action bias. Often discussed in the context of climate change, this bias 
demonstrates simplified decision-making where just one action (buying energy saving 
light bulbs for example) reduces feelings of vulnerability and worry. People often take 
no further action even though their first action may not have been the most effective 
option and provides little in the way of protection or risk reduction (Weber 1997). A 
study of how Argentinean farmers adapted to climate variability found that, despite 
having several drought prevention options available to them, the farmers invariably 
chose to engage in just one activity, despite the known impact of drought on their 
livelihoods. Farmers who were able to store grain on their farms for example, were less 
likely to use irrigation or buy crop insurance although these measures would have 
provided an even greater protection against the impact of drought (Hansen, Marx and 
Weber 2004). 
Taylor’s (1983) theory of cognitive adaption explains how and why, in the face of 
threatening information people distort their perceptions and change their beliefs.  This 
theory explains why different people can hear or see the same thing, but interpret it 
differently. For example hearing a warning about a bushfire but ignoring it because they 
think where they live is cooler or wetter (than the area being warned about), or 
rejecting a warning because it was given by an agency that the person feels has no 
credibility. For either scenario where the message is dismissed, it is necessary for people 
to create positive illusions about what they think the risk reality is. Taylor, Kemeny, 
Reed et al. (2000) argue that this allows people to understand the event and ‘gain a 
sense of mastery’ (875), and as the previous section explained, increase self-efficacy 
and feelings of control and agency. Those who do this most successfully in the face of a 
threat cope better than those who less successfully create positive illusions. 
Additionally, as the threat situation changes - information is updated, the threat passes -  
these illusions are often revised (Attwood 1994) and serve, similarly to optimistic bias, 
to bolster perceived self-efficacy and self-esteem. In this way, illusions fulfil a positive 
function and contribute to mental health in that they enable survivors of traumatic 
events to ‘bounce back’, demonstrating the defence and resilience -building 
mechanisms of the psyche. In contrast to delusions90 which are typically associated with 
mental illness and unaffected by new information, positive illusions are often modified 
in response to context and the social environment (Taylor 1983). One of the findings of 
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 Hallucinations and/or grandiose misperceptions of physical reality . 
85 
 
research into self-evaluation maintenance was that people ‘reduced the importance 
attached to the threatened dimension’ (Tesser 1988 cited in Taylor and Armor 
1996:878). This is despite having past experience of similar threats, the information 
being factual and the warnings being timely. This phenomenon of reduced vigilance is 
often seen in bushfire vulnerable communities when a fire season is particularly wet; 
there is a perceived lessening of bushfire danger even though the rain markedly boosts 
the fuel load and increases the likelihood of more destructive fires in the following fire 
season.  
Normalcy Bias 
Very similar to optimism bias, but different in that it relates to the unrealistic risk 
evaluation of the threat (rather than a ‘self-other’ comparison), is ‘normalcy’ or 
‘normalisation bias’. This bias has been shown to cause people to underestimate both 
the probability of a negative event occurring and its consequences (Valentine and Smith 
2002). Normalisation bias can affect not only decision-making at the time of an event, 
but preparation ahead of a disaster. It usually occurs because people have never 
experienced the predicted threat, or known one to happen in their area. Referred to by 
some as the ‘head in the sand effect’, when a disaster is predicted to be of an 
overwhelming magnitude, people often simply cannot comprehend the scale of the 
threat and its impact. In a report to the Victorian Bushfires Royal Commission, Handmer 
et al. (2010) described the Black Saturday bushfires as ‘unprecedented’ and 
‘unimaginable’ and commented that in the many cases where people had died, 
considering the ferocity and unpredictability of the fire, their survivability and the 
defence of their properties should never have been an option. 
 
The degree to which people directly experience a disaster has been shown to influence 
normalisation bias. Studies conducted into risk perception and warning response after 
the 1989 Loma Prieta earthquake by Mileti and O’Brien (1992) concluded that, when 
asked about their perception of harm in any future event, those who experienced the 
earthquake without suffering any major effects displayed significant normalisation bias.  
Mileti and O’Brien suggested that in a pre-disaster scenario, normalisation bias may 
explain why ‘persons without any disaster experience are more reluctant to personalize 
risk and respond to pre-impact warnings’ and that this bias could constrain ‘perceived 
risk and protective response even in the face of warning information’(ibid.: 54,55). 
Possibly another way of interpreting normalisation bias is when things return to 
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‘normal’ after an event, the saliency of a future disaster is lessened. This was certainly 
was the case for residents in Istanbal after a large earthquake in 1999; Tekeli-Yesil 
(2007) found that, in comparison with the many other challenges of living in a post-
disaster reality (restoring basic needs like shelter and food for example) the motivation 
to prepare for another disaster was simply not there. The reduction over time of media 
commentary about the disaster was also credited with reducing concern about a future 
threat. This observed ‘lack of motivation’ has similarities to the idea that people 
struggle to maintain a fear of one problem when a new one appears and may be why 
disaster and emergency agencies have difficulty keeping a threat salient over time. This 
phenomenon has been labelled the ‘finite pool of worry’ (Weber 2006) and has some 
echoes in the cognitive load theory (Sweller 1988). This theory suggests that people can 
only pay attention to a certain amount of information before it gets replaced with more 
recent or more interesting information.  
Cognitive Dissonance 
Closely related and relevant to people’s personal perception of risk is one of the most 
influential and extensively studied theories in social psychology; that of cognitive 
dissonance. The theory explains what happens when people are confronted with 
experiences or information that is inconsistent with their core beliefs or morals. People 
in these circumstances are faced with two choices: change the situation or change their 
beliefs (Brehm and Cohen 1962). Another approach is to reject the information (and 
keep their beliefs), and search for alternative confirmatory information from others 
who believe the same things (Aronsen 1969). This theory derives from the observation 
that people have a bias towards keeping their beliefs consistent with their actions. 
When a situation occurs where their beliefs are at odds with their actions or intended 
actions, people become ‘cognitively uncomfortable’; so much so that there is a strong 
drive to reduce the discomfort. The example that is often used to explain this 
phenomenon is the conflict smokers have between their habit and the medical facts 
about the harm that smoking causes.  
 
Festinger (1957) was the first person to coin the phrase ‘cognitive dissonance’ and 
suggested that there were three ways to reduce these dissonant feelings, a process he 
called ‘dissonance reduction’. The first way was to change one of the dissonant factors 
(smoking less), the second added a consonant factor (‘I smoke low tar’) and the third 
lowered the importance of one of the consonant factors (‘statistics show that driving in 
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a car is more dangerous’). People who live with a long term risk from a disaster, for 
example those who live in flood prone areas such as New Orleans, USA, or on the side 
of a dormant volcano as on Mt Etna in Italy, need to justify their safety and downplay 
the risks in order to go about their daily lives. Residents in bushfire-prone areas of 
Australia face identical issues of cognitive dissonance: despite generations of people 
experiencing devastating bushfires in similar environments, people choose to live close 
to, or amongst forests of eucalyptus. Ways of justifying these choices can be explained 
by dissonance reduction: residents fortify their houses with fire-retardant materials,  
clear fuel and vegetation from around their houses to the ‘recommended’ 30 metres, or 
report feeling confident about their local authority’s ability to warn and protect them. 
This enables people to feel better about the risk and to believe that, because of the 
actions they have taken, the bushfires risk is reduced. To use Festinger’s theory of 
dissonance reduction in the bushfire context, the residents at risk from bushfires can:  1) 
change one of the dissonant factors (move to a safer area); 2) add a consonant factor 
(install sprinklers on the roof of their house) or 3) lower the importance of one of the 
consonant factors (plant all English natives rather than Australian eucalypts). 91 
Regardless of what action is taken, the outcome is the same: a belief that the bushfires 
risk is not as great as the authorities say it is. The importance of understanding the 
relevance of cognitive dissonance as a decision-making factor is that it can act as a bias 
towards certain decisions even though an alternative decision may deliver a much 
better result.  
Attribution Biases 
Just as optimism bias is a self-serving ‘esteem booster’, so too, attribution bias 
contributes to a feeling of well-being. It is a ‘comparison to others’, where others are 
judged less favourably in certain situations. For example living in bushfire-prone areas 
often report that think they are generally more prepared for a bushfire than their 
neighbours, and that, in an actual event, they will have a better outcome.92 This could 
be an internal attribution (they see themselves as more careful, or better prepared) or 
an external attribution, where their house or property is deemed to be more resistant 
to fire than their neighbours. Some causal attributions can be seen as similar to 
cognitive dissonance; for example if an individual alters their belief about an obviously 
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 There is anecdotal evidence to suggest English native trees – oak, willow, elm and birches for example – 
are far more fire resistant than the Australian eucalypt. A Tasmanian interview participant purposely 
planted rhododendrons as she had heard they ‘steamed’ during a fire. 
92
 See participants’ reflections of their personal risk from bushfire in chapters 7 and 8. 
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negative situation, then by attributing their situation to controllable factors they can 
mitigate anticipated stress. This can be done in a variety of ways: for example 
attributing an improvement in life experience to misfortune: ‘I never would have begun 
my new business if I hadn’t lost everything in that fire’. Alternatively people can 
compare a current situation to a hypothetical worse situation: ‘our house was badly 
damaged in the earthquake, but not as badly as those whose land was also affected’. 
Kunda (1990) calls this ‘motivated reasoning’ and argued that whilst a large body of 
psychological research has shown that individuals use cognitive processes and 
representations to arrive at their desired conclusions, motivation is important ‘in  
determining which of these will be used on a given occasion’ (480).  
 
Building upon previous research about self-serving conclusions, (Kruglanski and Ajzen 
1983, Chaiken, Liberman and Eagly 1989; Pyszczynski and Greenberg 1987), Kunda 
(1990) clarifies that she is not referring to the motivation to make accurate judgements. 
Rather, she is interested in the motivated reasoning where people ‘arrive at conclusions 
that they want to arrive at’ (italics added:480). She observes that people use different 
beliefs and rules depending on the motivation for a desired outcome and that these 
beliefs can also change if the outcome changes. In the context of decision-making 
where the outcome of a decision can be the difference between surviving or 
succumbing, Kunda observes that ‘motivated illusions’ stems from motivated reasoning 
and often excludes more rational and objective reasoning. 
Third Person Bias 
Third person bias has traditionally been examined in the context of media and mass 
communication. However, because of its influence on risk perception and the inherent 
cognitive affects, third person bias merits consideration here. From a psychological 
viewpoint, third person bias is thought to be an attribution error or inferential bias. This 
is because when evaluating the impact of media messages on others, people 
underestimate the effects of situational or external factors (Gunther 1991). 
Interestingly, early psychological research into social cognition showed that generally 
people think they have more positive traits than negative ones and that compared to 
others they also have more positive attributes (Salwen and Dupagne 2003). Third 
person bias is important to consider in the context of decision-making as it may be an 
influence on preparation and why people attend to warning messages. When a bushfire 
is warned about and threat information broadcast, those who are subject to third 
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person bias may reject the message more often and take less precautions than those 
who are not.  
Cognitive Maladaptations 
Denial, Avoidance, Helplessness and Fatalism 
Maladaptive strategies are coping strategies that allows individuals to moderate or 
mitigate anxiety. However, whilst these can reduce anxiety in the short-term, they are 
flawed approaches because the problem that caused the anxiety in the first place still 
remains. In the face of a potential threat, people orientate either towards or away from 
it; a coping strategy referred to in some psychological literature as the approach-
avoidance distinction. 93  Rothe and Cohen (1986) state that ‘people are either 
approachers or avoiders’ (815) and these strategies of approach or avoidance are not 
mutually exclusive, even though people generally seem to have a preference for one or 
the other. As previously mentioned, an avoidance coping style is useful  for reducing 
stress, which if high enough can become debilitating, rendering the individual unable to 
respond at all. When the threat first presents, emotional resources are scarce and 
avoidance can enable an individual to prioritise and focus. It also gives the individual an 
opportunity to become accustomed to the threat and gather resources. As a coping 
strategy denial or avoidance can only be used for a relatively short time as it cannot be 
sustained and eventually the reality of the situation will intrude (ibid.: 820). 
 
Whilst avoidant coping may make an individual feel better in the short term, when the 
reality of a threat or disaster is denied, opportunities to quickly remedy a dangerous 
situation may be lost. This, according to Horowitz (1976, 1979), is the first consequence 
of denial whilst the second is an intrusion into the psyche (nightmares, negative 
feelings). Both of these consequences lessen over time as the process of dealing with 
the threat is worked through. The avoidance coping style has been shown to be more 
effective in situations where the threat is deemed uncontrollable, whereas when 
individuals felt the situation afforded them some sort of control, an approach coping 
style worked better (Roth and Cohen 1986). Interestingly, when avoidance strategies 
are used and the threat does not materialise as predicted (in other words a false alarm), 
the avoidant behaviour is reinforced.  
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 Other trait-orientated approaches used to moderate stress that are analogous to the avoidant-approach 
are attention-rejection (Mullen and Suls 1982), monitoring-blunting (Miller 1987) and repression-
sensitisation (Byrne 1964); each of these conceptualise stress responses at one end of a coping dimension.  
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As previously explained, when faced with a threat the perception of personal control 
makes a big difference to how the threat is evaluated. A threat could be perceived to be 
uncontrollable because of past experience of a similar threat or because the new threat 
is very different to the last one. Responses to evaluations of an uncontrollable situation 
have often included helplessness (‘there is nothing I can do’) and fatalism (‘no matter 
what I do, it won’t make any difference’). There are a number of studies done in the 
experimental psychology domain which have investigated responses over time to an 
uncontrollable threat. These have concluded that ‘learned helplessness’ is the result of 
people essentially giving up because they have learnt that their actions cannot alter the 
outcome. However, in the context of a disaster, that is,  experiencing a disaster and 
learning the limitations of personal control within the event, it is difficult to imagine a 
scenario where an individual does not learn from his or her experience. Moreoever 
when a similar disaster threatens, remains in a vulnerable position. In fact, Eiser,  
Bostrom, Burton et al. (2012) comment that when people have been frightened or 
injured in past events, they work very hard to avoid similar scenarios. Therefore, it is a 
feeling of helplessness that this discussion of negative coping strategies refers to, 
rather than learned helplessness, which is usually characterised by demoralisation, 
increasing passivity, a decline in motivation, and depression. When individuals attempt 
to exert mastery and control in situations where no control is possible, not only do they 
give up, but the resultant ‘motivational, cognitive and emotional deficits [may] interfere 
with learning in a new environment’ (Seligman 1975; Abramson, Seligman and Teasdale 
1978 cited in Taylor 1983:1169). In the context of communities who have repeatedly 
survived a disastrous event, emergency authorities need to acknowledge these 
maladaptations if they want to effectively communicate future threats. 
 
Fatalism is an external attribution, where the factors outside of an individual’s control,  
sometimes referred to as ‘fate’, are perceived to be so overwhelming that no personal 
agency can be entertained. Mileti and Sorenson (1990) state that ‘having fatalistic 
cognitions’ are a ‘constraint to processing warning information and to response’ (92).  
Wheaton (1983) views fatalism as an organising schema that comprises related 
concepts such as locus of control, 94  feelings of powerlessness, helplessness and 
personal mastery. He also suggests that an increase in personal resources will lessen 
the effect of fatalism and environmental stressors. Several studies (Gullatte, Magee, 
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 http://www.mccc.edu/~jenningh/Courses/documents/Rotter-locusofcontrolhandout.pdf 
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Brawley et al. 2010; Flores, Aguirre, Viladrich et al. 2009; Parsons, Cruise and Davenport 
2006) have examined fatalistic beliefs and health outcomes in the context of religiosity 
and culture. Whilst religiosity and strong spiritual beliefs were found in people with a 
stronger fatalistic outlook, neither concept predicted a non-adaptive response to health 
threats. However, in the context of environmental threats, especially those which have 
the potential to be on a large scale, religious and cultural influences have the potential 
to amplify fatalistic beliefs.  
Habituation 
We are highly adaptive creatures. The predictable becomes, by definition, 
background, leaving the attention uncluttered, the better to deal with the 
random or unexpected (McEwan 1997:141). 
 
Warning fatigue, the observed complacency to warnings from official sources, is a 
puzzling phenomenon that this thesis argues is not a bounded concept, but rather is 
composed of several factors.95 The role that habitation plays in the ways people 
interpret risk is an interesting one to contemplate. Traditionally, most of the 
habituation literature details laboratory-based stimulus/response experiments, and 
does so from a biological and physiological perspective. However, this thesis would 
suggest there is an argument to be made for ‘event habituation’ where, after exposure 
to repeated events (and in a similar way to the biological paradigm) there is a decrease 
in responsiveness; people pay less attention to warnings than they did before. When an 
event is threatened but neither eventuates nor (if it does) causes harm, the event and 
its outcome become less of a threatening prospect. Disaster literature (Turner 1983. 
Drabek 1986) has shown that there is not only a relationship between preparedness, 
response and warning time but that the number of prior warnings makes a difference as 
well. Janis (1962) observed that these conditions make possible ‘a gradual, easy 
adaptation to the approaching danger.. [where] ..the potential hazard is perceived to 
be less of a threat [and] render the warnings less effective’ (79-81). If the desired 
stimulus response to warnings is paying attention, then it could be argued that warning 
fatigue is a cognitive mal-adaptation or ‘habituation’ to warnings. This habituation is 
increasingly likely when there have been multiple false alarms and is true particularly 
when the reasons for the false alarms have not been made clear to the public.  Possible 
ways to alleviate this affect, or ‘dis-habituate’ could be to change the characteristics of 
the warnings through language, frequency or the delivery method.  
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 See Warning Fatigue measure Chapter 9, page 185. 
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Wilson and Gilbert’s (2008) model of affective adaptation represented by the acronym 
AREA – attend, react, explain and adapt – illustrates clearly the social habituation 
process. Once people who are exposed to an extraordinary threat come to understand 
the threat (because of past experience, or additional information), it is transformed 
from the extraordinary to the ordinary, is paid less attention, and so elicits less 
emotional response. Habituation therefore is a result of the same cognitive drive to 
reduce stress; when individuals quickly make sense of a threat, thereby rendering it 
‘normal’, it ultimately lessens their emotional reaction to it. In other words, ‘people 
know what the event is, why it occurred and how it fits into their self-concepts; as a 
consequence they have adapted to it’ (373). Furthermore, the very nature of ‘explaining 
away’ an initially frightening event renders the threat less scary and more predictable. 
The ‘reference point principle’ (Brickman and Campbell 1971; Helson 1964; Parducci 
1995) and ‘norm theory’ (Kahnemann and Miller 1986) also go some way to explaining 
event habituation, especially in reference to disasters. The premise of these approaches 
is that it is the differences or changes in a situation that grab our attention. It is only 
when a threatened event is different in some way, that people will pay attention to it.  
Moreover, if there has been an extraordinary event in the past, all subsequent events 
may be compared to it, even though lesser events have the potential to be just as 
dangerous. A logical extension of this idea is that repeated events, especially when they 
don’t produce the threatened results, exacerbate the effects of event habituation.  
Warning Fatigue therefore, could be imagined to be a classic example of event 
habituation; prolonged lead-time disasters are warned about many times over periods 
of months, and most often years. The hazards are often the same which negates the 
‘new information’ effect, and because these types of hazards are familiar ones (they 
have been warned about before), they are ‘known-about’, and rendered somewhat 
normal and less concerning. 
Reactance 
Psychological reactance has some resonance with the previously explored appraisal 
theories that position perceived personal control as key. When people feel obliged or 
pressured to adopt a certain point of view, or act in a certain way, a belief that certain 
freedoms are being denied can engender strong emotional reactions. There is no doubt 
that warnings, by their very nature, intrude into people’s everyday lives. However, they 
‘should not interfere with civil liberties; on the other hand they cannot help but do so to 
some degree’ (Mileti and Sorenson 1990:118). As an anger response, reactance is 
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typified by people deliberately taking an opposing view or attitude  and can also 
strengthen their resolve not to be persuaded further. An interesting aspect of 
reactance is that the persuasive messages ‘reacted against’ are most often those which 
are intended to improve the health, well-being or safety of the intended audience; for 
example health messages encouraging cessation of smoking, or warnings about the 
dangers of bushfires. Whilst this maladaptive strategy could just as easily be discussed 
in the context of media and the influence of media framing, it is how this cognitive 
response affects the perception of a threat that is of interest here.  
 
First conceptualised by Jack Brehm in 1966, the theory of psychological reactance 
argues that people want the freedom to feel, think and act as they (not others) choose 
and when these freedoms are threatened, some people experience psychological 
reactance (Donnell, Thomas, Buboltz Jnr. et al. 2001). Operationalised as a motivational 
personality trait, past research (Brehm and Brehm 1981; Dowd and Wallbrown 1993) 
suggest that reactance has elements of locus of control, depression and self-esteem. 
Considering that reactance has been conceptualised as a constraint of freedom, self-
efficacy has been found to be a relevant affect (Brockner and Elkind 1985). In other 
words, people who feel more self-efficacious are less likely to display reactance. 
Moreover, as the previous discussion revealed, religiosity may not only be related to 
helplessness but, as suggested by Hong and Feadda (1996) also have an inverse 
relationship with reactance.96  
 
Reactance has been found to be higher in unhappy, lonely people (Joubert 1990)  which 
suggests that although this emotional reaction is a strategy people use to deal with a 
threat, it is a maladaptation that does not appear to improve the outcome. Reactance is 
somewhat similar to cognitive dissonance in that in order to make themselves feel 
better about the threat, people rationalise why they do not need to pay attention to the 
warnings, and they become contemptuous of official advice. One of the main features 
of reactance is that after people have emotionally reacted to a perceived loss of 
freedom, they are then motivated to restore that freedom. This restoration can be 
achieved through several means: doing something that demonstrates an alternative 
freedom (Wickland 1974), downplaying the danger of the threat or even acting illegally.  
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 The Questionnaire for the Measurement of Psychological Reactance (QMPR) was originally developed by 
Merz (1983) and subsequently critiqued and refined by Donnell et al. (2001), Hong and Ostini (1989) and 
Tucker and Byers (1987). 
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The concept of reactance therefore, demonstrates that people are neither rational nor 
predictable and that disaster and emergency authorities need to understand this when 
devising warning messages and ‘public education’ campaigns. It is important to note 
that there has been little recent research into this theory.  
The Australian Bushfire Context 
There are limited studies that explore the effects of stress and anxiety on decision-
making in the Australian bushfire context. There have been many studies which have 
examined effects of stress on cognition and performance in a range of settings but 
fewer where, away from a laboratory setting and in a naturalistic setting, peoples’ 
warning responses to a stressor such as a disaster, have been studied. By assessing 
research literature that examined the effects of stress on human performance and by 
analysing interviews conducted after the 2009 Black Saturday bushfires, McLennan et 
al. (2011) inferred how people facing an imminent bushfire may be cognitively affected. 
They suggested that the approaching bushfire caused individuals extreme stress; they 
found it difficult to remember previous bushfire plans, and misinterpreted ‘the 
significance of emerging threats’ (311). Additionally, survivors reported not being able 
to understand new information, and they had difficulty selecting the best options for 
survival. Some interviewees reported that their decision-making was poor and in more 
than one instance, they were clumsy and unable to do basic tasks. McLennan et al. 
(2011) observed that higher levels of alertness and preparation and an ability to ‘down-
regulate fear and control attention focus was closely linked to surviving in a potentially 
lethal environment’ (3). It is important to note that this research was in the context of 
imminent, certain and extreme conditions, not a prolonged bushfire scenario where 
bushfires are seasonally warned about.  
Discussion 
This chapter has explored some psychological affects and theories that can go some 
way to explaining why people act the ways they do in the face of potential disaster. 
Importantly it does so from the perspective of pre-disaster risk perception. This 
approach emphasises a fundamental tenet of this thesis,  which is to ‘pay attention to 
what people are trying to do instead of only observing how they actually respond to 
natural events’ (Krohne 2002:9). Risk perception is a ‘catch-all’ term for how people 
assess personal and community risk and there are many ways to understanding it. The 
processes involved in risk perception discussed in this chapter are multi-faceted, and 
95 
 
cannot be addressed nor understood without acknowledging the interplay between the 
psychological and the social. It is important to note that decision-making and risk 
evaluations are complex, combining many cognitive responses in numerous ways 
depending on the context and risk. There cannot be one way of understanding these 
complex interactions, nor is there one element that is more important to this 
understanding than any other. Out of this literature some things are well-established: 
self-efficacy and optimism bias for example. However, other coping strategies such as 
the maladaptation of reactance have been explored much less. In disaster scenarios, 
especially prolonged lead-time scenarios, it is the interactions of these coping strategies 
and affects that have yet to be explored; it is the intention of this thesis to do so. 
 
The following chapter “Risk Perception and Communication” discusses risk from the 
social and cultural perspective, and examines the role of the media in framing risk 
perceptions. The emphasis of this chapter is on the psychological processes associated 
with response to warnings about risk, and the aim of the following chapter is to situate 
the psychological literature models and theories within the social context in which 
these responses occur. A focus of this chapter will be disaster warnings; existing 
approaches to warning the public, disaster warning in the context of the Australian 
bushfires and the phenomenon of warning fatigue. 
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5. RISK PERCEPTION AND COMMUNICATION  
Introduction 
The examination of the disaster literature thus far, the exploration of cognitive affects 
and coping strategies in pre-disaster contexts, and the analysis of the media reporting 
of disasters has identified that risk is a common denominator. More specifically, the 
concept of risk is fundamental to understanding how people perceive risk, evaluate it in 
times of disaster and use that evaluation when responding to warnings. In the context 
of exploring warning fatigue, risk becomes an organising framework within which 
knowledge can be built about the ways that people living in bushfire-prone areas 
construct risk as they go about their daily lives. The epistemological underpinnings of 
this thesis are that the individual and society are inextricably linked and that there is 
more than one way to understand how people perceive risk. The perception of risk is 
both a psychological and social process, and a subjective social construct reflecting 
symbols, values, history and ideology; it is an amalgamation of knowledges constituted 
in a social and cultural environment. Early sociologists and philosophers97 made a 
distinction between the individual and social realities outside the individual. However, 
this thesis argues that ‘reality for the individual is, to a high degree, determined by what 
is socially accepted as reality’ (Lewin 1948:57). More importantly, the individual and 
society are neither ‘one and the same thing, nor is one reducible to the other’ 
(Jovchelocitvh 1996:122). The theoretical approaches such as social constructionism, 
social representation and interpretive phenomenological analysis (as outlined in the 
methodology chapter)98 are useful to explain the reciprocal interactions between the 
individual and society. In many ways they are congruent, certainly complementary, 
which is both useful and confusing at the same time and perhaps a result of the 
‘unhelpful separation of the disciplines of psychology and sociology’ (Burr 2003:2).  
 
Risk perception comprises multiple factors and is not a homogenous or bounded 
process (Moscovici 1998). This chapter focuses on the interpersonal, inter-subjective, 
shared ‘meaning-making’ of risk, and aims to understand the relationship and the 
interplay between the individual and society. Furthermore, it builds upon the 
conceptualisation of bushfire risk in Australia as outlined in Chapter 2. Following an 
operationalisation of risk, this chapter will focus on the perception and communication 
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 For example: Scottish philosopher David Hume (1711-1776) and French sociologists Auguste Comte (1798-
1857) and David Émile Durkheim (1858-1917) 
98 Chapter 6 
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of risk, heuristics of risk and bias and some theories and models that ‘unpack’ public 
response to risk communication. The last part of this chapter details the current risk 
communication used by bushfire authorities in Victoria, Australia. . 
Risk 
Risk is not synonymous with catastrophe. Risk is the anticipation of the 
catastrophe. Risks concerns the possibility of future occurrences and 
developments; they make present a state of the world that does not (yet) exist  
(Beck 2009:9) 
 
Although risk can be reduced to an equation, Risk =∫(probability X severity), there is  no 
such thing as ‘real risk’ or ‘objective risk’; something just waiting to be measured that is 
value-neutral and independent of cognition and culture. Regardless of who is making 
the risk evaluation (expert or lay person) the risk is always ‘subjective and assumption-
laden’ (Slovic and Weber 2002:4). Risk is appraised differently by experts and non-
experts as ‘experts tend to base their perception of risk on statistics [and] risk 
perception for lay people is much more complex’ (Bushnell and Cottrell 2007:5). 
Meacham (2004) insists that in order to better understand risk, research needs to move 
away from the ‘statistical risk approach for addressing public risk issues’ (207). Risk 
information can be scientific and fact laden, nonetheless the public interpret, transform 
and construct risk from these facts. The risk evaluation that results is influenced by a 
myriad of factors: experience, context, beliefs, resources, threat typologies and the 
emotional and cognitive affects detailed in the previous chapter.  
 
Defining risk has occupied researchers since the early 20th century, who have 
approached this task by categorising risk by its characteristics, hazard types, impacts 
and stakeholders. Attempts to position the notion of risk within different disciplines, 
such as cultural studies, sociology, earth sciences,99 psychology, even economics, have 
led to distinct ‘understandings’ of risk. This has resulted in many theories, models and 
approaches which are detailed by Renn (1992) in Concepts of Risk: a classification, where 
he states that although they are diverse they have one element in common; they each 
distinguish between the reality of risk and its possibility. Across disciplines and 
perspectives, there is a consensus that the ‘essence of risk consists of the probability of 
an adverse event and the magnitude of its consequences’ (Rayner 1992:93). A strength 
                                                                 
99 Geology, Geography, Hydrology and Climate-change scientists. 
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of the cultural theory of risk 100 as advanced by Mary Douglas101 and Aaron Wildavsky, is 
that individual responses to threats can be predicted by social and cultural exemplars.102  
 
German sociologist Ulrich Beck asserts that people have always lived with and 
understood certain risks but as a result of modernisation and globalisation, modern 
risks ‘affect all peoples alike, whether rich or poor, regardless of national  or geographic 
borders’ (cited in Lupton and Tulloch 2003:2). He coined the term ‘Risk Society’103 and 
argued that earlier risks were much more visible because they ‘assaulted the nose or 
eyes and were thus perceptible to the senses’ (Beck 1992:21).  Knowledge about modern 
everyday risks has become the domain of experts, especially scientists, however Beck 
asserts that modernity 104 has transformed the role of science and less and less this  
‘expert authority is taken as a given’ (2009:6). Beck suggests that knowledge about risk 
is culturally and socially pervasive and in fact it was ‘cultural perception and definition 
that constitutes risk’ (Adam, Beck and van Loon 2000:213). This interpretation Beck 
argued, made risks ‘open to social definition and construction’ (ibid.: 23) and positioned 
those within society able to influence such construction (the mass media or politicians) 
as key. Whilst interactions between people shape perceptions of risk, there is a vast 
body of communication literature that shows the quasi-social relationship the media has 
with the public. The media has a powerful role in constructing people’s knowledge 
beyond their personal experience, reflecting back to the public ideas, norms and values, 
thus validating and maintaining what are already there. The literature and these ideas 
were discussed in chapter 3. 
 
A ‘risk society’ is not only one which has created new global risks never known before 
(climate change for example) but one which assumes that it will be able to anticipate, 
mitigate and control these risks. In fact it is the very anticipation of risk that obliges 
                                                                 
100 The Cultural Theory of Risk is a conceptual framework that challenges the notion that people see risk 
only in terms of objective definitions (like magnitude and probability).  It offers that the risks most 
important to people are those which help to reinforce the cohesiveness of their social systems.  
101 Dame Mary Douglas (1921 – 2007) was a British social anthropologist. Her interest and expertise lay in the 
study of human culture and symbolism and (along with Aaron Wildavsky) she created the Cultural Theory of 
Risk building on the ideas of Ėmiele Durkheim and structural analysis.  
102 Social networks are constructed recognitions of how people (‘nodes’) are joined to one another (‘ties’). 
Once all the nodes and ties are known, pictures of the network can be drawn to discern every person's 
position within it” (Dickenson, 2013) 
103 ‘Risk Society’, as a way of describing how modern societies respond to risk, was first coined by 
sociologists Anthony Giddens and Ulrick Beck, and interpreted in Beck’s book Risk Society, Towards a New 
Modernity.  
104 Modernity can be described as a reflexive modern society which differentiates itself from other societies 
by focussing, not on what has gone before, but on the future; a society where knowledge and agency 
resides more with individuals than with institutions. 
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society to do something about them. Intrinsic to a risk society is the ‘security business’ 
(insurance, surveillance, protective policies) that, despite restricted personal freedoms 
and resultant fears, is nonetheless embraced by society. Beck goes as far as to suggest 
that security has become a consumer product, able to be lucratively traded and sold.  In 
attempting to define risk, Krimsky (1992) asks “Is the risk of something an objective 
measure of that thing, or is it a subjective value that varies according to context?” (19). 
This question encapsulates two ends of the risk debate continuum where risk has 
traditionally been regarded as either an objective property (or measure of probability) 
or a cultural and social construction (Renn 1992). Another risk binary is the ‘external’ (to 
human control) and ‘manufactured’ (man-made) risks as first defined by European 
sociologist Anthony Giddens.  
 
Risk and risk perception in the context of disasters is the focus of this thesis. Blaike, 
Cannon, Davis et al. (1994) define risk from a disaster as a function of vulnerabilities and 
hazard: Risk = ∫(V+H). Vulnerabilities are conceptualised as ideological and originating 
from (a) ‘limited access to power, structures, (b) social deficits in markets, skills and 
training and (c) unsafe conditions (Aguirre and Best. 2005:2). When these vulnerabilities 
interact with hazards, (earthquakes, floods, volcanic eruptions, bushfires, earthquakes 
for example), disasters are created. As risk and emergency management has developed 
into the 21st century, the approach to managing disaster risk has become focused on 
disaster resilience, where risks, both environmental and technological are regarded as 
preventable. The very idea of a natural disaster (and the risks associated with it) has 
begun to be challenged, and the ‘taken-for-granted’ definitions contested. Increasingly, 
contemporary risk studies regard disasters as the result of poorly managed risks and a 
combination of resilience, preparation, and vulnerability. Aguirre and Best (ibid.) also 
argue that the nature of hazards have changed and the new hazards 105 tend to be 
‘infrequent, have long durations and widespread effects, often have slow speeds of 
onset and diffused spatial dispersions, and are irregular in their occurrence ’ (3). These 
new hazards have parallels to prolonged lead-time disasters that, as suggested by this 
thesis, may exacerbate warning fatigue.  
  
                                                                 
105 Aguirre and Best. (2005) argue that ‘new hazards’ are caused by human error and intentional foul play. 
Examples include: SARS pandemic, 9/11 and the collapse of the New York Trade Centre towers, cyber 
terrorism (computer viruses) and Japans earthquake/tsunami/nuclear accident.  
100 
 
This thesis is predicated upon the assumption that bushfires are a risk. Moreover that 
for the Australian ecosystem and those living in or near it, bushfire risk is ‘a given’. 
However, what is not so certain is how much of a risk people think bushfires are, and 
how that risk is interpreted by those who have a stake (and an opinion) on risk in the 
bushfire sphere: scientists, fire prevention agencies, media and the public. Those who 
are accepted as experts in the field of fire behaviour and mitigation have different risk 
knowledges than public for whom bushfire is just one more risk they have to 
incorporate into their daily lives. The question of how people live in ‘risk societies’ is 
addressed in this section and is exemplified by Krimsky (1992) who asked: ‘why is it that 
lay people often fail to follow the advice of experts in responding to the risk of modern 
life?’ (5).  
Risk perception 
Gilbert F White106 a American geographer famous for his work on natural hazards and 
known as the ‘father of floodplain management’ concluded that  for some reasons such 
as familiarity about the risk or the amount of personal control (over the risk), members 
of the public perceive some risks differently from others (Lofstedt 2003). Sometimes 
called ‘decision-making under risk’, or ‘human response to natural hazards’, the study of 
risk perception has examined the judgements people make when asked to evaluate and 
describe hazardous technologies or activities (Slovic 2000). Risk perceptions direct 
decision-making and influence behaviour prior to, during and following a disaster. These 
perceptions can be thought of as risk attitudes, which are how people feel about a 
particular risk (Rhormann 2008). Attitudes include aspects of ‘experience–seeking, self-
enhancement, pleasure from being at risk, social pressure, financial gain, lack of time or 
means and underestimation of a hazard’ (5). If the risk has the potential for personal 
harm or to friends and family,  then the risks are cared more about, paid more attention 
and responded to differently. Whilst that statement may seem self-evident, it is 
important to note that attitudes to risk depend on wh o may be the potential victim. 
Furthermore when households comprise families (including children), risk is perceived 
differently than by those people who live in single person or childless households (Riad 
and Norris 1998). 
                                                                 
106 Professor Emeritus Gilbert F White (1911-2006) was the founder and Director of the University of 
Colorado's Natural Hazards Research and Applications Information Centre. He was most notable for work 
to identify and classify adjustment mechanisms for flooding in the United States.  
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Worldviews and Mental Models 
Risk perception is an active process of meaning-making where individuals construct 
their own mental models that enable them to make sense of what they see happening 
around them; in other words, the ‘real’ world can be a different place for each person. 
Fischhoff (2002) suggests that a person’s mental model can help shape behaviour and 
develop problem-solving skills, as well as anticipate outcomes of known events. Dake 
(1991) offers the idea of ‘orientating dispositions’ to describe how a person comes to 
view the world; these dispositions are essentially deeply held attitudes about such 
things as politics, and social and cultural functions. These worldviews guide peoples 
responses (Buss, Craik and Dake 1986) and function in the same way as mental models 
in that they enable people to efficiently navigate in a sometimes unfamiliar and 
threatening world (Slovic 2000). Depending on a person’s world view and when 
confronted by a threat, risk will be evaluated as either positively or negatively. As 
discussed in chapter 2, if someone’s worldview is that bushfire is a natural phenomenon 
and plays an integral role in Australia’s ecological system, then they may perceive the 
risk from bushfire in a more positive way than those who regard bushfire as aberrant 
and an intrusion upon their chosen lifestyle. Additionally, receptiveness to warnings 
about fire, and response to advice about how to manage the bushfire risk may also be 
influenced.  
 
When making judgements about potential risk, worldviews are not the only heuristics 
that influence perception; risk and benefit are two others. Research107 has shown that 
there is an inverse relationship between risk and benefit: the greater the perceived 
benefit the lower the perceived risk. Moreover, if an activity is liked, people tend to 
‘judge its risks as low and benefits as high; this appraisal is reversed when the activity is 
disliked’ (Slovic 20009:416).108 Risk perception in the Australian bushfire context has 
been shown to depend on multiple factors such as frequency (McCaffrey 2004), 
experience (Handmer and Penning-Roswell 1990; Blanchard & Ryan, 2003), perception 
of property in relation to environment (Montz 1993; Gilbert 2004), social capital and 
                                                                 
107 Fischhoff, Slovic, Lichtenstein & Read et al.1978. Slovic, Kraus et al.1991. McDaniels, Axelrod, Cavanagh 
& Slovic 1997. 
108 In most academic studies about risk, it is assumed to be a negative construct, and there is little said 
about voluntarily assumed risk, that is, risk accommodated for pleasure. Any extreme sport (for example: 
rock climbing, snowboarding, base-jumping, hang-gliding, mountain biking and sky diving) demonstrate 
that it is the danger and riskiness associated with the activity that enhances its attraction; people have 
made a decision about how much risk ‘they are willing to bear and that risk becomes a fixed parameter’ so 
they incorporate the risk into the whole activity (Heimer, 1988:509).  
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community connectedness (Gough 2000; Flint and Luloff, 2005), and personal and 
official preparedness (Beringer, 2000; Odgers & Rhodes, 2002; Anderson-Berry, 2003). 
Lupton and Tulloch (2002) found that bushfire risk was regarded by people as no more 
of a concern (to themselves or others) than day to day risks including other 
environmental risks. They commented that this appraisal of risk was contextual and if 
the research had been done immediately after a major bushfire perhaps the response 
would have been different.  
 
Experience of past bushfires has been found to raise awareness of future bushfire risks. 
However, Gardner, Cortner, Widaman et al.  (1987) found an opposite effect in a study 
that compared two communities – one fire affected and the other non fire affected – in 
southern California’s San Bernardino County. Contrary to predictions that the fire 
affected community would have higher risk perception than the non affected 
community, Gardner et al. (ibid.) found that the risk expectations were reversed: those 
residents who had no experience of fire in their area thought they had a higher 
probability of a future fire, than those who had recently experienced fire in their 
community. The authors suggest that this may be a function of flawed probabilistic 
thinking, or that the residents may have thought the recent fire had ‘reduced the 
vulnerability of the landscape to another fire’ (cited in Bushnell and Cottrell 2007:10). 
Past bushfire experience and a close association with the local fire brigade were 
positively correlated with high risk perception amongst the residents in a rural bushfire-
prone community in North-Central Victoria, Australia (McGee and Russell 2003). 
Additionally the authors observed that there was strong community cohesion and self-  
reported social capital. 
 
Risk perception (rather than preparedness) contributed towards many people dying in 
the 1983 Ash Wednesday bushfires. Krusel and Petris (1992) identified that late 
evacuations of people who thought they were not at risk until the wind changed, 
resulted in a large number of deaths. A study of a fire-affected peri-urban community in 
New South Wales in 1985 explored the role of time upon bushfire risk perception. 
Cunningham and Kelly (2001) found that when they surveyed the residents six years 
later, every household assessed their risk from bushfire to be high. However, in 2001, 
just over half of those surveyed thought they were at risk from bushfire; importantly,  
just under a third of residents surveyed had experienced the 1985 fire. This 
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demonstrated that, over time, there was both a decrease in collective community 
knowledge and a reduction in risk perception.  
 
Risk perception can also depend on how responsibility for the risk is viewed; perceived 
responsibility can determine which risks are addressed and by whom (Winter and Fried 
2000). Bushnell and Cottrell (2007) maintain that bushfire risk (and the consequences) 
is shared between residents and public land managers, portraying the risk as both 
private and public. If individuals perceive the risk to be public (the responsibility of 
governmental land management for example), then the impetus for individuals to 
mitigate the risk could be reduced (16). Controllability or mastery over a bushfire 
situation has an influence upon risk perception (Kumagi, Carrol, Cohn et al. 2004) For 
example, if bushfire is considered to be a likely event but considered survivable because 
people think they are able to successfully fight it, then people evaluate their risk from 
bushfire to be low, even though they are most probably ‘most at risk’ (Bushnell and 
Cottrell 2007:14).  
 
Perhaps people living in bushfire vulnerable areas of Australia make risk and benefits 
judgements when deciding to live in the bush. The benefits of living in a quieter, less 
urban environment, coupled with a larger section and a more community-like 
environment may mean that they downplay the risk from bushfires because they see 
the benefits of living in the bush to be many. It is pertinent to consider that perhaps the 
fire and emergency authorities believe that bushfire risks should be diminished as much 
as possible, whereas people who have chosen to live in the bush accept a certain level 
of risk. Communicating risk in this context needs to acknowledge these challenges.  
Affect Heuristics 
Just as disaster and emergency agencies and people living in bushfires-prone areas of 
Australia have differing views of ‘acceptable’ risk, similarly, an assumption cannot be 
made that there is a ‘right’ or wrong’ way to perceive risk.  Experts in a field have a 
greater awareness and knowledge about a particular risk, and because these 
knowledges are largely based on scientific facts, could be regarded as ‘objective’. This 
risk perception is in contrast a more subjective risk assessment where people who have 
experienced a threat and gained a personal knowledge about it believe they know 
about the risk as a result (Alba and Hutchinson 2000; Lindell and Perry 2000). As people 
negotiate the world around them, they build up images and feelings about activities and 
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objects, and it is these prior judgements that influence risk perceptions when new 
situations are faced. Finucane, Alhakami, Slovic et al. (2000) suggests people employ a 
dual-process way of thinking about risk whereby they evaluate risk analytically and 
emotionally, that is, by how they feel about it. This is not to imply an ‘either/or’ binary: 
Damasio (1994) showed that, ‘in all normal thinking, emotional processes interact with 
reason-based analysis’  (cited in Slovic 2000:xxxii). Moreover, these ways of making 
decisions have been labelled deliberative or intuitive, with an implication that people do 
the latter automatically and subconsciously; a mental short-cut called the ‘affect 
heuristic’. Affect is operationalised here as an automatic, subtle form of emotion, of 
which people are often not aware. It can be feelings about an external stimulus that can 
be either positive (‘I like that’) or negative (‘I dislike that’) and can also be viewed 
pejoratively as ‘good’ or ‘bad’ (ibid.). Because of the often subtle nature of the feelings, 
people’s judgements can be seen ‘irrational’, that is, based more on subjective 
reasoning that objective facts. Slovic and Peters (2006) call this ‘the faint whisper of 
emotion’ (322) and research has shown it has a powerful influence on decision-making 
under uncertainty. One emotion in particular, dread, has been shown to accurately 
predict the extent to which a hazard is perceived as risky. Those hazards deemed not 
under a person’s control, or a high potential for disaster (for example nuclear power), 
were ‘dreaded’ more than other risks because the deaths from these more dreaded 
hazards were also viewed as ‘worse’ than deaths from other hazards (Slovic, Fischhoff, 
Lichtenstein et al. 1982). 
 
The amount of time people have to make a decision influences the affect heuristic. 
Specifically, if people have more time to make a decision they are more logical in their 
approach, whereas when a decision is time is restricted, people rely much more on 
affect and make judgements that are more emotion-based. Information has also been 
shown to change the way risks are perceived; whether there is some or no information 
and whether risk is described in positive or negative terms. Predictably, more 
information meant that people used the affect heuristic more (as their cognitive load 
was greater) and information which implied a higher benefit resulted in the situation 
being judged as less risky (Slovic, Finucane, Peters et al.  2007).  However, these findings 
need qualifying; Wilson and Arvai (2006) found that when participants were asked to 
make risk evaluations about two different problems (crime and deer over-populations), 
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despite factual information about both issues, the participants largely disregarded the 
information and made their evaluations based on affect.  
 
Framing, that is,  how different options are presented, also demonstrate the affect 
heuristic. When scenarios use percentages and numbers, and the outcomes are 
described in negative terms (‘33 people out of hundred may die’) or positive terms (‘66 
people might be saved’), people most often choose the second option, even though 
the percentage of possible deaths is the same. Based in prospect theory, 109 Kahneman 
and Tversky (1979) termed this a ‘value function’, where a loss is viewed as more 
devastating than the equivalent gain. People feel much better about choosing a positive 
scenario over a negative one regardless of the outcome. The influence of the media 
upon framing risk was discussed in chapter 3.  
Availability Bias 
Similar to affect, the ease of recall serves as a mental shortcut to decision-making. This 
availability heuristic is a combination of drama, salience, frequency, recentness and 
personal relevance and, in many cases is a very effective strategy for assessing risk. 
These judgements are often biased because people think when something is easier to 
remember it means that the risks or consequences are greater. Additionally, events that 
are easy to recall are deemed to happen more often than those that do not spring to 
mind so easily. The media is a powerful contributor to the availability bias; by presenting 
newsworthy but unusual and rare images and events, and by ignoring more common 
(but non-sensational) issues, the public’s perception of risk is often distorted.  
Interestingly (and relevant to the phenomenon of warning fatigue) are studies by 
Fischhoff, Slovic and Lichtenstien (1978) that suggest that availability bias may lull 
people into complacency, because the ‘commonplace’ is easier to ignore. Moreover, 
because visibility implies probability, when something is not visible it falls prey to an 
‘out-of-sight’ and ‘out-of-mind’ affect.  
 
As discussed in the previous chapter, people’s opinion of their ability to control a 
potentially hazardous situation influences decision-making. It can also impact upon risk 
evaluation where, in a previous disaster event, the predicted risk turned out to be 
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manageable and despite warnings to the contrary, people were able to defend 
themselves against the threat. Surviving an event can engender a false sense of 
invulnerability and demonstrates the erroneous risk evaluation process of the ‘hindsight 
effect’. Simply put, if a decision (not to evacuate for example) is followed by a good 
outcome, it increases the confidence that the decision not to evacuate was a good one 
and, despite a future threat being very different in impact potential, makes it more 
likely that the same decision will be made again. ‘Not only does this mean that such 
actions are reinforced (and hence repeated) it means that people may ignore real signs 
of danger’ (Eiser et al. 2012:7). Hindsight effect is a ‘bias of hindsight’ and is also known 
as the ‘knew-it-all-along’ effect; it is related to memory recall and how recall influences 
subsequent judgments (Fischhoff 2003). This is a bias of which people are unaware and 
has consequences for the evaluation of (past) decisions and the ability to learn from 
experience. Hindsight bias reconstructs the past in a way that makes people feel better 
about the actions they took (or did not take); often because they think they ‘knew all 
along’ how the scenario would play out (Fischhoff and Beyth 1975).  This is especially 
true in disaster events where positive outcomes resulted from ‘good luck rather than 
good management’ and yet are seen to be the product of good decision-making. People 
subject to hindsight bias become overconfident and ignore equally probable 
possibilities. Another term for this could be ‘survivors effect’, where people presume 
they have withstood and prevailed against incredible odds because of their actions, 
rather than acknowledging the part that luck played in the outcome.  
Experience 
People’s perception of risk is based on their direct experience with the risk and their 
subjective knowledge of the risk (Martin, Martin and Kent 2009). Furthermore, ‘a 
subsequent episode, even if objectively independent of a previous event, is 
automatically altered by past experience’ (Brezntiz 1984:16). The literature about the 
influence of experience on response behaviour and decision-making is contradictory. 
Past hazard experience can have an effect on the public’s responses to disaster 
warnings (Sharma and Patt 2012), and people with prior experience of natural disasters 
‘are likely to experience heightened stress and anxiety when a subsequent hazard is 
warned about, because they will remember and re-experience the past events’ (Moore 
and Moore (1996 cited in Reser 1996:207). Moreover, studies have found (Weinstein 
1989) that people are more motivated to engage in risk reduction behaviours because 
of past experience with a hazard event, especially if the experience has been a negative 
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one (Sattler, Adams, Watts et al. 1995). Conversely, Mileti and O’Brien (1992) point out 
that those who have experienced a disaster are ‘harder to convince to take protective 
actions’ than those people in a pre-impact scenario. This could be because people who 
live in areas which experience repeated disaster events ‘accept this hazard as part of life 
and do not readily adopt risk mitigation strategies’ (Tierney 1994 cited in Martin et al.  
2009:491). In relation to flood risk Drabek (2010) observes that experience has a 
‘curious effect on people’s risk perceptions’ (207) and if their immediate area has not 
flooded in their lifetime, then people take that as evidence that it will not flood in the 
future. For example Kates (1962) claimed that residents of floodplains seemed to be 
‘prisoners of their experience, and were unable to imagine floods that had never 
occurred or see the future as anything but a mirror of the recent past’ (cited in Slovic et 
al. 1981:18).  
 
The ‘common sense’ idea that once something unpleasant has been experienced, then 
people will avoid repeating that experience appears to be flawed, as research with 
floodplain dwellers has shown (Kates 1962, Burton and Kates, 1964). Despite detailed 
records detailing repeated floods in flood-prone areas such as Lehigh Valley in 
Pennsylvania, almost 40 percent of floodplain occupants did not expect to be flooded in 
the future (Slovic et al. 1974). This was because disasters are often seen as occurring at 
regular intervals (‘once every 50 years’ for example) rather than randomly which more 
accurately characterise natural disasters. One flawed assumption was that a flood was 
less likely to occur in the future if one had just happened (‘the law of averages’ 
approach) and another was that floods were such freak events they were unlikely to 
happen again (Slovic, Kunreuther, White et al. 1974: 190). Kates (1962) concluded that it 
was the frequency of floods rather than the magnitude of any one flood that 
determined whether experience was useful in raising risk awareness. It is possible 
therefore, that experiencing an event similar to that which is being warned about, alters  
risk perception and decision-making about a future risk. Having experienced a disaster, 
people are more likely to be aware of its consequences. However, as many disasters 
have shown, this does not guarantee that the public will pay more attention to 
subsequent disaster warnings. In fact in some cases, the public can become more 
complacent (because they have survived before and expect to do so again), pay less 
attention to warnings and prepare less. This is because, as McCaffrey (2004) observes, 
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when people underestimate a risk, they are less likely to act to reduce their exposure to 
it (cited in Martin et al. 2009).  
 
McGee and Russell (2003) found that people living in an area of high bushfire risk in 
Victoria who had personally experienced bushfires, reported being more aware of the 
risks, more knowledgeable about what to do and more prepared. In some cases the 
experience of not having a recent bushfire made them more complacent as well: ‘You 
get a bit slack … if you haven’t had a fire for a good many years’ (8). This finding was 
consistent with studies by Martin et al. (2009) who concluded that direct experience 
with bushfires did not significantly influence homeowner’s decisions to mitigate risk 
(497). One of the key findings in a review into the fatalities of Black Saturday was that 
there was ‘no evidence that prior experience of bushfires was an advantage’ (7). This 
was because past fires of note were deemed to have been less severe and as in the 1983 
Ash Wednesday bushfires for example, had happened many years before (Handmer et 
al. 2010). 
 
Experience of bushfires has led to flawed assumptions which, over time, have become 
part of bushfire discourse. A common assumption for example is that it only takes 20 
minutes or so for a fire front to pass and that houses are defendable, should a person 
make the choice to do so (Handmer and Tibbits 2005., Tibbits, Handmer, Haynes et al.  
2008). This suggests that for experience to have any effect on decision-making and 
attention to warnings, past events need to be made more salient and need to have 
happened in the recent past. Therefore, disaster ‘memorability’ or salience is important 
to consider when exploring the influence of experience upon attention to warnings and 
decision-making. Some disasters are more memorable than others especially if they 
have been extreme, ‘blots out recall of earlier events and acts as a fixed point against 
which to calibrate later points’ (Slovic et al. 1974:194).  After the 2009 Black Saturday 
bushfires another rating was added to the existing fire danger ratings: ‘Catastrophic’ in 
New South Wales and ‘Code Red’ 110 in all other states. Anecdotally, it seemed to some 
of the public that the fire emergency authorities then proceeded to ‘overuse’ the 
‘catastrophic’ subsequent to Black Saturday.111 That every bushfire after 2009 was 
implied to be ‘a potential Black Saturday’ demonstrates Kirby’s point. This is an example 
of ‘recency bias’ where the not only the public but the emergency officials as well gave 
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more weight to recently experienced events; Black Saturday became the ‘new normal’ 
and every potential bushfire became a potential Black Saturday catastrophe.  
Risk Communication  
Crisis Communication  
Crisis communication deals with things that do go wrong. Risk 
communication deals with things that might go wrong (Telg 2010:1) 
 
Some emergency and disaster management literatures do not differentiate between 
risk communication and crisis communication, and the examination of warning fatigue 
is not made within this context. ‘Crisis’ communication is something that has just 
happened that is a real threat to people’s lives, or will be in the near-future. Often these 
types of dangers come ‘out-of-the-blue- and were totally unexpected. It is important to 
make a distinction here between risk communication and crisis communication as they 
have different goals and outcomes. Crisis communication is closely linked to the public 
relations profession and used to manage public concern and mitigate perceived risk 
from technological (or man-made) disasters (Coombs 2004). Crisis communication has 
been identified by political parties as crucial in their managing of unexpected events, 
from election gaffes to national disasters. Political parties typically employ public 
relation companies to anticipate issues and ensure that public fears are allayed and 
confidence is maintained (Benoit 1997). One of the tasks of public relations companies 
is pre-evaluating potential audiences so that when a disaster happens, they are able to 
predict, to some extent, how they may react; but as this thesis has previously explained, 
people are not ‘blank slates’ and have pre-existing worldviews about all sorts of things. 
For this reason, when preparing crisis communication, Sandman (2004) argues that 
agencies need to ‘start where they - the public - start’ (italics added:2). Business 
continuity is the goal of crisis communication which ensures organisations, especially 
critical infrastructure authorities, can maintain operational continuity such as security, 
connectivity (internet, telecommunications) and employee safety. By communicating 
key facts quickly, clearly and calmly, the public response to a crisis and public opinion in 
the aftermath can be altered dramatically. The avoidance of public outcry and reactive 
action is as much a goal of crisis communication as is the dissemination of accurate 
information immediately after a disaster.  
 
‘Crisis management’ and ‘risk management’ are often used interchangeably with crisis 
communication. A key difference between risk and crisis communication is that, initially 
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at least, the source of factual information is almost exclusively the domain of the 
expert. This is because disasters that need crisis communication are often one-off, 
extremely large, mostly unexpected and sometimes mass fatality events. For the most 
part they are large-scale failures of technology; nuclear power-plant malfunctions, or 
dam collapses for example. Information has to be disseminated quickly and action 
taken equally fast, which often does not allow time for the public to make up their own 
minds. Crisis communication in catastrophic natural disasters requires similar 
communication because the affected fields such as infrastructure, telecommunication 
and medical, have particular expertise assigned to their areas. So the experts within 
these organisations become the immediate and definitive source of information. These 
scenarios are quite different to risk communication where the risk is usually ‘known’, 
and has been warned about for a long time before it happens (if at all). The experts 
have previously been able to inform the public allowing them much more time to refer 
to other sources of information; friends, family and other members of their community 
with whom they may discuss the risk. In terms of power relations, prolonged lead-time 
risk (as opposed to sudden unexpected events) enables the public to take control of 
the risk to a certain extent, and lessens their reliance on the experts for information.  
Theories and Models 
Development of risk communication theory was seen as a ‘means to bridge the gulf 
between expert views and public perception of risk’ (Golding 1992:43). Much more than 
just the broadcasting of information, risk communication is ‘the flow of information and 
risk evaluations back and forth between academic experts, regulatory practitioners, 
interest groups and the general public’ (Leiss 1996:86). Rohrmann (2008) described risk 
communication as a social process ‘by which people become informed about hazards, 
are influenced towards behavioural change and can participate in decision-making 
about risk issues in an informed manner’(p:1). He asserts that at the core of risk 
communication is an exchange of risk information between interested parties 
(individuals, groups, institutions) and that its goal should be to ‘modify individuals risk 
perceptions and risk attitudes towards protective risk behaviour’ (p:6).  
 
In her risk theory of social drama, Swedish scholar Palmlund (1992) constructed risk 
communication as primarily a social interaction comprising actors who perform as 
agents upon their audience. As a reaction to what she saw as an over-emphasis on 
quantitative management tools to mitigate risk, Palmlund theorised that through social 
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interactions, ‘risk actors’112 are involved in a dramatic process, employing a genre and 
engaging in a dramatic plot (205). Palmlund asserts that her theory provides a critical 
perspective not only on the discourse and symbolic action of risk communication, but 
also on the field of risk analysis. US risk communication consultant Peter Sandman 
similarly positions the public as central to effective risk communication. His risk 
communication model comprises four stages; 113  firstly he claims that risk  
communication simply ignored the public, and ‘they were content to be ignored’ 
(Covello and Sandman 2001:169). However, this method ceased to work as the 
environmental activism of the late 1980s began, and during the second stage, 
companies and organizations realised that they needed to explain risk data better. 
Sandman (1993) argues that in the third stage risk was viewed differently from how it 
had been viewed before. It could now be thought of as a combination of two new 
ideas; hazard and outrage. According to Sandman (ibid.) ‘Hazard’ is the technical 
component of risk, the product of probability and magnitude, whilst ‘Outrage’ is the 
nontechnical component, an amalgam of voluntariness, control, responsiveness, trust 
and dread.  
 
This new conceptualisation of risk allowed risk communicators to reframe the problem. 
Instead of just quoting numbers and statistics, organisations needed to acknowledge 
people’s outrage or emotion, as being related to the hazard, and adjust the risk 
messages accordingly. Sandman’s fourth stage is described in hopeful terms as a stage 
that is yet to be fully realised and ‘involves a full partnership between organisations and 
the public, including negotiation and dialogue’ (Covello and Sandman 2001 cited in 
Mackie 2009:27). What Sandman shows us is that, regardless of how social actors are 
theorised in the risk literature, it is the process through which the actors progress that 
is essential to understanding the social construction of risk.  
Hazard and Outrage 
Trust and credibility are central to any successful risk communication and notions of 
blame are also implicit. Sandman (2001) distinguishes between short-term and long 
term public judgements of trust and says that the former is influenced more by verbal 
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and nonverbal communications. In long term judgment scenarios however, actions and 
performances of the organisations are more important factors on public judgements of 
trust and credibility. Moreover, in low trust/high concern situations, empathy and caring 
often carry more weight than numbers and technical facts (Covello and Sandman 
2001:3). It is this conviction that trust and credibility is at the heart of effective risk 
communication that led Sandman to advance his idea that ‘risk equals hazard plus 
outrage’. Incidentally, Sandman makes no distinction between risk and risk perception, 
arguing that to do so would be to suggest that ‘risk assessment experts have some way 
of getting their risk data directly, while the poor public is stuck perceiving the risk and 
therefore gets it all muddled with outrage’ (Sandman 2004a:35). 
 
Sandman argues that for emergency authorities, outrage is as much of a hazard as the 
hazard itself. Experts define hazard (risk) as a function of magnitude and probability,  
Risk = ∫(M+P), however the public view risk as all the things they worry about that the 
experts ignore, which Sandman has coined ‘outrage’. According to his model, problems 
with risk communication arise when the ‘experts focus on the hazard and ignore the  
outrage, [but] the public focus on outrage and ignore the hazard’ (Sandman 1993:8).  
Moreover, risk perceptions become biased when outrage is part of the risk equation; 
risk is overestimated when people are outraged, even when the hazard is low. 
Furthermore, risk is underestimated when people are not outraged, even when the 
hazard is high. One of Sandman’s twelve components of outrage114 particularly relevant 
to this thesis is ‘controllability’. As discussed in Chapter 3, this component strongly 
impacts the way people react to stressful situations, respond to warnings, assess risk 
and evaluate their ability to cope with it. Public outrage is something that is often 
dismissed by authorities as no more than nuisance value, and more importantly, by 
accusing the public of being irrational it allows the experts to ‘define the debate’ 
(Sandman 1993:8). However, Sandman argues that public outrage is valuable because it 
undermines the experts positioning themselves as the ultimate decision-makers and 
allows the concerns of the public to be heard. It is important to point out that Sandman 
does not present outrage as heightening the perception of risk, rather it distorts it,  
becoming a function of emotion which is then regarded by ‘experts’ as irrational and 
puzzling. Sandman’s model is useful for this thesis because it encompasses both 
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cognitive and affective responses to risk; it acknowledges the emotional response of 
the public, suggests possible reasons for the response, and proposes ways to address it.  
Sandman’s model of risk as a function of hazard and outrage, (Risk = ∫(H +O)), was 
developed in the mid 1980’s and it has not been widely used in risk literature until 
relatively recently. It is a theory (albeit empirically untested) that applies equally to both 
technological and ‘natural’ disasters. It addresses the conundrum that when emergency 
authorities devise risk communications that are intended to warn and help the public,  
the warnings are often received by the public with suspicion and resistance. Its appeal 
to the academic community has, to date, been limited, possibly because it has an 
‘applied’, real world application and is advanced by somebody working outside of 
traditional academia. 115 Sandman acknowledges that as his model is more prescriptive 
than descriptive, and less likely to have been tested empirically.116  
 
There are two peer-reviewed papers that use Sandman’s work. Lachlan and Spence 
(2007) extended Sandman’s conceptualisation of public response to risk 
communication by hypothesising that the concepts of hazard and outrage were 
tangible; they were measurable and relevant components of the public’s perception of 
risk/crisis events (ibid.: 120). Using the four scenarios possible in the Sandman model 
they devised a 2 X 2 matrix: high hazard/high outrage, high hazard/low outrage, low 
hazard/high outrage, and low hazard/low outrage. The high hazard/low outrage 
scenario is defined as having the potential to cause the greatest harm even though 
people do not appear to worry about it very much. This scenario may have some 
resonance with warning fatigue where, despite experts continually warning about a 
threat they are convinced is dangerous, the public are sometimes puzzlingly apathetic 
and do not respond in ways that are expected or recommended. Reynolds and Seeger 
(2005) used Sandman’s model of risk as a function of hazard and developed a 
framework to effectively communicate public health risks. Their model of 
communication was called crisis and emergency risk communication (CERC) and 
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proposed an amalgamation of traditional health and risk communication with crisis and 
disaster communication.  
Social Amplification of Risk Framework (SARF) 
Perceptions of risk are a central element in the process of social amplification. The 
metaphor of amplification is derived from communications theory and describes the 
way that various social agents ‘generate, receive, interpret and pass on risk signals’ 
(Pidgeon, Kasperson and Slovic 2003:15). In 1988 researchers117 from the Clark University 
and Decision Research created the Social Amplification of Risk Framework (SARF). This 
was in order to integrate the technical and social experience of risk, and explore why 
individuals pay attention to some risks (but ignore others). This framework 
conceptualised risk as not only a social construct but also an objective property (of a 
hazard or event); an approach which avoided ‘the problems of total relativism on one 
hand and of technical determinism on the other’ (Renn, Burns and Kasperson 1992:138).  
 
SARF advances the premise that risk information passes through individual and social 
‘amplification stations’ which transform the risk signals in various ways: 118 reinterpreting 
and elaborating, augmenting or attenuating and highlighting the salience of specific 
features of a message (Kasperson and Kasperson 1996 cited in Pidgeon et al. 2003). 
Moreover it is through this communication process that risk and risk events interact 
with psychological, social, institutional, and cultural processes in ways that amplify or 
attenuate risk. For this thesis, these amplification stations are imagined to be local and 
state fire and emergency authorities, individuals and their social networks, the 
Australian media, and local, state and national politicians. The influence and impact of 
the amplification stations is not assumed to be equal, in fact in the SARF theory, the 
media is given primacy. Media can only attenuate or amplify risk ‘if they capture or 
resonate with an existing public mood’ (Murdock, Horlick-Jones and Petts 2001:ix). 
When the lay public has little information or direct experience of an issue, the media 
plays a greater role in the process of interpretation and refinement. It is important to 
clarify that amplification and attenuation is seen as a two-way process, not just a one-
way transfer of information. The difference between the voice of the expert and the 
voice of the ‘lay public’ is an important consideration of SARF.  Risk amplification can 
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occur when the risk event is judged by experts to be ‘low-in-risk’, but the public do not, 
affording the risk more attention than the objective threat deserves. Risk attenuation 
on the other hand, can result from the public deciding that, despite the expert’s 
assessment of a risk as serious, they pay less attention to it than expert’s think they 
should. Warning Fatigue could be imagined to embody this process. 
Social Attenuation 
Each society selects its worry beads, the particular risks that we choose to rub 
and polish assiduously while we relegate others to inattention  (Kates, 1985 
cited in Kasperson 19888:102). 
This idea of society highlighting or downplaying risks has echoes in Mary Douglas’ 
Cultural Theory of Risk. The reasons that issues become attenuated are less clear than 
the reasons for amplification; there is a suggestion that attenuation may result from  
risks that ‘occur in distant times, distant places, or to distant, powerless or marginalised 
social groups’ (Kasperson and Kasperson 1996:103). Attenuation could be relevant in 
the Australian bushfire risk context. Anecdotally, fire and emergency authorities in 
Australia have commented the risk that bushfires poses is not paid enough attention, 
that the level of bushfire risk is often downplayed by some members of the public. 
Attenuation has similarities to the psychological concepts of denial and cognitive 
dissonance which were previously addressed in chapter 4. Whilst these concepts can 
apply to individual attenuation, the remainder of the discussion focuses on the social 
aspect.  
 
In a study that examined newspaper coverage and social group activity in Lincoln 
County Nevada, Kasperson (1992) describes some key amplification or attenuation 
processes: filtering signals, processing of risk information, social values, interaction and 
engaging. Risk information is transformed through these processes, and, using the 
‘Chinese Whispers’ analogy, seldom results in an accurate reflection of the original 
communication. In another study into community response to health risks arising from 
excessive and prolonged noise, Pidgeon et al. (2003) suggest that attenuation had 
resulted from people normalising the risk to such an extent that they were not able to 
imagine it could have serious consequences (399). Despite being given information 
about the health risks, this view was reinforced because people believed they had not, 
to date, suffered any serious damage.  
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Freudenberg (1992) examined the role that organisations play in the attenuation of risk 
and concluded that both management and employees contribute to hindering 
information flows, albeit unintentionally. He points out that communication is always an 
imperfect process, and ‘the greater the number of links in a communication chain, the 
greater the likelihood that important information will fail to get through’ (14). These 
links can be both people (management) and processes (administration, protocols).  
Failings of these links are exacerbated in scenarios where the identified problems are 
critical and the choices available to address them equally unpalatable. Risk attenuation 
results from the management filtering the negative information in such a way that the 
oft-preferred ‘concentrate on the positive’ approach changes the real implications of 
the threat. In the context of fire and emergency authorities in Australia, it could be 
imagined that these types of organisations would be more vigilant about risk 
attenuation than most. However, as the 2009 Black Saturday bushfires showed, there 
were many failures of the very organisations that were committed to the issues of fire 
prevention, mitigation and control. In particular, the communication of the risk came in 
for criticism, not just by the Royal Commission (Teague et al. 2010) but also by residents 
and survivors.  
 
The characteristic of the disaster itself is suggested by Turner (1978) to be another 
reason risk is attenuated. In the case of prolonged lead-time disasters and during what 
Turner calls the ‘hazard incubation period’, there may be an accumulation of 
troublesome events, of which the scientists may be aware but the public has little or no 
visibility. Whilst Turner hypothesised this idea in the context of man-made disasters 
(technological, structural, operational) the application to ‘natural’ disasters is valid. 
Shorter lead-time disasters119 have high visibility and multiple cues. However, prolonged 
lead-time disasters have few, if any obvious cues, and this absence of cues reinforces 
the public perception that the scientists (or experts) are at best over-hyping the threat, 
and at worst simply wrong. The attenuation of these hidden hazards is attributed to 
complex global factors such as culture marginalisation, ideologies, and the disparity 
between the development of technologies and the ability of societies to keep up with it 
(Kasperson, Kasperson and Turner 1995).  
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Trust and Credibility 
Trust is not a simple ‘uni-dimensional’ construct that can simply be lost or 
replaced.. [it is] a highly contextual multi-dimensional concept involving such 
things as knowledge/expertise, implied public duty .. independence of a risk 
regulator and the ability of resources to act upon intentions (Pidgeon et 
al.2003:6).  
 
There are several elements that contribute to effective risk communication, and one of 
the most important is social trust: in the experts, in the accuracy of the risk information  
and in the media. The media also need to trust that different stakeholders in the 
disaster scenario agree with each other, trust that the authorities will be accountable 
after the hazard has passed. Because of the pervasiveness of global media and the 
constant advancement of digital technologies, ‘modern society is increasingly informed 
and active, less trusting, more demanding of influence and more socially and culturally 
diverse’ (italics added; Cronin 2007 cited in Mackie 2009:33). Moreover it takes a long 
time to build trust but it can be lost in an instant and is almost impossible to regain 
(Covello and Sandman 2001). Far from being a one way process where the ‘problem’ is 
how to get the public to trust the experts, trust is multi-dimensional and necessary 
between scientists and journalists (and journalists and scientists). Sandman (1993) 
insists that experts needs to trust the public more and ask to be trusted less; in fact, he 
suggests that if the experts ‘share information, share the control, and keep the outrage  
from getting in the way, people will make pretty good decisions about risk’ (82).  
 
Many agencies are reluctant to involve the public in important decisions about risk, as 
they consider them less able to understand the complexities of scientific knowledge. 
Whilst this may or may not be the case, until the public feels at least that that they are 
part of the conversation, it is very difficult for agencies to maintain public confidence. In 
order to be effective, trust has to be reciprocal and ‘it never rests on blind faith’ 
(Giddens and Pierson 1991:109). This notion of faith is exactly what Giddens (1991) 
described when he characterised trust as ‘the vesting of confidence in persons or 
abstract systems, made on the basis of a “leap of faith” which brackets ignorance or 
lack of information’ (244). A truism is that trust (or the lack of it) is inextricably linked  
with the public’s previous dealings with experts and their practices; often governmental 
agencies act autonomously, not involving the public at all. When decisions about risk 
are not transparent, suspicion and mistrust results, especially when agencies are 
perceived to have a vested interest in which action is taken. For example, after the 2009 
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Black Saturday bushfires (and compared to previous years),  it seemed to some 
members of the public120 that Code Red warnings were ‘overused’ because authorities 
did not want to be held responsible should a bushfire occur and people were harmed. 
These warnings were seen by some members of the public as having a legal impetus 
rather than a community safety one.  
 
Source credibility can dramatically influence how people respond to risk messages. 
‘Source trust’ in this context comprises characteristics of faith (or good will),  
consistency, fairness, objectivity and competence (Gutteling and Weigman 1996:155). 
Warnings are judged as being more biased and less true if they come from sources 
judged to be less trustworthy (Hovland and Weiss 1952). In the same way risks are 
judged to be greater when they are associated with sources lacking in trust and 
credibility (Covello and Sandman 2001). Studies show how an agency behaves (or is 
reported to behave) ‘is at least as critical for public perceptions of risk and agency 
performance as what it says’ (italics in original; Johnson and Sandman 1992:3).  
Communicators often see the lack of trust and credibility as their central problem, 
especially where the agency is regarded as having a history of frequent distortion, 
exaggeration and secrecy. Activists can leverage this and regard the undermining of 
undeserved trust as a major achievement (Covello & Sandman 2001). If an authority is 
suspected of having a hidden agenda, in other words, of trying to deceive or manipulate  
the public, this can lead to the public reacting negatively to warning messages. 
 
This negative response was detailed in the previous chapter as reactance 121 and is 
especially strong when the public are being pressured to give up something they value 
so that a problem may be fixed. People need to be motivated to pay attention to risk 
communication; often that is made easy by cues that herald an imminent disaster, for 
example dense smoke from a bushfire. But in less obvious scenarios, motivation to 
heed warnings can be hampered by perceptions of source duplicity, resulting in a 
deliberate rejection of the message, also known as the ‘boomerang effect’.  In 
democratic societies, where public debate is encouraged and the media is regarded as 
‘free’, public and scientific debates about all manner of risks are easily accessible to the 
public; often the information is abundant and conflicting views encouraged. The ‘reach’ 
of social media into people’s everyday lives means that very little in the public arena is 
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taken at face value; debates, whilst informing, can also confuse and change the salience 
of the risk. Climate change is an example of an on-going debate where, despite the 
experts who disagree in the premise of climate change being in the minority, those on 
both side of the argument are often afforded equal voice. When those who are 
supposed to be the experts are seen to publically disagree, it brings into question the 
credibility of both the message and the experts. This has been suggested as a core risk 
communication dilemma where ‘science is not yet able to provide the clear and certain 
answers the public is waiting for’ (Gutteling and Weigman 1996:153).  
Australian Bushfire Risk Communication 
Risk communication in the Australian bushfire context encompasses the official 
messages and warnings from fire authorities, media stories and commentaries as well 
as informal information that the public access through their social networks. The 
following is an overview of the Country Fire Authority and a summary of the official fire 
information that is communicated and available to the Australian public prior to and 
during the annual fire season.  
The Country Fire Authority (CFA) 
Each state and territory has their own fire authorities and fire advisory practices and 
procedures,122 but as the three case studies used for analysis in this thesis were 
conducted primarily in the state of Victoria, it is the bushfire risk communications of the 
Country Fire Authority in Victoria that will be discussed. The Country Fire Authority is an 
amalgamation of three fire boards: The first two were a result of the Fire Brigade Act of 
1980 and were the Metropolitan Fire Brigades Board (MFBB) and the Country Fire 
Brigades Board (CFBB) and the third, (the Bush Fire Brigades) was formed in 1926 
following a devastating series of fires that killed 60 people and razed 1000 properties. 
Consisting entirely of volunteers, the Bush Fire Brigade had little official power and no 
governmental recognition or support. The outcome of a Royal Commission into the 
1939 'Black Friday' bushfires that burned 2 million hectares, destroyed 3,700 properties 
and killed 71 people, recommended a single fire fighting organisation for country 
Victoria; subsequently the Country Fire Authority (CFA) became an official entity on 2 
April 1945. A first-responder for any house or bush fire, the CFA has currently more than 
1,200 CFA brigades servicing the operational areas throughout regional Victoria (except 
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state forests and parks) and outer metropolitan Melbourne. It is one of the world’s 
largest volunteer based emergency management organisations. 123  
 
The CFA works closely with Forestry industry brigades and provides assistance in other 
emergencies, for example flooding. As well as year-round risk reduction, fire 
suppression and incident management, they coordinate a variety of non-emergency 
activities including community awareness, education and safety programs, building 
code-related inspections, post incident analysis and land-use planning. Distributed via a 
variety of media the CFA have sophisticated and comprehensive fire information and 
warning systems. Additionally, the public education campaigns and community 
fireguard groups aim to communicate to as wide a population of people in Victoria as 
possible.  
Fire Danger Ratings  
Fire Danger Ratings124 are a measure of fire danger as well as how a fire may start, and 
how hard it will be to put out. Fire Danger Ratings are forecast by the Bureau of 
Meteorology during the fire season. Based on weather and other environmental 
conditions (and forecast up to four days in advance) it is an assessment of the potential 
fire behaviour, the difficulty of suppressing a fire, and the potential impact on the 
community should a bushfire occur on a given day. 
Fire Danger Index 
The Fire Danger Rating is determined by the Fire Danger Index (FDI). The FDI is a 
combination of air temperature, relative humidity, wind speed and drought. Displayed 
on billboards throughout Victoria, the Fire Danger Index ranges from a value of 1 to 100. 
Definitions are assigned to each value range:  
 LOW-MODERATE (1-11) means that fire will not burn, or will burn so slowly that it will 
be easily controlled; HIGH (12-24) denotes that a fire can be controlled but still 
present a threat.  
 VERY HIGH (25-49) fires present a very real threat and may be difficult to control. 
 SEVERE (50-74) fire rating predicts that fires will be moving fast and be difficult to 
control. 
  EXTREME (75-99) fire rating are uncontrollable fires, with embers likely to cause 
problems, starting fires up to 6kms ahead of the main fire.  
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 CATASTROPHIC (100+) rating, the fires will be aggressive, totally uncontrollable, 
with fires starting in excess of 20 kms in front of the main fire. Incidentally, this last 
rating was added to the categories after the 2009 Black Saturday bushfires as a 
result of the Royal Commission.  
 
Additionally, each rating has actions and recommendations associated with it: 
 LOW-MODERATE/HIGH/VERY HIGH: Check your bushfire survival plan, Monitor 
conditions as action may be needed. Prepare to leave if necessary. 
 SEVERE: If you are not prepared to the highest level, leaving high risk bushfire areas 
early in the day is your safest option.  
 EXTREME: Well prepared homes that are actively defended can provide safety – 
check your bushfire survival plan [but] if you are not prepared, leaving bushfire-
prone areas early in the day is your safest option. 
 CODE RED: Leaving high risk bushfire areas the night before or early in the day is 
your safest option – do not wait and see. Avoid forested areas, thick bush or long, 
dry grass. 
 
Fire Warnings 
There are three levels of warnings which are made available to the public via the CFA 
and Department of Environment and Primary Industries (DEPI) websites, the Victorian 
Bushfire Information Line (VBIL), Radio & Television,125 Social media and mobile phone 
RSS feeds. 
ADVICE: General information to keep you up-to-date with developments. 
 
WATCH AND ACT: An emergency threatens you. Conditions are changing and you need 
to start taking action now to protect your health, life and your family. 
 
EMERGENCY WARNING: You are in imminent danger and need to take action 
immediately. You will be impacted by the emergency. 
 
In addition, a siren sound may be played over the radio or TV before an emergency 
warning is broadcast. This is known as SEWS (Standard Emergency Warning Signal).  
 
Total Fire Ban Days 
During days of increased fire danger and based on the advice of the Bureau of 
Meteorology, the CFA may declare a Total Fire Ban which sets legal restrictions on what 
activities can or cannot occur in a particular district for that day. During these days all 
fire permits are suspended and open fires of all kinds are prohibited. This also includes 
using any sort of tools or equipment that could potentially produce a spark: chainsaws, 
vegetation clearing tools for example. The Total Fire Ban days are declared the day 
before and penalties for ignoring a Total Fire Ban can include large fines and up to 25 
years imprisonment (CFA 2013). 
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Code Red Days 
Code Red days were another government initiative following recommendations from 
the 2009 Black Saturday Royal Commission. Code Red is the highest Fire Danger Rating; 
the declaration of a Code Red day happens during a fire season and signals the worst 
conditions for a bush or grass fire. Schools, parks and forests in high risk areas are 
closed and people who live in high fire risk areas are recommended to leave early.  
Communication of Bushfire Risk 
Summer fire campaigns typically incorporate media and social media, partnerships with 
state-wide organisations. Fact sheets, ad templates, radio scripts, and media releases 
are freely available. General and critical information (advice and warnings) are 
communicated through a variety of means: newspapers, television, community 
education, internet, mobile and electronic technologies and social media.  
Information 
The CFA has made available a community information guide 126  which has been 
developed for a number of communities state-wide deemed to be at risk of bushfire or 
grassfire. Whilst they are mostly generic, they contain information specific for that area 
or community with maps and targeted advice.127 Prior to a fire season, it is typically 
delivered to all households in bushfire-prone areas of Victoria. The Fire Ready Kit128 is a 
12 page pamphlet that is designed to prepare households for a possible bushfire. It 
includes general bushfire information, statistics about bushfire risk and ways to 
prepare. It is comprehensive and covers year-round preparation, specific preparation 
for the fire season and details about what is involved in staying and defending a 
property. 
Newspaper 
The CFA regularly provide media releases containing stories of interest pertaining to 
relevant CFA activity.  Along with media originated stories, the newspaper publishes the 
official communications from the CFA, and government and emergency agencies. The 
communication encompasses ‘business as usual’ information, as well as bushfire 
relevant weather updates, fire season public education campaigns and warnings. A 
version of the CFA FireReady information brochure 129 is published (in conjunction with 
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CFA) by a local newspaper and inserted into their daily distribution prior to the fire 
season.  
Television 
Just prior to the fire season the CFA releases a series of television advertisements to 
educate the public about relevant fire dangers. These take various forms and change 
according to the events of the previous fire seasons. For example, in 2011, the television 
ads were described as ‘graphic’ and survivors of the 2009 Black Saturday bushfires were 
warned about the nature of them, giving them an opportunity to avoid seeing them if 
desired. In 2012, there were four televisions ads produced,130 which targeted people 
travelling in regional Victoria and stressed the importance of checking warnings before 
travelling. They also addressed the ‘Stay and defend or leave early dilemma using the 
catch phrase “If you are in two minds – Leave Early”.  
Community Engagement  
The CFA offers and runs a comprehensive community home-based fire safety 
programme called the Community Fireguard. Meetings usually last around two hours 
and are held in community members’ homes. The programme covers planning for 
varying scenarios, how to make informed decisions, how to ensure a fire-safe home and 
property; importantly it enables and builds community cohesiveness. The format is 
group discussion and practical activities and covers around eight hours of material.  As 
part of Community Fireguard the CFA also offers a practical "Stay and Defend" 
workshop. In addition to group meetings, community members have available to them 
personalised bushfire information advice and can ‘book’ an expert to come to their 
home to advise them on bushfire related matters. These range from ensuring the fire 
trucks can access their property to managing vegetation around their house.  
Victorian Bushfire Information Line (VBIL) 
The Victorian Bushfire Information Line (VBIL) is essentially a call centre set up to 
provide information to the public during and after major bushfire incidents. It also 
offers information to help householders, landowners and small businesses reduce 
bushfire risk. The public can ring a free 1800 number during business hours and talk to 
someone who will provide pre-scripted information; for example whether there is a 
prescribed burn planned or in progress in the caller’s area. For non business hours 
inquiries, there is recorded up-to-date information. 
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Mobile Telephone FireReady App, RSS Feeds. 
The FireReady app131 was launched in 2010 to 'deliver critical emergency information 
and community safety advice to smartphone and tablet devices'. To date it has been 
downloaded by more than 450,000 users and aims to provide timely and accurate 
incident and fire safety information to smart phones or other compatible tablet devices.  
The CFA provides RSS feeds for the public.132 This is also an 'opt-in' service where the 
public need to subscribe to the CFA feeds. Once subscribed the CFA automatically sends 
warnings & advice, incident summaries, total fire bans & fire danger ratings and any 
relevant news. 
Social Media: CFA website, Twitter, Facebook,  
CFA has a comprehensive internet presence with an official CFA website,133 Facebook 
page134 and a Twitter account135 (hashtag #bushfires). The website provides a myriad of 
bushfire information and if people choose to become a member they can log in to the 
CFA website and have access to public forums and blogs. These are discussions that are 
open to the public who are able to contribute to the discussions. The public has to ‘opt 
in’ to these social media sites to receive information, updates and warnings. Warnings 
are posted automatically to both Facebook and Twitter during bushfire events.  
Discussion 
The sociological imagination consists of the capacity to shift from one 
perspective to another, and in the process to build up an adequate view of 
a total society and its components (C Wright Mills, 1959) 
 
This chapter (and the one preceding) has demonstrated that there are many different 
ways to understand the same phenomena, and each discipline has an emphasis that 
others do not. Each perspective brings with it its own strengths and weaknesses, and 
also related thinking as demonstrated in the literature referenced. Risk perception in 
the previous chapter has been examined using a cognitive individual perspective, and 
this chapter widened this understanding to include the society and culture in which the 
individual resides. Each idea, theory, model and approach detailed in this chapter has 
relevance for understanding how people may (or may not) respond to disaster 
warnings and evaluate risk threats. The theoretical underpinning of this thesis is social 
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constructionism which advances the notion that knowledge is produced as people 
‘construct it between them’ (Burr 2003:4). Moreover, in direct contrast with the 
essentialism of traditional psychology, knowledge construction and meaning-making is 
conceptualised as an active, dynamic and on-going process.  
 
The ways that risk is assessed are complex and as chapters 2,3 and 4 show, depend on a 
great many elements which are constructed though social interpretations and mediated 
by scientists, journalists and disaster and emergency agencies. Slovic (1987) described 
risk as ‘inherently subjective’, and a conceptual tool that helps people decide what is 
dangerous and therefore needs to be paid attention to. How people view their worlds 
and how they construct ideas of risk and vulnerability  contribute to an individual’s 
‘mental model’, that is, a persons’ beliefs, values and use of their surrounding 
environments. Similarly, worldviews predict how people prioritise and interpret risk, 
including technological, economic, political and environmental risks. (Dake 1991; Dake & 
Wildavsky 1991). Bushfire risk literature that focuses on how risk is evaluated in relation 
to warnings comprises few studies and more in the Australian context is needed.  
 
Models of communication have evolved since the beginning of media communication 
research in the 1920’s and the ones relevant to this thesis have been described in this 
chapter. The contextual model resonates strongly with the social constructionist 
approach of this thesis and is a useful model with which to analyse the ways in which 
the Australian public respond to bushfire information and warnings. Heuristics of risk 
have been described in social terms in these chapters, and included biases of 
accessibility, availability and positive affect. Kahneman (2011) called the availability 
heuristic as perhaps the most dominant heuristic in the social context which, beginning 
with the media and ending with large-scale government action, can create a chain of 
events that amplifies over time. The social amplification of risk theory explained that 
communication is a two stage process where the first stage is risk perception and signal 
transformation and the second are its effects. A key assumption of SARF is that, unless 
risk events are socially discussed and debated, their impact remains ‘localised and 
largely irrelevant’. When the idea of audience reception is viewed through the ‘social 
construction of reality’ lens, it is easy to understand how texts can shape public 
discourse. 
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Studies exploring the public perception of risk communication (Eagly, Wood and 
Chaiken 1978; Renn and Levine 1991; Flynn, Burns, Mertz et al. 1992) agree the 
assessment of risk is very much dependent on how much the source of the message is 
trusted. Trust and credibility is central to any effective risk communication and McGuire 
(1969) defined trustworthiness as a measure of the possible hidden agenda of the 
source, that is, the possible intention to the public (154). There is no doubt that the 
public and the experts view risk differently, and some people can react emotionally to 
risks in ways that the experts find puzzling. Sandman, (1993) confronts the criticism 
often levelled at the public from emergency agencies of ‘irrationality’ and suggests that 
it is unhelpful to think that emotional responses are irrational whilst thinking or 
measured responses are rational. Furthermore, agencies often link ‘irrationality’ to 
ignorance; Sandman (1993) asserts that just because the public may be ignorant of 
scientific facts, does not mean their reaction to a scenario (about which they have 
experience but no knowledge) is irrational. 
 
This chapter made a distinction between risk communication and crisis communication 
and showed crisis communication is very specific, often concise, and people focused. As 
Covello (2002) points out, good communication concentrates on ‘what the people most 
need to know and most want to know’ (52). The following chapter outlines the 
theoretical epistemologies and methodologies employed to understand the topic of 
warning fatigue as well as addressing methodological issues. 
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6: METHODS, THEORIES AND EPISTEMOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
Main Aims  
As stated in the introduction, the principle aim of the research reported in this thesis 
was to explore the phenomenon of warning fatigue and establish whether there was a 
way to operationalise it in such a way that it could be measured. The research aimed to 
establish whether prolonged lead-time disasters influence risk perception, engender 
the phenomenon of warning fatigue and impact response. A further aim was to 
understand how people living with the risk of bushfires evaluated their personal risk 
and interpreted and understood bushfire risk communication. The previous chapters (4 
and 5) explored these concepts and showed that, within the substantive subject of risk, 
there can be differing ways to respond to it. For example, an individual can assess risk 
personally as it relates to their own concerns; they can ‘react’ or ‘cope’ or strategise’. 
They can manage their responses and how they feel about them, they can reduce their 
reactions or altogether ignore their feelings. Within the social context in which they 
operate - their neighbourhood, their community, their family and social networks – they 
can assess how well their surrounding environment might survive the threat, how 
prepared their property or neighbours property might be and evaluate the readiness of 
their local brigade to respond to a bushfire. They may also gauge how helpful their 
family and friends might be in a crisis situation. Some literatures have examined these 
ways of assessing risk, but as yet, none has done so in the context of a prolonged lead-
time threat. By using these knowledges about the many ways to perceive risk, the 
question that this methodology seeks to answer is,, ‘how do people living with the on-
going threat of annual bushfires, evaluate and respond to their risk?’ Therefore, it is 
important that this methodology captures the multi-dimensional character of this 
unique situation: people continue to live in bushfire-prone areas and are annually 
confronted with the risk from bushfires even though a bushfire of disastrous 
proportions rarely occurs.  
 
Consistent with the interdisciplinary focus of this thesis, the methodology will draw 
upon more than one approach: for the first two studies it will employ a qualitative 
methodology but for the third study, the design is both qualitative and quantitative. The 
advantages of a mixed methods approach is discussed on page 138 of this chapter. The 
design methodology aimed to ensure that both the individual responses to personal risk 
and the evaluations of risk in their wider social context were captured. 
128 
 
Through investigating the bushfire warnings that the people pay attention to, 
considering whether there are some warnings that are paid more (or less) attention and 
exploring the reasons for this,  the research aimed to understand what it is like to live 
with bushfire risk, to understand the participants’ points of view; to ‘get under their 
skin’ in a sense. In the context of Australian bushfires, the methodology therefore was 
designed to explore how the participants talked about those aspects of living with risk, 
how they constructed risk and warning issues and what considerations influenced those 
constructions.  
Theoretical epistemologies 
The epistemological underpinning of this thesis is that the individual and society are 
inextricably linked. A fundamental premise is to understand how the individual, as part 
of his or her social and cultural environment, perceives risk from potential disasters. 
Moreover this risk is mediated by emergency agencies and the media. Therefore, the 
epistemological orientation of this thesis is integrative and draws upon several 
psychological and sociological theories, models and approaches. These include Social 
Constructionism, Symbolic Interactionism, Social Representation Theory, Critical and 
Discursive Psychology and Interpretive Phenomenological Analysis. What is notable 
about these different theories are their complementarities; despite being grounded in 
different disciplines, the philosophies of each approach are very similar in that the 
individual is considered in the wider socio-cultural context. 
 
Social Constructionism challenges the taken-for-granted assumptions about ways to 
understand the world.  Rather than deriving knowledge from ‘an objective, unbiased 
observation of the world’ social constructionism advances the notion that knowledge is 
produced and incorporated into everyday life as people interact  socially. Moreover, in 
direct contrast with the essentialism of traditional psychology, knowledge construction 
and meaning-making is conceptualised as an active, dynamic and on-going process. 
Social Constructionism examines the ways in which events, realities, meanings, 
experiences and knowledges are ‘the effects of a range of discourses operating within 
society’ (Braun and Clarke, 2006:81). Importantly, Social Constructionism is not 
deterministic and ‘relocates problems away from the pathologised, essentialist sphere 
of traditional psychology’ (Burr 2003:7). Language is central in the social constructionist 
process as it renders the content and structure of peoples thoughts ‘visible’ and in no 
small way demonstrates that ‘what we say is what we think’ (ibid.: 47). Moreover, it 
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emphasises that, it is the social realm (or linguistic space) where individuals interact 
with others that understanding is to be found. 
 
The term Symbolic Interactionism was coined in the 1970’s by social constructionist 
Herbert Blumer (1900 – 1987), who built upon the earlier works of American sociologists 
George Herbert Mead (1863–1931) and Charles Cooley (1864-1929). It builds upon the 
concept of social interaction and was seen to be a major alternative to functionalism 136 
and social system theory137 where society was imagined to be an exchange of gestures 
which involved the use of symbols. According to symbolic interactionism individuals and 
society are considered inseparable because they are both 'created' though social 
interaction and one cannot be understood without the other. Fundamental to this 
theory was the belief that humans act toward things on the basis of the meanings they 
ascribe to those things. The meaning of such things is derived from, or arises out of, the 
social interaction with others and the society. These meanings are used and modified 
through an interpretative process when dealing with everyday life. Symbolic Interaction 
challenged traditional psychology’s assumptions of consciousness and mind, and argues 
that people are as affected by their interactions with society as they are by their 
cognitive physiology. Mead insisted that ‘Individuals’ do not exist independently of 
society but are, instead, ‘made possible by social interaction between people’ (Burr 
2003:193). Importantly, these interactions are made possible (and made sense of) by 
the use of symbols; there is an assumption that successful interaction is only possible 
within a system of shared meanings and understandings. The premise of symbolic 
interactionism (and of this thesis) is that the individual and society exist only in relation 
to each other and therefore can only be fully understood in terms of their interaction.  
 
Risk perception can be seen as a ‘representation of risk’ and comprises multiple factors 
that are ‘beyond information processing’ (Joffe  2003:60). It is not a homogenous or 
bounded process, because, when forming a representation ‘there is always both 
conflict and cooperation’ (Moscovici 1998:377). Originally coined in 1961 by Serge 
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Moscovici,138 social ‘re-presentation’ is framed as a socio-cognitive practice that enables 
people to learn about their world by reinterpreting events to ‘fit with what is already 
known’ (Howorth 2006:68). Social representations not only embody individual and 
collective histories, social and cultural entities but they also enable people to make 
sense of new events, creating what Moscovici termed an ‘environment’. Moscovici 
(1984) was particularly interested in the ideological ‘battle of ideas’, that is, how 
meanings are challenged and negotiated: 
Social representations are systems of values, ideas and practices which enable 
communication to take place among the members of a community by 
providing them with a code for social exchange and a code for naming and 
classifying unambiguously the various aspects of their world and their 
individual and group history. (Moscovici 1973: xiii).  
 
Moscovici proposed two distinct processes by which representations of events are 
constructed: the first is ‘anchoring’ which transforms unfamiliar abstract concepts into 
familiar,  concrete experiences. Anchoring ascribes meaning to an unfamiliar,  strange 
and threatening object, rendering it less threatening and more familiar. In this way, it is 
a similar process to that of affective adaptation, 139 where (the model proposes) the 
mere action of understanding something makes it less scary and more predictable 
(Wilson and Gilbert 2008). The second process Moscovici called ‘objectification’ and is 
where new or strange ideas are ‘re-categorised’ using familiar concepts that are already 
part of a society’s collective frames of reference. Objectifying extends the idea of 
anchoring because objectification ‘domesticates the unfamiliar’, transforming the 
unfamiliar into something concrete and ‘known’, giving it a sense of understanding. 
Once an idea is reified, it feels more within the control of the individual; therefore 
objectification is a process not dissimilar to the cognitive adaptations discussed in 
chapter 4 that enable people to feel more in control (or less out of control) when 
managing anxiety provoked by unfamiliar threats. Whilst the past is drawn upon when 
attaching something already known to something new, objectification ‘saturates’ a new 
idea with the current or familiar, turning it from an abstract idea into something much 
more tangible. For example, when the media demonstrate the effect of climate change 
(an abstract idea) by repeatedly depicting exceptional floods, bushfires or storms, they 
objectify and transform climate change into a concrete phenomenon. 
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Social Representation theory (SRT) ‘allows for the simultaneous presence of divergent 
concepts, inconsistent ideas and paradoxical meanings’ (Moscovici 1973 cited in Rose , 
Efraim, Gervais et al. 1995:4). Depending on the culture within which the 
representations are formed, collective representations will vary in the extent they are 
contested or challenged; for example hegemonic social representations ‘rooted in 
systems of power’ are ubiquitous and more resistant to change (ibid.: 23). Emile 
Durkheim (1858-1917)140 viewed collective representations in the same way calling them 
‘social facts that are imposed upon society’ (Howarth 2006:71). Critics of this theory 
(Potter 1996b; Moloney and Walker 2002) have questioned the extent of the 
relationship between social representations and action. However, Howorth (2006) 
insists that social representations are ‘often only apparent in action [as they] influence 
social practices’ (72). Other critics (McKinley and Potter 1987) have questioned the 
degree to which a key feature of SRT - shared knowledges - implies consensus. 
However, consensus is neither just agreement nor the ‘shared-ness’ of social opinions 
and values, rather it is a taken-for-grantedness about those things that people share -  
language, protocols, rituals; in short, all those things that make up social life (Rose et al.  
1995:1). 
 
Situated cognition contends that knowledge can only be gained through experience, 
situating this learning within cultural, social and physical contexts. Importantly, this 
learning is conceptualised not a result of knowledge retrieval, but as the individual 
interacts with his or her environment. Language is central to another psychological 
theory, that of discursive psychology which explores how people actively construct 
their own accounts of events, of which others may have a different view. Language, as 
people use it in everyday life, is seen to be a representation of what they think, believe, 
who they are and how they interpret the world around them. Like social 
constructionists, discursive psychologists view everyday life as constantly changing 
through interaction (which they call ‘performance’); ‘thus memory, emotion and other 
psychological phenomena become things we do rather than things we have’ (italics 
added, Burr 2003:17). Situated Cognition describes a perspective of human cognition 
that claims that learning happens as human beings interact with the living world; it is a 
theory of thinking mainly ‘as you go’ and ‘in the moment’, and is a situated in physical 
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and social contexts (Greeno 1989). Situated cognition theory shifts the focus from the 
individual to the socio-cultural setting and the activities of the people within that 
setting. Knowledge is understood as ‘accumulating through the lived practice of the  
people in a society’ (Driscoll 2004:158); this theory is particularly pertinent for 
understanding participants ‘lived experience’ of bushfires. In short, these theories are 
most useful for ‘making-sense’ of the ways that risk is perceived by individuals who are 
also constituents of a social world. Predominantly however, it is their similarity to social 
constructionism that affords their inclusion in the theoretical epistemology of this 
thesis. In particular, it is how they complement social constructionism, symbolic 
interactionism, and the augmentation of these two theories: ‘Social Representation 
Theory’ (SRT).  
 
The importance and relevance of these theories to conceptualising the research design 
cannot be overstated and at every stage of the research, these theories directed the 
methodological approach. In practical terms, this meant that when reading relevant 
literature assumptions that psychologists made about ‘the social’ were challenged. 
Similarly, the ways that those writing about the social talked about the individual were 
not taken for granted. In this way the concept of risk was not reified, but considered a 
concept within which the participants’ perspectives were paramount. These different 
theories underpinned the theoretical epistemology of this thesis’ research, enabling a 
consistent, coherent and integrated understanding of bushfire risk communication and 
perception.  
Analytic epistemologies 
In order to understand the participants’ perception of their personal and community 
risk in the context of possible annual bushfires, more than one analytic approach is 
used. These include interpretive phenomenological analysis (IPA), discourse and 
narrative analysis and the concept of interpretive frames and repertoires. These 
methods are concerned with ‘themes and patterns across an entire data set rather than 
within a data item’ - one participants comment for example - and although they are 
similar each brings an analytic strength. Moreover they all share a fundamental feature: 
qualitative thematic analysis (Braun and Clarke 2006:81).  
 
Qualitative thematic analysis is a method in its own right which allows for the 
interpreting of ‘various aspects of the research topic’ as well as a flexible way to 
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‘identify, analyse and report patterns (themes) within data’ (ibid.: 79). It is a process for 
encoding qualitative information and can be a complex model with themes, topics, 
indicators and qualifications. Themes are understood as interpretations of the 
phenomenon, and are recurring patterns of meaning (ideas, thoughts, and feelings) 
throughout the text. They identify both something that matters to the participants and 
also convey something of the meaning of that ‘thing’ for the participants. (Boyatsis 
1998). In the context of this thesis the themes may be initially generated inductively 
from the transcribed interviews or generated deductively from the literature. Thematic 
analysis begins with an individual data set (the interview) but importantly extends 
understandings gained from these single interviews to the whole data set (all 
interviews). It is a useful method for this thesis as it can be used to ‘reflect reality and 
[also] unpick and unravel the surface of reality’ (Braun and Clarke 2006:81). Themes can 
be determined by prevalence, that is, how many times the idea came up in an interview, 
or by the number of participants who mentioned the idea. However no attempt is made 
to quantify these themes, rather they are represented in terms such as ‘most of’, ‘the 
majority of’ or ‘many’. Thematic analysis is a ‘data driven’ analysis where no 
assumptions are made about the coding framework or analysis outcomes. It is used in 
the context of this thesis as a ‘starting point’ from which more detailed analysis, using 
different analytic methods, can be done.  
 
Interpretive Phenomenological Analysis (IPA) is a two-stage interpretative process 
where the researcher is trying to ‘make sense of the participants trying to make sense 
of their world’ (Smith and Osborne 2003:53); it enables a more detailed and nuanced 
account of the personal experiences of a smaller sample. It is a useful approach to use 
for qualitative research as it suggests ways that people make sense of a given 
phenomenon which can include, but is not limited to, personally important experiences. 
IPA ‘assumes that there is a connection between people’s talk and their thinking and 
emotional state’ (ibid.: 54). Therefore questions for the interview protocol were 
designed to explore the participants’ ideas and opinions, as well as their reasoning and 
feelings. Consistent with the social interactionist ontology, IPA is a  ‘bottom up’ 
approach which can be used to generate understanding, interpretation and meaning 
from the data rather than beginning with a preconceived hypothesis. IPA enables a 
broad framework that does not assume a point of view nor a hypothesis and was an  
especially useful epistemology for the first round of interviews. Semi-structured 
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interviewing (as is employed for both interview rounds) is the most compatible 
interview method for IPA as it is a flexible method which can be iterative and adaptable 
depending on the participant’s responses and interests. Importantly, this approach 
allows for a participant-lead interview rather than one which is largely orchestrated by 
the interviewer. By ceding some control over the interview process, the interview can, 
at times, take longer than ‘necessary’, resulting in lengthy transcripts (and longer 
analysis); this could be seen as a limitation of this approach.  
 
Discourse analysis (DA) has similarities with IPA, in that it is a qualitative approach that 
places an emphasis on the importance of language. It is congruent with social 
constructionism and symbolic interactionism, as both approaches are concerned with 
how individuals construct meanings from their social and personal worlds (Nunn 2009). 
Discourse analysis pays attention to social interaction, and is ideal for exploring forms 
of subjectivity: ‘ways of understanding and experiencing the world, of accounting for it,  
and being positioned in it’ (Edwards 2005:258). It is an analytical approach that is 
entirely congruent with social constructionism, as it focused, not on the individual and 
personal, but rather on the ‘public realm which people have access to when they are 
dealing with other people’ (Potter 2012:5). The ‘public realm’ in the context of the 
analytic chapters is the bushfire-prone environment in which the participants construct 
their everyday lives. Discourse analysis makes possible more nuanced analysis than IPA, 
and is especially useful for the second round of interviews and the reflections of 
participants from the warning fatigue survey. This thesis used DA ‘as a source of 
evidence or insight about social life and social relations’ (Cameron 2001:13) rather than a 
linguistic approach concerned with function and form of language. Importantly, DA 
allows for competing viewpoints, and does not assume or promote homogeneity of 
response.  
 
A fundamental aim of the analysis was to understand the ‘talk’ of the participants as 
they discussed why they lived in a bushfire-prone area; how they made sense of their 
decisions and described their everyday lives in these contexts. ‘Talking’ in this context 
means ‘the social activity of making meanings with language and other symbolic 
systems in some particular kind of situation or setting’ (Lemke 1995:6). Meaning-making 
or sense-making is a process whereby people respond to events in the real world and 
actively construct them, ‘often using pre-fabricated vocabularies or schemas’ (Benford 
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1997; Gamson, Croteau and Hoynes 1988). ‘People develop some sort of sense 
regarding what they are up against, what their own position is relative to what they 
sense, and what they need to do’ (Weick 1999:42). It is only when people talk about 
their responses to events that an interpretation of their sense-making can be made. 
Wetherell (2008) calls this ‘basic psycho-discursive practices where the inter-subjective 
nature of sense making is revealed’ (Manuti, Traversa and Mininni  2012:1) The ways of 
talking about or ‘narratives’ that the participants used when talking about their 
everyday lives in bushfire-prone environments can be thought of as interpretive devices 
through which they represent themselves and their worlds to themselves and to others. 
Narratives are social products produced by people in the context of specific social,  
historical and cultural locations and narrative analysis focuses on ‘the ways in which 
people make and use stories to interpret the world’ (May 2002:6).  
 
Interpretive repertoires are the textual and interpretative stories or building blocks 
used by people in their social interactions to develop accounts and versions of 
significant events. Moreover, it is through using these interpretive repertoires that they 
are able to perform identities and social life. Operating at a broadly semantic level, they 
are recognizable routines of connected arguments, explanations, evaluations and 
descriptions which often depend on familiar anecdotes, illustrations, tropes or clichés 
(Wetherell 2006). The terms, categories and idioms of an interpretative repertoire are 
closely conceptually organized and are typically assembled around a metaphor or vivid 
image. In most cases, interpretative repertoires are identified by analysing a set of 
open-ended interviews in which participants address a set of different themes. This 
concept formed the basis for designing the interview protocols for the first and second 
round of interviews; it also directed the coding and analysis. 
 
As an analytic method for understanding text (which the transcripts of the interviews 
represent) content analysis (CA) was considered. Certainly, during the ‘first pass’ of the 
transcript data, words were the predominant unit in the coding process, but 
subsequently, they were used in a different way to the intentions of a true content 
analysis. Content analysis systematically codes words, phrases and text to produce 
reliable, valid variables; it aims to produce a consistent classification that is able to be 
done by different people but get the same result. Whilst CA does not preclude a 
qualitative analysis, it employs a mostly quantitative approach and was considered to 
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be a reductionist methodology inconsistent with the predominant qualitative 
methodology of this thesis. Finally, the advantages of using more than one analytic 
method for this thesis are that it reinforces the philosophy of this thesis which argues 
that there is more than one way of ‘seeing the world’. By approaching the same issue 
from differing perspectives a more comprehensive and integrated understanding of 
people’s perception of risk is achieved.  
Design Overview 
The research design consisted of three case studies: two rounds of interviews and a 
survey. The participants for the interviews (n = 36) were people living in bushfire 
vulnerable areas in Tasmania and Victoria. The survey participants (n = 33) also lived in 
bushfire vulnerable areas in Tasmania and Victoria, New South Wales and Queensland. 
The design was mixed methods and comprised semi-structured interviews (using an 
open-ended question technique) and a survey, which included responses to statement 
on a 7 point Likert scale as well as options for participants own reflections on their 
responses.141 The particulars of the participants, recruitment methods, rationales for 
each particular study design, the methods and limitations are detailed at the beginning 
of each case study.142 
Design 
The research design of the research project involved mixed methods using both 
qualitative and quantitative data generation, collection and analysis methodologies. The 
advantages of this design are that the qualitative method can inform and shape the 
quantitative method and the findings can be triangulated, allowing for convergence or 
dissonance. By using different methods to assess the same issue, the investigation is 
more broad, allowing for nuances and unexpected findings often not obvious when 
only one method is used. For example, a quantitative method may establish what 
people are saying or thinking about, but will not be able to say why or how. Because 
social issues involve complex inter-relationships and diverse individuals, different 
features of the same phenomenon may be illuminated. As each method has limitations, 
mixed methods can help balance out the strengths and weaknesses: for example 
qualitative interviews can provide an in-depth understanding of people’s experiences, 
but may lack the capacity to generalise. Mixed methods allow for a flexible 
complimentary approach, which is able to be expanded and developed as the project 
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progresses. Lastly, by using a mixed methods design, it is envisioned that this research 
will have relevance to a wider range of audiences and heighten the acceptability of the 
findings (Emmerson and Goodrich 2008).  
 
The literature review highlighted gaps in the literature, focused the direction of the 
study and coupled with the main research aims, afforded the formulation of questions 
for the first round of interviews. The analysis of the first interview data revealed 
dominant themes and patterns, and were used to devise a second set of questions 
which teased out some of these ideas in more depth. The intention of the second 
interviews was not only to involve a different cohort of participants but also to focus 
more closely on the main issues that had arisen out of the first round of interviews. 
Subsequently, and during a discussion with a colleague143 about the initial findings of 
these interviews, a casual comment “I wonder whether warning fatigue changes over 
time” led to the idea for the third data set, which was primarily quantitative. This 
consisted of a measure of warning fatigue hypothesised from limitations in the risk 
perception literature, participants’ ideas and opinions and themes and patterns 
observed in the interview data. This measure was tested using a predominantly 
quantitative survey administered over the 2011 fire season. 144 The survey included 
qualitative components which were comments and responses to statements that had 
also been informed by the previous interview findings and literature review. The mixed 
methodology for this thesis enabled an ontogeny of understanding about the thesis 
topic. In this context therefore, the addition of a quantitative component to a 
dominantly qualitative research strategy provided information about participants’ 
perceptions and responses that could not have been gained by one method alone.  
Survey 
Most of the thesis has been written from a qualitative epistemological perspective, 
while taking advantage of benefits accruing from adopting a mixed methods approach: 
specifically, the device of triangulation. The third study employs both quantitative and 
qualitative data gathering methods. The rationale for including a self-report 
questionnaire survey in the final study of the thesis was to ‘map out, or explain more 
fully, the richness and complexity of human behaviour by studying it from more than 
one standpoint’ (Cohen and Manion 2000:54). The assumption which underpins this 
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methodology is that by using standardised questions it is possible to infer people’s 
thoughts and opinions about a specific topic, which data can then be quantitatively 
analysed. The results can then be generalised tentatively to a larger population.  
 
Quantifying qualitative responses is not a new idea in social science and is entirely 
consistent with the interdisciplinary and integrative epistemology of this thesis. Surveys 
were first used to measure poverty among the working class in England at the end of 
the 19th century (Park 2006) and more recently have been used to understand risk 
perception in the context of environmental hazards (Williams, Greenberg and Kahn al.  
1999), environmental quality (Saarinen and Cooke 1971), flood risks (Brown and Damery 
2002), and intentions and actions in the face of bushfire threat (McLennan et al, 2013). 
Surveys work best when the population surveyed is clearly defined (Emmerson 2010), 
and at this point in the thesis, the population needed for the third study had been made 
clear by the previous studies. Importantly, quantitative surveys complement qualitative 
work by providing a wider context for confirming the findings from qualitative analyses 
(Alreck and Settle 1995). In the third study, the survey examined risk perceptions of 
people in the context of the peri-urban bushfire-prone environment of Australia for the 
purposes of measuring bushfire warning fatigue over a typical fire season. 
Depth of Transcription 
When giving the transcriptions back to the participants to validate, some commented 
“that sounded just like me!” which is a confirmation that the way the data was 
transcribed was a true representation of both how and the way they talked about 
things. There are many ways to transcribe spoken data, from linguistic analysis of 
spoken syntax that documents in fine detail to micro-pauses. Other transcription 
conventions include intakes of breath, multiple uses of symbols to denote speaking 
order and interruptions or speed of speech. However, a functional approach is more 
interested in ‘how language communicates when it is used purposefully in particular 
instances and contexts’ (Cameron 2001:18). The aim of the transcription for this 
research was to understand the text rather than the finer points of spoken interaction, 
hence ‘there was a clear trade-off between accuracy and detail on one hand and 
readability on the other’ (ibid.: 39). Nonetheless, the interviews were transcribed 
verbatim, with the accuracy of what was said as close to the original recording as 
possible. There were small changes made for ease of reading such as transcribing ‘and’, 
instead of ‘n’, and making a judgement call as to whether to notate a full-stop or 
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comma. In some but not all instances, repeated words or ‘filler’ words such as ‘um’, ‘er’, 
‘ah’, ‘you know’, ‘sort of’, and ‘I mean’ were not transcribed. A couple of the 
participants had strong foreign accents, and verbal mannerisms that meant they used 
filler words such as ‘basically and ‘actually’ numerous times. Where the meaning of the 
sentence was not changed or compromised, these words were excluded from the final 
transcription.  
 
The level of transcription was moderate (Bird 2005) and the discussion was written 
down verbatim. However, some transcription conventions such as transcribing the 
length of a pause with a number of seconds in brackets (2) or ‘hh’ for audible out-
breath were not followed. The instances of laughter were noted. The transcribing of all 
interviews was done by the author and even though this took a great deal of time, it 
was an excellent way to become familiar with the data. Researchers (Bird 2005; Lapadat 
and Lindsay 1999) argue that transcription is ‘a key phase of data analysis within 
interpretative qualitative methodology’ and should be recognised as ‘an interpretative 
act, where meanings are created, rather than simply a mechanical act of putting spoken 
sounds on paper’ (cited in Braun and Clarke, 2006:87). Transcription is interpretative in 
the sense that, depending on the theoretical emphasis of the thesis, selection of what is 
recorded is made at the transcription stage, therefore it can be argued, is part of the 
analysis process. A limitation of this approach could be that by choosing a moderate 
level of transcription (where the text was more important than pauses and tone), the 
talk is constructed in a certain way and therefore a claim cannot be made that the 
transcription is an absolute reflection of the interviews. A further limitation could be 
that the ordering of the talk into sentences, using commas and full stops could be seen 
as subjective, because, as is normal for ‘natural speech’, ideas (as they were spoken) 
were often not fully formed, and words or whole phrases were repeated in order to 
express an idea. However, for the theoretical purpose of this thesis, the construction of 
the topics discussed (fire risk, personal safety for example) as representative of the 
meanings that the participant gave to the ideas, was what was most important to 
capture, rather than the way (inflections, emphases, hesitancies) the participants 
spoke.  
 
The question of whether the method for collecting qualitative data is contrived and 
therefore does not constitute ‘natural speech’ is one which needs to be addressed. An 
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assumption could be made that one sort of talk is more ‘natural’ than the other. For 
example by privileging ‘ordinary talk’ - that is talk which is informal and would have 
occurred whether it was recorded or not - over talk that has been ‘manufactured’ for 
research purposes. Ethics demand that recording is with the participants consent and 
not covert, and some researchers (Green, Franquiz and Dixon 1997; Edwards 1993) 
recognise that natural talk also happens in structured situations such as medical 
consultations, counselling sessions and courtrooms (cited in Wetherell, Taylor and Yates 
2001:27). Whilst acknowledging that all talk is shaped by the context in which it is 
produced, Cameron (2001) states that she does not think that ‘anyone has shown 
convincingly that what the talking research subjects do in a laboratory is a different 
thing from “normal” talk’ (20). For all three studies of this research there is no doubt 
that the participants knew the overall intended subject of the interviews before they 
were conducted. However, the questions posed to the participants were more of a 
conversational guide than a predetermined script, and deviations and elaborations 
were encouraged.145 When designing the interview questions, considerable effort was 
made not to lead or prime the interviewees, and interviewer input was kept to an 
absolute minimum as it was the participants’ voices, their ideas and their points of view 
that were most important. Some participants apologised for ‘wandering off the topic’ 
at which point they were assured that, in this context, “there was no such thing and to 
please continue”. This last point addresses a critique that interviews are unnatural 
because the interviewer ‘controls’ the interview, imposing a structure that detracts 
from a natural conversation, and interpreting the participant responses in a certain way. 
However, the transcripts show that ‘control’ of the interviews was at the very least 
shared and possibly more firmly with the participants than with the interviewer.  
Methodological Issues and Limitations 
Participants  
Studies (I) and (II) were exploratory in their aims and design where the goal was to get 
the views of people who lived in areas that were bushfire-prone. Mileti and Sorenson 
(1990) claimed that people who are part of a particular social network ‘are more likely 
to hear a warning’ (90), ‘understand, believe and personalise warnings and to engage in 
response’ (94). For the first study, members of Tasmanian and Victorian Community 
Fireguard Association (CFA) groups were contacted and asked to participate in the 
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study. The particular communities were chosen primarily because of the authors’ 
personal contacts with people in the fire and emergency agencies. In Tasmania people 
were approached during a community education morning, and in Victoria, email contact 
details for members of a local CFA were used to request participation. Because this was 
an exploratory study, the views of people who could be considered to be 
‘knowledgeable’ about living with bushfire risk were sought first. It was assumed that 
people who were already involved in personal and community bushfire mitigation 
would be engaged in the issue and more easily bring to mind issues of living in bushfire-
prone areas.  
 
Study (II) was more focused and aimed to elaborate on the issues raised by participants 
from Study (I). In order to get wider and possibly contrasting viewpoints, people who 
did not involve themselves in community Fireguard activities but who still lived in areas 
prone to bushfires were sought.  Study (II) participants were recruited by approaching 
people in a Mt Dandenong village as they went about their weekend business. Even 
though it was a seemingly small community the resulting participants were quite 
disparate and did not all live in the same area. This gave a contrast to the participants 
from Study (I) who were mostly long-time residents of small communities and knew 
most of the people in them. 
 
Study (III) participants were recruited through social media, personal contacts and 
snowballing methods. Because it was not community or area focused, this enabled a 
more diverse sample of residents, with participants living in bushfire-prone areas over 
four Australian States. This was a new cohort of participants who responded to a post 
on the CFA website,146 various emails and requests from friends and colleagues. 147 
Limited time and financial resources meant that the number of participants in each of 
the three studies was less than 70. However, the qualitative component of Study (III) 
yielded sufficient data for a robust analysis.  
Methods 
Semi-Structured Interviews 
Semi-structured interviews were chosen as the method for Study (I) and Study (II) as it 
was a qualitative research method conducive to the social constructionist epistemology 
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of this thesis. The discussion format that semi-structured interviews encourages 
allowed the participants to express their views ‘in their own terms’, and digressing and 
elaboration was commonplace. In this way topics and issues which were not anticipated 
by the interviewer but important to capture, could be part of the interview. Semi-
structured interviews are best used when interviewing participants once (Bernard 1988) 
and provide reliable, comparable qualitative data (Cohen and Crabtree 2008). As the 
literature review preceded this data collection, semi-structured methodology allowed 
for preparation ahead of time where questions and observations were able to be 
drafted; they were in the form of open-ended questions. It provided a template for 
discussing the topic without restricting the exploration of other viewpoints.  
Interviewing participants requires a certain level of expertise and is time consuming. 
These limitations were mitigated because of considerable experience in conducting 
semi-structured interviews on the part of the interviewer. The time component was not 
an issue: the participants were told that an interview may last up to 40 minutes and all 
were happy to take part. They were conducted at a time that best suited the 
participants.  
Survey 
The survey methodology for Study (III) was chosen because of the mainly quantitative 
requirement but also because a qualitative aspect could be included. Research has also 
shown (Schuman and Presser 1981) that, because of the relative anonymity that 
electronic surveys offer, participants are often more honest in their responses than with 
paper surveys or interviews. Other research has also shown that when participants use 
their own private networks their response rate is higher than paper surveys or 
interviews (Boyer, Olson and Jackson 2001). The survey was designed to be done online, 
and was able to be conducted remotely, repeatedly and reliably. Survey Monkey™ was 
the online tool chosen and enabled transfer of data between platforms. 148 It was a  
relatively time and cost-efficient method of collecting data and because the survey was 
repeated several times, ensured a consistency across time points. The survey allowed 
for specific statements to be responded to and was designed to eliminate ambiguity. 
Because the survey was conducted over a period of six months; it was easy to liaise with 
the participants quickly if needed; this included follow-up emails.  When participants are 
asked to respond in a definite way to statements, there is always a possibility that they 
may have misunderstood the reason for the questions. For this reason, an option for 
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the participants to elaborate on why they answered the way they did, was made 
available. This enabled analytic interpretations to be made with a greater degree of 
certainty.  
Limitations 
The method for recruiting of participants (snowballing and through personal and 
professional contacts) meant that the sample for all case studies was not 
representative as it might have been if census data was used for example. This method 
of recruitment would have required a much larger time frame which was outside the 
scope of the thesis. Nonetheless, as detailed in the case study chapters, there was a 
satisfactory range of age, gender, and household demographics (single, partnered, with 
or without dependants). The sampling for the studies were purposive and the most 
important criteria for the three studies were that the participants had lived in bushfire-
prone areas of Australia for more than three years and that they were, or were not, 
involved in formal bushfire mitigation and community education activities. It was clear 
from the results of the analysis of the first study data, that there were no obvious or 
distinct differences between the Tasmanian and Victorian participants’ responses. 
Therefore, for this reason, and also for practical and economic reasons, the cohort for 
the second study was wholly people living in the Dandenong mountain region of 
Victoria.  
 
Self-selection bias is a common limitation in any study and is difficult to avoid 
altogether, even in a perfectly designed study. For the first study, participants were 
approached to be interviewed and the criterion was that they were regularly involved in 
their local community fireguard groups (TFS or CFA). 149 As this was the main selection 
criteria, the participants selected themselves into or out of the study based on the 
research mandate, rather than any subjective, personal bias. For the second study, once 
again, the criteria for inclusion or exclusion was set by the study’s author and was 
straightforward: if the potential participant was regularly participating in any formal 
community fireguard activity, they were excluded (by the recruiter) from the study. 
Nearly all of those approached to participate who met the study’s criteria (non-
involvement) agreed to take part. Those who did not agree to take part (n=2) were not 
available to be interviewed at the time required for family or work reasons.  
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 TFS – Tasmanian Fire Service., CFA – Country Fireguard Authority, Victoria.  
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The participants for all three studies were predominantly Australian-European and more 
than half owned their own home. Therefore the findings of this research may not 
generalise well to other cultures. Additionally, because study (III) required participation 
via an online survey, it can be imagined that those who were less internet capable 
would not have chosen to take part, meaning this particular demographic could have 
been more limited than others. The sample size for each study was at the lower end. 
However, it was still well within conventional standards for empirical analysis.  
Ethics  
A minimum risk ethics application was sought and granted by the University of 
Canterbury Human Ethics Committee for both the first and second round of 
interviews.150 Seven months later an amendment to include the warning fatigue survey 
(Study III) was sought and granted.151 The participants for both rounds of interviews 
were recruited in several ways: by word of mouth, through social networks and by 
personal invitation. Permission to attend the CFA open days was granted by the local 
CFA personnel. At no stage and in no way was anyone put under pressure to 
participate. Furthermore, as the information sheet explained, the participants were free 
to withdraw at any stage during the process, or at any time subsequent to agreeing to 
take part. 152 The information sheet was accompanied by an informed consent form 
which expressly sought the participant’s permission to have their interview recorded. 153 
The informed consent form invited the participants to take part in the research, 
explained the objectives of the study and outlined the process of the interview and 
when they could expect it to take place. Information affirming that their confidentiality 
and anonymity would be respected and details about the security of the data was also 
provided. Contact details for both the researcher and primary supervisor were supplied.  
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7. STUDY I: KNOWLEDGES, PERCEPTIONS AND CONCERNS 
Introduction and Aims 
The primary aim of this chapter is to understand how people who live with bushfire risk 
in semi-rural areas of Australia perceive bushfire risk and interpret bushfire risk 
warnings. Additionally, to understand those factors which hinder or enhance the uptake 
of warning messages. As discussed in Chapter 3, risk from disasters which do not occur 
frequently or predictably are very different scenarios from those disasters (mostly 
weather-related) which are relatively frequent, highly predictable and with multiple 
visual cues. These have been characterised in this thesis as short-term or rapid-onset 
disasters. Within the rapid-onset context previous researchers have largely dismissed 
the notion that that warning fatigue influences risk perception and householder 
decision-making. However, it is the premise of this thesis that when prolonged lead-
time disasters threaten and the likelihood, severity and impact are unpredictable, there 
is a need to find out more about how people perceive risk and respond to warnings.  
 
Bushfires are one of four major threats to Australian residents who live in rural and peri-
rural environments.154 Although bushfire threats remain constant (in that it is an annual 
threat), bushfires of the magnitude which result in destroyed homes and multiple 
fatalities occur about once every twenty years. For people who live day to day with this 
risk, it is regarded as an uncommon and infrequent occurrence. Pertinent for 
understanding risk perception in prolonged lead-time scenarios, is that people who live 
in these bushfire-prone areas of Australia are warned about the possibility of bushfires 
annually. Furthermore, when media reporting and prediction of bushfires is taken into 
account, it could be assumed that the Australian public is made aware of bushfire risk 
throughout the year. The aim of this first round of interviews was to hear from 
members of the public who live in bushfire-prone areas of Australia about their 
perception of bushfire risk. The interviews were intended to gain some insight into the 
relevant issues of living with a well-known risk. The literature discussed thus far in this 
thesis encapsulated several topics: risk perception, communication and understanding 
of disaster warnings, and the important cognitive and social influences on both. It was 
intended that the findings from these first interviews would augment the 
understanding already gained from the literature, and highlight directions for further 
research. 
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 The others are floods, cyclones and severe storms (Ellis et al. 2004). 
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Participants 
Both Tasmania and Victoria have experienced severe bushfires: notably Tasmania in 
1967155 and Victoria in 1939 156 and 2009;157 participants were from both these areas. The 
characteristics of this first group of interviewees ( n=16 ) were that they all lived in a 
bushfire vulnerable area, were all actively involved in bushfire mitigation activities and 
identified as belonging, at some time over the past two years, to the Community 
FireGuard group in their area.158  
 
There were two groups of participants; the first (n=7) lived in Middleton, a small 
community 40 minutes south of Hobart, Tasmania and they were recruited during a TFS 
information day; they were all retirees, four male, three female. The second group (n=9) 
were from various communities in the Dandenong ranges, which lie 35 kms north-east 
of Melbourne, Victoria. The Victorian participants were five male, four female, mostly in 
their mid-thirties with families of young children; however, there was one retired 
couple.  
Method 
The participants were all recruited using community and network contacts, either face-
to-face or by email. The interviews took place between September and October of 2010, 
(Spring in the Southern Hemisphere) and before the start of the official fire season in 
late November. All participants were able to be contacted via email, and were sent (or 
had been given on the CFA or TFS information day) an information sheet159 and a 
consent form;160 the latter which was signed and returned to the interviewer. The 
interviews were held by phone at various times of the day and began with a question re-
confirming the participant’s willingness to have the interview recorded.  The purpose of 
the interviews was to capture relevant bushfire issues, from people who, by virtue of 
the fact that they all belonged to their local community FireGuard group, were assumed 
to be engaged and thinking about issues of bushfire, bushfire mitigation and 
preparedness.  
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 ‘Black Tuesday’ - 62 people died and 1,293 homes destroyed. 
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 ‘Black Friday’ - 71 people died and 3,700 homes destroyed. 
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 ‘Black Saturday’ - 173 people died and 2,029 homes destroyed. 
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 Community Fireguard is a community education program promoted and supported by the Victorian 
Country Fireguard Authority (CFA) and the Tasmanian Fireguard Service (TFS), designed to reduce the loss 
of lives and homes in bushfires. It emphasises that bushfires are survivable if communities take 
responsibility for their fire safety and prepare themselves for the event. 
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 Appendix 1.3. 
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 Appendix 1.2. 
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The interviews were semi-structured, and the telephone interview schedule 161 
comprised 25 questions which were a guide, and were only asked if the discussion 
progressed in such a way that it was appropriate to do so; the interviews were similar to 
a facilitated conversation. This was deliberate, as the interview aimed to understand 
any issues that arose for each participant when thinking about their risk from bushfire; 
if a subject arose that was not detailed on the interview protocol, it was facilitated and 
included. It is important to note that the questions were open-ended and did not 
promote a point of view or opinion. Participants were asked about their assessment of 
personal and community risk from bushfires, evaluation of warnings and sources of fire 
information both generally, immediately prior and during a bushfire event. The average 
time for the interviews was 42 minutes with a range of 24 minutes to 1 hour 7 minutes. 
Coding 
The level of transcription was moderate and is detailed in the methodology chapter. 162 
The interview transcripts were coded first to get a sense of whole issues important to 
the participants, so ‘large ideas’ were coded for (risk  and behaviour for example). 
Within these ideas, there were more nuanced threads which were grouped together to 
enable a more coherent understanding. Once the more detailed categorisation of issues 
was completed, a synopsis of the ideas and viewpoints expressed by the participants 
was undertaken. These broader narratives constitute the main sections in this chapter 
and directed the way the participants’ narratives were presented. The excerpts 
(denoted by italics within single speech marks) are a representation of themes, patterns 
and sub-themes but are not exhaustive; they are the most pertinent examples and 
illustrate the mostly commonly used narratives. The participants are denoted by letters 
which have been assigned to ensure anonymity: for example (AV). 163  
Analysis 
The purpose of the analysis was to capture the ‘big picture’ around issues of risk 
perception and communication. The analysis of these ideas is primarily thematic.  
However, discourse analysis was also used. Discourse analysis in this context relates to 
using discourse ‘as a source of evidence or insight about social life and social relations’ 
(Cameron 2009:13) rather than a linguistic approach concerned with function and form. 
Ideas, opinions and viewpoints were taken note of and recurring patterns, themes or 
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 Page 136. 
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 Similar letters do not indicate members of the same household. 
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threads in the narrative recorded. The analysis is situated within symbolic interactionist 
and social constructionist epistemologies which were detailed in the Methodology 
chapter. The analysis was qualitative and no attempt was made to quantify responses. 
From this analysis of the 16 interviews, 27 narratives about bushfire risk were identified, 
which comprised five major themes: (i) assessment of risk; (ii) behaviour; (iii) 
information sources; (iv) warnings and (v) warning fatigue. Within each of these five 
themes there were several threads; for example under ‘behaviour’, was talk of what 
participants did during a pre-bushfire event, on a total fire-ban day, what participants 
did to prepare and what they planned to do when a bushfire warning was issued. There 
was no attempt to differentiate between either the Tasmanian or Victorian responses  
and unless specifically noted, the analysis is a generalisation across all 16 participants.  
Findings 
(i) Risk  
Participants were asked about their assessment of personal and community risk from 
bushfires and their responses indicated that their assessment of risk depended upon 
several factors: their knowledge of their immediate environment, their experience of 
previous bushfire events and their knowledges of fire behaviour. 
Most of the participants had thought about the bushfire risk before they chose to move 
into their particular area - ‘yes it is in the back of your minds, but  it’s not a key indicator to 
sort of go ‘oh god, I’m not going to come here’  [AF] - but several had not: ‘and we never 
gave it a thought when we came up here, no’ [AV]. However, as result of the 2009 Black 
Saturday fires, ‘look, I didn’t give 2 hoots about the risk until Black Saturday’ [AF], many 
realised that they now lived in a high risk area; ‘the last fire was in 1962, which means 
we’re overdue, but it burnt before then in the 30s, and before then last century so, it’s 
almost inevitable that we’ll have a fire up here’ [C].  Acknowledging that their area was 
bushfire-prone was not the same thing as evaluating their personal risk as high, and 
many participants strongly doubted that there would be another bushfire that would 
necessitate them leaving their homes. One of the reasons for this was their appraisal of 
where they lived in comparison to the conditions and location of the most recent 
bushfire - the Victorian Black Saturday bushfires of 2009. Many participants said that 
the conditions of Black Saturday were unique, and, rather than the result of a relatively 
short period of dry weather conditions, had been ‘building up for 10 or 15 years’ [AV]. 
Black Saturday was described as exceptional in terms of the extreme heat, and the 
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participants described the day as ‘hideous’ and ‘extraordinary’, ‘a one-in-80-year event’ 
and something that they ‘just knew’ was going to be different from any other day they 
had ever known. 
All of the participants had experienced a previous bushfire event and their direct 
experience of bushfires and their knowledge of past bushfires heightened their 
awareness of the danger. The Victoria cohort talked about the Black Saturday bushfires 
as a ‘near-miss’, and it became an impetus for discussion and preparation:  ‘everybody 
after Black Saturday sat up and went ‘whoa’ we really ought to get our act together, it 
frightened everyone out of their wits’. ‘So there was this huge meeting that everyone 
came, and then we set up the fire tree, and we became aware of what we should and 
shouldn’t do. So it really started from the Black Saturday bushfires’  [J2]. Hindsight 
showed them that ‘it was more by good luck than good management’ that they 
escaped the same fate as their near-by neighbouring communities of Kinglake and 
Marysville ‘and it was only afterwards, we realised how close it came to the Dandenongs 
burning as well’ [C]. For some it was an opportunity to re-evaluate what was important 
to them: ‘cause after Black Saturday I walked around the house and said ‘OK, what can I 
bear to lose’, and really there really wasn’t much’ [K1]. 
 
Knowledge of how their house and surrounding environment survived past fires played 
a big part how the participants viewed their risk from a future event; ‘We have many 
European trees, and we have a stone house which is really thick – built in the 1930’s and 
it...it’s been here since the 1930’s and the garage is hugely cool and the walls are really 
thick’ [A]. The participants were knowledgeable about weather patterns, vegetation, 
growth, regeneration and had a good understanding of how fire may behave in their 
area. The amount of rain, humidity – ‘it’s a wetter forest than other parts of the 
mountain’ [C] - proximity to the sea and geographical location featured in many 
discussions. ‘Up here we get a lot of’ or ‘in these parts the wind always comes from’ and 
‘fires don’t burn in that direction’ were common preludes to describing why they 
weren’t going to be at risk from a bushfire: ‘So the fire wouldn’t approach from this side, 
it would approach from the north, and we would see it coming from a long long away 
‘cause we’ve got big open undulating hills and farmland out to our east and forest to our 
west’ [J2]. Although it did not preclude the participants listening to warnings, 
overwhelmingly they used their own knowledge and experience as their ‘first port of 
call’. The ‘disconnect’ between the status of their immediate surroundings and what the 
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authorities said the conditions were, meant that they prioritised personal knowledge 
over official warnings: ‘Look, the warnings are not particularly useful I have to say, just 
because the micro-climate up here is so different’ [C]. 
 
All the participants were active members of local CFA or TFS Fireguard groups and as 
such had attended regular meetings, knew a lot about ways to protect themselves and 
had invested in technologies to protect themselves. This preparation and perception of 
preparedness (and for many participants it was extensive) seemed to influence their 
assessment of risk: ‘so we’ve put in a 27 thousand litre tank – we’re like a fire station. 
We’ve got pumps, we’ve got water coming up to the house, we’ve got taps from the tank 
in case the water system goes, we’ve got our kits, which are all stocked with what we’re 
supposed to have – you know, water, torches radios, clothing, food etc etc etc’ [A]. Some 
participants owned larger properties that incorporated natural or man-made dams: 
‘…we’ve got an electric pump on our dam and most of our reticulation is underground. As 
one of the first things we’ll lose in a major bushfire is power we’ve put a 2 kilowatt 
generator which will run that dam pump’ [A]. Some participants ‘helped’ their 
neighbours prepare also: ‘But behind the house here were blackberries everywhere and I 
just got in there and cleaned them all up, threw a bit of petrol in there in winter and got 
rid of them all’ [J3]. Controlling their immediate environment in these ways seemed to 
give the participants a sense that their risk had been reduced. These preparations and 
observations show that these participants had perhaps ‘habituated’ the threat of 
bushfire; by making ‘sense of a threat’ they turned it into a more normal occurrence, 
one that they could control and not be afraid of.  
(ii) Behaviour 
The interview discussions showed that several different behaviours were relevant to 
the participant’s decision to continue to live in a bushfire-prone environment: what they 
did (or saw others doing) during their most recent bushfire event, their general 
preparation, what their overall bushfire plan was and what they did when Catastrophic 
or ‘Code Red’ days were predicted.  
 
Research has shown that in the event of a disaster there is a difference between what 
people say they will do, and what they actually do. The participants understood this 
also: ‘..and a lot of people are saying ‘yes they’re going to leave, they won’t be here’, 
there’s quite a bit of difference between saying ‘yes I will be leaving’ and actually doing so’ 
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[R]. On Black Saturday, despite most of the participants having good preparedness 
information, acknowledging how ominous and ‘different’ the day seemed and being 
interested and engaged in the issues of bushfires, none of them evaluated the risk from 
the bushfires to be great enough to leave their properties: ‘We did everything wrong on 
Black Saturday’. ‘If I made a mistake on Black Saturday, (it was) we decided to stay. You 
could see it on the scanner that everything was getting out of control and 2 o’clock I 
realised that I could have made a mistake, because we would’ve been on our own’  [R]. In 
the same way, others acknowledged that they had completely underestimated the 
danger they were in: ‘On the actual Black Saturday day, we had a look around, “gosh, its’ 
going to be a bit hot, we’ll be alright, it’s going to be another normal day”. Well it wasn’t a 
normal day, we were up here at 2 o’clock in the afternoon and it just seemed like an alien 
world out there, “Cripes, we don’t want to be here”.. [C] 
 
Description of preparation behaviours were both ‘general’ (what participants did all 
year round), and specific (the week prior to a predicted event). Many participants had 
designed their houses with bushfires in mind: ‘And when we built the house we looked 
for a product that would be as fail-safe as possible and it’s a mesh...and it goes over the 
gutter so that nothing can, the wind or anything, can get in’ [K2]. Others had substantially 
added fire mitigation equipment to their properties: ‘But now we put a big tank in, we’ve 
got a fire hose, we’ve bought clothing and equipment like masks and boots and gloves and 
hats for everybody in the house, overalls and gloves and they’re all in a box ready to go..’ 
[K2]. Other preparation was more low key but seen as important nonetheless: ‘When it 
comes to summer I mow the grass pretty short because I figure you can’t stop a fire 
coming through the place but what you want is for it to pass through as quickly as 
possible’ [A]. Planting plants such as rhododendrons, well known for their fire retardant 
characteristics, was common as was a realisation that living in the bush comes with a 
certain level of anxiety: ‘because under stress situations your perceptions will 
change...rational thinking will not be there and you’re working from instincts – basically 
what you haven’t practiced you won’t be able to do’ [R]. A mother of a child who 
attended a community primary school appreciated that the school acknowledged how 
their pupils may be feeling as the fire season approached: ‘the local Catholic church this 
year they put out a flyer to say they were going to have a prayer for the hills, a prayer for 
the fire season (and) a prayer for everyone who lives in a fire area…’ [K1]. 
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Until very recently, the main bushfire preparation advice from the CFA or TFS on a 
‘Catastrophic’ day was to ‘Stay and Defend, or Leave Early’. It still remains the ir 
recommendation, but since Black Saturday the CFA and TFS have emphasised the 
‘Leave Early’ part of the message as ‘the best and safest option when a bushfire 
threatens is to leave ‘early’.164 However, for the participants the definition of ‘early’ was  
open to interpretation and led to a wide variety of planned behaviour:  ‘I think it means 
on the day..when you wake up; not hanging around til lunchtime, yeah, you gotta get up 
and go in the morning’ [K1]. ‘Well leaving early means that you have to leave way in 
advance..that’s 12 hours, the night before’ [R]. Some participants were reluctant to 
follow official advice: ‘because we kind of take the view that, you know, we can’t leave 
the mountain every day it’s over 30 degrees’ [AF]. Several participants talked about the 
inconvenience of leaving, especially when they had done so for previously warned Code 
Red/Catastrophic days: ‘so there were multiple times where the families were relocating, 
to Lillydale under the oval ..they went into this refugee camp and they were hanging out 
there in tents and they were saying this is the third time we‘ve been doing that and we’re 
really getting tired’ [R].  
 
Plans ranged from definitely leaving every time a Code Red/Catastrophic day was 
warned, to staying and defending their homes no matter what: ‘well, my husband won’t 
ever leave this place so we’ll stay and fight..Took too much getting to not do it, so we will 
definitely do that, yes’ [B2]. For some couples, their plans differed, ‘we haven’t made a 
clear decision’ [A], which could suggest that, in the event of a bushfire event, neither 
plan would be implemented. Some participants commented that because their plan was 
to leave, they didn’t really have one: ‘I don’t need to worry about a fire plan because my 
plan is to go, I’m just going to go’ [K1]. Other participants had different plans for 
different conditions: ‘what our fire plan is, on a normal fire danger day we’re relatively 
comfy to sit out here with our fancy fire sprinklers and things..but on a catastrophic day, 
we’d absolutely head off to Mum and Dad’s’ [C]. For others, there was an 
acknowledgement that their ‘plan A’ might not work: ‘well, we’ve decided to stay.. so we 
will probably, but if worse comes to the worst, we’ll head for the dam or channel’. We 
have a backup plan that says if we can’t get off the mountain we’ll stay in our house and 
prepare it to the best of our ability – we’ve got a list of things to do to do that’ ]K2].  
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 CFA guidelines – http://www.cfa.vic.gov.au/plan-prepare/stay-and-actively-defend/defending-your-
property-planning-template.pdf 
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(iii) Information Sources 
The participants understood that official bushfire warnings and information originated 
from three sources: the government (including the Royal Commission), national and 
local fire organisations and the media. There was a general acceptance that 
communicating warnings effectively was a challenging task, and many appreciated the 
process of the Royal Commission – ‘it’s given us the opportunity to empower ourselves 
and get as much information and knowledge as we could for the fire’  [AF]. Several valued 
the knowledge they gained from the published findings: 'and the fact too that even 
though some of them were very well prepared it didn’t matter, so that was a shock. I 
thought we’d survive anything and I thought I was all prepared… you know’  [B]. It was 
the policies and actions recommended by the government via the local councils that 
many participants were unhappy about. Particularly the ‘Leave Early’ actions to be 
undertaken on a Code Red/Catastrophic day: ‘we’ve got the warning, but what you’re 
telling us we’re supposed to do we’re not able to do’  [D]. ‘I think the problem is .. where is 
everyone supposed to go? If we have another hot summer where we have a week of 40 
plus, you know, are we all supposed to relocate?’ [A].  
 
Many of the participants had lived in their respective areas for a long time, knew it well 
and were openly sceptical about the practicalities of the recommendations: ‘the morons 
are saying we should now go and stand in the oval where radiant heat and all the rest of it, 
embers and so forth would be far less safe’ [C]. Additionally, many commented how 
dangerous it would be to follow official advice: ‘I don’t know how they base their plans 
but the idea of everybody on the road at once, with a road with a lot of dangerous 
material along the edge of it – to me it’s a disaster waiting to happen’ [D]. The logistics for 
some of packing up a family that often included young children, extended family and 
pets, combined with the cost of staying away from their home, seemed overwhelming: 
‘And it could be quite hard to find a place to stay with dog, cats, chicken, goats and the 
family, so evacuating is a very impractical option - I can’t see myself with the family sitting 
in a shopping centre’ [AF]. 
 
All of the participants lived in semi-rural environments: the Mt Dandenong cohort 
stated that they had chosen to live in that location because of its abundance of trees 
and larger block sizes, and the Middleton cohort typically lived on life-style blocks of 
several hectares. Council policies pertaining to fire prevention on their land were 
154 
 
discussed at length and some participants felt many of the policies had damaged the 
bush environment: ‘There’s been a whole lot of successive reactive policy decisions that 
are detrimental to where we live - 'chop down trees within a radius of your home’ which 
now makes them look like suburbia.. It just doesn’t make any sense, it’s reactive..’ [AF]. 
Participants were also suspicious that council policies were being driven by the ‘green 
agenda’ ‘There’s obviously a lot of conservationists in the council. Because they value 
conservation more than their lives I suppose’ [AV]. 
 
Print media came in for criticism for the way it represented bushfire issues and reported 
bushfire stories, mainly because of the language it commonly used. Participants 
described the reporting in terms of ‘hype’, ‘frenzy’ and ‘hysteria’ and some believed 
that the ‘media reports on bushfires is always in a disaster mode anyway’  [AV]. There was 
a general consensus that ‘the media (as with most major events) try to sensationalise it, 
it’s how they sell papers, so there’s the old adage “you don’t believe anything that you 
read and anything that you hear and only half of what you see” [A]. Television coverage 
was on a par with views about newspapers with the radio regarded as having more 
credibility, especially the official emergency broadcaster (ABC).165 In crisis scenarios it 
was felt that the information supplied by the radio stations was not current or updated 
quickly enough to be useful: ‘Many people in our fireguard group have, I believe, police 
scanners or emergency service scanners because we have been told that the media’s at 
least 20 minutes behind’ [J1]. Some of the criticism of the media was because of the way 
bushfire-prone areas had been recently portrayed by the media: ‘It’s been quite 
frustrating, because all of a sudden we’re living in a place deemed to be the second most, 
worst place in the whole of the world, well I mean you look at California, you look at 
Greece, and you think,’ how can we be the second most dangerous place to those? [AV]. 
(iv) Warnings  
A third of the questions put to the participants related to warnings, and their responses 
included how they were warned (and how they would like to be warned) and the 
technologies associated with those warnings. They also talked about different types of 
warnings and debated their effectiveness and the reasons for that. 
 
Once again, the environment gave the participants many cues as to how much danger 
they were in from a potential bushfire: ‘The whole day, the minute you got up…the day 
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was hot, like today but if you could imagine 50 times drier in the atmosphere and a 
roaring, roaring crazy loud wind, hideous day – you knew immediately you got up…there 
was just this foreboding – awful’ [J2]. Other aspects of the environment were noticed 
also: ‘well, Kookaburras in the afternoon usually means rain in a day or two, and then you 
look at the moon and if it’s got a ring around it, it’s rain in 4 days.. And they say that the 
animals will know before we do and on a really bad bushfire day you’ll wake up in the 
morning and there’ll be no sound, everything’s quiet and waiting’ [J2]. As well as taking 
notice of their surroundings, the participants were well aware of (and much reassured 
by) living in a community where ‘we now know our neighbours.. and we all look out for 
each other’ [AF], ‘I guess the bush telegraph’s pretty good down here’ [A]. Friends and 
family were often cited as the first place participants went for information about 
bushfires as well as the CFA or TFS ‘fire tree’ phone group. Warnings that were 
communicated via people and authorities that the participants knew were viewed as 
being more accurate; having more credibility and were privileged over more generic 
advice: ‘localisation would make the real difference. I would’ve thought some sort of 
general system of warnings as they have now combined with a local spin on those, where 
the local brigade commanders can say: “for our area there’s no risk of grass fires 
today…or alternatively overall for the state it’s pretty quiet, but for us it’s more 
significant” [C]. 
 
There were many official ways of being warned and the participants were well informed 
about all of them; which is maybe not unexpected given that they were active members 
of their local CFA or TFS. Participants distinguished between the different media 
sources, and had a good awareness of the latest technologies: ‘I’m expecting text 
messages, and I also get emails from the CFA as well’ [K2]. The CFA website was used by 
many on days when there was a fire alert, as a way of keeping up with developments: 
‘we rely a lot on the CFA website for our information, so um, during the fire season, if 
there’s fires around us and stuff we’ll usually check out the CFA’  [C]. However, during 
periods when timely information was critical, the CFA was not generally well regarded: 
‘..the CFA website was useless, in that it just wasn’t updated in real-time, which, you know, 
it’s about 5 times removed from what’s actually happening’  [AF]. The weather bureau 
was seen as a very credible source of information – ‘honestly the weather bureau’s going 
to give us better information than the CFA’ [C] – mainly because it was updated 
frequently. Television and radio for this reason, and because of its association with 
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official information sources, was seen as less reliable: ‘the ABC has a partnership with the 
emergency services, and was not going to broadcast anything that wasn’t clarified or 
verified with the CFA’ [J2].  
 
Roadside billboards were another way that the participants were warned about 
bushfire dangers, and a few participants thought they were useful: ‘I’ve learnt to look 
out for the CFA signs that are up, you know they’ll start coming up soon and I’m starting 
now to wonder ‘oh, when are they going to open fire season’  [K1]. However, a common 
criticism was that they weren’t kept up to date which meant they lost their 
effectiveness: ‘so it stays on the large register, and that doesn’t get changed so people say 
‘oh its always out of date’. And as soon as you have that, it becomes useless, because it 
takes only a couple of events and people say’ well it can’t be right today’ [R]. The 
billboards were regarded by participants as more relevant for visitors than for locals: ‘I 
think they’re more for the tourists, perhaps a little bit more than the residents. There used 
to be one where I went to school on the way, but I wouldn’t ever use that board for my 
own information’ [J1]. The road-side billboards served as a reminder, a ‘heads-up’, rather 
than a definitive harbinger of immediate danger. Like the warnings from CFA, the fact 
that they were not kept current with the latest fire condition, for some participants, 
negated any usefulness: ‘they’ve got a low to moderate today, well it’s higher than low to 
moderate’ and then they leave it about 2 weeks - it hasn’t even changed and we’ve had 
really hot days - so what’s going on?’ [J2]. 
 
CFA and TFS have three levels of bushfire warnings: advice, watch and act, emergency, 
additionally, the main CFA or TFS ‘alert’ refers to the phone warning system and also to 
the siren. The participants understanding of warnings, alerts and the fire danger ratings 
varied widely. They were asked if they knew the difference between an ‘alert’ and a 
‘warning’ and few did: ‘My perception is that people don’t know what to do with it, it’s 
like - yes we are alert but what does it mean?’ [R]. The discussion about warnings that 
elicited many comments was the addition (since the Black Saturday bushfires) of a 
‘Catastrophic’ or ‘Code Red’ fire danger category 166 with many people questioning the 
need for a further category.167 ‘I also think it’s hard for the average person to make a 
distinction between so many categories..’ [J1]. Additionally, there was confusion as to 
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 ‘Code Red’ is officially used in Victoria and ‘Catastrophic’ is officially used in Tasmania. However, 
‘Catastrophic’ is most widely understood by both cohorts to be the highest fire danger rating. 
167
 The existing fire danger categories were: low, high, very high, severe and extreme.  
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what the categories really meant: ‘we were trying to work out whether extreme and 
catastrophic denoted a total fire ban, but I don’t think they do? Yeah, code red is 
catastrophic isn’t it?’ [J2]. ‘What weather conditions denote an extreme fire danger...let 
me think, can you have extreme weather conditions without a total fire ban?’ [J3]. 
Catastrophic was described as ‘a helluva word’ and a much too emotive word to use as a 
warning: ‘code red will get people alert and doing things whereas catastrophic could 
actually make people go into panic mode, which I think will be far worse’  [AV].  
 
Many participants felt that Black Saturday was an unprecedented event, moreover, 
even though the issuing of a ‘Catastrophic’ warning is done when the FFDI 168 deems it 
necessary, the use of Catastrophic implied that every predicted bushfire event would be 
the same as Black Saturday – ‘catastrophic is to me really what happened, and personally 
I don’t think we’re going to have another one of those for quite a few years’ [A]. Others 
commented that the interpretation of the word ‘Catastrophic’ was problematic 
‘because what’s catastrophic for me isn’t necessarily for you, or vice-versa’ [AF]. These 
comments notwithstanding, some participants said a ‘Catastrophic’ warning would 
encourage them to take action which implies it was meaningful to them: ‘I probably wait 
until they said it was going to be a code red so if I thought it was going to be a day of 
extreme danger I would certainly consider leaving’ [J2].  
 
Many of the participants said that they thought a community siren would be a 
preferable way to be warned about an impending bushfire. The siren that sounds to call 
fire volunteers to an emergency served as an ‘alert’ for most; for one participant this 
meant she put her scanner on and listened to the CFA radio frequency and for another 
it was a signal to watch for the fire trucks on the road. ‘For ourselves, we think it’s a jolly 
good idea. If there’s a clear fire danger in the Dandenongs, you sound the alarm, it makes 
common sense...’ [C]. One of the arguments against using sirens was that there was no 
distinction between a siren that called volunteers out for anything emergency-related, 
and one that was specifically warning about fires ‘so it would take a bit of education to 
make people understand that’ [AF], ‘perhaps a ‘whoop, whoop whoop would be better’.. 
[AV]. However, people who talked about sirens in this way still thought they could be 
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 The McArthur Forest Fire Danger Index (FFDI) which measures the degree of danger of fire in Australian 
forests. It is a combination of dryness (based on rainfall and evaporation), meteorological variables for 
wind speed, temperature and humidity. 
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useful: ‘it does give you a bit of clue as to whether you need to worry or not’  [J1] and ‘if it  
saved even one life’ [A] then it would be valuable.  
 
Finally, as disaster research has shown, people respond best to warnings if they contain 
self-efficacy advice, and suggestions from the participants as to what they would prefer 
in a warning, confirmed this: ‘a little check list would be better for people – get your plan 
ready, turn your gas off, grab the dogs, call the..’ [J1]. ‘I don’t want to get text messages 
on the hour but I don’t mind that the signs saying ‘start cleaning up now, start cleaning 
gutters, start getting ready’ and I like…it’s comforting to see people out in their gardens 
doing a bit as well’ [K1]. Participants were clear that they wanted timely, specific and 
practical information: 'But for me it’s as much about getting as much information as you 
possibly can about the fire risk and about where geographically, fires come from, what 
winds, what weather conditions..' [J2], 'it was quite useful knowing how fast it does 
actually go up steep hills and that sort of thing'  [J1]. 
(v) Warning Fatigue  
‘Every year it’s the worst fire season ever; if its dry, it’s because 
everything’s dry and it’s going to burn. If it’s wet, it’s because it’s good 
growing weather, with lots of fuel being manufactured’  [C]. 
 
Black Saturday resulted in changes to policy and reviews of processes by the CFA, TFS 
and other emergency authorities; the bushfire fire-rating system was changed to 
include a new category of danger ‘Code Red/Catastrophic’. This is determined by a 
complex formula that calculates the moisture, humidity, temperature, and wind 
direction on any given day where there may be a threat from bushfire. Subsequently 
Catastrophic/Code Red days were forecast, and when fires did not eventuate as 
predicted, for some participants the believability of the warnings began to be 
undermined. One participant described such a day: “and [they] said that this is going to 
be as bad if not worse than Black Saturday, and it was obvious to even the most amateur 
observer – they looked at the weather forecast – and the forecast was for a day that was 
at least 15 degrees cooler’ [C]. 
 
The consequences of the over-warnings and false alarms were talked about by most of 
the participants who used terms such as ‘hysteria’, ‘cry-wolf’, ‘false alarm’, ‘yeah 
whatever’ and ‘why the hell would we do that again?’ [D]. Many participants had heeded 
the first one or two warnings and for some this was at great inconvenience: ‘But from 
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my point of view there’s no point evacuating the family and losing a day of work etcetera, 
unless there’s a real risk’ [A]. ‘Yeah, on the Tuesday I was a little bit narky, because we 
went through so much effort, and about 11 or 12 o’clock midday it started raining…and I 
thought ‘oh gee, all this work’ .. but as it was it was a bit of a fizzer’ [R]. The sensationalist 
nature of some media warnings combined with a perception that warning in such 
extreme terms engenders panic, led to several participants expressing disdain: ‘We 
literally had neighbours tearing off the mountain with kids, dogs and you name it, only to 
cause grid-lock. If a fire had occurred, they would’ve all perished.. it’s just a convoy of the 
Beverley Hillbillies with Granny on top’ [AF].  
 
There were three main reasons that the participants felt they were being over-warned: 
firstly the type of language used in the warnings: ‘It got to the point we were sick of 
people on the radio saying ‘it’s going to be worse than Ash Wednesday, ‘cause you just 
kept thinking ‘oh, don’t be a drama Queen’ – you know, it’s just too much drama’ [J2]. 
‘They signal a Code Red and everyone goes [intake of breath] “ooh, panic, leave” and then 
nothing happens and the next…couple of days later “Code Red” and off you go again and 
I’m just worried that it gets diluted, you know, the urgency of it’ [K1]. The second way the 
participants felt over-warned was the amount of warnings they received: I think you can 
certainly overdo the warnings, if you yell ‘wolf’ every week they’re not going to believe you 
after the 4th week and the wolf arrives (or it doesn’t arrive) [laughs]’ [C]. The third main 
reason was the number of times the warnings turned out to be false: ‘no, it’s too 
disruptive ... you’re talking about 10 or 15 times, it’s more than public holidays in a 
year…You could potentially be talking 100 or 150 days over 10 years where, everybody says 
‘nothing ever happens’ [R].  
 
The phenomena of ‘switching off’ or ‘tuning the warnings out’ described by participants 
are supported by research that has shown that people cannot sustain a heightened 
level of anxiety and continue with their daily routines; they have to normalise the risk to 
some degree. ‘We just don’t plug into it, and I think that’s true for a lot of folks that I talk 
to up here, they go ‘oh god, we’re so sick of hearing about it, all the rubbish’, because a lot 
of it’s never based in fact, a lot of it’s hearsay, or, you know, hysteria’ [AF]. The scepticism 
of the warnings translated for some participants into questioning the fire authorities’ 
motivations: ‘After the 3rd or 4th false alarm, it’s like [laughs] ‘hang on’: this is coming 
from someone with legal liability check boxes, not someone trying to help’  [C]. 
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Discussion 
All the participants were active members of their local CFA or TFS, and were all involved 
in their community to varying degrees. They were very knowledgeable about fire risk 
and behaviour and had invested considerably in their properties and communities. 
However, despite fire authorities and the state premier warning extensively during the 
weeks prior to Black Saturday, none of the participants made the decision to leave their 
homes. The reasons for this were complex, and the risk assessments combined 
rationales of local knowledge, past experience, preparation and family and evacuation 
practicalities. Added to this was scepticism towards official warnings and the way the 
media had reported similar bushfires in the past. It is possible that the comprehensive 
fire prevention technologies that the participants had incorporated into their properties  
helped to reassure them that they were protected from the threat of bushfire better 
than most.  
 
At least half of the participants had a fire-plan that had them leaving early (as the CFA 
and TFS information recommends); there was a wide interpretation of this 
recommendation. The event of Black Saturday caused some participants to re-evaluate 
their decision to stay and for others, was a ‘wake-up’ call that clarified their decision-
making. Knowledge of how fire behaved in their particular area was broad and the 
participants talked at length about why they would be safe in the event of a bushfire. As 
the discussions showed, it was only when their personal evaluation of their 
surroundings aligned with what they were hearing on the radio or television, did they 
pay attention to the warnings. Warnings issued from central as opposed to local 
authorities were considered to have less credibility; compounding this were the 
observed lags in communication time and the discrepancies in information between the 
official fire authority (CFA, TFS) and the official emergency broadcaster (ABC). This led 
to a decline in credibility for the communication process and a belief by some 
participants that lives would have been saved if the CFA, TFS and ABC had better 
systems. The addition of the fire danger rating ‘Catastrophic’ was seen by the 
participants in equal measure as a good thing and unnecessary, with many feeling that 
it just added to the hype and panic of an already volatile situation. The understanding of 
the warning categories and rating varied between the participants, but were 
moderately understood. However, the methods of communicating them were less 
appreciated: road-side billboards for example were seen as irrelevant, unreliable and 
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mostly for the benefit of tourists. The ways of warning, or the ways people could get 
information once warned were several, with many relying on the internet and real-time 
sites such as the Bureau of Meteorology and the official CFA webpage. In times of high 
bushfire risk, the participants’ friends and neighbours were the first ‘port of call’ for fire 
information. 
 
The largest discussion thread was that of warning fatigue, and given that this was 
deliberately not mentioned nor used as a prompt by the interviewer, this was a major 
finding of this analysis. Participants called this phenomenon ‘cry wolf’ and were aware 
of its anecdotal effects on others. They suggested people became complacent and 
apathetic about bushfire risk when the predicted events did not happen. The increase in 
catastrophic days as a result of a systemised formula for calculating extreme fire danger 
days, led to more of these days being warned about; moreover, most of these days 
were not as dire as predicted. The participants attributed the media with promoting 
panic and fear which they argued led to warning fatigue. As the primary purpose of this 
research is to understand what hinders or enhances the uptake of warning messages, 
the strength of the participants’ opinions and feelings about warning fatigue is 
important. Questions which arise out of this analysis are: 1) to what extent does 
warning fatigue affect attention to warnings; 2) is it an effect which can be measured 
and 3) if so, what things contribute to it?  
 
When the preceding literature chapters are reflected upon in the light of this study’s 
findings, some ways of theorising and conceptualising risk appear to have more value 
than others. For example, the participants talked at length about how they felt about 
being threatened with bushfire year after year and what they did about the perceived 
risk to make themselves feel better about it. Therefore, the emotional reactions to 
threat and the coping strategies outlined in chapter four will be useful to explore in 
more detail. Similarly, opinions about the trust and credibility of warnings and officials 
combined with their previous bushfire experience determined how the participants 
assessed their risk and how they responded to it. The cognitive maladaptations of 
denial and avoidance do not seem to have been evident in the participants responses, 
and as all the participants in this study had direct experience with bushfires (and as a 
whole were conservative in their assessments of risk), unrealistic optimism would not 
be a useful concept to explore in the next study. The analysis of this study shows that, 
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in the context of living in a bushfire-prone area, risk decisions for the participants were 
not simply about whether or not they thought they were at risk from a bushfire. Rather, 
their responses to warnings and the decisions about what to do were complex. 
 
The following chapter builds upon the findings of Study (I) by interviewing people who 
live in bushfire-prone environments but who are not actively involved in community 
bushfire mitigation. It narrows the focus of this research by exploring some of the more 
relevant theorisations of risk from Chapters 3, 4 and 5 and continues with the 
exploration of what role warning fatigue may play in warning response and an everyday 
understanding of bushfire risk. In particular, the next chapter will focus on the part that 
repeated warnings play in this response.   
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8. STUDY II: RESPONSES, RATIONALES AND REASSURANCES 
Introduction and Aims 
A second interview study was conducted in order to extend the understanding of how 
people living in bushfire-prone areas of Australia interpreted their bushfire risk. More 
specifically, the focus was on how people who were not affiliated with a formal bushfire 
mitigation program169 made decisions in anticipation of future bushfire threats. The first 
interview study (1) involved participants who attended community meetings by their 
local CFA and TFS and as such, could be assumed to be more knowledgeable about 
issues of bushfire safety. They were also possibly more engaged in the processes of 
protecting themselves and their families, therefore it was thus important to have the 
views of people who were not formally associated with CFA  or TFS. The aim of the 
second study was three-fold: (i) to interview people who were not actively involved in 
any community fire mitigation activities; (ii) to explore in more detail those themes 
which had arisen from the analysis of the first interviews; and (iii) to understand further 
what topics, themes or aspects may constitute the phenomenon of warning fatigue. 
This chapter does several things: firstly it describes how the participants talked about 
issues of living with bushfire risk. Secondly, through exploring psychosocial aspects as 
detailed Chapter 4, it confirms that many of the participants used typical coping 
strategies to manage stress resulting from anticipating a bushfire threat. And thirdly, it 
explored whether, similar to the first group of participants, warning fatigue or cry wolf 
was talked about in the context of warnings and risk assessment.  
 
One of the most notable findings from the first interview study was that warning 
fatigue was considered by most participants to be an important issue when 
commenting on why people did not pay attention to bushfire warnings. Important 
questions arising out of the first analysis were: 
1. To what extent does warning fatigue affect attention to warnings? 
2. Is it an effect which can be measured? And if so 
3. What factors contribute to it? 
 
Thus, an important aspect of the second interview study was to examine in more detail 
the phenomenon of warning fatigue and to explore those aspects which participants 
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 CFA – the Victorian Country Fire Authority and the TFS – the Tasmanian Fire Service. 
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reported to be an influence on their risk perception. Question (2) is addressed in the 
following chapter;170 Questions (1) and (3) are addressed in this chapter. 
Participants 
The inclusion criteria for participants (n=20) were (a) living in a bushfire-prone location 
and (b) not actively participating in community bushfire mitigation activities. The 
participants comprised 11 men and 9 women aged between 23 and 57 years of age. 
Nineteen were partnered and 14 had at least one dependent child living with them. All 
the participants but one lived in and around the villages of Ferny Creek, Upway, Olinda, 
Sassafrass and Kalorama on Mount Dandenong, in the Dandenong Ranges, 35 kms 
north-east of central Melbourne, Victoria. All but two of them had lived there during the 
2009 Black Saturday bushfires. The remaining participant lived 160kms south-west of 
Melbourne on the Great Ocean Road. 171 In May 2011 (six months after the first 
interviews), the participants were recruited for the second study and in June 2011 the 
interviews were conducted.  
 
Recruitment of the participants took place over two weekends in May, in the small 
village of Mt Dandenong. Members of the public were approached as they made their 
ways to local shops and, after agreeing to hear a brief description of the research 
project, were asked two questions: 1) Did they live in a bushfire vulnerable area and 2) 
were they involved in any community bushfire mitigation/preventative activities. If they 
answered ‘Yes’ to Q1 and ‘No’ to Q2, they were asked if they would be prepared to have 
a telephone interview taking about 20 minutes, at a time of their choosing before the 
end of May 2011. If they agreed, they were told some information about the study, 
asked to sign a consent form, 172 given a more detailed information sheet173 and a smal l 
gift174 to take away. People who were approached but refused to participate gave time 
constraints or not being available at the time of the interview as the most common 
reasons for not agreeing to take part.  
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 Chapter 9. 
171
 This participant was included in the study because they were recruited in exactly the same way and the 
same location as the others participants - they met the criteria of living in a bushfire-prone area and not 
being involved in any community bushfire mitigation activities. Moreover, their comments (when compared 
with the others) were not distinct in any way. Finally, no attempt was made in this analysis to make any 
observations about the particular area the participants lived in, other than it was bushfire-prone.  
172
 Appendix 2.2 
173
 Appendix 2.3 
174
 The gifts comprised souvenir-type items from New Zealand. 
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Interview Format 
The interview guide differed somewhat from that used in the first study in that the 
questions were more focused around warnings, perception of risk and perception of 
the effectiveness of warnings. There was a more concerted effort to cover all the topics 
on the interview schedule in depth; this did not appear to constrain the informal feeling 
of the discussions and the interviews progressed very naturally. Once again, as in the 
first interviews, discussion of warning fatigue as a topic, phrase or idea was not initiated 
by the interviewer. The interview protocol comprised nineteen questions which were 
focused on the topics of warnings and risk perception.175 Of particular interest was how 
the February 2009 event of Black Saturday had influenced participants’ perception of 
bushfire risk. Over half of the questions were specifically about warnings, as opposed to 
general bushfire information (in contrast to the interviews of Study (I)). The average 
time for the interviews was 30 minutes with a range of 18 to 42 minutes. 
Coding  
The level of transcription was similar to that of study (1) and was at a ‘moderate’ level 
(Bird, 2005), but the coding differed in some respects. Initially transcripts were coded to 
get a sense of whole issues important to the participants, so global themes (Braun and 
Clarke 2006) were coded for (assessment of risk, opinions of authorities for example). 
The coding then built upon these global themes, but focused on how the participants 
were ‘making sense’ of these ideas, (Gamson et al.  1992; Benford 1997; Weick 1999; 
Smith and Osborne 2007; Manuti et al. 2012), which necessitated a more detailed coding 
schema. As noted above, interviews were more structured than for study (1), and the 
discussions more nuanced. Rather than whole sentences or ideas being captured for 
analysis, words within the sentences were coded. For example, words which the 
participants used to describe their experience of Black Saturday gave not only an 
‘objective’ description of what the event was like but also a ‘subjective’ sense of what 
the event meant to the participants. However, it is also relevant to acknowledge that 
through the act of transcribing and analysis, the author is interpreting, contextualising 
and attributing meaning to their voices, ultimately writing the research up and 
presenting it as an original product.  
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Analysis 
Similar to the first interview study, the analysis was thematic, and looked for patterns 
within the data (Braun and Clarke 2006). However, it was also iterative and adaptable, 
where codes were able to be built upon, as the transcripts were examined for meaning. 
When the transcripts had been coded inter-relations between the codes and categories 
were taken note of, and a ‘new picture’ of what the participants were saying was 
constructed. Therefore, from small codes and then larger categories, patterns and 
themes were established which created an overall picture or ‘sense making’ of the 
participants’ ideas, opinions, feelings, perceptions and experiences. What became 
evident during this more detailed analysis was that most participants had strong 
feelings about why they (or others) made the decisions they had about living with 
bushfire risk. These feelings demonstrated a strong association with many of the coping 
strategies outlined in chapter 4 and are discussed in section 2 – ‘Rationalisations’. The 
excerpts176 used in this chapter are not an exhaustive listing of every relevant response, 
rather they are an illustrative representation of comments overall, and were chosen 
because they encapsulate well the sentiments of most.  
Findings 
Life is in many ways a series of conversations [but] studying people’s talk is 
not an end in itself, but a means for studying other aspects of their lives 
(Cameron 2001:145) 
 
From this analysis, three ways of talking about bushfire were evident: (i) participants 
responded to the questions and highlighted important issues for them; (ii) they 
rationalised their discussions and decisions and (iii) they reassured themselves about 
their decisions in multiple ways. The three ways of talking have been characterised as 
(1) responses, (2) rationales and (3) reassurances. Within these main categories, there 
were several narratives: (i) media; (ii) authorities; (iii) warnings; (iv) appraisal schemas; 
(v) coping strategies; (vi) biases; (vii) stress responses; (viii) environment; (ix) social 
capital; (x) previous experience; (xi) personal risk assessment; (xii) plan; and (xiii) 
technology. The final substantive narrative was (4) warning fatigue.  
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 The source used for the excerpts is denoted by a letter, or by a letter and a number: for example [A2]. 
This represents the code assigned to the transcripts.  
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(1) Responses 
There were some similarities of response between the participants in study (II) and 
study (I) which could be expected as some of the questions were similar. Most notably 
these were the large number of responses around (i) media, (ii) the role of authorities 
and (iii) bushfire warnings. This section addresses these three issues and shows that, 
although there were some positive evaluations of the ways that media and fire 
authorities communicated the realities of bushfire risk, these comments were in the 
minority.  
(i) Media 
The media were generally not viewed favourably, nonetheless, occasionally they were 
seen as ‘getting it right’: ‘I don’t think they really over sensationalise it, I think it’s quite 
informative reporting …quite factual and they don’t really over-blow the reporting in any 
particular way’ [M1] . Others were just grateful to be told about an impending risk: ‘ I’d 
welcome any news like that. Just tell me if you’ve got suspicion on a day that’s going to 
strong winds and there might be fire around…I might avoid that camping trip you know’ 
[T1]. ‘It’s better to be warned about and nothing happens than to be warned about or not 
warned about’ [V]. Media was loosely defined by the participants and meant for most, 
both the newspapers and the television: ‘I get the impression they’re just sitting there 
waiting.. like ambulance chasers of the legal professions...I wouldn’t put one bit of faith in 
the..’ [N]. ‘Everyone’s’ putting their spin on it, um, and again, also, sometimes it becomes 
so harrowing you tune out...because people can’t cope with all these stories of misery’ 
[T2]. The media came in for a substantial amount of criticism. This was partly because of 
the post Black Saturday coverage: ‘the media continued that on for months, and months, 
where every time you turned on the TV they’d be talking about any puff of smoke they 
saw, and it was gratuitous…they wrung it for all it was worth’ [RC]. ‘But Black Saturday 
caught the media’s attention and they trotted it out for months…yeah it was like 
watching the Twin Towers thing’ [A1].  
 
The local media was perceived as more accurately portraying the real situation, and had 
been used by most of the participants prior to or during a bushfire event: ‘I listen to the 
local radio if there’s a fire, they’re very good at reporting ...I also check the CFA website, 
and watch their reports of where fires are and what they’re doing - I have that on all day 
and keep checking yeah, and if anything looks like it’s moving or it’s started here, then 
we’ll just go’ [A1]. The newspapers in particular came in for a lot of criticism as ‘the over 
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reporting of it gives you a sense that things are far worse than the actuality is’  [D1]. The 
general view of print media was that ‘the media is there to sell stuff and..try and get 
viewers by sensationalising things..(it’s neither) helpful or factual’ [D2]. Some participants 
thought the media were predictable in the way they reported bushfire events. As 
discussed in Chapter Three there often seemed to be a formulaic way to depict bushfire 
disasters, and as this participant observed, it always ended the same way: ‘You know, 
the newspaper is always insisting on juicy stories where the most dramatic always wins’ 
[V]. What this means is that if the warnings came via the media, often the credibility of 
warnings and the urgency of the recommended actions were paid less attention 
because of the participants’ reluctance to believe the source of the message. 
Participants expressed their frustration at the way the media reported bushfire issues: 
‘it’s a bit hyped up and then it turns out to be overload’ [T3]. ‘The media beat it up, it went 
on for months and nothing happened, as usual’ [A1].  
(ii) Authorities  
There was a general acknowledgment that the authorities have a difficult job to make 
the warnings relevant and timely, and the experience of Black Saturday loomed large in 
their evaluations: ‘Well, I think about the kind of build up to that Black Saturday and we 
were constantly warned that it was going to be a bad day so we were warned well in 
advance. The Victoria government was very proactive about warning us about it’  [M2]. 
‘You’re never going to get it right, in that, if you don’t warn and it  flares up, you’re going 
to be accused of not warning people’ [C]. The official response on Black Saturday was 
deemed inadequate and considerably lacking in many areas; for this reason and to 
examine all aspects of the government’s bushfire strategy a review was conducted; it 
was called the Victorian Bushfires Royal Commission. 177 Some saw the Commission as 
effective because ‘the way they gave space to people affected, families, and people were 
able to have their stories and involve people ... was a credit to them’ [I]. However the 
participant’s view of the official response was mostly poor: ‘John Brumby was buying a 
water pump to protect his property on the day at least one government minister should've 
been helping to run something, rather than all the ministers turning to ground and putting 
the sprinklers on their own roofs’ [R1]. ‘And the leader of that (Christine Nixon) off having 
dinner with her friends and other people were scratching their heads saying ‘what’s going 
on’ [RC]. A common view was that official involvement in addressing bushfire issues is 
‘just politics’ [L] and that the government ‘holds everything up, they don’t make anything 
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any better, they just slow everything down, you know, they’re just not efficient, they just 
don’t function very well, all they seem to do is waste the money’ [T3].  
 
A particularly strong sentiment was that the fire officials (and bushfire warnings) did 
not take into account the local conditions; ‘I don’t think they approach what it’s actually 
like to live a life up here realistically...it’s like they don’t look out the window’ [A1] which 
eroded community confidence in the warnings. The tension illustrated by these 
comments perhaps shows where the ‘knowledge’ about bushfire is perceived to lie; the 
fire and emergency officials have information about the bushfire risks and communicate 
that risk in prescribed ways. However, often this does not take into account that there 
are individual and social knowledges used to evaluate risks that are equally valid. 
 
One of the problems that arose was the perceived confused oversight of the bushfire 
risk. As a result the local authorities were overwhelmingly regarded as the best ones to 
listen to: ‘for me the local CFA is most knowledgeable, right?...much more meaningful 
(way to be warned) than someone sitting in a remote centre control room somewhere’ [I]. 
The reasons for this trust were very clear: ‘your local council, your local papers, your local 
everything, because they know, they know the local area, they know what’s happening’ 
[RC]. This trust translated to participants saying they would not only pay more attention 
to what was being said to them about the bushfire risk from their local media: ‘um, I 
don’t feel like I get any warnings for my area. I think Melbourne in general gets the kind of 
weather and high fire danger warning on the weather reports, but the only people who 
talk directly to us are our local radio station and so that’s who I listen to’ [A1].  
(iii) Warnings 
Bushfire warnings are communicated in several ways and the participants were aware 
of many of them. However, for differing reasons the warnings were regarded as having 
limited value: ‘any warnings that come through text or sms-ing .. that’s way too late’ [A1]. 
Some of the participants were not sure of the technology behind the messaging: ‘my 
fear there was have they sent this message because of my house address or have they 
picked up I’m within the area, so it was a bit disconcerting’ [C]. Likewise: ‘yeah, I think the 
billboards are pretty confusing, well because all they’ve done is recalibrated those boards 
so in terms of how your eye works, you're still looking at the needle at a similar stage, 
they’ve just put in an extra category’ [A2]. Similarly, sirens, although preferred by most 
participants, seemed to add to the confusion: ‘The other thing is, you hear the little CFA 
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alarms going off during the summer on days that there are fires, I don’t know what they 
are, if they’re a call for arms to go to the local station, it might only be for a car crash or 
something’ [D1]. The solution offered by several participants was ‘pure, simple, if there 
was a secondary tone of some description that would indicate to residents that OK, the 
first sirens were for the firey’s, but then one distinctively different that would mean 
activate your procedure plans...a tone that would be so distinctive it couldn’t be confused 
with the call out siren’ [N]. Participants in bushfire-prone areas in Australia are exposed 
to many different types of warnings (as discussed in Chapter 5) and perhaps the 
comments expressed indicate that a simplified warning system may help the public 
understand them better and pay attention to them in a timely way.  
 
One aspect of the warning system that came in for particular attention was the revised 
fire danger rating category ‘Code Red’ (‘Catastrophic’). 178 After the 2009 Black Saturday 
bushfires, this extra category was added not only to the CFA road-side billboards (Code 
Red) but also as a description of the worst category of fire danger. As a result of 
recommendations from the Royal Commission the following was announced by the 
Victorian Premier:179 
There is a new fire danger rating for an index of above 100 that will be 
known as Catastrophic (Code Red). Under these types of weather 
conditions fires will be unpredictable, uncontrollable and fast moving. The 
fires on February 7 are an example of the types of fires that may be 
experienced under a ‘Catastrophic’ rating. Advice to communities under 
these conditions will be that leaving is the safest option for survival.   
 
The efficacy of this modification to a warning system that already included Very High, 
Severe and Extreme was debated by the participants, with some (but not many) 
agreeing with the change: ‘well it certainly piques our attention and ‘extreme’ or ‘severe’ 
maybe doesn’t have that same ‘ring’ [T2], ‘and to me that means Black Saturday 
conditions’ [S1]. It was certainly meaningful enough that some used it as their decision 
point: ‘probably we wouldn’t leave until catastrophic..the night before if a catastrophic..if 
it was severe or extreme, we might leave on the day’  [T1]. The addition of an extra 
category was seen as a legal imperative rather than safety advice: ‘that terminology was 
just driven by the fact that that last event scared people so much they had to do 
something’ [S2] and ‘catastrophic’ should be something they use once every 50 years,’ but 
it’s not, they’re going to trot it out because it’s going to be their way of saving their bacon 
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 The fire danger rating of ‘Code Red’ is used in Victoria. All other states use the rating ‘Catastrophic’.   
179
 ‘New warning system explained’. Posted by Bushfire Preparedness Program Thursday, 10 September 
2009. https://www.cfaconnect.net.au/news/new-warning-system-explained.html 
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basically’ [D2]. Many other participants had strong feelings about the term and several 
thought that ‘ it caused people to panic’ [D2]. ‘One of things up here that people need to 
be really careful about is raising the anxiety to an unproductive level, and to me 
‘catastrophic’ does that, like it makes you feel that.. completely disabled’ [A2]. This last 
comment is a clear example of the anticipatory anxiety discussed in Chapter Four. 
Research suggested that the uncertainty generated by a prolonged lead-time event 
such as a bushfire increases this type of anxiety. 
 
As in the first interviews, the participants were asked about their preferred warning 
system and most agreed that the messaging and SMS message system worked 
reasonably well. In addition to a different sounding siren and, ‘in conjunction with last 
resort shelters (but they won’t spend money on that)’ [A1], ‘it would have to be plain 
language, that helps people understand, as opposed to just evoking potentially panic 
scenarios’ [A2]. It was clear that the participants had thought a lot about what warnings 
would be useful, prior to the discussion: ‘I think that a warning system is only meaningful 
when if it is given a context.. embedded into a larger understanding of how fire works 
[and] how it can destroy incredibly quickly. And obviously it’s the heat and the smoke 
which is as destructive as anything else’ [M2]. Like the participants in Study (I), the 
participants in the second study relied on hearing the sirens from the CFA stations and 
from the fire trucks to warn them of an impending bushfire. And both groups 
mentioned that they would like these ‘everyday’ emergency sirens to be differentiated 
from the sirens used in bushfire scenarios. 'Yeah that to me would seem like a logical 
thing to do because if you hear the call out signal, if there was a different signal that 
followed at least then you’d know if it was a going fire or not' [A2]. 
(2) Rationales 
South-eastern and south-western Australia is one of the most bushfire-prone countries 
in the world, an, apart from Queensland and the subtropical north, most of the country 
is at risk annually from potentially devastating bushfires. The Australian bush consists of 
predominantly eucalyptus trees whose leaves, in certain weather conditions, evaporate 
combustible oils; when ignited by natural or deliberate means, they burn ferociously. 
These facts about the Australian bush are well known by most Australians, which raises 
an important question: Why do people continue to continue to live ‘in the bush’? The 
most common answer is that it is a lifestyle choice; a more ‘natural’ way to live, a place 
where people feel more at home and removed from the fast-paced urban and peri-
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urban existence: ‘We do want to be in a bushed area, we don’t want to be in a cleared 
away, we love the bush and that’s part of the reason we want to be here’ [T2]. The 
participants in the second study seemed to be well aware of the risks of living ‘in the 
bush’, 180  yet they consciously chose to locate their homes in a bushfire-prone 
environment. The question then becomes: how do people living with heightened, 
consistent, and on-going risk, interpret this risk? The analysis of the participants’ 
discussions suggests that they do so by activating various coping and appraisal schemas 
and rationales. These rationalisations will be discussed using the literature that explains 
psychological reactions to stress and threat, as outlined in chapter 4.  
(iv) Appraisal Schemas 
Research (Lazarus 1966, Khone 2002) suggests that, when faced with an actual threat, 
people enact two appraisal schemas (although there is debate as  to which may come 
first): one appraisal evaluates the personal risk - ‘If there’s dew on the ground, there’s 
moisture in the air, if there’s moisture in the air you’re not going to have a belter of a fire’  
[D2], and the other considers the available coping options – ‘we’ve put a sprinkler 
system along the front of the deck and we’ve got the water tanks behind us, the header 
tanks for the whole area so we’ll always have pressure’ [D2]. The latter appraisal schema 
also apportions responsibility or blame: ‘my brother rang me and said ‘the mountain’s on 
fire, don’t let anyone go home ... which is what he heard on the radio. The media blew it 
out of proportion because what they predicted didn’t happen, you know, it wasn’t 
Armageddon, it wasn’t…’ [RC]. The evaluation of the ability to cope with the threat (and 
its probable outcome) is also part of this appraisal: ‘well I would take chainsaw with me 
cause trees fall and people get stuck on roads. I would head towards Monbulk, which is 
probably only 5 minutes from here. And there’s no fire risk in Monbulk cause as you know, 
up there they grow tulips and daffodils and it’s just cleared…they’ve a footy ground, the 
bowling green, it would be a pretty safe place’ [R].  
(v) Coping Strategies 
The imagining of a possible scenario and planning ways to combat it is described as 
preventative and proactive coping strategies (Schwarzer (1999a). Proactive coping 
results in lower levels of anxiety – ‘I was looking around and I couldn’t see anything, in 
terms of smoke or anything so..I wasn’t overly worried’ [C] and makes people feel better 
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 The participants were asked to quantify their perception of living in their area: sixty percent (n=12) 
regarded their risk as moderate to non-existent. The question asked about their general perception of risk, 
rather than their risk perception at the time of their interview.  
173 
 
whilst imagining the threat: ‘I don’t worry about it, or let it concern me, it’s just factor in 
the fact that it is there and some steps or some sort of planning as we mentioned before is 
necessary..’ [D1]. Acquiring and managing resources is a strategy that Steven Hobfoll 
(1989) argues people use to control or mitigate threats and can be both internal and 
external. The internal resources are self-beliefs: ‘cause I think I’m prepared, because I 
keep myself alert to the fact of looming conditions .. you know the ground’s dry, you know 
we’re in the deep end of summer, you know we haven’t seen rain for a month, it’s been 
over 35 degrees, big hot summer and all its waiting for is that big wind really ’ [T1]. The 
external resources can be physical and social: ‘I’d say we’re quite prepared, yeah so I 
mean we’ve got a proper pump for the water and hoses and stuff around the house that 
we can easily lay out and stuff to put in the drain pipes and things like that’ [A2]. Social 
resources are an example of social capital which is discussed in the next section. 181 
Knowing that family, neighbours and others knew about them and would look out for 
them in a bushfire threat scenario was a safety resource: 'You might get a few text 
messages from people that you know. Even my sister who lives in the city might ring up 
and ask if I’m OK and yeah…people kind of just keep in touch to ask where you are and 
what you’re doing. Like a friend, she picked up another friends’ kids from home that were 
stuck at home alone .. We all just kind of keep in touch' [T3]. 
 
For some participants, having a mastery over their situation appeared especially 
important. There was a lot of discussion about the things that they did to prepare and 
also the things which they had been advised to do, but realised were simply impractical.  
Many of these discussions elicited strong and derisive comments, some of which could 
be interpreted as reactance, which is primarily an anger response to being pressured to 
adopt a certain point of view: ‘The CFA people tell me to go home and rake up my leaves, 
now I rake up my leaves, the next day they’re all back again because I live in the forest! 
[laughs]. I can’t battle the entire forest of leaves and earn a living and bring my children up 
and be driving everywhere all the time’ [A1]. Recommended advice from fire authorities 
came in for criticism, and even more so when the participants had tried to follow it:  
‘well my plan was to make my way to the, you know, the safe zone but I lost faith in that 
this year (because) my nearest safe zone was a construction site. When I made that point 
to the CFA they said ‘oh, it’s a council thing’, when I made the point to the council they said 
yeah, but they’d move the machines only if it’s a holiday’ [laughs] [C]. The outcome of 
                                                                 
181
 Page 178 
174 
 
reactance is that advice is not listened to and decision-making excludes those actions 
officials recommend: ‘they could spend 60 seconds per street driving down saying ‘get 
out, get out, fire coming, evacuate evacuate, emergency’ whatever, rather than radio 
saying ‘oooh, ‘catastrophic’ , the world’s going to burn you’re all dead, best move’. When I 
hear that I think ‘go to hell, I don’t’ believe you, who are you?’ [RC] 
 
Many of the coping and appraisal strategies discussed thus far served to make the 
participants feel less stressed about the possibility of a bushfire threat which is a natural 
cognitive drive. The participants showed that by making sense of the threat of bushfires 
in a myriad of ways, they rendered it ‘normal’. The idea behind this strategy is that the 
threat is transformed from the extraordinary to the ordinary, is paid less attention, and 
therefore elicits less emotional response: ‘but I don’t let that become a overriding 
emotional thought in any way, I don’t worry about it, or let it concern me’  [D1] ‘you can’t 
just worry all the time’ [R1]. The possible threat of bushfire is ‘adapted to’ through these 
processes, and is hypothesised in this thesis to contribute to warning fatigue.  
(vi) Biases 
Evident in many of the participants risk evaluations was the bias of optimism, or the 
belief that if misfortune occurs, it will always be to other people. It was either inferred: 
‘I think those are the people who are in the most danger because they actually don’t know 
what they are doing’ [L] or overt: ‘my life is about assessing risk, and managing risk, so I’m 
probably more attuned to what’s going on, than maybe a lot of people’ [C]. Optimism 
increases problem-solving efforts: ‘I think we’re 100 percent prepared, I’ve been round 
and spoken to all my neighbours, we’ve swapped phone numbers, and so on’  [D2] and 
enables people to feel more in control: ‘then every day when you look at the weather 
forecast and figure out what the weather forecast is going to be and whether it’s going to 
affect you or not’ [L]. Participants talked about their experience in terms of luck or 
destiny: ‘we were lucky there was only one death, we’re in the same position as areas 
where more lives were lost there were better support’ [I],  ‘we’re actually very protected, 
as I said, I think it’s a very…we’re a bit lucky, we’re in a tourist area’  [R]. These comments 
are examples of externally-based optimism and locus of control (Rotter 1954) where the 
participants felt as though that there was nothing they could do to influence the 
outcome of the event one way or the other: ‘We were lucky, or he was lucky at that time 
because there was a wind change and the fire was coming directly towards Wye River but 
the wind changed and it went back the other way’ [S1].  
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In the same way that optimism bias boosts self-esteem, so too, attribution bias 
contributes to a feeling of well-being. It is a comparison to others, where others are 
judged less favourably in a myriad of different situations; for example residents living in 
bushfire-prone areas often report that think they are generally more prepared for a 
bushfire than their neighbours, and that, in an actual event, will have a better outcome: 
‘I’d probably say, in some aspects of it quite low, but at the same time I think we’re more 
prepared to leave a lot quicker than other people would be so’ [D1] This could be an 
internal attribution (they see themselves as more careful, or better prepared) or an 
external attribution where their house or property is deemed to be more resistant to 
fire than their neighbours: ‘We live in a property that has been inhabited for over 100 
years, never had a bushfire there ever, and that’s part of the reason why we feel a lot more 
secure than other areas’ [R2]. This comment, and the one following could also be an 
example of realistic optimism where the participants evaluation of the bushfire risk is 
grounded in knowledge and experience: ‘Cause I’ve lived here for 50 years, I’ve seen god 
knows how many bushfires, I’ve travelled round the state with the CFA fighting bushfires, 
so I’ve got a fair enough experience to know what days are not the days to be around. I 
also know the experience of Ash Wednesday’ [D2]. 
 
A number of participants explained their perception of risk by reducing the importance 
attached to the threat – a self-serving bias called positive illusions (Taylor 1989): ‘People 
have been living in high fire dangers forever, we know we live in them and you know, we’re 
not dying in droves, it was just that one fire, I mean like it was huge fire’ [A1]. Employing 
these biases to make themselves feel better about their bushfire risk also allows the 
participants to understand the event and increase feelings of self-efficacy and agency 
(ibid.). Some of the participants compared their likely risk of a devastating bushfire with 
past events, demonstrating the erroneous belief that if something similar has happened 
recently then the likelihood of it happening in the near future was low:  ‘I think that fire 
was one in a lifetime event, because it was all the conditions that were manifestly 
wonderful for a fire to happen, um… I don’t think that condition will happen again 
probably in my lifetime’ [S2]. ‘I think the odds are relatively low’ [D1], ‘I mean, you 
probably won’t see another day like that for another 20 to 30 years I doubt, it’s pretty 
uncommon, that kind of day…a bit extreme’ [T3]. 
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One way to explain how the participants rationalised living in bushfire-prone areas is 
that for some, living in the bush creates a cognitive dissonance: the reality of bushfire 
risk (as told to them by bushfire authorities and as recently experienced through the 
2009 Black Saturday fires) is at odds with their beliefs (they will be safe) about their 
‘real risk’. According to research (Festinger 1957), there is only one way to resolve this,  
and for those participants, it would be to either move out of the bushfire-prone area, or 
to change how they think about living there. A common way that people change the 
way they think about their situation is to compare it favourably to others; some of the 
participants clearly did this: ‘I mean, you live in the inner suburbs you can get stabbed by a 
junkie and get HIV, you can get knocked over the head if you walk through the city and live 
in the city with the dickheads drunk at the nightclub. There’s risks and benefits to 
everything. You live by the sea and love sailing a boat - you can die in a storm’ [L]. This 
type of justifying rationalisation has also been called ‘motivated reasoning’ (Kunda 
1990), and during this type of talk, participants also referenced other large disaster 
scenarios: ‘and the tsunamis are worse for deaths aren’t they, just shocking for deaths 
those ones’ [A1], ‘I‘d sooner do fires, than earthquakes darling, you can never deal with 
those’ [R2].  
(vii) Stress Responses 
A fundamental premise of this chapter is that, in the face of an actual threat, people 
may become stressed and anxious, and cope with these reactions in differing ways. 
Certainly, many of the participants reported being anxious - ‘it’s probably more the 
nights that were more distressing. Thinking... because you don’t have the visibility, um, so 
that sense of ‘god, what if you wake up and you see fire’ or something like that’ [A2]. They 
were also aware of the anxiety that the threat of a bushfire evokes: ‘I’ve got some 
friends involved in that and they go along to these meetings all the time and I’ve got to say 
that the level of anxiety it raises amongst them and the steps they’re all taking to do it, I 
sort of think removing myself from the area will be just as effective’ [D1].  
 
Having recently experienced Black Saturday as a ‘near miss’, many participants talked 
about the bushfires in emotional terms: ‘I mean we weren’t anywhere near as afraid 
before the whole Black Saturday thing; yeah, the Black Saturday thing really really scared 
us’ [A1], ‘I think that probably really that period was significant stress for me and my 
husband’ [M2]. Several of the participants reported feeling one stress response in 
particular: that of helplessness. This was most noticeable when they were talking about 
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the Black Saturday fires: ‘it (Black Saturday) was a rare case of being so extreme, so 
violent so that even if you were prepared you had no chance if you were right in its path 
..how can you fight a fire like that?’ [RC]. These feelings were also evident when they 
talked about how they felt when viewing media footage or reading survival stories: ‘and 
it’s only through the repetition of images and seeing the extraordinary footage of fire just 
rushing up hills that we suddenly realised what an absolutely extraordinary force you’re 
dealing with’ [M2]. ‘Oh, you feel helpless, and I guess that’s my point about some of the 
articles after the bushfires, there was a real feeling of helplessness and not enough about 
what you could do and what you should do next time’  [T2]. A threat such as a 
catastrophic bushfire is seen as outside of people’s control; as well as feelings of 
helplessness, analysis of participants interviews showed they also viewed their ‘agency’ 
in a bushfire threat in fatalistic ways: ‘you do what you can but maybe there are limits to 
what you can do depending on the particular situation’ [M2]. Fatalism is an external 
attribution, where the ability to change and effect a potential outcome is seen as 
virtually impossible; there is an inevitable sense of powerlessness: ‘if there was actually a 
fire of ‘catastrophic’ proportions coming, your little safe house is going to do nothing, this 
thing is a living monster that just tears through the trees above and beyond anything 
anybody else can do’ [RC].  
 
Similar to the participants in the first study, these participants did not deny that 
bushfires happened regularly or that they were a worthwhile risk to pay attention to; 
neither did they actively avoid thinking about the threat. Thus, it is reasonable to 
assume that the maladaptive strategies of denial and avoidance are not influences upon 
risk perception and decision-making in time of bushfire threat.  
(3) Reassurances 
In addition to rationalising their decision to live in bushfire-prone areas of Victoria, 
Australia, the participants were much reassured by different aspects of their life ‘in the 
bush’. These reassurances comprised of six main categories: viii) the environment, ix) 
their social capital, x) previous experience with bushfires, xi) their own risk assessment, 
xii) knowing they had a plan and xiii) the advantages of technology. 
(viii) Environment  
A participant’s environment includes not only the environment that surrounds them 
(countryside and vegetation for example) but also their immediate surroundings and 
physical circumstances. Several of the participants talked at length about the location 
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of their properties in relation to local fire authorities and major neighbourhood 
facilities: ‘and on the north-west side we’ve got the hospital, so the authorities fly a 
chopper any time there’s anything close cause they don’t want to have to evacuate the 
hospital, so they protect this hill like it’s Tobruk basically’ [D2]. Similarly, the region in 
which the participants lived was deemed to be safe by virtue of its distinguishing 
characteristics: ‘this is a high tourist area, they are not going to let anything happen to Mt 
Dandenong, it’s worth too much money to them’  [RC]. Many of the participants 
referenced their geographical location and, using their knowledge of prevailing winds 
assessed their risk from a bushfire as low: ‘As I say, if we had a westerly wind, it would 
never get to us anyway, it would destroy the township of Upway first and that’s not going 
to happen because there’s nothing there really to burn. Plus a southerly wind is not going 
to happen on one of those really really hot stinking days ‘cause that’s what will drop the 
temperature down’ [D2]. Participants’ knowledge of fuel loads, nearby open spaces and 
topographical advantages all combined to make the participants feel much happier 
about where they lived.  
(ix) Social Capital 
The communities in which the participants lived played a big part in reassuring them 
about how they would cope in a bushfire, and more importantly, that they would know 
about a bushfire in advance. Almost all of the participants talked about their extended 
social network in terms of being given sufficient warning to be able to react safely:  
‘because our community is such a small community word spreads very quickly’ [S1]. ‘You’d 
just know, it’s such a small area, community, you would know that you would have to get 
off the mountain, you wouldn’t need the radio to tell you that' [RC]. Those considered to 
be in the participant’s social network did not need to be close family or friends: ‘Yeah, or 
even, this is like a small town and even...somebody standing down in the pizza shop, or 
outside the pub saying “what do you want to do, do you want to leave”  [L]. ‘People just 
ring and say there’s a little fire down the road so everyone knows...it’s like an unofficial 
bush telegraph’ [A1]. Participants were very confident about how their community 
‘worked’ in times of threat ‘anyone who was missing they’d make sure the others wou ld 
know about it’ [A2] not only because they knew their neighbours and others in the 
community but because ‘our community is such a small community [and] word spreads 
very quickly’ [S1].  
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(x) Previous Experience 
Participants drew much reassurance from knowing that their house had withstood 
previous fires: ‘The house I’m living in for example has been here for 100 years and hasn’t 
burnt down in that particular time and there’s 80 year old trees around as well so 
statistically the odds of a bushfire coming through and actually wiping us out and been 
caught unawares are relatively low ‘ [D1]. Participants experience and the knowledge 
that came with experience not only reassured but seemed to make the participants feel 
as if any threat was manageable: ‘I’ve lived here 50 odd years. Dad was captain of the fire 
brigade...so I’ve grown up with bushfires, like country folks grow up with brown snakes 
basically’ [D2]. This participant also had direct experience of fighting bushfire in the 
past: ‘I actually took the first truck into Ash Wednesday, I was the officer in charge of the 
first truck’ [D2]. Other participants talked about past fires as being part of their 
‘reference’ points for understanding the bushfire threat: ‘I have the benefit of growing 
up here...we’ve also lived through the Ash Wednesday fires in the 1980’s..fire risk and the 
prospect of fire coming through has been part of my childhood and really my own sense of 
self’ [M2]. Yet other participants had learned about bushfire through their parents’ 
experiences: ‘My mother lived through the famous 1939 bushfires..she remembers 
fighting to save her house because the fire was at the front door and things like that’  [R2]. 
As all of the participants lived in bushfire risky areas, they all had knowledge of the 
ramifications of doing so – ‘we live in the hills, we know what the weather is [and] what is 
going to be like tomorrow’ – [R2], ‘a total fire ban is don’t have your Barbie outside where 
it’s going to cause problems, and as a kid you grew up with total fire bans..it was just part 
of summer’ [A2].  
(xi) Personal Risk Assessment 
Participants’ perceived ability to assess risk was high, and many of them felt confident 
to make decisions rather than rely on official information: ‘so that’s why I think accessing 
your own information and making your own judgements ...probably puts you in a better 
position than blanket statements made from afar' [D1]. These assessments were based 
on many things, not the least of which was the fact of where they were living: ‘I think 
when we bought into the area we accepted we were buying into a bushfire area, so we 
came into it with our eyes open in that respect’ [A2]. Some participants were more 
specific about this assessment: ‘I assumed that the openness around the house would 
protect us, a mud brick house, there were very few trees coming up by the house’ [S2]. 
Whilst that type of assessment was reassuring, other comments illustrated how the 
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participants made their assessments: ‘We have the forest right on our doorstep, both 
sides, we’re surrounded’ [A1] and 'I live in an old weatherboard house with a number of 
trees on the property quite close to the house, so if a fire were to come through, there’s 
probably little I could do to protect the place'  [D1]. Once again, participant’s knowledge 
of where they lived and in particular, typical weather patterns for their area helped 
them assess their particular risk: 'Well, it depends on what the climate is on a daily basis, 
if we had of had some hot days we would’ve done a lot more thinking about it, but right 
now, recently, it’s not a big concern at all'  [I]. ‘But over there it’s just dry, seriously 
seriously dry and I always reckon personally, you don’t have to be a rocket scientist to 
work out that on a bad day they could cop it there’ [R1]. 
(xii) Plan 
All participants had a plan, whether it was to stay and defend or to leave well in 
advance of any high fire-risk day. Those who planned to leave were unequivocal about 
their plan and they had a lot of confidence in it: ‘if there was decent fire coming and we 
were threatened with that, I would’ve been long gone – and I have got a plan which 
direction I would head in, that’s all worked out and I know what I would do, when I left’ 
[R1]. 'I mean for me it’s quite a simple scenario, when there’s a bushfire you have to get 
out as early as possible' [M2]. Others had practised their plan which reassured them that 
they were prepared: 'I mean we’ve done things like [laughs] had our own little fire drills 
and things like that, so that we know the sequence of what we need to do if the worst did 
happen' [A2]. Several participants planned to stay and for those, the preparation was 
often detailed: 'Our attitude was ‘we will stay in our house’, that’s ok – we had the 
buckets around the place with the mops in them, to mop up the cinders, we had our bath 
full of water, we had the heavy blankets ready right in the centre of the house to dive 
under..we had never planned on leaving our home' [R2]. Several participants had multiple 
plans - 'We’ve got 3 avenues of departure from here, so we’ve weighed up that ability to 
have multiple escape routes, and just go in the opposite direction'  [M1] – and especially if 
things did not go the way they had planned: 'The worst case scenario if we did get stuck 
here and there wasn’t that avenue off, we’d try and head to the Ferny Creek horticultural 
society, go there go there as fast as possible' [D1].  
(xiii) Technology 
Knowing that they would have the advantages of living close to large fire-fighting 
organisations reduced the participants’ concerns about their risk: ‘And as I say, within 
three, four kilometres of us, we have no less than four fire fighting units. So I think we’re 
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fairly well covered’ [R2]. '..but we are very well serviced with a number of brigades very 
close. We also have the helicopter which is just at the top of our hill…here would be a lot 
of action straight away’ [R2]. Furthermore, the progress in communication technologies 
of these agencies reassured the participants a great deal: 'I mean, it’s not that hard 
to…get on the internet' [L], ‘And I mean they’ve got the technology, it’s not like ten years 
ago when you didn’t even text message. I hear sirens going off, I’ll get on my iPhone on the 
CFA page and.. now the CFA put stuff regularly on the website, so you’ve got more of an 
idea’ [L] . Reassurances comprised many of the ways that participants made sense of 
why they were able to live where they did and why they did not need to worry. Whilst 
the veracity of their claims of safety was not verified, and in some cases their 
assumptions may be true, it was clear that the participants felt able to justify why they 
lived where they did and that those justifications reduced their concerns. 
(4) Warning Fatigue 
In chapter 4, it was suggested that warning fatigue could be conceptualised as a 
cognitive maladaptation or ‘habituation’ to warnings. As an issue that was raised by the 
participants, the idea of warning fatigue or ‘cry wolf’ was a dominant narrative in the 
interviews: out of 36 themes that were coded for, only the media was coded for more.  
 
Participants used many ways to talk about being ‘fatigued’: ‘ if you had several 
(warnings) in a row quite quickly, you might get a bit more blasé about it’ [A2]; ‘We 
become wearisome of the message, and then fail to react when a real warning came 
through’ [C]. ‘I’ve driven past (the billboards) that many times I forget what they say to be 
honest, you become a bit complacent’ [N]. The participants were vocal about warnings 
which were seen as over-playing the seriousness of the threat rather than the likelihood 
of it: ‘Every year since Ash Wednesday in the 80’s, you get told ‘it’s going to be a bad 
bushfire season, this year, it’s going to be a bad bushfire’ so I never took any notice’ [L]. 
The following comment supports Sandman’s (2013) hypothesis that warnings which 
overstate the probability of a threat can raise the level of warning fatigue: ‘I don’t want 
to be in the situation that 30 days out of 90 I’m getting these ridiculous warnings that are 
over the top, forcing me out when I don’t really need to be out, and disrupting my life and 
the finally getting another warning and thinking ‘god, not another one’ and totally 
ignoring it, and the that being the bad day’ [D1].  
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These types of comments were also linked to the use of ‘Code Red’ or ‘Catastrophic’ 
which was also seen as an over-statement of the likely impact and an actual prediction 
of a fire. However, they were just as much an evidence of third person bias where other 
people were thought to behave in one way, whilst the participants themselves would 
have acted differently: 'We get 5 or 6 of these Code Red days in a row, people are going to 
say ‘oh well, nothing happened in the last fires, I’m not going to do anything about it’. So 
you’ve got to be really really careful about what days you call Code Red' [D2]. Similarly, the 
following participant does not say that they themselves don’t take any notice of 
warnings: I think a lot of people wouldn’t really listen to them, it’s like ‘oh that’s what you 
said last time’ [RC]. This comment highlights how risk is socially constructed and how 
the community in which people live influences everyday concerns.  
 
Because ‘Catastrophic’ came into the bushfire warning lexicon after Black Saturday, it 
became synonymous with that terrible, ‘once-in-thirty-years’ event: ‘I would associate 
‘Catastrophic’ with the Black Saturday fires’ [M1], ‘to me that means Black Saturday’ [S1] - 
‘Catastrophic’ is a mixture of absolutely everything, I drop a match and the world going to 
burn' [RC]. When ‘Catastrophic’ was used as a warning, some participants reported that 
they ‘reacted’ against it: ' ..and if that was to be put into the catastrophic category I’d go 
‘oh yeah, ok, [laughs] another year another warning’  [N]. Over-warning in the absence of 
any obvious threat was mentioned by several participants: ‘I do feel like they make an 
enormous fuss about things that have been going on forever and nothing ever comes out 
of it' [A1]. 'If I were getting those 5 or 6 times a season where there was nothing that 
seemed to be a big threat, I think I would start to ignore them after a while’ [D1].  
 
Some participants felt alarm was created by warnings about extreme bushfire risk, and, 
as discussed in chapter 4, they reacted against the feeling that engendered: ‘… now it’s 
panic stations before anything really happens [R1]. ‘But there’s an enormous bunch of 
terror on the tele, and it’s not like any of its new. Oh, you know what, it’s like terror-
fatigue, we don’t take any notice of what they say anymore. I don’t take any notice of 
them [A1]. Similarly: ‘Panicking them, or getting them to the point of stop listening 
because they’re so sick of the message, and they think they’ve got it ’ [T2]. A few 
participants seemed to get annoyed at the recommendations to leave: ‘The fires didn’t 
come within a kilometre of us [but] we had our whole area evacuated .. when they started 
the fires were all going away from us but it was ‘everyone evacuate, get out! Get out!” [RC]  
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The issues talked about when referencing warning fatigue were varied and the 
narratives of warning fatigue were interlaced with references to message sources and 
implications of trust and credibility. ‘One of the issues was the cry-wolf thing, people are 
not going to take the message seriously when they look out the window and it ’s chucking 
it down with rain – we’ve got the floods on, or was it ‘oh well, we’ve spent our budget and 
we’ve no more to tell them, so we won’t tell them’[C]. It was clear from the comments 
that they did listen to the warning messages and bushfire information and evaluated it 
carefully, but if it didn’t equate with their own knowledge of their particular location, 
some became derisive about the message source: ‘the whole mountain didn’t burn down 
so now everyone’s thinking the next time they say we’re not going to really listen, so God 
forbid if something really tumultuous happens’ [RC]. Moreover, if the warnings had been 
issued too soon, or were seen as exaggerating the magnitude of the threat, participants 
reacted in a similar way: ‘There was a couple of high-level warnings to the point where I 
was getting messages on my phone and things like that to say, ‘we’re back here and 
nothing happened’ and people are sort of saying ‘we don’t want to be ‘crying wolf’ ..so I 
thought, ‘yeah, maybe the warnings aren’t as they should be’ [C]. 
 
Finally, the participants talked directly about warning fatigue, and most of them called it 
‘crying ‘wolf’: ‘(there's) this constant ‘oh we’re expecting a ripper of a summer, the fires 
are going to be horrendous, blah blah blah, get yourself in order’ because people don’t 
take any notice of it because it just goes on and on and on and it becomes like ‘the boy 
who cried wolf’ [D2].  
Discussion 
This chapter summarised the ‘sense-making’ and ‘meaning making’ of people living in a 
bushfire risky environment. It sought to understand how people explained why they 
continued to live in the bush (despite its inherent bushfire risk) and whether they 
perceived their bushfire risk from bushfires in different ways to the participants in Study 
(I). This chapter also explored the reasons for the participants’ decisions in the context 
of the psychosocial response to a threat. The analysis confirmed previous observations 
about possible aspects or facets that could contribute to warning fatigue.  It also 
disconfirmed an assumption made after the analysis of the first study, that people who 
were not actively involved in community bushfire mitigation issues could be thought of 
as ‘non-engaged’. The participants in Study (II) were deeply interested in the issue of 
bushfire risk, and seriously engaged with the challenges and contradictions of 
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managing their risk. They had thought about their bushfire plans; many had actively 
prepared, and most had changed their view of their risk as a result of experiencing the 
Black Saturday bushfires. They were very cognisant of their surroundings and how their 
environment might respond to a bushfire. Furthermore, all of these elements afforded 
them confidence in the face of a bushfire threat.  
The strategies that the participants employed to cope with and appraise bushfire risk 
were apparent through their explanations and interpretations of their everyday lives. In 
the first instance, the participants responded in similar ways to the first cohort in 
identifying the media and official fire authorities as influences upon their risk 
perception. In more instances than not, the media and official were seen as hindering 
effective bushfire communication. Closer analysis showed that their responses 
comprised detailed reasons and justifications for their perceptions of safety amongst 
what they knew to be a bushfire risky environment. Additionally, they bolstered their 
confidence in their decision to live in the bush by reassuring themselves that their 
community, the authorities and their past experience with and knowledge of bushfires 
would keep them safe should a bushfire threaten.  
When interviewees talked about warning fatigue the dominant narratives were: 1) how 
sceptical many of them had become about bushfire warnings; 2) the anxiety that had 
resulted from the many uncertainties a bushfire warning presented; 3) the helplessness 
that some felt when thinking about what they would do if a bushfire threatened them 
and 4) the apathy that a series of uneventful bushfire seasons (and public education 
bushfire prevention campaigns) had engendered. Their comments suggested that 
warning fatigue is complex, multi-layered and multi-faceted: for example the warning 
fatigue narratives included themes of anxiety, overtly reacting against warnings, trust 
and mistrust of both the warnings and warning source. Some participants explicitly 
talked about being ‘tired’ and choosing not to listen to bushfires warnings as attentively 
as they had in the past. What is interesting for this study, is that the issues involved in 
warning fatigue were teased out in depth, and, adding to the findings from study (I) 
and the literature review, have allowed for ‘an imagining’ of what warning fatigue may 
be like. This conceptualisation is expanded upon in the next chapter in the form of a 
measure of bushfire warning fatigue.  
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 9. Study III: DISSECTING WARNING FATIGIUE: an Experimental Self- 
Report Measure 
Introduction  
Warning Fatigue, as previously discussed in Chapter 1, is a phenomenon that is 
hypothesised to influence the way people respond to disaster warnings. Disaster 
literature has already established many impediments to effective public disaster 
response; trust and credibility of disaster authorities, past disaster experience, the 
prevalence of false alarms (about a similar threat), the public’s preference for local risk 
information, the lack of self-efficacious information and an optimistic view of the world 
(Mileti 1999; Paton 2006; Fischer 2008). The preceding analysis chapters showed that 
interviewees from the bushfire vulnerable areas of Tasmania and Victoria were well 
aware of the notion of warning fatigue and furthermore, many spoke at length about 
how they felt it affected their perception of risk and response to bushfire warnings. 
Their narratives about warning fatigue included many of the concepts hypothesised in 
this thesis to be related or constituting a ‘cry wolf effect’. 
 
This chapter reports on an exploratory study intended to extend the findings described 
previously. This third study re-examines the concept of warning fatigue and describes 
(a) development of an experimental self-report measure of Bushfire Warning Fatigue; 
and (b) an investigation as to whether self-reported levels of bushfire warning fatigue 
are related to bushfire warnings over the course of a bushfire season. The aim of this 
study was threefold: (i) to re-examine both the relevant literature and the interview 
transcripts from the previous two studies to investigate the multi-faceted nature of 
warning fatigue; (ii) to develop a self-report measure of bushfire warning fatigue; and 
(iii) to use this self-report measure to track self-reported levels of bushfire warning 
fatigue in a sample of residents over the course of a fire season to see if their levels 
change. 
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Method 
The Composition of Bushfire Warning Fatigue 
Previous Literature 
Previous research and literature on warning responses suggest that there are different 
aspects, or facets, or components of the warning fatigue phenomenon. It seems clear 
that this is so. For example Dow and Cutter (1998) showed that the evacuation 
response for tornadoes changed depending on the residents experience with past 
tornadoes and the perceived level of information credibility. Repeated natural disaster 
warnings were claimed by Reser (1996) as leading to ‘inattention, complacency and 
desensitisation’ (204) and over-warning or the frequency of warnings was also assumed 
by Tverski et al.  (1976) to ‘contribute to a perception that certain types of warnings 
should be ignored’ (cited in Stewart and Martin 1994:7). Repeated warnings are also 
proposed as contributing to the relationship between preparedness, response and 
warning time (Turner 1983. Drabek 1986) as they make possible ‘a gradual, easy 
adaptation to the approaching danger where the potential hazard is perceived to be 
less of a threat and render the warnings less effective’ (Janis 1962: 79- 81). False alarms 
were suggested by Rhatigan, Barnes and Gruntfest (2004) to contribute to a lessening 
of public confidence in subsequent warnings. Desensitisation or normalisation bias was 
alluded to by Handmer et al.  (2010) when (in a report to the Victorian Bushfires Royal 
Commission) the Black Saturday bushfires were described as ‘unprecedented’ and 
‘unimaginable’. The report observed that, considering the ferocity and unpredictability 
of the fire, the people who had perished should never have considered defending their 
homes.  
 
Trust and credibility has been shown to affect public confidence in and response to 
warnings: if warnings come from sources considered less trustworthy, they are 
appraised as less accurate (Hovland and Weiss 1952). Similarly, the integrity of an 
information source is ‘critical for public perceptions of risk’ (Johnson and Sandman 
1992:3). As one of the many fear responses detailed in chapter 4, worry is suggested to 
be a predictor of coping; often leading people to feel vulnerable, and inhibiting decision 
–making (Weber 2006). Apathy has been shown to affect decision-making but in a 
different way. Some people can dismiss disaster warnings because, over time, they 
have become complacent about the risk (Sandman 2008). The disaster literature 
examined in chapters 1-5 has established these influences upon warning response and 
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decision-making and has informed the selection of components for the bushfire 
warning fatigue measure. The most pertinent literature is detailed in table 2 below. 
 
 
Suggested Component Sources of Suggested Component 
Helplessness 
Abramson, Seligman and Teasdale 1978; Flores et al. 2009; 
Gullatte et al. 2010; Mileti and Sorenson 1990; Parsons et al. 
2006; Seligman 1975; Wheaton 1983; Wilkins et al. 2012;  
Desensitisation/Normalisation 
Handmer et al. 2010; Mileti and O’Brien 1992; Reser 1996; 
Tekeli-Yesil 2007 Tverski et al. 1976 
Trust/Credibility 
Covello & Sandman 2001; Eagly et al. 1978; Flynn et al. 1992; 
Giddens and Pierson 2009; Gutteling and Weigman 1996; 
Hovland and Weiss 1952; Johnson and Sandman 1992; 
McGuire 1969; Pidgeon et al. 2003; Renn and Levine 1991; 
Sandman 1993, 2004, 2008 
Over-Warning 
Barnes et al. 2007; Dow and Cutter 1998, 2000; Drabek 1999; 
Janis 1962; Mileti and Peek 2000; Mileti and Sorenson 1990; 
Sandman 2012;  Stewart and Martin 1994; Turner 1983; 
Tverski et al. 1976 
Risk Perception 
Anderson-Berry 2003; Beck 2009; Blaike et al. Breznitz 1964; 
Burton et al. 1993; Bushnell and Cottrell 2007; Finucane et al. 
2000; Folkes 1988; Gardner et al. 1987; Handmer and 
Penning-Roswell 1990; Joffe 2003; Kahneman and Tversky 
1979; Dunwoody and Neuwirth 1991; Krusel and Petris 1992; 
Lofstedt 2003; Lupton and Tulloch 2002; McCaffrey 2004; 
Mileti and O’Brien 1992; Montz 1993; Moscovici 1998; Renn 
1992; 1994; Riad and Norris 1978; Sjøberg and Engelberg 
2010; Tversky and Slovic 2000a; Weinstein 1989 
Localisation/ Relevance 
Bushnell and Cottrell 2007; Eagly et al. 1978; Flint and Luloff 
2005; Flynn et al. 1992; Gough 2000; Hovland and Weiss 1952; 
McGee and Russell 2003; Mileti and Sorenson 1990; Olick 
2007; Renn and Levine 1991; Short 1979 
Apathy 
McCaffrey 2004; McGee and Russell 2003; Martin et al. 2009; 
Fischoff, Slovic and Lichtenstien 1978; Sandman 2008, 2103 
Scepticism 
Downs 1972; Fischoff, Slovic and Lichtenstien 1978; Sandman 
2008; Punongbayan and Newhall 1999; Wilson and Gilbert 
2008 
False Alarm 
Atwood and Major 1998; Barnes et al. 2007; Breznitz 1984; 
Dow and Cutter 1998, 2000; Gruntfest and Carswell 2000; 
Mileti and Soresnon 1990; Reser 1996; Sharma and Patt 2012; 
Rhatigan, Barnes and Gruntfest 2004; Roulston and Smith 
2004; Savage et al. 1984; Sandman 2008; Simmons and 
Sutter 2009; Stirling 2011; Weaver et al. 2000; 
Worry 
Averill and Lazarus 1968; Breznitz 1984; Glanz and Schwartz 
2008; Kates, 1985; Lazarus 1991; McLennan et al. 2011, 2011a; 
Monet et al. 1972; Sandman 1993; Scharwzer 2000; Weber 
1997; Weber 2006   
Table 2: Literature that informed selection of bushfire warning fatigue components. 
 
 
188 
 
Interview Transcripts from Study I and Study II 
The transcripts (n=36) of those interviewed in Studies 1 and 2 were re-examined in the 
light of suggestions gleaned from previous literature about the likely components of 
bushfire warning fatigue. The different ways participants described their individual 
bushfire warning fatigue experiences were tabulated and experiences which resembled 
each other were grouped. It was ascertained that ten different possible aspects, or 
facets, or components of bushfire warning fatigue could be identified (Table 3). These 
corresponded to those noted in previous literature that discussed the warning fatigue 
phenomenon: Helplessness, Desensitisation/Normalisation, Trust/Credibility, Over-
Warning, Risk Perception, Localisation/Relevance, Apathy, Scepticism, False Alarm and 
Worry. 
Bushfire Warning Fatigue 
Component 
Illustrative descriptive extracts from Study 1 and Study 2 
interview transcripts 
Helplessness 
Oh, you feel helpless, and I guess that’s my point about some 
of the articles after the bushfires, there was a real feeling of 
helplessness and not enough about what you could do and 
what you should do next time [2T] 
Desensitisation/Normalisation 
On the actual Black Saturday day, we had a look around, gosh, 
it’s going to be a bit hot, we’ll be alright, it’s going to be 
another normal day (1C) 
Trust/Credibility 
Official advice does carry more weight than my own 
assessment - I expect that professional meteorologists and 
people in the emergency services have more information and 
expertise than I do [H1] 
Over-Warning 
They signal a Code Red and everyone goes [intake of breath] 
“ooh, panic, leave” and then nothing happens and the 
next…couple of days later “Code Red” and off you go again 
and I’m just worried that it gets diluted, you know, the urgency 
of it [1K] 
Risk Perception 
If there’s dew on the ground, there’s moisture in the air, if 
there’s moisture in the air you’re not going to have a belter of 
a fire (2D) 
Localisation/ Relevance 
Your local council, your local papers, your local everything, 
because they know, they know the local area, they know 
what’s happening [1RC].  
Apathy 
I’ve driven past (the billboards) that many times I forget what 
they say to be honest, you become a bit complacent [1N]. 
Scepticism 
We just don’t plug into it, and I think that’s true for a lot of 
folks that I talk to up here, they go ‘oh god, we’re so sick of 
hearing about it, all the rubbish’, because a lot of it’s never 
based in fact, a lot of it’s hearsay, or, you know, hysteria [2AF]. 
False Alarm 
After the 3rd or 4th false alarm, it’s like [laughs] ‘hang on’: this 
is coming from someone with legal liability check boxes, not 
someone trying to help [2C]. 
Worry 
And yes if you don't worry about bushfires whilst living in the 
bushfire-prone area you are delusional and I'm sorry, an idiot. 
(2D) 
Table 3: Illustrative Bushfire Warning Fatigue Components from Study 1 and Study 2.  
  
189 
 
Hypotheses 
On the bases of findings from study (I) and study (II) coupled with a review of the 
literature, it is hypothesised that: 
 
 Hypothesis 1: Bushfire Warning Fatigue is a multi-faceted phenomenon. 
Hypothesis 2: Bushfire Warning Fatigue can be captured by a multi-component, 
self-report measure. 
Hypothesis 3: Bushfire Warning Fatigue may change over time. 
 
Development of a Bushfire Warning Fatigue Self-Report Measure (BWFM) 
The previous literature on the warning fatigue phenomenon suggested ten possible 
components. This was supported by descriptive material extracted from the transcripts 
of interviews conducted for Study (I) and Study (II). This suggested the starting point to 
developing a self-report measure of bushfire warning fatigue, was to construct ten 
subscales (Sudman and Norman 1982). For each subscale, four statements were 
formulated to express peoples’ reported experience in relation to each hypothesised 
bushfire warning fatigue component. The statements were designed to be responded 
to on seven-point Likert scales where ‘1’ corresponded to ‘Strongly Disagree; ‘2’ 
corresponded to Disagree Somewhat; ‘3’ corresponded to Disagree; ‘4’ corresponded 
to Neither Disagree nor Agree; ‘5’ corresponded to Agree; ‘6’ corresponded to Agree 
Somewhat; and ‘7’ corresponded to ‘Strongly Agree’ (Harre  1974; Kelly 1955; Howard 
1984). The initial bushfire warning fatigue measure thus comprised forty statements. 
Sixteen of the items were reverse-scored in order to counter ‘acquiescence response 
set’ (Winkler, Kanouse and Ware 1982).182  
 
A third sample of residents living in bushfire vulnerable areas of Victoria (n=30), New 
South Wales (n=2) and Queensland (n=1) were recruited primarily through snowballing 
methods. A request for participation was advertised on the Victorian CFA website; 183 in 
addition requests were made through personal contacts within the Office of Land and 
Fire from the Department of Sustainability and Environment (Victoria).184 Contact with  
all the respondents by these various recruitment means was entirely via email, and once 
the study criteria was established, the respondents were asked to complete the 
                                                                 
182
 Acquiescence response set (ARS) is the tendency to agree with questionnaire statements regardless of 
content. 
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bushfire warning fatigue survey measure on six occasions, one month apart over the 
course of the 2011/2012 bushfire season (November 2011 – April 2012). 
Participants 
The participants (n= 33) comprised a purposive sample of 15 men and 18 women aged 
between 23 and 62 years of age living in rural or peri-rural communities; they were 
asked to completed the survey on six occasions, once a month for six months. Most 
owned their own home, almost three quarters identified as married or partnered, and 
just over half had dependents living at home. Fifty two percent had lived in their 
present home for more than ten years and two-thirds had had personal experience of 
bushfires as well as being affected by them. Just under half (45%) reported that 
bushfires occurred regularly in their area and many of them (82%) had a bushfire plan 
which, for half of the participants, had changed since the 2009 Black Saturday bushfires. 
Those who were recruited following an initial expression of interest were: 
1. Aged between 20 and 65 years.  
2. Lived in a peri-rural or rural area. 
3. Had lived there for 3 years or more.  
4. Knowledgeable in their use of the internet.  
5. Had no or limited involvement in the local Fireguard programs, activities or local 
community bushfire mitigation activates.  
The age group was chosen because the elderly are generally regarded as a distinct and 
more vulnerable group (than non-retired peoples) and understand and respond to risk 
quite differently (Bolin and Klenow 1982-83). Participants had lived in their area for 
some time and had some experience with the issues of bushfires. For most this meant 
they had experienced at least three fire seasons in their present location. The 
requirement for limited involvement in the local Fireguard groups was because previous 
interviews had been with those involved in CFA or TFS Fireguard groups, and these 
people had shown a certain level of engagement with and knowledge of bushfire 
issues. Additionally, bushfire prevention with these ‘involved-type’ groups has been 
well-documented. The participants recruited for study (III) were very similar 
demographically to those of Study (I) and Study (II), so because of this Study III can be 
assumed to be a logical continuation of the previous studies. 
 
Limiting involvement in the study to those who had a good working knowledge of the 
internet privileged a group of people who probably have good access to information, 
bushfire and otherwise. It is possible that there are other groups of people living in 
bushfire-prone areas that do not avail themselves of online information and therefore, 
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could have responded differently to the survey; a different study would need to be 
done to understand these peoples’ experiences of bushfire warning risk.  
Procedure 
In addition to the quantitative 40-item Bushfire Warning Fatigue Measure (BWFM), the 
survey 185  included a qualitative component which were questions about the 
participant’s experience with and knowledge of bushfires. These optional questions 
were included in the survey only for Time 1. Also asked at Time 1 was whether the 
respondents had a bushfire plan and whether this plan was different to any bushfire 
plan they had prior to the Black Saturday bushfires. The intent of the exploratory survey 
was not made obvious to the respondents. The survey was labelled ‘Decision-making 
and Warnings’ and as the Participation Information Sheet186 explained this was in the 
context of the Australian bushfires.  
 
The phrase ‘warning fatigue’ was not used in any literature the participants received; 
there are two main reasons for this. Firstly, the purpose of the study was to understand 
the different components that had been hypothesised to construct bushfire warning 
fatigue, rather than a (whole) predetermined construct. Asking people what the term 
‘cry wolf’ or ‘warning fatigue’ meant to them would not achieve this purpose. And 
secondly, avoiding the first use or reference to warning fatigue avoided the classic 
psychological effect of priming (Jacoby 1983). In the survey context, this would mean 
that when exposed to a stimulus, in this case the word or idea of warning fatigue, the 
participants would be more likely to talk about warning fatigue and report that warning 
fatigue had an influence on their warning response (Ratcliffe and McKoon 1988). This 
priming effect would essentially render the findings from the study invalid.  
Pilot 
A pilot was run to establish the viability of the survey, for example how long it took to 
do and to make sure the questions were understandable and did not confuse the 
respondents. The online survey was sent out to thirteen people to complete and 
comment on. The participants were recruited from the second cohort, and were people 
who had previously offered to partake in any other research I was doing.  
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They were asked to not only do the survey, but also to take note of: 
1) How long it took  
2) Were there any questions that were unclear, hard to answer or generally 
problematic 
3) How did the survey ‘feel’ overall, noting issues of font, colour, layout and  ease of 
use 
 
Thirteen people completed the online survey and six responded in depth. None of them 
reported any issues with the survey; they reported that it took them between 10 and 29 
minutes to complete, the questions were easy to answer and layout was ‘user-friendly’. 
One mentioned that the orange background may be problematic for someone who was 
colour-blind, and another commented that the questions felt ‘a little repetitive towards 
the end’. In terms of ensuring that the participants commented when given an option 
to do so, there was an issue with how SurveyMonkey™ allocated ‘priorities’: a 
participant was able to ignore the request to comment if they chose. To mitigate this in 
the survey proper I added an introductory statement immediately after the ‘consent 
page’:  
“Thank you for agreeing to take part in this survey - it should take you about 20 
minutes. Each question requires an answer, additionally, where a "please explain" box 
is provided, please DO NOT skip this bit: your reasons for giving your answers are as 
important as the answers themselves. Most often, a couple of sentences will suffice”.  
This amendment proved successful: one respondent who was late to do the pilot 
(which had the amended statement in the introduction) subsequently commented on 
each occasion when prompted. Once the pilot was completed and the feedback 
incorporated into the survey, participants were recruited for participation in the survey 
proper, to be carried out over the upcoming bushfire season (November 2011-April 
2012). Participants were invited to contact the author via an email account, and were 
sent an information sheet187 about the study. Consent was obtained by the participants 
responding in a certain way on the very first page of the survey.188 The survey was 
uploaded to an online survey program SurveyMonkey,™ and sent to the participants to 
complete in the second week of December 2011. The survey was completed at their 
convenience and all participants completed the survey within 10 days. This was done 
every second week of the month until May 2012. A reminder email was sent to any 
participants who hadn’t returned the survey within a week of receiving it. Upon 
completion of each month of surveys, they were downloaded from SurveyMonkey™ 
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and printed. For analysis, the results were subsequently downloaded into the statistical 
analysis program ‘SPSS’. 189 
Results 
The first hypothesis – Bushfire Warning Fatigue is a multi-faceted phenomenon - was 
confirmed on the basis of a literature review and content analysis of interview 
transcripts from studies (I) and (II): it seemed that the bushfire warning fatigue 
experience could be described as comprising ten characteristics or facets: Helplessness, 
Desensitisation/Normalisation, Trust/Credibility, Over-Warning, Risk Perception, 
Localisation/Relevance, Apathy, Scepticism, False Alarm and Worry. 190  
 
To test the second hypothesis that bushfire warning fatigue can be captured by a multi-  
component, self-report measure, an internal consistency reliability analysis (Cronbach’s 
a) was carried out on each of the ten subscales. Using a generally accepted convention 
for the homogeneity of short subscales (<six items) of a Cronbach’s alpha of .6 (Aron 
and Aron 2002), six of the subscales had an acceptable level of reliability of Cronbach’s 
alpha of .6 or above: Helplessness, Trust/Credibility, Over-Warning, False Alarms, 
Scepticism, and Worry. Table 4 shows the subscale Alpha levels. A Principle 
Components Analysis (PCA) was carried out on scores of the six surviving subscales: 
Trust/Credibility, Over-Warning, False Alarms, Scepticism and Helplessness. 191  It’s 
important to note while it is usual for such data reduction procedures as PCA to be 
carried out using individual items, the small number of participants meant that this was 
not possible. This is because a PCA requires there to be more participants than items 
and the generally accepted convention is there should be at least five participants per 
item (Abdi and Williams 2010). For example, in this context (and for the number of 
items, n=40) there would have needed to be 200 participants. But by using the six 
reliable subscale scores, the number of participants (n=33) was sufficient. The purpose 
of the PCA was to see if the six BWFM subscales were sufficiently highly inter-correlated 
to conclude that they constituted a single cohesive bushfire warning fatigue construct. 
This could be concluded if the PCA showed the presence of a large first Principal 
Component (Reckase 1979). Table 5 details the loading of each subscale score on the 
First Principle Component (Bushfire Warning Fatigue). 
                                                                 
189
 SPSS, an IBM-owned software package is among the most widely used programs for statistical analysis 
in social science. 
190
 Item content of ten subscales – Appendix 5. 
191
 The item content for the revised scale (BWFM-R) - Appendix 6. 
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Subscale (BWFM-R) Alpha Levels 
Helplessness  .640 
Trust/Credibility  .791 
Over-Warning  .765 
Scepticism .700 
False Alarm .790 
Table 4: Subscale Alpha Levels (< .6) 
Subscale (BWFM-R) Loading 
Trust/Credibility .919 
Over-Warning .881 
False Alarm .858 
Scepticism .711 
Helplessness .695 
Worry .292 
Table 5: Loading of each Subscale Score on the First 
Principal Component 
 
Figure 3 shows the scree plot for the BWFM-R PCA. The eigenvalue of the first Principal 
Component was 3.430 and the second was .919.  
 
Figure 3: Principal Components Analysis Scree Plot for 6 Warning Fatigue Eigenvalues 
 
Five of the six subscales loaded appreciably (>.6) on this first component using a 
generally accepted criterion of a loading of 0.4 or greater. The loadings (i.e. the 
correlations of each of the subscales with the first component) indicated that scores on 
the Trust, Over-Warning, False Alarm, Scepticism, and Helplessness subscales cohered 
to constitute a self-report bushfire warning fatigue measure. Worry scores did not load 
appreciably having a loading of just .29 and this suggests that in terms of self-report, it 
makes sense to talk about a global warning fatigue construct as having five 
components, or facets, or aspects: Trust/Credibility, Over-Warning, False Alarms, 
Scepticism and Helplessness. The inter-correlations, subscale score means and standard 
deviations at Time 1 of the five subscales of the revised bushfire warning fatigue scale 
(BWFM-R) are shown in Table 6. 
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Table 6: BWFM-R Subscale Inter-Correlations, Mean and Standard Deviation for 5 Bushfire Warning Fatigue 
Subscales at Time 1. 
It was concluded that Hypothesis 2 was partly supported: a self-report measure of 
bushfire warning fatigue was able to be constructed. An examination of the 
psychometric properties of the original ten subscale measures (limited by the small 
sample size) indicated that only five of the originally proposed ten subscales could 
reasonably be regarded as comprising a self-report measure of bushfire warning 
fatigue: Trust/Credibility, Over-Warning, False Alarms, Scepticism and Helplessness. 
 
To test the third hypothesis,  the ten component self-report measure was completed by 
the 33 participants once a month for the six months that comprised the 2011 bushfire  
season, in Victoria, Australia (November 2011- April 2012). This was done using an online 
survey program which captured the data and allowed it to be downloaded into an Excel 
and SPSS programme to be analysed. The third hypothesis (that bushfire warning 
fatigue would change over time) was tested by calculating the total BWFM-R mean 
scores for each of the six time points, and plotting these (Figure 4). A t-test for paired 
samples was then conducted comparing the mean score at Time 1 with that of Time 6. 
Figure 4 suggests that bushfire warning fatigue did change over time. However, not in 
the direction hypothesised. The magnitude of the decrement in self-reported bushfire 
warning fatigue from Time 1 to Time 6 was small although statistically significant: effect 
size (Cohens ) =.023, t(32) = 2.325, p = .027. The finding of a decrease in self-reported 
bushfire warning fatigue over time, even though small, was unexpected. Possible 
explanations are offered in the Discussion. 
 Trust/ 
Credibility 
Over-
Warning 
False 
Alarms 
Scepticis
m 
Helpless-ness Mean Std.Dev 
Trust/ 
Credibilityb 
[.79]     13 5.4 
Over-
Warningc 
.76** [.76]    6.1 3.1 
False Alarmsd .74** .76** [.79]   13.7 5.7 
Scepticisme .66** .55*** .45*** [.70] .30 16.6 4.9 
Helplessnessf .55*** .51*** .51** .30 [.62] 16.3 5.0 
 
 aNote: Figures in square brackets are the sub-scales internal consistency 
coefficients (Cronbach’s ) 
 b,c,d,f sub-scales have 4 items, responses 1-7 
 c sub-scale has 2 items, responses 1-7                    ** p<.01        *** p<.001 
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Figure 4: Mean Bushfire Warning Fatigue Scores November 2011 – April 2012 
Month (2011 Fire Season) Means Std Dev 
November  65.7 19.85 
December 62.4 19.31 
January 62.5 22.07 
February 60.9 20.36 
March 62.9 20.22 
April 61.0 21.88 
Table 7: Means and Standard Deviation Bushfire Warning Fatigue scores 2011 Fire Season 
Discussion 
In summary, the proposal that warning fatigue is a multi-faceted phenomenon was 
confirmed because a self-report measure could be constructed whose psychometric 
properties indicated that five out of an originally-proposed ten subscales had an 
acceptable internal consistency (Cronbach’s alpha 0.6 of greater). Scores on the five 
subscales were summed and the total used to chart changes in self-report bushfire 
warning fatigue over a six month fire season. The results confirmed the second 
hypothesis that it is possible to measure bushfire warning fatigue by a self-report 
measure. The third hypothesis, that bushfire warning fatigue increases over time was 
not confirmed; bushfire warning fatigue changed significantly over time but not in the 
direction that was predicted. The hypothesis that bushfire warning fatigue would 
increase over the fire season was predicated on the assumption that warning fatigue 
was low at the beginning of the fire season and, in response to continuous warnings 
about bushfire events that, over time, did not eventuate, the level of bushfire warning 
fatigue would rise. There are several explanations that may account for this decrement.  
 
There was no normative base-line for bushfire warning fatigue available before the 
study. It is possible for example, that bushfire warning fatigue is at its highest at the 
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beginning of the fire season because previous fire seasons have produced no significant 
bushfire events. Additionally, as a result of a previous winter season that had produced 
observable fuel growth, the rhetoric often employed by bushfire prevention campaigns 
is that the up-c0ming fire season will likely be one of the ‘worst ever’. It is possible that 
as the fire season approaches, those who are more likely to be fatigued will have a one-
off ‘here we go again’ response to public education bushfire campaigns and warnings 
to be ‘bushfire ready’. As the fire season progresses, and no major bushfire event 
happens, it may be that the public’s perception of risk from bushfire and their bushfire 
warning fatigue response decreases. The 2011 bushfire season was extraordinarily wet. 
The following information from the Bureau of Meteorology monthly weather reviews 
summarises some of the more significant weather events across the 2011 bushfire 
season: (http://www.bom.gov.au/climate/mwr/)192 
November 2011: Hailstones the size of golf balls, heavy rainfall and flash flooding in the first 
week led to minor to moderate flood warnings for rivers in central and eastern Victoria. 
 
December 2011: The third week in December was warm but very wet, culminating in a 
memorable Christmas day, especially for the Melbourne area.  A number of super cells (very 
severe long lasting thunderstorm cells) produced large hailstones, heavy rainfall and flash 
flooding. Victoria State Emergency Services (SES), received over 3500 requests for 
assistance and the Insurance Council of Australia estimated the damage at over $100 million.  
 
January2012: There was an exceptionally cold outbreak early in January, setting a new 
Australian lowest January maximum temperature. At Mt Hotham, where the temperature 
barely crept above freezing and light snow fell in the alpine areas.  
 
February 2012: Rainfall records, some which had stood for over 130 years, fell during 
February 2012. Several townships suffered flash flooding that affected main streets and 
inundated properties. A number of river systems were impacted by flash flooding and broke 
their banks. 
 
March 2012: March 2012 was the wettest March since 1900, with more than twice the 
Victoria average rainfall. 
 
April 2012: In the last week of April, many location in south-eastern Victoria recorded rainfall 
in excess of 100mm, with large hailstones and damaging wind gusts.  
 
This weather overview clearly shows that for the respondents of the survey, bushfires 
were not the risk they usually were over the 2011 bushfire season. In fact, there was 
more concern about flooding and more warnings about severe weather and associated 
flooding, than there were about bushfires. The respondents would have also been 
aware of the severe flooding in Queensland during this time where, beginning in 
December 2010, a series of floods hit Brisbane and other areas. The floods forced the 
                                                                 
192
 Note: In the southern hemisphere these months are Summer.  
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evacuation of thousands of people from towns and cities, killed 35 people, and three-
quarters of the state of Queensland was declared a disaster zone. Damage is thought to 
have cost around $2.38 billion.  
 
It could be assumed that during the 2011 bushfire season the salience of bushfire risk 
was very low for the respondents; they simply did not need to be concerned about 
bushfires because there were fewer warnings to ‘react’ to, and little bushfire risk to 
evaluate or respond to. Simply put, it is almost certain that most of the survey 
respondents had ‘other things to worry about’ during the 2011 bushfire season. It could 
be hypothesised that by the end of the bushfire season, bushfires were so little a 
concern for them that they had stopped paying attention (and responding to) any 
suggestion that bushfires may be a threat. Therefore any associated bushfire warning 
fatigue would likely also have decreased.  
 
Findings from this third and final exploratory study show that bushfire warning fatigue, 
as a phenomenon, is a multi-faceted construct, probably made up of five subscales: 
Helplessness, Trust, Over-warning, Scepticism and False Alarm. The levels of bushfire 
warning fatigue are able to be measured over time, and bushfire warning fatigue 
changes over time. Moreover, the direction of change can be explained by the context 
in which the respondents operate. The context in which the survey was conducted can 
be understood in multiple ways, not the least by analysing the reports from the Bureau 
of Meteorology. However, it was by examining the participants’ reflections on their 
feelings of risk, and how they reported they responded to the 2011 fire season that was 
most useful in understanding the reasons for the bushfire warning fatigue decrement. 
The unexpected finding that bushfire warning fatigue decreased over the fire season 
seems counter-intuitive, and highlights the reality that understanding phenomena that 
are inseparable from and dependent upon people’s feelings and circumstances, is 
complex. 
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The Participants’ Perspectives 
Introduction 
At Time 1 (November 2011), the participants were given the choice to comment on one 
of each of the subscales in order to expand on the answers they had given. This gave 
some insight into how they were thinking about the subscales. Importantly, as self-
report warning fatigue decreased over the fire season, participants’ comments that 
show how they were thinking about the fire season suggest why the change in bushfire 
warning fatigue was not in the direction predicted. The questions which the 
participants responded to are shown in Table 8. 
 
Time (when question 
was asked) 
Question 
Time 1 
In terms of bushfire warnings, is there anything you think needs 
to be addressed? 
Time 2-6 
Since the last survey, has anything changed for you that you’d 
like to comment on? 
Time 6 
As you reflect on this past fire season, is there anything further 
you would like to add? 
 
Table 8: Optional Questions in the Bushfire Warning Fatigue Survey 
This section discusses the interviewees’ comments and is in three sections: the first 
details the ways that the participants talked about warning fatigue, the second 
illustrates how they talked about the five subscales and expands on issues around those 
subscales. The third section describes the context in which the interviewees were 
receiving and responding to bushfire warnings and their perception of the bushfire risk 
during this time. Moreover, their comments indicated the salience of bushfire for them 
during the 2011 bushfire season. The excerpts are representative rather than exhaustive 
and are used because they are the best examples of the subjects discussed. 
Warning Fatigue 
One of the main hypotheses of this chapter is that it is aggregation of several elements 
that ‘construct’ the experiential phenomenon of warning fatigue. This section shows 
that as well as specifically referring to ‘warning fatigue’ or ‘cry wolf’, the participants 
talked about these particular elements in detail; because of the importance of the 
responses in the context of warning fatigue, no attempt has been made to condense 
the participants’ comments. When responding to statements about over-warning and 
false alarms, some participants referred to the fable about the boy who cried wolf, 
using, in several instances those exact words: 
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(Just like) the little boy who cried wolf [G2] 
 
Whilst awareness is important, "boy who cried wolf" syndrome must also 
be considered [F:1] 
 
It’s the “boy who cried wolf" syndrome again [I] 
 
Similarly, when commenting on the way the authorities issued warnings: 
 
[they] need to be careful of crying "Wolf" [J1] 
 
It's about faith in what you're being told, like the boy who cried wolf [M2] 
 
Several participants thought that the style of public education campaigns and the  
frequency of the warnings contributed to the warning fatigue problem: 
Govt has overreacted now and issue scare campaign 'warnings' that 
people will become immune to and not heed over time. [D2] 
 
But I guess if I received warnings on a daily basis (or close to) I’d be less 
likely to pay attention [A1] 
 
.. when there are warnings all the time you tend to switch off, one can't  be 
healthy and live in fear [G4] 
 
Lastly, several comments reflected a common theme narrative that the language used 
for warnings post-Black Saturday was unhelpful. Moreover, it contributed to a type of 
complacency and desensitisation often implied in disaster literature as encouraging 
warning fatigue and hindering disaster response:  
It's important that the catastrophic warnings don't engender the same 
complacency by having too many of them (R1) 
 
The warning scales are silly – Code Red comes out of Hollywood and 
means nothing and it is associated with silly reactions – automatically run 
without taking into account your own circumstances [E1] 
 
Catastrophic warnings are already being overused. They should only be 
used when absolutely necessary - once every several years, otherwise 
there is the risk of complacency (as there was on Black Saturday) [R1] 
 
These comments show that not only do the participants have a taken-for-granted 
knowledge about warning fatigue but they understand the meaning of warning fatigue 
as it relates to warning response. There was an assumption by some of the participants 
that the ‘cry wolf effect’ is a real influence on risk perception and their opinions implied 
that, if it were to be eliminated, people’s attention to warnings and subsequent safety 
in times of a bushfire, would improve. The language used by emergency and disaster 
agencies was singled out for comment and highlights that, as well as the frequency and 
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timeliness of warnings, the content of the warning message has an influence of warning 
response. It also shows that people have paid attention to the warnings, but because 
people’s interpretation of what they hear is complex and subjective, the messages can 
be understood in multiple ways.  
Bushfire Warning Fatigue Subscales 
In the first part of this chapter, the elements that comprised bushfire warning fatigue 
were pinpointed by statistical analysis of the participants’ responses to the self-report 
bushfire warning fatigue measure. This section continues this analysis by looking at how 
the participants talked about each of these subscales: (i) Helplessness; (ii) Scepticism; 
(iii) Trust; (iv) Over-Warning and False alarms. It is in the context of ‘building a picture’ 
of warning fatigue (as a global construct) that these comments and opinions are 
highlighted. 
(i) Helplessness 
Risk communication literature (Davies, Covello and Allen 1986; Friedman, Gorney and 
Egolf 1987; Mackie 2012; Roche and Muskavitch 2003) has showed that self-efficacy is an 
important part of any disaster warning: people need to feel that there is something that 
they can do in the face of what often seems an insurmountable and overwhelming 
threat. Therefore it is not surprising that helplessness constituted one of the warning 
fatigue subscales. Participants talked at length about what they could do (or not do) in 
the face of a potential bushfire and, like the second cohort of interviewees, seemed to 
find much reassurance in those actions.  
 
Detailing their bushfire plan was one of the main ways participants showed that they 
felt less helpless, although, as one participant commented ‘Nothing could have ever 
prepared anyone for Black Saturday’ (D2). 
I am prepared to an extent, I have valuables boxed, know several different 
routes to get to the freeway (A1) 
 
Our plan is simple as we have a large dam close to the house - the kids 
abandon the house and head straight for the dam (L4) 
 
I have insured my property for the correct amount and they can worry 
about it (J2) 
 
Concepts related to helplessness – control, fatalism and powerlessness – were evident 
in the responses. Acknowledgment of the unpredictable nature of bushfire was a 
common thread: 
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Black Saturday showed bushfires can move extremely fast (A1) 
 
[it was] incredible and not predictable and not controllable (N1) 
 
If a grass fire came from the north with a strong wind there would be little 
chance of saving the house (S3) 
 
Participants’ perception of their level of control (their self-efficaciousness) differed 
across responses: 
I do feel that is possible to prepare our property to be defended (A3) 
 
[after Black Saturday] it was just luck! (D1) 
 
Whether bushfire preparation will be enough depends on factors out of 
our control –for example weather (J3) 
This comment from a participant who had experienced Black Saturday 
described how helpless she felt, in stark terms: 
 
There was no water, no electricity, no communications. [G4] 
 
These comments reinforce and build upon what previous interviewees have expressed. 
The degree to which the participants felt helpless was very dependent on how self-
efficacious the participants felt. This is in keeping with previous research discussed in 
chapter 4 that shows that self-efficacy is a predictor of coping behaviour, agency and 
resilience and positively correlated to self-control. Almost all of the participants seemed 
to have good knowledge of bushfire behaviour and the ramifications of a disastrous 
bushfire. Additionally, knowledge about weather conditions, especially those which 
precede a bad fire appeared high. For some this knowledge afforded them a degree of 
reassurance but for others, the knowledge highlighted just how vulnerable they could 
quickly become.  
(ii) Scepticism 
Scepticism involves a negative judgement about the accuracy of information and the 
motivations or ‘agendas’ of the source of that information. For the participants, the way 
they evaluated the accuracy of the warnings implied on the part of some participants a 
degree of scepticism. Several did not expect the warnings to be accurate: 
they are warnings - they alert us to the future which no one can predict 
absolutely – it’s a mistake to want them to be accurate (S3) 
 
I'm not sure how warnings can be defined this way - how can a warning be 
quantified as accurate or inaccurate? [J2] 
 
However, others were sure that the veracity, certainty and timeliness of warnings were 
lacking: 
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If the warnings on Black Saturday had been accurate there would have 
been many less lives lost [G5] 
 
they are often out of date by the time they are relayed [J1] 
 
Warnings are rarely accurate, lots of overkill, warnings when it’s not 
urgent or important [N1] 
  
A number of participants were equally sceptical about the emergency 
authorities and their motivation for issuing warnings: 
There is usually a high degree of butt-covering incorporated into the 
warning [G1] 
 
Again most have been an overprotection of the department managing 
them (nanny state stuff) [J2] 
Much of the problem is that the Vic government is unwilling to give real 
advice on anything lest it is sued for inadequate advice that is relied upon 
[L3] 
 
However, one participant issued her own warning: 
You would be a fool to question their accuracy - it is better to be warned 
and nothing come of it, than the other way round [L2] 
 
The comments in this section not only show that the accuracy of the warnings and the 
motivations of agencies are scrutinised for resonance with the participants own 
situation, but also that advice, however well intended, is seldom taken on face value. 
Warnings are not issued in a vacuum but in a past and present context where 
authorities have a reputation ‘of sorts’; warnings are then evaluated in relation to what 
the public know and believe about the authorities. Their warnings are also compared 
the public’s knowledge about their own environment and what they see as they go 
outside to assess the conditions. Often all the factors (visual cues, local knowledge, 
source credibility for example) need to combine to convince the public to take 
protective action.  
(iii) Trust 
Trust and credibility of both the warnings and those issuing them is an important 
determinant in public response to disaster warnings. The participants had strong 
opinions about whom they trusted, and which information they relied on when made 
aware of a potential bushfire. Some were unequivocal that the official advice was the 
best: 
Official advice does carry more weight than my own assessment - I expect 
that professional meteorologists and people in the emergency services 
have more information and expertise than I do [H1] 
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I am not an expert, I rely on official advice [L2] 
 
Official advice is given by experts with access to more broad resources 
than I have [M2] 
 
The majority of the comments suggested that a combination of trust in official advice 
and trust in their own assessment was the best way to evaluate their potential risk: 
Of course I believe my own eyes and ears but i don't discount the official 
news either. I use a combination of the two plus local networks and 
knowledge - everything I can in fact - to keep myself informed [S3] 
 
Official advice combined with personal assessment is the best option as 
far as I'm concerned [R1] 
 
I combine information from official channels with my own assessment [J3] 
 
Some of the comments demonstrate a well-known reality that, when people go looking 
for more information to verify a warning, they turn to their social networks: family,  
friends and neighbours: 
I go to some length to keep myself informed both through official and 
unofficial channels (friends throughout the area) [E1] 
 
I relied heavily on ABC radio and friends for my information [F1] 
 
On Black Saturday we survived because a neighbour called us and told us 
he believed the wind was going to change and the fire would head 
straight for our property. None of the "official" advice gave us this 
information [G5] 
  
Equally ‘trusted’ was people’s own knowledge of their environment: 
I think I am in a better position to make relevant judgements regarding 
the local conditions but temper that by saying I  am also guided by what 
they say might be coming. [I1] 
 
So I use my knowledge of local weather [M1] 
 
Also, on the morning of Black Saturday we had no birds in the garden- 
that was spooky and it felt eerie as we usually have lots of birds [F1] 
 
Lastly, many of the participants preferred to trust their local sources of 
information – radio, CFA or their own community: 
I do tend to rely on people that are on the ground 7 days a week to 
provide advice on the condition, dryness and flammability of the 
understory ground level file load [D2] 
 
Local radio tries to let you know what is happening where you are. Also I 
listen to the local brigade [N1] 
 
The local network is a better guide as to what is happening [G5] 
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Trust and credibility is an important category in this study: in the first section of this 
chapter correlation and factor analysis revealed that it had the highest internal 
consistency score (Cronbach’s .79) and the highest eigenvalue in the PCA (.919). 
There are many ‘types’ of trust that the participants talked about and all play a role in 
how people perceive risk and respond to warnings. For the most part, participants 
trusted the official news they heard, and they sought out known and ‘trusted’ sites 
(ABC news, local weather channel) for more information. It was only when the fire 
event became urgent, and participants wanted the information to be ‘up to the minute’, 
that fire information sources (CFA website, national news channels) became less 
credible. People trust themselves more often than they trust others when evaluating 
risky situations, especially when they are familiar with their environments and have had 
experience of similar events. They also ‘trust their gut’ as detailed in Chapter 7, (first 
analysis chapter); people’s intuition often comes to the fore in such situations, which 
may not be a ‘logical’ response but one that is used nonetheless. Words such as ‘a 
foreboding’ and ‘we just knew’ shows that, in unsettlingly uncertain scenarios, some 
people relied on their ‘sixth sense’ as much as their other senses. It’s difficult for 
disaster and emergency agencies to account for intuition in their warnings, but it should 
be acknowledged. People trust their own assessment of the environment they live in, 
because they consider they are more familiar with it than any emergency authority.  So 
when people hear warnings, they invariably go outside, looking for cues (flames, 
smoke) that confirm what they have heard. And they will often trust more what they 
see and sense than official information. In these often critical scenarios, the local 
authorities have the most influence in persuading people of the severity of a situation.. 
Trust is a broad category and importantly, it is not ‘a given’; when considering ‘trust’ as 
a component of warning fatigue it is important to acknowledge that many types of 
trust are talked about by the participants.  
(iv) Over-Warning and False Alarms 
The responses to the over-warning and false-alarms subscale statements were strongly 
at either end of the ‘agree/disagree’ scale. In fact some participants were scathing of 
those they thought were taking the warnings lightly: 
..and yes if you don't worry about bushfires whilst living in the bushfire-
prone area you are delusional and I'm sorry, an idiot. (D3) 
 
You would have to have your head in the sand to not have known of the 
risk (I1)  
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Most participants were happy with the level of warnings they received 
And I would prefer to be pre-warned so I have the danger in the back of 
my mind.. [A1] 
 
I feel they have the balance about right - I have not been aware of any 
warnings that have been frivolous [A2] 
 
False alarms still need to be heeded, just in case - you never know which 
one will be real [D2] 
 
However, some thought there were too many warnings and pointed to the possible 
consequences: 
I think too many warnings de-values them so that they become ignored 
(G2) 
 
Too many warning do lead to overkill and not listening, I have definitely 
reached this level. Too many official warnings that do not match the 
actual risk (N1) 
 
Warnings all the summer, not good, causes fear, complacency, bad for 
business and town. I work in a hospital; I just cannot not go to work, at 
every warning [G4] 
 
One of the recurring comments about reasons for the over-warning and false alarms 
was the event of Black Saturday and the subsequent over-use of the term 
‘catastrophic’: 
I think there has been an over-reaction since Black Saturday (E1) 
 
Many warnings are reactive to Black Saturday conditions … the authority 
has gone berserk - they are not realistic (N1) 
 
Bush fire ads on telly are still miles too soon for me..maybe in 7-10 years 
when people have forgotten they will be needed. Catastrophic days seem 
to have been wrongly assessed since Black Saturday. Panic merchants. 
(N1) 
 
The ‘dilemma’ that emergency authorities face when issuing warnings was 
acknowledged by several participants: 
I think for the authorities, it's very hard to strike the right balance. If they 
don't give enough warnings, and a serious bushfire occurs, then they'll be 
criticised terribly [L1] 
 
I do worry about that there is a conflict between covering the ‘risk’ to the 
community (ie the fire itself) and the ‘risk’ to the authorities, 
organisations (liability, political) as the latter all too often gets priority 
and compromises the former [G2] 
 
I'd rather have a false alarm than not be notified of something, and it 
turns very nasty. Then, everyone would be criticising [them] for not being 
vigilant or communicative enough [F2] 
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The last comment is representative of a common sentiment: 
 
Just because it did not happen this time does not mean it will not happen 
next time (H1) 
 
Many of the comments, criticisms and opinions about bushfire warnings and 
participants’ assessments of ‘how to do things better’ were in response to the over-
warning and false alarm statements. They appear to be mostly closely associated with 
the characteristics of warning fatigue and it was not unexpected that over-warning and 
false alarm constituted two of the five bushfire warning fatigue subscales. They also 
demonstrate how closely inter-related false alarms and over-warnings are. In fact, both 
subscales had the highest internal consistency and as the principle components analysis 
showed, were ‘more related’ to the construct of warning fatigue than scepticism, 
helplessness and worry. Even though there was sympathy expressed by some 
participants for the difficult role disaster and emergency agencies have in warning the 
public, there was a conviction that too many warnings diluted the urgency of warnings 
and could lead to people ignoring them. Moreover, the actions associated with the 
warnings, (leave early, evacuate) were difficult to adhere to on every occasion. People 
in bushfire areas do not just have to leave their house: they have businesses, and 
children in day-care, animals to be re-located and jobs they have to go to.  
 
‘Over-warning’ is more than just issuing too many warnings; it is disrupting peoples’ 
lives on a regular basis. Whilst some people may be able to hear many warnings and not 
become ‘fatigued’, there are others who, when they are exhorted to leave yet again, 
find the process too troublesome, and so pay less attention over time to the warnings. 
This is not because they don’t think the warnings are not important, but just not so 
important as to warrant the disruption they represent. Similarly, false alarms become 
the background to future warnings, and undermine the credibility of them more than 
any component in the warning fatigue construct. The comments about the 
‘catastrophic’ warning are important to note because these are the warnings about 
which people need to take the most notice. If they used too often without the 
predicted disastrous outcome, they become just like any other warning, and are 
regarded (or disregarded) in the same way.  
The Decrement of Bushfire Warning Fatigue in Context 
At each time point, the participants were asked “Since the last survey, has anything 
changed for you that you’d like to comment on?” In terms of what the participants 
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were asked to talk about, this question was ‘wide open’. Of the 34 participants, 28 
commented at one or more time points of the survey and of those 80 percent 
mentioned the cooler weather conditions. They talked about the rain, how wet 
everything was and the cooler mild conditions:  
.. things are still very green and there has been a fair bit of rain, so I'm not 
too worried at the moment [D2] 
 
All water tanks are full and the ground is soggy. [D4] 
 
it has rained a lot!!..It is still raining!!..The weather continues to be 
unbelievably benign! [J2] 
Sixty one percent of people talked about their perceived risk from bushfires, and most 
felt that, in comparison to previous bushfire seasons, their risk was low or had 
diminished throughout the fire season: 
 A wet, mild summer has decreased the immediate risk in this area [G1] 
 
I guess the main thing that has changed is that we've had so much rain - 
and now that it's late in the season, it seems as though there just isn't any 
fire risk [L1] 
 
Recent heavy rains have sharply decreased risks for March [L3] 
 
A similar number of participants also talked specifically about the fire season and 
compared it to previous fire seasons. Without exception this comparison showed that 
they thought the 2011 bushfire season was much different to the previous one, in that it 
was much wetter, had produced more fuel and they were less worried about bushfire 
than previous seasons:  
There has been no fire season here to speak of.. Yes, we've had a negligible 
and wet fire season [D2] 
 
It is a much cooler and wetter summer this year so any immediate threat 
isn't present [S1] 
 
Very low risk season apart from just one day of high temps and strong 
north wind in February [L4] 
 
A major premise of warning fatigue is that, for the effect to have an impact, the salience 
of a threat needs to be high in the absence of an actual event. Not only was the 2011 fire 
season wetter, but as a result, there were fewer warnings. The number of comments 
that indicated how much attention the participants paid to the bushfire warnings and 
how little bushfire were ‘on their mind’, suggests that salience could be an important 
indicator for understanding warning fatigue: 
I think the summer we've just had has pushed issues associated with 
bushfire into the background...thoughts of fire are a long way off [J2] 
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Only that as summer proceeds and there are no fires and few severe or 
Code Red days I think many people tend to become complacent - all the 
warnings serve to keep them thinking about the risk [M1] 
 
It has been a relatively mild summer so far from the perspective of 
bushfires so the sense of risk is not as heightened [P2] 
 
The following comment suggests that bushfire risk was so low that other concerns that 
were normally regarded as less important, took precedence:  
Therefore, the thought or threat of bushfire has not been particularly high 
in my or anyone else's minds..the whole thing has been a bit of a non-
event..(and) I have a lot of other pressing things to get done at the 
moment [D2] 
 
Chapter 4 clarified just how important anxiety was in people’s ability to respond to 
warnings and objectively perceive of risk. A main narrative from the participants about 
the 2011 fire season was as it continued into the New Year, they started to relax about 
the fire risk. During the 2011 fire season there were many other types of warnings, 
normally associated with winter - flooding, severe hail storms, record rainfalls – and so 
any attention that the participants were paying to the fire risk would have been 
attenuated. This diminishing sense of risk from bushfire would have become especially 
clear as Victoria approached its traditionally worst months for bushfire (January and 
February) and everything was still so wet and green. Many of the participants talked 
about the decreased bushfire risk as a result of all the rain, and they were happy about 
that. It is reasonable to conclude that as the 2011 fire season progressed, the 
participants evaluated their bushfire risk rationally and appropriately and therefore, 
their responses to the statement in the survey that teased out their warning fatigue 
levels reflected this evaluation.  
Discussion 
One of the hypotheses arising from the development of a bushfire warning fatigue 
measure, was that bushfire warning fatigue would increase over time. It was assumed 
that the 2011 fire season would be an average fire season; that is that it would be 
reasonably hot, with a number of minor to moderate fires but with no major events. 
The outcome of this type of fire season would be that the Victorian public (and the 
participants of the survey) would be warned regularly, continually and somewhat 
insistently throughout the fire season about potential fire events that most often would 
not eventuate. Therefore, the threat of bushfire would be constantly salient but not a 
direct threat. What actually happened was very different and very unusual; it could be 
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said that the 2011 fire season started with a bang and ended with a whimper. This was a 
very good outcome for the residents living in bushfire-prone areas, but it was not a 
typical fire season and certainly not what could be predicted given the weather 
patterns normally present at this time of year.  
 
If bushfire warning fatigue is usually high at the beginning of the fire season, regardless 
of how the fire season ‘plays out’, it could be expected to diminish. However, if bushfire 
warning fatigue is fundamentally dependent on the fire and weather conditions during 
the fire season, then it is possible that for a ‘normal fire season’, the results of the 
survey would have been quite different and analysis may have shown an increase in 
bushfire warning fatigue. The levels of bushfire warning fatigue could additionally be 
dependent on the number of similar past bushfire seasons; fire seasons which have not 
had major ‘catastrophic’ events such as the Black Saturday bushfires. The Victorian 2011 
fire season began as past bushfire seasons normally have, with warnings about the 
heavy fuel loads produced during the winter months, and with the annual CFA public 
bushfire mitigation and prevention campaigns. These campaigns were heavily 
promoted from the beginning of November onwards and encompassed most forms of 
media: television, radio, newspaper, brochures (letterbox drops) and social media (Face 
Book/Twitter). Added to the saliency of the imminent bushfire season was the 
publication of fire information from local CFA: roadside billboards, CFA community 
meetings, warnings (Advice/Watch and Act and Emergency). Added to these warnings 
were the Total Fire Ban days and, when conditions become dire, ‘Catastrophic’ Days.  
Figure 5 shows that there were a fraction of total messages (Advice, Watch and Act and 
Emergency Alerts) sent by OSOM193 in the 2011 fire season as compared to the number 
sent in the 2012 fire season. 
  
                                                                 
193
 The OSOM was an outcome of the Royal Commission after the 2009 Black Saturday bushfires. It is a 
system for creating and sending messages using standard incident message templates that have been 
designed using the National Framework for Scaled Advice and Warnings. They include messages from: 
Country Fire Authority (CFA), State Emergency Service (SES), Department of Sustainability and 
Environment (DSE) and parks Victoria (PV). 
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Figure 5: Comparison of Total Warning Messages sent during the 2011/12 and 2012/13 Fire Season 
Figure 6 shows that the number of Emergency Alerts sent by CFA (which are only fire-
related warnings) in the 2011 fire season were fewer than the following season 
(2012/2013). However, the State Emergency Service (SES) sent many more emergency 
alerts for this season; this is because the SES manage all potential threats and call-outs 
for flooding and storm-related incidents; these types of warnings over the 2011/2012 fire 
season far exceeded the 2012/2013 season totals.  
 
Figure 6: Comparison of Emergency Alerts sent by CFA and SES for the 2011/12 and 2012/13 Fire Season 
As the 2011 fire season progressed into December and predictions about the hottest 
part of the season (January/February) began to be made, the unusually wet and cold 
conditions suggested to both the public and fire authorities alike that the likelihood of 
bushfires in early 2012 was waning. Certainly the major storm on Christmas Day 2011 
added to this perception. With the memory of the Queensland floods still very fresh in 
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the minds of Australians, it appeared as if there was likelihood that flooding may 
become one of the ‘risks’ of the fire season!  
  
Figure 7: Total Types of Warnings sent during the 2011/2012 and 2012/2013 Fire Seasons  
The usefulness of Figure 7 is that it shows the types of warnings issued for each fire 
season and demonstrates that for the 2011/2012 season, there were just four of the 
most urgent warnings issued compared to 153 the following season. This is a further 
confirmation how benign the 2011/2012 fire season was compared to other fire seasons.  
 
The findings that bushfire warning fatigue decreased over the fire season, rather than 
increasing as predicted was unexpected, and raised some interesting questions as to 
why this was so. Through examining the participants’ comments about the fire season,  
as they experienced it, some of these questions were answered, and yet more have 
been raised. The possibility that there are other factors that contributed to bushfire 
warning fatigue, apart from Helplessness, Trust, Over-warning, Scepticism and False 
Alarm, must be considered. The components that were discarded through the process 
of analysis (Risk Perception, Apathy, Worry, Localisation and Normalisation) may yet be 
factors that need to be reintroduced for subsequent research. However, the analysis of 
results definitively showed that, in its current design, the bushfire warning fatigue 
measure should not include these components. A reason for the exclusions may be that 
all of the items for each subscale were not consistently designed, and they did not 
measure the same component in the same way. It may also be that the statements 
elicited another type of response other than the one intended, confounding the results.  
 
The context in which the participants were operating when completing the survey has 
been explained, mostly in terms of the weather during that time. What has not been 
considered was the types of media the participants were being exposed to, and the 
‘unofficial’ warning messages they were hearing, especially prior to the fire season. If,  
as suggested, bushfire warning fatigue may be highest at the beginning of the fire 
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season, then understanding the media context of the preceding months may be 
important. For example, in October 2011 the ABC News published an article from a 
respected scientist warning of a catastrophic 2011 fire season: 
Retired CSIRO scientist David Packham says a repeat of the summer of 
1974-75 is a strong possibility [and warned that] Australia faces a 
catastrophic bushfire risk, similar to a summer of the mid-1970s when 15 
per cent of the continent went up in flames (ABC News 2011) 
  
This very specific risk communication, whilst not ‘official’ in the traditional sense, still 
serves to warn the public about bushfires. These types of ‘warnings’ combined with 
more official public education campaigns may result in a public that become fatigued 
over the winter months. These are considerations for further research. 
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10: CONCLUSION 
Discussion 
This phenomenon [warning fatigue] is too complicated to be adequately 
studied in its ‘natural environment’. That can be done later, when we 
become equipped with some knowledge about the relevant main effects 
and with some analytic tools to ask good questions (Breznitz 1984:23) 
 
This thesis studied warning fatigue in the ‘natural environment’ – in the everyday lives 
of people living in bushfire-prone areas of Australia. This research established that, for 
those interviewees who participated in the studies, warning fatigue was credited with 
inhibiting attention to bushfire warnings, changing the way they thought about their 
bushfire risk and affecting warning response. A major implication of this research is that 
warning fatigue can be operationalised, enabling disaster and emergency agencies who 
are concerned about warning fatigue in their communities, to adapt their risk 
communication accordingly. The following sections conclude the major findings of this 
thesis, the ways that the research has addressed the gaps in the disaster and warning 
response literature, and the implications of this research for communicating risk in 
other prolonged lead-time disaster scenarios.  
 
A substantive search of the literature found that conventional wisdom assumed that 
warnings which were not followed by the predicated event reduced vigilance and 
preparation. Moreover, warning fatigue was considered a taken-for-granted 
phenomenon that, in everyday life, generated complacency about the risk, and 
scepticism about the veracity of the warnings. Interviews with people living in the 
bushfire-prone areas of Tasmania, Victoria, New South Wales and Queensland showed 
that these discourses about warning fatigue were echoed in their bushfire risk 
narratives. Warning fatigue was subsequently conceptualised as a multi-faceted 
phenomenon comprising five main components. The findings of a survey that used a 
self-report bushfire warning fatigue measure conducted over a six month bushfire 
season, found that warning fatigue changed over that period. The main reasons for that 
change are hypothesised to be related to the context in which the participants were 
living and the influence of ‘unofficial’ warnings which came mainly from the media prior 
to the bushfire season. This research has established that warning fatigue is evident 
when: 
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1) People are distrustful of the message source, which in turn, renders the message less 
credible. 
2) People feel helpless and less self-efficacious in the face of warnings about imminent 
disasters of frightening proportions. 
3) There have been multiple false alarms for similar threats with little or no explanation 
from authorities about the reasons for the false alarms. 
4) There have been many and repeated warnings over a prolonged period and long in 
advance of the threatened event.  
5) People become sceptical as a result of these factors combined with their own 
evaluation of their situation which is a combination of: multiple knowledges about their 
environment, their assessment of their ability to cope, the actions they took in a 
previous threat event (and the outcomes) and their perceived social resources.   
 
However, since the first scientific study of warning fatigue by Breznitz in 1984, and 
despite few subsequent studies, disaster theorists have relegated warning fatigue to a 
myth. Regardless of the dismissal of warning fatigue from within the field of disaster 
theory, in the ‘natural environment’ academics, practitioners, disaster and emergency 
managers, and the public continue to believe in the face of a potential disaster, 
‘warning fatigue’ (or the ‘cry wolf effect’) or is a real barrier to effective communication 
and timely decision-making. In the absence of knowing what warning fatigue is – what it 
‘looks like’, what it comprises of, how strong an effect it may be, who is impacted by it 
and in what contexts – the influence that warning fatigue has upon risk communication 
and risk perception continues to be assumed and speculative. This thesis represents the 
first reported empirical examination of warning fatigue in the context of prolonged 
lead-time disasters. The phenomenon was hypothesised to be a unique combination of 
risk perception, frequency of warning messages, the type of disaster and warning lead-
time. Australian bushfires exemplify a potential prolonged lead-time disaster and 
provided an ideal context in which to explore warning fatigue.  
 
To date, disaster literature has made little distinction between rapid-onset disasters and 
those which have a prolonged lead-time. As discussed in chapter 3, typifying a disaster 
as having a prolonged lead-time is problematic and certainly, once a bushfire begins it 
can become a rapid-0nset threat. However, more typically, disaster-level bushfires 
occur in Australia once every 10-20 years and as such (for the purposes of 
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understanding warning fatigue in this context) have been characterised as a prolonged 
lead-time threat. Making a distinction between types of disasters has implications for 
the way warnings are devised and communicated. Risk communication has become a 
‘catch-all’ term for information about risk, but this thesis argues that risk should be 
communicated very differently depending on the type of threatened event. In rapid-
onset scenarios (tornados, hurricanes, cyclones for example) studies have shown that 
risk communication is believed more and responded to more often than warning 
messages about prolonged lead-time disasters. This is primarily because rapid-onset 
threats often provide visual cues, are more likely to be of the magnitude predicted and 
have more certainty about when and where they will arrive. As the literature has 
shown, risk communication in these scenarios has more in common with crisis 
communication and is rarely (if ever) prone to warning fatigue. Prolonged lead-time 
disasters - bushfire, earthquakes, pandemics, volcanic eruptions for example - need a 
different risk communication; it is in this context that this thesis argues warning fatigue 
influences risk perception and warning response.  
 
 
Figure 8: ‘You Have Been Warned’, Dominion Post, July 15, 2011, A1 
Keeping a risk salient over long periods of time poses challenges for disaster and 
emergency authorities and this thesis has demonstrated that information about an 
uncertain threat is processed very differently compared with a warning about a threat 
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whose outcome is more conclusive. The headline and front page story in Figure 8 is 
typical of the type of risk information that the public sees. This is important to note 
because experts routinely use the media to communicate threat information, and the 
findings of this thesis suggest that experts may underestimate the effects that 
continued, non-specific information can generate. The public can regard generalised 
indeterminate threats to be of little importance compared with the demands of their 
day-to-day lives. The news story depicted is not an ‘official warning’ in the true sense. 
However, it is certainly a type of risk communication and the public often perceive it as 
such. The qualitative analyses of the three studies reported in this thesis showed that 
the participants did not generally differentiate between an ‘official’ and a ‘non-official’  
warning. Therefore, this thesis suggests that after multiple ‘non-official’ warnings (and 
where no disaster eventuates), the public may dismiss the information as untrue and 
not relevant; they may downplay or even ignore the risk. Importantly, the next time a 
similar threat is warned about, their reaction most often could be the same. As the 
literature chapters showed, few studies had examined warning fatigue in either a rapid-
onset or prolonged lead-time disaster scenario. The authors in the following literatures 
have highlighted short-comings in present knowledge about public warning response 
and decision-making and identified areas for further research; this thesis provides a way 
to address the knowledge gaps described below.  
 
There has been little research which has directly addressed the effects of warnings on 
decision-making (Lehto and Miller 1986), and empirical research on the effects of 
warning messages ‘have been neither systematic nor conclusive’ (Stewart and Martin 
1994:1). Breznitz (1984) called the field research on warning fatigue ‘limited’ and Barnes 
et al. (2007) suggested that their conceptual model of warning accuracy (which showed 
false alarms on a warning continuum) be revised to ‘more accurately represent the 
success of warnings’ (1146). The link between false alarms and the perception of 
warning quality was also highlighted by Simmons and Sutter (2009) to be an area for 
future research as they had not been able to find direct evidence that ‘false alarms 
affected the perceived credibility of warnings’ (52). This thesis devised an adapted 
version of the Barnes et a. (2007) model which, in the context of false alarms, bought 
the public into the ‘frame’ and imagined how their response could be understood as an 
aspect of warning fatigue.  
218 
 
Little work has been done to explain individual variations in response to warnings, 
especially in relation to the timeliness component (Sorenson 2000). When pondering 
implications for public perception of risk from cyclone warnings, Reser (1996) argued 
that there needed to be a better understanding of how ‘psychological and social factors 
interact with reception and response to warning communication’ (207). Studies that 
clarify how warning messages are processed by individuals and how this processing 
affects response have been suggested as ‘a particular fruitful avenue for further 
research’ (Martin et al. 2009). Moreover, Martin et al. note that the only way to 
effectively communicate risk is to understand what things influence individual risk 
perception and risk reduction behaviours. The interdisciplinary methodology of this 
research sought to understand ‘subjectivity in the social domain’, thus teasing out 
individual response within the wider social environments.  
 
In 2006 the U.S National Research Council committee on disaster research in the social 
sciences said that ‘far less is known about how the characteristics of different hazard 
types affect disaster preparedness and response’. It suggested that understanding the 
relationship between these two aspects ‘would directly facilitate the adoption of more 
effective disaster preparedness and mitigation practices’.  The typology of disasters 
proposed in Chapter 3 clearly makes a distinction between different hazard types and 
because the members of the public think about their risk in very different ways, 
suggests that rapid-onset and prolonged lead-time disasters and warnings need to be 
differentiated. Importantly, in the context of Australian bushfires, Beatson and 
McLennan (2010) call for an ‘understanding of how  to enhance the likelihood that 
people will personalise and act upon warnings [because it would] improve bushfire 
community safety’ (9). These calls from disaster and natural hazards literature for 
further research demonstrate that, by exploring risk perception and decision-making 
from the point of view of people who live in bushfire-prone areas of Australia, and by 
examining the role that warning fatigue plays in their responses to bushfire warnings, 
the importance of the topics addressed by this thesis contributes a valuable and distinct 
perspective to the existing body of knowledge.  
 
The ways in which members of the public respond to disaster threats have been 
discussed in the literature which has largely concentrated on behavioural responses; 
intentions, preparedness, evacuation and survival factors. A few of these literatures 
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have examined these responses to media effects and the conventions of disaster 
reporting. Notably, these studies have been confined rather narrowly to the disciplines 
of the researchers involved - psychology, sociology, media and communication or 
disaster studies – and so the findings have been very ‘discipline-centric’. A strength of 
the methodology used this thesis is that it drew upon inter-disciplinary understandings 
and did not privilege one ‘knowledge’ over another. The processes involved in risk 
perception are multi-faceted, and cannot be addressed nor understood without 
acknowledging the interplay between the psychological and the social. Individuals 
cannot be understood in isolation from their cultural and social environments and just 
as importantly, the meanings of risk and bushfire are not a ‘given’: they are constantly 
being defined and redefined as people interact with each other. Risk perception is both 
a subjective and social process. By drawing upon insights from both social psychology 
and sociology this thesis enabled an integrated understanding of the issues involved in 
disaster warning response. Additionally this trans-disciplinary approach revealed 
similarities in how public and individual risk responses are conceptualised within the 
different disciplines. This thesis used a mixed methods epistemology which applied  
both qualitative and quantitative methods to explore the phenomenon of warning 
fatigue. This allowed for a flexible yet complimentary approach which was able to 
examine the problem of seemingly ineffective disaster risk communication ‘from many 
angles’. The integrated and inter-disciplinary philosophy that underpinned the 
methodology for this thesis affords relevant and practical research applicable to diverse 
audiences.  
 
Reactions to repeated warnings in the subsequent absence of a threat have been 
thought by disaster theorists to involve elements of desensitisation, complacency, 
scepticism and apathy; these were evident in the interviews with participants living in 
bushfire-prone areas of Australia.  Study (I) and (II) showed that, for people living in 
bushfire-prone areas of Australia, bushfire warning fatigue was credited with poor 
decision-making and a frequent disregard for the annual bushfire warnings. Study (III) 
culminated in a conceptualisation of warning fatigue and the design of a bushfire 
warning fatigue measure. Analysis of the literature and interview data revealed some 
common themes which were used as constructs of a multifaceted bushfire warning 
fatigue phenomenon. The facets or sub-themes were operationalised initially in a ten 
construct, 40-item self-report survey measure, which was used as the basis of a tool to 
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measure warning fatigue. This tool (BWFM) was used to measure bushfire warning 
fatigue over the annual bushfire season in Victoria. Quantitative analysis revised the 
self-report measure to comprise five inter-correlated aspects: Trust/Credibility, Over-
Warning, False Alarms, Scepticism and Helplessness. The revised measure (BWFM-R) 
was used to investigate warning fatigue levels over time, finding a small but statistically 
significant change in bushfire warning fatigue over the fire season. The results suggest 
that warning fatigue is a quantifiable phenomenon that is able to be measured; 
furthermore that it changes over time.  
It was conjectured early on in the thesis, that perhaps there would have been 
differences in responses between the first cohort of interviewees and the second. It 
was assumed (wrongly as it turned out) that those who were actively involved in 
personal and community bushfire preparation activities would be more ‘engaged’ in the 
issues of bushfire risk and thus more prepared for a bushfire event than those who 
were not. This was found to be an inaccurate representation of the two cohorts: the 
second group were just as engaged in issues of bushfire risk, and many of the themes 
and topics arising from the first interviews were reflected in the second. The second 
group did not give high priority to attending neighbourhood meetings to learn how to 
prepare, but this did not meant that they were less prepared or socially connected – 
their connections were typically people in their own social networks. However, there 
was a big difference in the way that they talked about their bushfire risk; possibly 
because of the more focused nature of the second study. Analysis of the second 
interview data set concentrated on the ‘sense-making’ of the participants as they 
rationalised, justified and reassured themselves about their continued decision to live 
‘in the bush’. Many of their responses echoed the psychosocial stress appraisals and the 
adaptive and maladaptive coping strategies discussed in chapter 4.  
The scope of the research for this thesis was restricted to the definition of ‘official’  
bushfire warnings as communicated by the Australian fire authorities. However, one of 
the main conclusions from the findings was that the role of the media may be crucial in 
influencing the public’s ‘level’ of warning fatigue. Media stories about bushfires 
constitute much of the unofficial warning information the public are exposed to 
throughout the year and certainly, the participants in all three studies talked about the 
media a great deal. The results from Study (III) found that the participants’ level of 
warning fatigue was highest at the beginning of the bushfire season and the direction 
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of this change unexpected. This is because warning fatigue was hypothesised to result 
from the public receiving multiple warnings about a threat which, over time, did not 
materialise. In the Australian bushfire context, it was imagined that as the bushfire 
season progressed without any disastrous bushfires, the continued warnings that 
bushfires were imminent would increase bushfire warning fatigue.  
Therefore, a new hypothesis arising from the research is that year-round media stories 
about bushfires constitute unofficial warnings, so by the time the official bushfire public 
education programmes begin (just prior to the bushfire season), the public is weary of 
the bushfire rhetoric and ‘react’ accordingly to the spectre of ‘yet another catastrophic’ 
bushfire season. This could explain why the level of bushfire warning fatigue was 
highest at the beginning of the bushfire season and declined as the season progressed. 
Another factor that may have influenced this decrement is the context in which the 
survey was conducted. The 2011 bushfire season was unusually wet, with many more 
emergency warnings and callouts for flooding and wet weather-related events than for 
bushfires; as pertinent was that fewer bushfire risk warnings were issued. The public 
simply had ‘other things to worry’ about and, as discussed, made realistic assessments 
of their bushfire risk based on experience, information from their social networks and 
their knowledges of fire behaviour and immediate environments.  
Implications and Recommendations 
This research has challenged the long-held assumption that ‘cry wolf effect’ or warning 
fatigue is a disaster myth, and as such, should be placed in the same category as ‘mass 
panic’ and ‘social disruption’. Disaster literature to date has repeated this assumption, 
yet paradoxically much of the literature has also adopted warning fatigue as 
‘conventional wisdom’. This literature expresses puzzlement as to why the public do 
not respond to disaster warnings in rational and recommended ways. This observation 
can be extended further to imagine that disasters which are ‘a long time coming’ are 
prepared for less and responded to quite differently than rapid-onset disasters. For 
example, even though scientists insist that the potential driver of increased disaster risk 
- climate change -  is approaching faster than even before, for the majority of the public,  
this is a potential disaster which has little impact upon their daily lives; for most it will 
not affect them in their lifetime. Therefore, this re-theorisation of risk communication is 
valuable in establishing the influence of warning fatigue in prolonged lead-time threats 
such as climate change, which is an important consideration for further research.  
222 
 
As the third study demonstrated, warning fatigue was able to be operationalised using 
a self-report measure comprising five subscales; the analytic process discarded five 
other subscales originally thought to be a part of a global bushfire warning fatigue 
construct. These discarded subscales were Desensitisation/Normalisation, Risk 
Perception, Localisation/Relevance, Apathy, and Worry. It is worthwhile to ponder why 
these subscales did not ‘make it’ into the final measure and perhaps any future use of 
the bushfire warning fatigue measure (BWFM-R) needs to reconsider these subscales. It 
may be, for example, that the way in which the questions were asked for these 
subscales led to responses that were not a good indication of how the participants 
really thought about the particular subscales. It could be that the original idea to include 
the subscales, for example risk perception, was valid but the statements were not 
devised in ways that were specific enough to the participant’s context. It may also be 
useful to consider other subscales related to the existing warning fatigue subscales. For 
example, self-efficacy could be thought of as on the ‘helplessness’ continuum. Perhaps 
if a warning fatigue measure was designed which included self-efficacy as a subscale, 
the measure would be more robust and the results more conclusive.  
 
One of the findings of Study (III) - that bushfire warning fatigue decreased over the fire 
season - was an important albeit unexpected finding. The hypothesis that arose out of 
that finding was that the media act as ‘unofficial’ risk communicators in disaster 
scenarios. By reporting about bushfires during the winter months, for example by 
quoting predictions about the upcoming fire season from scientists and meteorologists, 
the media prime the public to think about bushfires. This keeps that risk of bushfires 
more salient than perhaps they need to be and encourages the public to pay attention 
to a threat that in the winter months is non-existent, and for the summer up ahead, is a 
long way off. This thesis suggests therefore, that an in-depth analysis of media 
reporting during the winter months would clarify the types of bushfire stories, the 
frequency of reporting and the strength of predictions about the upcoming bushfire 
risk. It would be equally useful to run the bushfire warning fatigue survey over this time 
period for three purposes: 1) to establish a bushfire warning fatigue baseline, 2) to 
measure the level of bushfire warning fatigue to explore any changes over time (and in 
what direction) and 3) to ultimately determine whether bushfire warning fatigue is 
more influenced by ‘unofficial’ than by ‘official’ risk communication.  
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This thesis argues that far from being a myth, warning fatigue can influence how the 
public perceive, interpret and respond to uncertain disasters. The uncertainties 
associated with prolonged lead-time disasters make it difficult for the emergency 
authorities and the public alike to know when to pay attention to disaster warnings. 
More specifically, this thesis proposes that trust, helplessness, over-warning, false 
alarms and scepticism play a large part in these perceptions and responses. A 
recommendation of this research is that, for disaster and emergency authorities who 
are concerned about warning fatigue, it is important to pay attention to the 
relationships between the emergency agencies and the community. The credibility of 
the warning source leads to greater trust in the veracity of the warnings. Emergency 
managers may also need to take into account the false alarm rates for similar disasters 
in the past. Moreover, when a false alarm happens (and for prolonged lead-time 
disasters this is more common than not), explanations to the public as to the reasons 
for the false alarm are imperative. Related to false alarms is the problem of over-
warning; when events are warned about and do not happen. These warnings are 
sometimes interpreted by the public as ‘happening too often’ with the inference being 
that they are unnecessary. Disaster and emergency agencies must tread a fine line 
between over-warning and under-warning – it is not an enviable task or an exact 
science. This research has shown that over-warning contributes to warning fatigue and 
suggests that more research needs to be done to look at the specific content of the 
warnings. Perhaps only the most urgent threat situation needs to be warned about and 
more general information conveyed about less urgent threats. For example, 
participants from the second study wanted more specific information about fuel load 
and moisture content.  
 
The timeliness of warnings is an important consideration for avoiding over-warning the 
public. The warnings not only need to be relevant to the location of the threatened 
community, but also communicated in time for the public to take avoidant action if 
necessary. If they are issued too early, the urgency to take action is compromised and 
the uncertainty of the threat is increased. Many studies including the ones conducted 
for this thesis, have found that the public can be sceptical about risk communication, 
especially when the media are involved. Transparency and honesty from the disaster 
agencies about their level of knowledge about the impending threat can go some way 
towards mitigating public scepticism. It is just as valuable to tell the public what is not 
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known about a possible threat, as it is to tell them what is known and what might 
happen. The helplessness and fatalism that many people feel in the face of a seemingly 
overwhelming disaster plays a part in creating a warning fatigue effect. Therefore, 
improving the self-efficacy ‘component’ of any disaster warning is crucial; warnings 
should have information about the threat but also include ways to protect and mitigate; 
these warnings could also detail actions to be avoided.  
 
The sensational nature of the language used in warnings has been shown to undermine 
the message. In particular, as Sandman (2013) has pointed out, exaggerating the 
likelihood may be worse for generating warning fatigue, than overemphasising the 
magnitude. Whilst acknowledging that warning fatigue is a real phenomenon, he 
maintains that compared to warnings which overstate likelihood, when warnings 
dramatize or exaggerate how bad a disaster might be, warning fatigue becomes less of 
an issue. However, the analysis of the interview transcripts did not always reflect 
Sandman’s (ibid.) premise and one of the strongest statements from a participant on 
any issue was about the overstatement of magnitude: ‘….[the] radio saying ‘oooh, 
‘catastrophic’ , the world’s going to burn you’re all dead, best move’. When I hear that I 
think ‘go to hell, I don’t’ believe you’ [RC]. In the context of warning fatigue, it would be 
useful to develop a study that teases out these two different types of warning 
messages and the public’s responses to them. 
 
The qualitative analysis of the data in all three studies showed that all the participants, 
regardless of their location, or how involved they were in their local Fireguard activities, 
were not just passive ‘actors’ in the bushfire risk scenarios in which they lived. Rather 
than just hearing warning messages (issued according to the FFDI guidelines and when 
the authorities thought it necessary), the participants were already actively making risk 
judgements and thinking about their risk in multiple ways. Bushfire warnings were just 
one of many indicators of impending risk that the participants were aware of and for 
many, they did not privilege the warnings over their own assessments of risk. This has 
implications for how the authorities warn about bushfire. Perhaps bushfire warnings 
need to be specifically local in their content, which could ‘close the gap’ between what 
the people are hearing from the authorities and what they see when they ‘walk outside’ 
and make their own assessments. 
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At the outset of this research it was noted that warning fatigue was imagined to be a 
myth by many disaster theorists; it was a concept ‘in the shadows’, the form of which 
was difficult to determine. This thesis began with no a priori assumption that warning 
fatigue was a phenomenon, or (if it was) that it had an effect upon risk perception and 
decision-making. This thesis sought to ‘put flesh on the bones’ of this myth, to d raw it 
out of the shadows and bring the phenomenon into focus. In conclusion, this thesis 
argues that warning fatigue is contextual, it can change over time and may be 
influenced as much by official warnings as unofficial ones. Trust and credibility, over-
warning, false alarms, scepticism and helplessness are not new factors in public warning 
response to disaster communication. However, this research demonstrates that they 
combine in a unique way to produce the phenomenon of ‘warning fatigue’. It proposes 
that if emergency and disaster agencies differentiate between rapid-onset and 
prolonged lead-time disasters, understand the complexities of warning fatigue and 
design their warnings accordingly, then disaster risk communication will become more 
effective, increasing public engagement and improving disaster response. 
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Appendices 
1. Study I 
1.1 Ethics Approval 
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1.2 Consent Form 
 
 
Telephone Interview Consent Form               School of Psychology 
     University of Tasmania 
 
Risk perception and Warnings: the Australian bushfires 
 
1. I have read and understood the ‘Information Sheet’ for this study. 
2. The reasons for the study, what it will involve, and the possible effects of the study have been 
explained to me. 
3. I understand that an interview/interviews will be conducted with me to obtain an 
understanding of my views on bushfire preparedness. It is my understanding that the 
interview(s) will take approximately 30-40 minutes to complete.  
4. With my agreement, the interview can be recorded. I understand that I have the right to 
request that the interview is not recorded.  
5. I agree that information gathered for the study may be published provided that I cannot be 
identified as a participant. I also understand that while my interview will be recorded, my 
anonymity will be assured, as it is not necessary to record my name or any other identifying 
information in this recording.   
6. I understand that all research data will be securely stored at the School of Psychology, 
University of Tasmania in a secure location for a period of five years and that the recordings 
and the data will be destroyed at the end of five years. 
7. I understand that no psychological distress or inconvenience beyond the normal experience of 
everyday life is expected.   
8. Any questions that I have asked about this process have been answered to my satisfaction. 
9. I agree to participate in the interview session and understand that my participation is 
voluntary, that I may withdraw at any time and withdraw any information/data supplied to 
date without being penalised or disadvantaged in any way. 
  
I am happy to have the interview tape recorded: (circle 0ne)           Yes  No                     
 
Name of participant :...………………………………………………………….…..(please print) 
 
Signature of participant:….…………………………….....   Date:…………………………… 
 
Contact Number: (hm)……………………........................(mobile)................................................ 
 
Preferred time to call (Day/time)………………........./…………............... 
 
Statement by investigator: 
I have explained this project and the implications of participation in it to this interviewee and I believe that 
the consent is informed and that he/she understands the implications of participation. 
 
Name of Investigator:………………………………..Signature ……………………………… 
Date:………………………………….... 
 
 
Please post to:                                             Brenda Mackie, 
33 Sinclair Ave, Lower Templetstowe, Melbourne, Victoria 3107. 
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1.3 Participant Information Sheet 
 
 
 
 
School of Psychology 
University of Tasmania  
“Risk perception and Warnings: the Australian bushfires” 
 
TELEPHONE INTERVIEW INFORMATION SHEET 
 
Invitation 
You are invited to participate in a research study that intends to examine factors that influence individual 
and community bushfire preparedness. This study is being conducted by Brenda Mackie to fulfil the 
requirements for a PhD in Psychology, and is being supervised by Professor Douglas Paton.  
 
Objective of the Study 
This research will assess factors that influence how and why people make decisions about preparing or not 
preparing for bushfires. Warnings are an integral part of decision making and the telephone interview will 
include questions that will hopefully initiate discussion about what warnings mean, how they are understood 
and whether they are effective in enabling people to make decisions which enhances safety in the event of a 
bushfire. 
  
The information produced by this research will be used to improve the effectiveness of bushfire risk messages 
by tailoring the information content and the ways in which it is delivered to the public. This will also help 
ensure that targeted public education programs can be developed which will meet the needs of the 
community.  
 
What’s involved as a participant?  
As a participant you will be asked to take part in a telephone interview between you and the researcher, to be 
conducted, at a time that suits you between  April and May 2011.  
 
With your permission, telephone interviews will be digitally recorded. While we will need a name and 
telephone number to conduct the interview, no personal or identifying information will be used in the 
transcript of your interview. This will ensure that your interview data remain anonymous.  
 
What will happen to the information provided? 
The information collected will be used to inform the analysis and findings for the researchers PhD which 
will, in due course, be published  by the University of Tasmania http://www.library.utas.edu.au/. (This is the 
link where the thesis will be found). The data will be stored for five years in a locked cabinet, and all raw 
data will be destroyed at the end of the five-year period. 
 
If you would like to participate in this study, please complete the attached consent form. 
 
Thanking you in advance for your assistance in this project. 
 
Brenda Mackie 
 
 
The above project has received ethical approval from the Human Research Ethics Committee (Tasmania) 
Network. If you have concerns or complaints about the conduct of this study you should contact the 
Executive Officer of the HREC (Tasmania) Network on (03) 6226 7479 or email human.ethics@utas.edu.au.  
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1.4 Recruitment 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Improving Community Bushfire response                    
 
*What do you think of the bushfire warnings? 
                                  *What’s wrong or right with them? 
                                                      *Do you feel as if you have been ‘over-warned’? 
If you have an opinion on any or all of the above questions, then I would love to talk to you! 
 
Why is this important? 
Preparing is seen as an important factor helping communities safeguard their wellbeing and minimise 
disruption (e.g., damage to property, loss of work) should a bushfire threaten them.  
The recent report from the Royal Commission recommended that more research be done that looks at 
whether the way that people process warnings make a difference in how decisions about preparing for 
bushfires are made. 
 
What’s the aim of my research? 
This research will investigate factors that impact on the decision-making and risk-assessment processes in 
regards to bushfires. 
It is hoped that the results from the research will enhance the effectiveness of bushfire risk messages by 
tailoring the information content and the ways in which it is delivered to the public.  
 
Benefit to the community? 
The information provided by community members will be used to help develop more effective and 
targeted bushfire public education programs for the community and contribute to bushfire communication 
research.  
 
How can you help? 
This research needs to know what people think about warnings and a great way to do this is through 
interviews which would take about 45 minutes and be conducted via the telephone. The telephone 
interview will include questions that will cover issues of ‘how to do things better’ and participants’ concerns 
and opinions. 
You will be eligible if you: 
 Are a community member living in a bushfire-risk area 
 Are willing to be interviewed by telephone before the fire-season 
If you wish to be involved or want more information please contact: 
 
Brenda Mackie :-            bamackie@utas.edu.au  
 
This study has been approved by the University of Tasmania Human Resources Ethics Committee and is supervised by Professor 
Douglas Paton. 
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1.5 Interview Protocol 
 
 
 
Telephone Interview Schedule – Questions and prompts 
(Pre Bushfire Season) 
 
**Bushfire and understanding and preparation. 
****Bushfire warnings and perceptions of risk. 
 
1. How long have you lived in __________________?  
 [Do you live in ______________all year round or is this mainly a holiday residence?] 
 Why do you live in/did you move to____________? 
 
2. Have you or any of your family experienced a bushfire? (details/tell me about it) 
 [So], do you think it’s something you need to pay attention to? Why/why not? 
 
3. Do you believe there is a bushfire risk in your community? 
 Did you consider this when you moved to the area? 
 Have you built your house with, or made any renovations that incorporate building 
design characteristics that are considered bushfire safe? 
 
4. In regards to the upcoming bushfire season, have you begun preparing for, or thought about 
how you might prepare for bushfires? Why? Why not?  
 
5. (If you do prepare) when do you normally begin making preparation for the bushfire season? 
[and]what sort of things do you do to prepare? 
 Yourself/your family 
 Your property 
 Are there any limitations to your ability to prepare? 
 Do these preparations include a bushfire plan?  
 
6. So does doing these things make your feel safer about the prospect of possible bushfires? 
 
7. How prepared do you think you and your family are, compared to others. Why? 
 What about your community compared to others? 
 
8. [Are you involved in any active community-safety activities in relation to bushfires?] 
 
9. Whose responsibility do you believe it is to ensure the bushfire preparedness of the 
community? 
 
10. Is there anything that prompts you to begin thinking about/preparing for the upcoming 
bushfire season? (Media/Weather/Friends/family/neighbours) 
 
11. Where do you go to get information about bushfires? (media/friends/internet/community 
forums) 
 Do you think the information’s adequate? Why? (want more info, less info) 
 Do you differentiate between information and warning? 
 
12. Do you know about the Royal Commission report and its findings? Tell me about that. 
13. What do you think about the way the media reports issues to do with bushfires?  
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14.[ Do you make a distinction between what the media are saying and reports that come 
directly from the Royal Commission (or they one-in-the-same?)] 
 
15. What do you think about how bushfires are warned about?  
 (for example) there is a recommendation that, if you plan to leave, you need to leave 
early. What does ‘early’ mean to you? 
 
16. Does ‘prepare to leave early or stay and defend’  imply that if you’re prepared, you’ll be OK? 
 
17. Tell me about some bushfire warnings that you know about.  
 Are you aware that they’ve been changed recently to include a ‘catastrophic’ category? 
(for Tasmania) ‘Code red’ for Victoria. What is your understanding of this word?  
 Do you think there is a possibility that (because of this new category) people will ignore 
the less severe ratings and wait until they hear ‘Code Red’ to act? 
 
18. Do you know what the ‘Fire Danger Rating’ means? (the numbers that have accompanied 
the categories)  
 (so, if they do) do these numbers mean more to you that the categories (high, very high, 
severe) 
 
19. When do you start to think that you may need to act – very 
high/severe/extreme/catastrophic  
 [and/or] are those categories reassuring to you that the danger hasn’t reached the 
maximum? 
 
20. If there was a serious bushfire unfolding in your vicinity, what warnings do you think you 
will get? [list]  - 
 Do you think there would be a serious fire that you weren’t warned about? 
 
21. How would you like warnings about possible bushfires to be told to you? For example, only 
if the authorities are really sure it’s going to happen, (‘leave now’) or lots of warnings over a 
period of time that includes information such as temperature, wind, moisture, likelihood? 
 
22. Do you think there can be too many warnings? Why/Why not? 
 
23. Can you remember being warned of the likelihood of a bushfire, and it not eventuating?  
 Does that make you more or less inclined to pay attention to the next one? 
 
24. Are there other ‘risks’ to yourself or your family that you think about?  
 Have you prepared for any of those? If so, in what way? 
 
25. Any other comments? 
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2. Study II 
2.1 Ethics Approval 
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2.2 Consent Form 
 
 
 
 
                                    
  
Telephone Interview Consent Form 
 
“Risk Communication and Warning Fatigue: the Australian bushfires” 
 
1. I have read and understood the ‘Information Sheet’ for this study. 
2. The reasons for the study, what it will involve, and the possible effects of the study have been 
explained to me. 
3. I understand that an interview/interviews will be conducted with me to obtain an 
understanding of my views on bushfire preparedness. It is my understanding that the 
interview(s) will take approximately 30-40 minutes to complete.  
4. With my agreement, the interview can be recorded. I understand that I have the right to 
request that the interview is not recorded.  
5. I agree that information gathered for the study may be published provided that I cannot be 
identified as a participant. I also understand that while my interview will be recorded, my 
anonymity will be assured, as it is not necessary to record my name or any other identifying 
information in this recording.   
6. I understand that all research data will be securely stored at the School of Social and Political 
Sciences, University of Canterbury in a secure location for a period of five years and that the 
recordings and the data will be destroyed at the end of five years. 
7. I understand that no psychological distress or inconvenience beyond the normal experience of 
everyday life is expected.   
8. Any questions that I have asked about this process have been answered to my satisfaction. 
9. I agree to participate in the interview session and understand that my participation is 
voluntary, that I may withdraw at any time and withdraw any information/data supplied to 
date without being penalised or disadvantaged in any way. 
  
I am happy to have the interview tape recorded:  (circle 0ne)           Yes  No                     
 
Name of participant :...………………………………………………………….…..(please print) 
 
Signature of participant:….…………………………….....   Date:…………………………… 
 
Contact Number: (hm)……………………........................(mobile)................................................ 
 
Preferred time to call (Day/time)………………........./…………............... 
 
Statement by investigator: 
I have explained this project and the implications of participation in it to this interviewee and I believe that 
the consent is informed and that he/she understands the implications of participation. 
 
Name of Investigator:………………………………..Signature ……………………………… 
Date:………………………………….... 
 
Please post to:                                             Brenda Mackie, 
33 Sinclair Ave, Lower Templetstowe, Melbourne, Victoria 3107. 
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2.3 Participant Information Sheet 
 
 
 
 
 
  
“Risk Communication and Warning Fatigue: the Australian bushfires” 
 
TELEPHONE INTERVIEW INFORMATION SHEET 
 
Invitation 
You are invited to participate in a research study that intends to examine factors that influence individual 
and community bushfire preparedness. This study is being conducted by Brenda Mackie to fulfil the 
requirements for a PhD in Media and Communications, and is being supervised by Dr Donald Matheson.  
 
Objective of the Study 
This research will assess factors that influence how and why people make decisions about preparing or not 
preparing for bushfires. Warnings are an integral part of decision making and the telephone interview will 
include questions that will hopefully initiate discussion about what warnings mean, how they are understood 
and whether they are effective in enabling people to make decisions which enhances safety in the event of a 
bushfire.  
  
The information produced by this research will be used to improve the effectiveness of bushfire risk messages 
by tailoring the information content and the ways in which it is delivered to the public. This will also help 
ensure that targeted public education programs can be developed which will meet the needs of the 
community.  
 
What’s involved as a participant?  
As a participant you will be asked to take part in a telephone interview between you and the researcher, to be 
conducted, at a time that suits you in late May 2011. 
 
With your permission, telephone interviews will be digitally recorded. While we will need a name and 
telephone number to conduct the interview, no personal or identifying information will be used in the 
transcript of your interview. This will ensure that your interview data remain anonymous.  
 
What will happen to the information provided? 
The information collected will be used to inform the analysis and findings for my PhD which will, in due 
course, be published by the University of Canterbury.  The data will be stored for five years in a locked 
cabinet, and all raw data will be destroyed at the end of the five-year period. 
 
If you would like to participate in this study, please complete the attached consent form. 
 
Thanking you in advance for your contribution to this project. 
 
Brenda Mackie 
 
Researcher: brenda.mackie@canterbury.ac.nz 
Primary Supervisor: donald.matheson@canterbury.ac.nz  
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2.4 Recruitment 
 
 
 
  
Warnings and Risk Communication: the Australian Bushfires 
 
To better understand how warnings about bushfires and other potentially serious threats can be 
better communicated, Brenda Mackie, a doctoral student from the University of Canterbury, 
would like to talk to people who: 
 
 DON’T attend community meetings about bushfire safety (and don’t intend to) 
 HAVEN’T made any changes to their home to prevent against bushfire damage 
 ARE willing to be interviewed by telephone late May/early June 
 
Benefit to you? 
Most research to date has come from those who are very involved in bushfire prevention 
activities but these people are a minority. Getting ‘the other side of the story’ will provide a 
valuable and unique perspective on warnings and risk communication, the findings of which will 
be used to help develop more effective bushfire education strategies for your community and 
contribute to bushfire communication research.  
 
For more information please contact: brenda.mackie@canterbury.ac.nz 
Interviews will be recorded and participation is voluntary and confidential. Participants can choose to withdraw at any time. 
 
 
 
    
 
269 
 
2.5 Interview Protocol 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Questions for second round of interviews 
 
1) Are you involved in any active community-safety activities in relation to bushfires? 
 If yes, what and why and who 
 If no, why not [can you anticipate circumstances that would increase your interest to do so?] 
 
2) Do you believe there is a bushfire risk in your community? [get them to quantify this if possible} 
 “if 1 was no real risk, and 10 was a huge risk, where would you put yourself in terms of worrying 
about bushfire?” 
 Are there other risks to you and your family that seem more important to think about than 
bushfires? – if yes, explore why 
 Why do you think you don’t need to worry? 
 
3) Do you ‘stop’ to think about bushfires? 
[ If yes, try and get them to put a number on it – per day – from 0-5] 
 Why do you [for ex: only when you hear or read something] 
 
4) Compared to yourself/your family, how prepared do you think others are? 
 How confident are you that you could survive a severe bushfire, such as one like Black Saturday? 
[very, reasonably, not very] 
 How does this make you feel (in terms of safety) in the event of a possible bushfire? 
 
5) Considering what you have told me about how prepared you are, how did you think a bad bushfire 
might affect you? 
 Do you think t he fire brigade will be able to help you? [tease out responsibility + self-efficacy] 
 Do you know anything about the way fire behaves? 
 
6) Where were you when Black Saturday occurred? 
 What about your family? 
 Did you have a fire plan? 
 What did you actually do? 
 Do you have a fire plan now that is different to before 
 
7) How do you decide if there is a danger or not, from a threatened bushfire? 
 How would you know? 
 
8) Did the events of Black Saturday make a difference to how you think about risk from a bushfire [try to 
get a before and after opinion] 
 
9) Have the Black Saturday bushfires influenced what you do to manage risk from a bushfire 
 Yes/no – why/why not? 
 
10) What do you know, if anything, about the CFA? [Country Fire Authority] 
 Are you aware of any of their recommendations for fire safety? [get them to describe – top 5?] 
 Do you do all those things? 
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11) Are you aware of the recommendation “stay and defend or prepare to leave early” 
 What does ‘early’ mean to you? 
o What would you do if you received a warning? 
o Do you think it’s useful/do-able [tease out ‘attachment to place’] 
 
12) What do you think about how bushfires are warned about? 
 What warnings do you know about? 
 Do you think there is a difference between a warning and an alert [get them to explain] 
 
13) Are you aware of changes to warning categories? 
 [if yes] get them to describe 
 What do they mean to you? 
 How might they influence what you do? 
 
14) Are you aware that the fire danger categories have been changed recently to include to 
‘Catastrophic/Code Red’ category? 
 What do you think catastrophic means? [not a catastrophic day but the word ‘catastrophic’] 
 What do you plan to do on these Code Red days?  
 Do you differentiate between these days and a normal fire danger day? 
 Do you think there is a difference between a total fire ban day and a catastrophic day? Do you 
think there is a possibility that the other/lesser ratings (severe/extreme) will have less impact 
now that there is this catastrophic category? 
 High/severe/extreme – what are the differences between these? Actions? 
 
15)  Where do you go to get information about bushfires? (tease this out - 
media/friends/internet/community forums) 
 What do you think of it? Why? 
 How credible/believable/up to date do you think [the source] is? 
 How do they influence your actions (why/why not) 
 
16)  Do you read newspaper reports about bushfire, and what do you think? [info vs warning] 
 What do you think about the way the media reports issues to do with bushfires? [really tease 
this out much more than last time] 
 
17) Can you remember being warned about the likelihood of a bushfire, and it not eventuating? 
 What did you think when you heard it? 
 Does that make you more or less inclined to pay attention to the next warning? 
 How much credibility do you attach to the next warning? [more/same/less] 
 
18) If you could design a warning system that would get your attention, what would that be/look like? 
For example…. [but try not to prompt] 
 Would there be lots of warnings? 
 Use scientific language 
 Only a few warnings but very strong language 
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3 Study III 
3.1 Ethics Approval 
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3.2 Consent Form 
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3.3 Participant Information Sheet 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
“Risk Communication, Perception and Decision Making: the Australian bushfires” 
 
ONLINE SURVEY INFORMATION SHEET 
 
Invitation 
You are invited to participate in a research study that examines factors that influencing individual 
perception of warnings and their influence on decision making.  This study is being conducted by Brenda 
Mackie to fulfil the requirements for a PhD in Media and Communications, and is being supervised by Dr 
Donald Matheson.  
 
Objective of the survey 
This survey will assess factors that influence how and why people make decisions about preparing or not 
preparing for bushfires. Warnings are an integral part of decision making and this online survey poses 
questions that explore what warnings mean, how they are understood and will hopefully highlight issues that 
inhibit or enable decision making in the event of a bushfire.  
  
The information produced by this research will be made available by the Bushfire Cooperative Research 
Centre to agencies interested in improving the effectiveness of bushfire risk messages and understanding 
how best these messages can be delivered to the public. This will also help ensure that targeted public 
education programs can be developed which will meet the needs of the wider community.  
 
What’s involved as a participant?  
As a participant you will be asked to take an online survey, once a month over the 2011-2012 fire season 
(December 2011-May 2012). The survey takes approximately 20 minutes the first time, and about 10-15 minutes 
for the subsequent survey. You can withdraw your participation at any time without penalty, including the 
withdrawal of any data provided up to the final collation of data. 
No personal or identifying information will be used in the written analysis of the collected data.  
 
What will happen to the information provided? 
The information collected will be used to inform the analysis and findings for the researchers PhD which 
will, in due course, be published by the University of Canterbury.  The data will be stored for five years in a 
locked cabinet, and all raw data will be destroyed at the end of the five-year period. 
 
 T0 show that you have read this information sheet and consented to take part in the survey, 
you will be asked to tick the ‘Consent’ box, at the beginning of the Survey.  
 
Thanking you in advance for taking part in this survey. 
 
Brenda Mackie 
 
 
This research study has received Ethics approval from the University of Canterbury Human Ethics Committee 
(ref 2011/20). 
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3.4 Recruitment (i) – CFA website 
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3.5 Recruitment (ii) – email from colleague in DEPI  
(Department of Environment and Primary Industries) 
 
 
 
 
Dear All  
 
As part of a Bushfire CRC funded project a doctoral researcher, Brenda Mackie, is seeking participants in a 
project that explores the meaning, understanding and effectiveness of fire warnings, and how they enable  
people to make decisions which enhance safety in the event of a bushfire.  
As Brenda is currently based in New Zealand I am trying to assist her in locating up to 50 research 
participants to take part in a short online survey that will be conducted once a month, over a period of 
several months -in order to understand perceptual changes over the fire up-coming  
season (at the participants convenience of course).  
 
I am hopeful that considering your location and experience that you may be able to nominate and provide 
Brenda with contact details for 1-4 people who might/or have agreed to participate. The time burden on 
participants would not be more than 15 minutes a month over four to five months, and in  
my experience Brenda is a thoughtful and respectful communicator.  
Each participant would then be contacted by Brenda who would obtain their consent and provide them 
with the further detail and appropriate information and guarantees around privacy and use of information. 
Ethics for this has study has already been approved by Canterbury HEC (2011/20). 
 
The parameters for the participants sought is:  
.                Not employees or volunteers in a fire related  
organisation (including CFA), or regular participants in community fire  
forums such as learning Networks or Community Fireguard- we are looking  
for "Joe Public" - friends, relatives, neighbours, that person who wants  
to shape the world but doesn't connect with or engage in the current  
forums?  
.                Aged over 18 and NOT retirees;  
.                Based in a peri-urban, or rural locations (this can  
include rural towns); and  
.                No gender specificity required. 
 
The information produced by this research will be used to improve the effectiveness of bushfire risk 
messages by tailoring the information content and the ways in which it is delivered to the public. This will  
also help ensure that targeted public education programs can be developed which will meet the needs of 
the community.  
Please send any leads you might have to Brenda at: brenda.mackie@canterbury.ac.nz 
 
This will ensure their privacy is protected. Brenda is at a point with her PhD where the opportunity to 
explore her topic in more depth has coincided with the upcoming fire season, but obviously, as the fire 
season is upon us, time is 'of the essence'. If you have any questions please feel free to contact me- and 
any help you provide will be deeply appreciated.  
Cheers  
XXXXXXX (Contacts Name) 
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3.6 Interview Protocol 
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4 Fire Danger Ratings 
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5 Item Content: Bushfire Warning Fatigue Subscales (BWFM).  
Note: (R) indicates that the item is reverse-scored. 
 
Subscale Items 
Helplessness 
I am confident I could protect myself from bushfires (R) 
No matter how much I prepare, I don't think it will be enough 
If a major bushfire occurred, there is little I could do to defend my house 
I rely on my own assessment of conditions more than the official advice (R) 
Desensitisation 
/Normalisation 
I've lived with bushfire risk for ages, and it doesn't overly bother me 
The bushfire warnings are just 'background noise' to the concerns of my life 
Living in the city has more risks than the threat of bushfires in my area 
I've survived fires in the past, and expect to again 
Trust 
Since Black Saturday, the emergency services have over-reacted to the danger of 
bushfires 
I rely on my own assessment of conditions more than the official advice 
I am tired of the emergency services telling me how to respond to bushfire risk 
The authorities can be relied upon to give accurate bushfire warnings (R) 
Over-Warning 
There are not enough bushfire warnings (R) 
At the moment, I'm concerned about the bushfire risk in my area (R) 
Because of the number of warnings we get, I tend to 'turn off' 
There are too many bushfire warnings 
Risk Perception 
In my area, I expect a bushfire like Black Saturday will happen again in my lifetime 
(R) 
The concern about bushfires is out of proportion to the real risk 
Black Saturday showed that bushfire risk for my area is much higher than I 
thought (R) 
Most of the time, the bushfire warnings don't apply to me 
Localisation 
/Relevance 
Bushfire warnings don't take the particulars of my area into consideration  
For me, local radio is less relevant for fire information than the official channels 
(R) 
Most of the time, the bushfire warnings don't apply to me 
I take more notice of bushfire warnings if they are issued by my local authorities 
Apathy 
On a day to day basis, I don't give bushfires a lot of thought 
I always follow the advice of official warnings about bushfires (R) 
I've lived with bushfire risk for ages, and it doesn't overly bother me 
I've survived fires in the past, and expect to again 
Scepticism 
The warnings are issued mostly because the officials want to 'play it safe 
Bushfire warnings are always accurate (R) 
Catastrophic warnings are issued because of Black Saturday rather than realistic 
conditions 
Bushfire warnings are only issued when there is a real threat 
False Alarm 
I don't mind how many bushfire warnings there are (R) 
False alarms affect how I respond to subsequent warnings 
False Alarms can lead to complacency 
There are too many bushfire warnings (R) 
Worry 
Each time I hear a bushfire warning, I feel worried (R) 
I don't worry about bushfires 
Thinking about bushfires stresses me out (R) 
On a day to day basis, I don't give bushfires a lot of thought 
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6 Item Content: Revised Bushfire Warning Fatigue Subscales (BWFM-R). 
 
 
Subscale Items 
Helplessness 
I am confident I could protect myself from bushfires (R) 
No matter how much I prepare, I don't think it will be enough 
If a major bushfire occurred, there is little I could do to defend my house 
I rely on my own assessment of conditions more than the official advice (R) 
Trust 
Since Black Saturday, the emergency services have over-reacted to the danger of 
bushfires 
I rely on my own assessment of conditions more than the official advice 
I am tired of the emergency services telling me how to respond to bushfire risk 
The authorities can be relied upon to give accurate bushfire warnings (R) 
Over-Warning 
There are not enough bushfire warnings (R) 
At the moment, I'm concerned about the bushfire risk in my area (R) 
Because of the number of warnings we get, I tend to 'turn off' 
There are too many bushfire warnings 
Scepticism 
The warnings are issued mostly because the officials want to 'play it safe 
Bushfire warnings are always accurate (R) 
Catastrophic warnings are issued because of Black Saturday rather than realistic 
conditions 
Bushfire warnings are only issued when there is a real threat 
False Alarm 
I don't mind how many bushfire warnings there are (R) 
False alarms affect how I respond to subsequent warnings 
False Alarms can lead to complacency 
There are too many bushfire warnings (R) 
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7. Hurricane Sandy Public Information Statement 
 
 
 
 
PUBLIC INFORMATION STATEMENT 
NATIONAL WEATHER SERVICE MOUNT HOLLY NJ 
241 PM EDT SUN OCT 28 2012 
 
...AN EXTREMELY DANGEROUS STORM TO IMPACT THE AREA... 
 
SANDY IS EXPECTED TO SLAM INTO THE NEW JERSEY COAST LATER MONDAY 
NIGHT, BRINGING VERY HEAVY RAIN AND DAMAGING WINDS TO THE REGION. 
THE STORM IS A LARGE ONE, THEREFORE DO NOT FOCUS ON THE EXACT CENTER 
OF THE STORM AS ALL AREAS WILL HAVE SIGNIFICANT IMPACTS. 
 
THIS HAS THE POTENTIAL TO BE AN HISTORIC STORM, WITH WIDESPREAD WIND 
DAMAGE AND POWER OUTAGES, INLAND AND COASTAL FLOODING, AND MASSIVE 
BEACH EROSION. THE COMBINATION OF THE HEAVY RAIN AND PROLONGED WIND 
WILL CREATE THE POTENTIAL FOR LONG LASTING POWER OUTAGES AND SERIOUS 
FLOODING. 
 
PREPARATIONS SHOULD BE WRAPPING UP AS CONDITIONS ARE EXPECTED TO 
WORSEN TONIGHT AND ESPECIALLY ON MONDAY. 
 
SOME IMPORTANT NOTES... 
 
1. IF YOU ARE BEING ASKED TO EVACUATE A COASTAL LOCATION BY STATE 
AND LOCAL OFFICIALS, PLEASE DO SO. 
 
2. IF YOU ARE RELUCTANT TO EVACUATE, AND YOU KNOW SOMEONE WHO RODE 
OUT THE `62 STORM ON THE BARRIER ISLANDS, ASK THEM IF THEY COULD DO 
IT AGAIN. 
 
3. IF YOU ARE RELUCTANT, THINK ABOUT YOUR LOVED ONES, THINK ABOUT 
THE EMERGENCY RESPONDERS WHO WILL BE UNABLE TO REACH YOU WHEN YOU 
MAKE THE PANICKED PHONE CALL TO BE RESCUED, THINK ABOUT THE 
RESCUE/RECOVERY TEAMS WHO WILL RESCUE YOU IF YOU ARE INJURED OR 
RECOVER YOUR REMAINS IF YOU DO NOT SURVIVE. 
 
4. SANDY IS AN EXTREMELY DANGEROUS STORM. THERE WILL BE MAJOR 
PROPERTY DAMAGE, INJURIES ARE PROBABLY UNAVOIDABLE, BUT THE GOAL IS 
ZERO FATALITIES. 
 
5. IF YOU THINK THE STORM IS OVER-HYPED AND EXAGGERATED, PLEASE ERR 
ON THE SIDE OF CAUTION. 
 
WE WISH EVERYONE IN HARMS WAY ALL THE BEST. STAY SAFE! 
 
NWS MOUNT HOLLY, NJ 
   
Dr Jeffrey D. Kepert 
Head, High Impact Weather Research 
 
Weather and Environmental Prediction 
Centre for Australian Weather and Climate Research 
Bureau of Meteorology 
GPO Box 1289 Melbourne VIC 3001 
Level 6, 700 Collins Street, Docklands VIC 3008 
Tel: +61 3 9669 4492 | J.Kepert@bom.gov.au 
www.bom.gov.au | www.cawcr.gov.au 
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8. Lyrics to ‘Waltzing Matilda’. 
 
 
 
 
Once a jolly swagman camped by a billabong 
Under the shade of a coolibah tree, 
And he sang as he watched and waited till his billy boiled: 
"Who'll come a-waltzing Matilda, with me?" 
 
[Refrain] 
Waltzing Matilda, waltzing Matilda 
You'll come a-waltzing Matilda, with me 
And he sang as he watched and waited till his billy boiled: 
"You'll come a-waltzing Matilda, with me." 
 
Down came a jumbuck to drink at that billabong. 
Up jumped the swagman and grabbed him with glee. 
And he sang as he shoved that jumbuck in his tucker bag: 
"You'll come a-waltzing Matilda, with me." 
 
[Refrain] 
 
Up rode the squatter, mounted on his thoroughbred. 
Down came the troopers, one, two, and three. 
"Whose[N 1] is that [N 2] jumbuck you've got in your tucker bag? 
You'll come a-waltzing Matilda, with me." 
 
[Refrain] 
 
Up jumped the swagman and sprang into the billabong. 
"You'll never take me alive!" said he 
And his ghost may be heard as you pass by that billabong: 
"Who'll come a-waltzing Matilda, with me?" 
 
[Refrain] 
